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Abstract
This thesis deals with the development of Anglo-American 
Modernism in London in the early twentieth century. It begins by 
depicting the economic and social position of the artist in the early 
nineteenth century, and agrees with Raymond Williams and EP, 
Thompson that the changing relationship between the artist and the 
market was responsible for what we call Romanticism. I then go on to 
argue that Romanticism explored the problems of artistic creation at a 
time when it seemed that aesthetic values were being sidelined in 
favour of materialism or utilitarianism, and that this raised the spectre 
of aesthetic relativism.
1 then argue that these central problems were essentially the same as 
the problems facing the first generation of British Modernists, and that 
this can be shown by studying the transitional figure of Pater. By 
tracing Pater's vacillations between objectivism and relativism (in 
terms of the ‘early' and ‘later' Pater), we can identify two strands of 
modernist thought: one which emphasises a materialist, relativist 
aesthetic, and another Idealist, Neo-Platonic element that more 
obviously derives from Romanticism.
Following both of these elements into the twentieth century, I then 
demonstrate that W.B. Yeats belongs to this latter tradition, and that by 
the late 1890s he had formulated an Idealist metaphysic, which saw 
poetry as consisting of temporal ‘moments' in which a spatial Neo- 
Platonic metaphysical universe could be glimpsed. Under the influence 
of Nietzsche and Synge, Yeats went on to modernise his diction and 
emphasise ‘hardness' and ‘precision' in his verse, a process that was
beginning by 1902.
I then show that Ezra Pound followed in Yeats’s footsteps in this 
respect, that his early poetry also deals with the Neo-Romantic 
‘moment’, and that Pound ‘modernised ‘ his poetry under the influence 
of Yeats.
I then discuss the theorising of T.E. Hulme and argue that this follows 
in the footsteps of the ‘early’ relativist Pater. Hulme’s earliest poetry 
posits a non-metaphysical aesthetic, which, nevertheless, resembles 
Yeats’s in its emphasis on precise descriptions of poetic vision. Hulme, 
however, found this world view emotionally unacceptable (on the 
grounds that materialism is deterministic, and leads to aesthetic and 
moral relativism), and so (just as with Pater), as soon as he has stated 
his materialist poetic, he attempts to get beyond it, and affirm 
aesthetic value, and free will. His project, is, therefore, an attempt to 
create an objectivist but non-metaphysical way of thinking. Neo- 
Classicism and Anti-Humanism are his attempts to do this.
I then show that the ‘Forgotten School’ of Imagism develops out of 
this way of thinking, and that this school (contrary to what the poets 
involved claimed at the time), has little to do with Pound’s later school 
of ‘Imagisme’. ‘Imagisme’ develops instead, out of Yeatsian Symbolism, 
and consists of Pound’s attempts to ‘modernise’ his own poetry 
(following Yeats) and work out a form that will structure the epic poem  
he was already planning. To Pound, the work of Richard Aldington and 
H.D. (nominally the other Imagistes) was of less importance than his 
relationship to Yeats.
Finally I explore the influence of Bergson on the early work of 
Wyndham Lewis, and show that Lewis’s Vorticism is his attempt to work 
beyond what he saw as the basic flaws o f Bergsonism, whereas for 
Pound, it was, again, an attempt to find a solution to his problem of 
poetic form.
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Introduction
This thesis will deal with the aesthetics of Anglo-American 
Modernism.
Firstly, some definitions. For reasons that are made clear in Chapter 
One, I deal only with poets and painters. Novelists of the period (such 
as D.H. Lawrence), are therefore excluded. Secondly, since the 
publication of Peter NicholPs M odernisms it has become clear that the 
Postmodernist tendency to refer to Modernism as though it were a 
single movement, consisting o f artists with similar aesthetic aims, has 
become untenable. Instead, it has become clear that Modernism (a 
term posthumously attached to the movement (or perhaps tendency 
would be a better label)), consisted o f many writers, artists and 
musicians, in many countries, all with their own artistic agendas. What 
they had in common was certain aesthetic problems, problems 
stemming in the main, I shall argue, from the rise of industrial 
capitalism, and the implications this had for the production of art 
(there were other themes they explored as well, of course, but many of 
these were clearly by-products o f this first process; the transition from 
a mainly rural economy to an urban one, for example). However, 
despite the similarities o f the problems they faced, the solutions they 
offered were frequently very different.
To explain why this should be so, we must be very careful to explain 
the specific cultural features o f the countries where these Modernisms 
arose. In this thesis, for example, I contrast the differing approaches to 
modernity of the Italian Futurists and the British avant-garde based
around the Tittle magazine’ The New Age, I shall show that these 
differences are related to differing conceptions of industrialism, 
progress, and the purpose of art, and that these can be linked back to 
the cultural and economic situation o f these countries at the time.
It is, therefore, what has become known as Anglo-American 
Modernism (actually, Anglo-Irish-American Modernism would be a 
more accurate term), that I will deal with here; it is not necessarily the 
case that studying the ‘solutions’ o f Wyndham Lewis, Pound e t  ai., will 
illuminate the very different aesthetic phenomena that arose, in, for 
example, Spain, Russia, or Germany (let alone Japan or Latin America) 
at this time, even though these too are frequently referred to as 
‘Modernist’.
The next point to make is that I study Modernism in relation to its 
predecessor, the late Romanticism of the 1890s (as well as showing the 
links between this ‘Neo-Romanticism’, and Romanticism proper). Since 
the publication of AxeVs Castle by Edmund Wilson, it has become 
something of a commonplace that Modernism (or at least part of 
Modernism) is an adaption of Romantic aesthetics, and works such as 
Romantic Image by Frank Kermode, and The Post-Romantic 
Consciousness o f  Ezra Pound, by George Bornstein have done much to 
illuminate this connection. However, it is only recently that work by 
American scholars such as Leon Surette in The Birth o f  Modernism  has 
enabled us to see the whole picture, and to realise just how much these 
early Modernists continued the Romantic view of the artist as being a
‘visionary’ or a ‘seer’.
The findings of these writers, (which are prefigured by books such as 
Thomas Jackson’s The Early Poetry o f  Ezra Pound, and Kevin 
Oderman’s Ezra Pound and the Erotic Medium), are still controversial, 
but I think the evidence to support their findings is strong, and getting 
stronger as more work is done.
For example. Pound’s work is filled with allusions to other texts, 
many o f them obscure, or written in languages that, it is reasonable to 
assume, most readers will not be fluent in (such as Chinese). Moreover, 
Pound’s poetry is frequently incomprehensible unless one understands 
these allusions. Why was he so obscure?
This is bound up with a broader question; why is Modernist poetry in 
general so difficult? It is frequently difficult, moreover, not just 
because the ideas it expresses are complex. It sometimes seems that 
Modernist poetry sets ou t to be difficult; to exclude the ordinary 
reader. I will argue that this is, in fact, the case, and that only by 
studying the philosophical beliefs that animated these texts will we 
discover why they look the way they do.
It has become fashionable in recent years (partly for the reasons 
m entioned above) to attack these Modernist thinkers for their alleged 
‘fascism’ or ‘elitism’; one thinks of works such as John Carey’s The 
Intellectuals and the Masses, This is a question it is not desirable to 
gloss over. However, I will argue that, while it is true that much of the 
political philosophy which is implicit (and explicit) in these Modernist
texts is unpleasant by our standards, one must bear in mind the 
situation they found themselves in: that is, as artists, in a world where 
art seemed to be under attack. I will show that the materialist values of  
capitalism, seemed, to writers such as W.B. Yeats, to be destroying the 
values o f the past, and that these values were necessary for the 
creation of great art. Since all these writers believed that art was 
essential for the continuance o f civilisation, it followed that 
uncontrolled capitalist expansion was a bad thing for art. It would be 
better, they thought, to return to the values of older civilisations. Their 
views, were, therefore, on the whole, ‘reactionary’.
Not only did the new socioeconomic situation seem to sideline the 
older, more ‘spiritual’ values of art, but they also brought in their wake 
the rise of democracy. To understand why these writers generally 
opposed democracy, we must understand, first, that, for these 
thinkers, value (aesthetic value, but also moral value), consisted of 
ordering. To say that Shakespeare was a greater writer than George 
Bernard Shaw, is to create an order, a ranking situation, in which 
Shakespeare is in a higher place than Shaw. And without this concept 
of aesthetic value, it was felt, art would become meaningless, and 
therefore redundant.
However, in the new egalitarian society, in which the masses ruled, 
this order would be decided solely on what was ‘popular’. And what the 
masses preferred, thought Pound and Yeats, was junk; the Daily Mail, 
cheap novels, the cinema. It was easy to make the supposition that the
‘higher’ aesthetic values of the past were related to their ‘ordered’ 
hierarchical society, in which cultured aristocrats gave patronage to 
the best and brightest artists o f the day, and the ignorant masses were 
ignored (of course, we must not forget that all these writers were 
middle class, and that simple snobbery played a part in this idea as 
well), and that, therefore, the hierarchy o f aesthetic value could only 
be preserved within a society ordered by a social hierarchy.
I will argue that it was W.B. Yeats who first formulated these theories, 
and that Ezra Pound learned his elitism from Yeats. However, this is not 
to say that all Modernist elitism descends from Yeats. Instead, I will 
show that there are two strands of Anglo-American Modernism, the 
one descending from T.E. Hulme, a philosopher whose theories owe 
most to the French school o f psychological Associationism and 
Bergson, and the other being the school of Yeats and Pound.
Both these strands, can, however, be traced back to the earliest 
thinking o f Pater, in the mid-nineteenth century. Not that Hulme was 
directly influenced by Pater (although Pound and Yeats certainly were). 
Instead, Pater was the among the first English thinkers to see that the 
rise of technology and capitalism created a new world, in which the 
certainties o f the past were dissolving. Pater both welcomed and feared 
this world, and so, even as he celebrates it, he proposes ways of 
surmounting it, and affirming objectivism and ‘value’, even in a world 
of chaos, of moral and aesthetic relativism.
In Chapter One, therefore, I begin by setting out the paradigm I will
be using, which is of the ‘cultural materialism’ of Raymond Williams. I 
show how the rise o f Romanticism is related to the commodification of 
art and the decline of the patronage system, and how these tendencies 
increased as the nineteenth century progressed. Then I illustrate how 
Pater dealt with these problems, and show that there is an ‘early’ Pater 
(who affirmed the new relativist worldview), and a ‘later’ Pater, who 
attempted to surmount it. Very roughly, Hulme followed the thinking 
of the early Pater (whilst also recapitulating his movement towards 
objectivism), and Yeats and Pound followed the later. I also deal with 
Pater’s view of time, a theme that is developed in the next chapter.
In Chapter Two, I move on to the early work of Yeats, and show to 
what extent it is indebted to Romanticism. I show that Yeats’s theories 
of apocalypse and the ‘gyres’ (known to most people from ‘The Second 
Coming’) actually date back to the 1890s, that there are similarities to 
Pater’s theories of temporality, but that they owe more to occult 
thought (such as that espoused by the Order of the Golden Dawn). I 
then relate his mystical philosophy to his increasing attachment to 
elitism and authoritarianism.
In Chapter Three, I show how Yeats ‘modernised’ his verse under the 
influence of Nietzsche, Synge, Florence Farr and Lady Gregory. The 
newer, ‘harder’ Yeats was already visible by 1902.
In Chapter Four, I investigate the early work of Pound, and show the 
influence of Romanticism and Neo-Romanticism (such as that 
exemplified by the poetry o f Yeats) on this early work. I show that
Pound was interested not only in Yeats’s poetry, but also his occult 
philosophy.
Chapter Five deals with Pound between 1908 and the publication of  
Ripostes (1911). The main focus o f this chapter is the vast influence of 
Yeats on Pound, and Pound’s increasing interest in Yeatsian philosophy. 
The key task for Pound, I shall argue, was looking for a way to write the 
Tong poem’ he had planned since his youth. This subdivided into two 
problems; how to create a valid form for this poem, and how to deal 
with the problem of temporality. I argue that Canzoni was Pound’s first 
attempt to ‘modernise’ his poetry, and that the way he chose to do this 
followed in the footsteps o f Yeats, both o f them seeking increasing 
‘precision’ in their poetry. I also explain that Pound’s interest in French 
Symbolism functioned as an adjunct to his (primary) interest in the 
poetry o f Yeats.
I claimed earlier that Anglo-American Modernism consisted of two 
main streams. Up until now, I have dealt only with the school o f Pound 
and Yeats. Now, however, in Chapter Six, I begin to discuss the thought 
of Hulme. I explain his earliest roots in Associationism and Nietzschean 
relativism, and, that, even though he accepted their thought 
intellectually, he found it emotionally unacceptable, and that he found 
a way out of his dilemma in the philosophy of Henry Bergson. I also 
explore the so-called ‘Forgotten School’ of Imagism, and to what extent 
this prefigured Pound’s ‘Imagisme’.
In Chapter Seven, I show that Pound’s school of ‘Imagisme’ was ad
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h o c , with little thought going into formulating a coherent aesthetic. I 
show that Yeats, and not Ford Madox Ford (or Hulme) was the main 
influence on Tmagisme’ and that Pound viewed his relationship with 
Yeats as being more important than his links with the other Tmagistes’. 
I also explore his increasing interest in foreign literature, specifically 
that they may help to act as a basis for the renaissance he believed to 
be imminent.
I then return to Hulme to show the links between his ‘Neo-Classicism’ 
and his earlier philosophy. I argue that there was more continuity than 
change in his position and that ‘Neo-Classicism’ developed out of his 
Associationist readings.
In the same chapter, I show that Pound’s (like Yeats’s) interest in 
China followed on from his interest in India. Both Pound and Yeats 
believed that these were the sort of hierarchical, static, religious (but 
non-Christian) societies they believed were necessary for the creation 
of great art. But they also felt they gave examples of a poetry which 
was precise (something his own poetry now attempted to be), and 
could give him examples o f the sort o f form that could structure his 
epic.
In Chapter Nine, I introduce Wyndham Lewis, and show that Lewis’s 
Vorticism was originally a Bergsonian Neo-Romantic movement, and 
that only in the very few months before the first world war did Lewis 
begin to have doubts about Bergsonism. I also demonstrate that, like 
Imagisme, Vorticism was an ad hoc arrangement, and that Pound’s
8
understanding of the word was very different from Lewis’s.
In the final chapter, I show that Pound’s ‘Anti-Humanism’ was based 
on his misunderstanding o f Hulme’s theory of the same name, which 
was, again, not a volte-face but instead a development o f his earlier 
theories. However, even with Pound’s Anti-Humanism was not a 
reversal o f his earlier thinking, but instead a new name with which to 
deal with old problems.
Chapter One : The Romantics
and Pater
In order to understand Modernism, it is necessary to understand 
Romanticism, and the extent to which Modernism was a reaction 
against it.
Romanticism was not a unified 'movement' (any more than 
Modernism was), but instead a complex of ideas and attitudes which 
were held to a greater or lesser degree by all those who were 
(posthumously) dubbed 'Romantic'. The point I wish to concentrate on 
at present is the relationship between the writer and society, and the 
extent to which this became problematic during this period (I should 
add at this point, that this thesis will deal (with the exception of 
Chapter Ten) with lyric and epic poets. It is their situation that I am 
mainly concerned with. Therefore, when I use or quote the words 
'artist' or 'writer', they are to be assumed to refer to poets only, and 
not to (for example), novelists, visual artists, or playwrights, where the 
subject is rather more complex). Raymond Williams lists the relevant 
ideas succinctly in Culture and Society.
There are five main points; first that a major change was taking place in the 
nature of the relationship between a writer and his readers; second that a 
different habitual attitude towards the public' was estabUshing itself; third, that 
the production of art was coming to be regarded as one of a number of specialised 
kinds of general production; fourth, that the theory of the 'superior reality' of 
art, as the seat of imaginative truth, was receiving increasing emphasis; fifth, 
that the idea of the independent creative writer, the autonomous genius, was 
becoming a kind of rule (Williams, 1958 : 32).
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All these points are important, but they all seem to follow from this 
first point; that the relationship between the artist and society had 
radically changed. Williams clarifies this point as follows; 'Under 
patronage, the writer had at least a direct relationship with an 
immediate circle of readers, from whom, whether prudentially or 
willingly, as mark or as a matter o f respect, he was accustomed to 
accept and at times to act on criticism [...] the writer "belonged'” 
(Williams, 1958 : 32).i Williams goes on to comment that whereas in 
the new literary 'market' the artist had opportunities for far greater 
financial gain than had previously been the case, this opportunity was 
gained at a price. Now, the artist was responsible not to any individual, 
'but to the workings of an institution which seemed largely impersonal' 
(Williams, 1958 : 33). This new institution is, of course, the growth o f
1 One could, of course, argue that this was a good thing, and certainly, many writers of the 
eighteenth century were unhappy with the system (see following footnote). However, patronage 
had one other advantage, as well as the ‘personal relationship’ discussed by Williams; security.
A poet with a patron was guaranteed an income, regardless of whether the work in question 
was popular in the market (of course it would still have to be liked by the patron). Certainly, the 
artists who most regretted the end of patronage (like Yeats; see  below), were those who knew 
that they could not have earned an adequate or secure living from sales of their literary work 
alone (Pethica, 1997). Perhaps the reason these concerns seem most prevalent In the works 
of epic and lyric poets is that, traditionally, these are the most ‘unpopular’ of the literary arts, 
(especially in an age increasingly dominated by the novel), and would therefore have had the 
most difficulty selling in an open market.
Novelists and playwrights do not seem to have been motivated by these concerns to the same 
extent. In Chapter Ten, for example, it is interesting that Wyndham Lewis (a prose writer and 
painter), does not seem to have been concerned with relativism, commodification etc. until after 
he had begun to associate with Pound and his friends, who certainly were.
It is often claimed that the so-called broadsheet ballad sellers’ were an exception to this rule, 
in that they sold lyric poetry directly onto the market as early as the Elizabethan age, but this is a 
false analogy. The main difference between them and lyric poets of the eighteenth century is that 
the ‘ballad sellers’ had no consciousness of writing as a careen Many of them had no concept 
of it as a craft. Most of them were teenagers, hawking ballads (most of which were not written by 
them), around alehouses, brothels and so on, for a brief period of time in their lives. Most of them 
had, in any case, other sources of income; such as begging, theft, and, as a matter of fact, 
patronage.
The vast majority of them were, in other words, peddlers or criminals, who hawked ballads as 
well as their other wares. We will remember that Autolycus’s  (from A Winter’s Tale) main produce 
was linen; selling songs was a sideline. (Watt, 1991 )12
what Williams calls the 'literary market'; in other words, the 
breakdown o f the old system o f patronage, and its replacement by the 
capitalist marketplace.2
This leads on the William's third point, that in the early nineteenth  
century, people began to look upon the work of art as a commodity, 
which would have to sell in the marketplace in the same way as any 
other commodity. But as Marx (following Adam Smith) pointed out, 
commodities have two kinds of value; their 'use value' and their 
'exchange value'. The 'exchange value' o f a commodity is whatever is it 
could be exchanged for; and for literary works this would obviously be 
the amount o f money that the public was prepared to pay for it. The
'use value' o f a literary work, was, however, much more problematic
2 This vast subject, is, of course, rather more complex than this brief note allows, of course. For 
example, whereas it is true that writers in the pre-Romantic period obtained money from patrons, this 
did not, of course, preclude them from obtaining income from other sources as well (such as 
inheritances, for example).
Moreover, there does not seem to have been quite as sharp a break between patronage and 
Capitalism as this passage implies. Critics are hazy about when patronage ended, with many 
proposing Samuel Johnson’s cry ‘“we have done with patronage'" from 1773 as marking the 
final end of the system. (Donoghue, 1996 :1). However, another critic can claim that Alexander 
Pope was ‘a professional poet, the first to live successfully without patronage', adding that 
‘Dryden had tried to live without patronage, and had died in poverty’ (Gurr, 1971 : 5).This would 
seem to imply that patronage was already breaking down at the end of the seventeenth 
century.
However, we must remember that Pope’s translations of the ///ad and the Odyssey, which 
earned him the majority of his money (approximately £5,000 each) were due to innovative 
subscription techniques (and not, therefore, sales alone). No-one had ever made quite this much 
money from the writing of poetry before (Gurr, 1971). A sa contrast, Milton made £10 in total for 
Paradise Lost (Hunter, 1978).
What seem s to have happened in the eighteenth century, the most recent scholarship has 
discovered, is that the financial value of patronage stayed more or less the same throughout the 
period (and had remained at this level since the Renaissance), but that the literary market 
increased, so that as a percentage of the money given to the arts patronage became 
increasingly unimportant. It was, therefore, the population explosion at the end of the century 
which made patronage irrelevant as a solution to the problem of the funding of the arts 
(Donoghue, 1996).
One must not neglect in this discussion the decline of other forms of income, such as (as 
mentioned above), inheritance, during this period. Whereas in the Victorian period Inheritance 
still played a part in sustaining some members of the bourgeoisie, by the eariy twentieth century 
it had all but died out, forcing writers increasingly to have ‘careers’ and make their money from 
what they could sell in the market, and nothing else.
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(Marx writes ‘A commodity can be alienated as a use-value only to one 
whom it serves as a use-value Le [„.] , as a means of satisfying a certain 
want' (Marx, 1904 : 43). It is this question, if what particular 'want' art 
satisfies that was persistently asked during this period. Certainly a 
writer could defend his work on the grounds that it sold (and only if. 
Marx writes 'exchange value is a variable quantity'; Le. it is not a 
consistent value (Marx, 1904 : 35)). If however, the work failed to sell 
in the marketplace, then this defence would itself, fail, and the writer 
would have to appeal to some other criterion of value. And positing 
such criteria would, by definition, challenge the view of art being a 
commodity, and nothing else.^
It was to this latter tactic that writers and intellectuals were 
increasingly driven to. It is no coincidence that it is at this point that 
the autonomous study of aesthetics began. (Williams writes 'Aesthetics, 
itself a new word, and a product of the specialisation (Le. the 
narrowing of artistic to activities that only belonged to "high art"), 
similarly stood parent to aesthete, which again indicated a "special 
kind o f person"' (Williams, 1958 : 44). Thus there is a relationship 
between Romantic aestheticism, and the new study of aesthetics). If it 
was true that there was some other form o f value, that ignored (or,
3 The idea that art is simply a commodity and nothing else is often taken to be the belief of the 
class displacing the aristocracy at this time, the bourgeoisie. Whether this is the case or not, it is 
certainly true that artists and intellectuals believed it to be the case. It was Matthew Arnold, of 
course, who, speaking of this class, called them The Philistines’ (Arnold, 1965), and The 
Philistines [...] dealt in education as though it were a commodity to be measured in terms of 
money and respectability’ (Avery, 1971 :126). Avery points out that Mr Podsnap from Our Mutual 
Friend is a perfect example of the type. Dickens goes out of his way to point out that Podsnap 
considers Literature’s only purpose to be to flatter himself and people like him. It was this attitude 
that the Romantics reacted against.
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possibly, was even antithetical towards) the value that the 'market' 
gave to a work, then what one meant by the concept of 'value' would 
have to be agreed upon.
So, the whole concept of 'worth', 'value', and what the 'literary merit' 
of a work might be, and how one might evaluate this, was up for debate 
in a way it had never been before. It is, therefore, no surprise that 
Romanticism expresses the problems with defining the ontological 
status o f 'the aesthetic' at the same time as it expresses the growing 
division between what were perceived as being the values of the artist 
and the values of the rest o f society. These problems were two sides of  
the same coin; and at the time they were expressed as the concepts 
that
A) the work of art needed no 'external' justification (that questions of 
the utilitarian value of art were unimportant; that its only justification 
was its aesthetic value, though the status and meaning o f that last 
phrase had yet to be defined) and
B) the values of the 'public' were irrelevant to the concerns o f the 
artist.
That these impulses began to be felt particularly strongly at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, was undoubtedly due primarily to 
the impact of what Eric Hobsbawm, in The Age o f  Revolution 1789-
15
1848  calls the ‘impact of the dual revolutions i.e. the French Revolution 
and the industrial revolution (Hobsbawm, 1988) (This is shown by the 
self valuation of the artists whose fields were not significantly affected 
by these changes. As Hobsbawm again points out; those creatively 
involved in arts where the role o f the artist was not affected by these 
revolutions did not produce Romantic art (Hobsbawm, 1988)).
Hobsbawm elaborates; T h e real problem was that of the artist cut off 
from a recognisable function, patron or public and left to cast his soul 
as a commodity upon the blind market, to be bought or not' 
(Hobsbawm, 1988 : 316), and he goes on to show how this led to the 
development of the ideology of the ‘genius'; a man somehow 
intrinsically different or better than the mass of common humanity.
This view of art led to two separate views of the standing of the 
artist. To the Philistine, the poet whose work had no obvious ‘use value' 
was nothing more than a wastrel; to the artist, he was a superior being, 
whose genius was beyond the understanding of the bourgeoisie. 
However, these views were not as antithetical as they might seem. The 
critic Gerald Graff expresses this linkage thus:
There is a secret and unacknowledged collaboration between rebellious 
aesthetes and their Philistine detractors which remains an unwritten chapter in 
the social history of art. For both poetolatory's glorification of the artist as a 
demigod and the Philistines' denigration of him as an irresponsible social deviant 
share a common definition of the artist as a special kind of person, one who 
perceives the world in a way different to that of ordinary objective judgment
(Graff, 1977 : 223).
16
To discuss what Graff means by ‘objective judgment' in this context, 
we must introduce a number o f other points related to the ‘dual 
revolution'. The first is the division between two kinds of knowledge 
(which we might call ‘hard' and ‘soft'). Up until now, we have merely 
looked at the introduction of the market to literature, and with the 
problems caused by treating art as a commodity.
However, a concomitant of the industrial Revolution was that science 
and technology were being brought into people's lives at an 
unprecedented rate (Hobsbawm, 1988 : 27-52). This had two major 
consequences for the relationship between the arts and the sciences.
Firstly there was the use of scientific or pseudo-scientific 
philosophies to justify the inequalities caused by the industrial 
Revolution.4 (Mainly economics. As Hobsbawm writes, ‘The daring 
innovation of the classical rationalists had been to demonstrate that 
something like logically compulsory laws were applicable to human 
consciousness and free decision. The “laws" of political economy were
4 It was undoubtedly the capitalist's valuation of profit above morality, indeed, the statement that 
there was no morality except the accumulation of profit, that caused the Romantics to first 
oppose them and their thinking. The poet Southey, for example, ‘rejected the notion that political 
economy was concerned with general welfare, and condemned its exclusion of all moral 
considerations [...] to Richard Oastler, it [...] seemed nothing less than blasphemy to him that such a 
principle should be seen, as he believed it was being seen, as the fulfilment of the laws of nature.' 
The Lake Poets soon coined the phrase ‘commercialism’ to define this attitude, to which they 
associated ‘materialism’ both being associated as philosophies that denied the existence of 
moral and aesthetic value.
it might be thought that they were exaggerating. But actually, many industrialists agreed with the 
poet’s  diagnosis. ‘Robert Owen acknowledged that pecuniary gain was the governing principle 
of trade [...] to achieve this a man must buy cheap and sell dear, and to succeed in this he must 
acquire such powers of deception that he must lose all honesty and sincerity’. In short ‘ it was 
good, conceded Howitt, that two blades were growing where previously there had been but one, 
but humanity had needs beyond the physical ones, and provision must be made for the 
spiritual and Intellectual, as well as the bodily needs’ (Thomis, 1976 :103-104).
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of this sort. The conviction that they were as far beyond liking and 
disliking as the laws of gravity (with which they were often compared) 
lent a certain ruthless certainty to the capitalists of the early 
nineteenth century, and tended to imbue their romantic opponents 
with an equally wild anti-rationalism’ (Hobsbawm, 1988 : 343 (my 
italics))5 . Thus, Shelley's suspicion of rationality in his Defence o f  
Poetry, is, as he says, prompted by moral indignation; ‘Whilst the 
mechanist abridges, and the political economist combines labour, let 
them beware that their speculations, for want of correspondence with 
those first principles which belong to the imagination, do not tend, as 
they have in modern England, to exasperate at once the extremes of  
luxury and want.‘(Shelley, 1909 : 149). The ‘mechanist' and ‘political 
economist’, says Shelley, provide a psuedo-philosophy (‘speculations') 
that have, in ‘modern England' led to huge inequalities between rich 
and poor, because their thought does not correspond to the principles 
of the 'imagination’. So writers of the time were driven to be 
increasingly suspicious of pure rationality; what one might call ‘hard’ 
knowledge, knowledge that ignores the principles of the imagination.
Secondly, as I have already mentioned, rationality was the tool with 
which the utility of art was questioned. To quote Shelley again; ‘But 
poets have been challenged to resign the civic crown to reasoners and 
mechanists, on another plea. It is admitted that the exercise of the 
imagination is most delightful, but it is alleged that that of reason is
5 We should remember this identification of anti-rationalism and romanticism when we come to 
analyse the thought of I.E. Huime.
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more usefuF (Shelley, 1909 : 148 (my italics)). Here,then, are the roots 
of Romantic distrust of rationality and science (the classic discussion  
of this is in Science and the Modern World, by A.N. Whitehead. 
Whitehead concludes his chapter on Romanticism; ‘the romantic 
revival was a protest on behalf o f the organic view of nature, and also a 
protest against the exclusion o f value from the essence o f matter o f  
fact [...] The romantic reaction was a protest on behalf of value' 
(Whitehead : 1985 118). Whitehead was using ‘value' in a slightly 
different way from the way I am using it here, but this is not important 
for this discussion).
Underlying this debate was the hidden assumption, which was held as 
fervently by the Romantics as their rationalist opponents, that the field 
of knowledge, which had once been ‘organic' and ‘whole' (just like 
society), had now become split in two; into rational (and empirical) 
knowledge, and, on the other hand, emotional, subjective knowledge. 
And the two were now perceived as having a different truth status.
After all, was it not the case that if something had been shown to be 
the case by scientific experiment, this proved that it was objectively  
true? And was it not the case (to quote two contemporary linguists 
discussing ‘objectivism') that ‘Only objective knowledge is really 
knowledge'? (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 : 188).
If this is the case, however, then what is the status of other kinds of 
knowledge that we have; knowledge of our feelings and emotions; and 
feelings about what is valuable in our lives; so called ‘subjective’
19
knowledge? The answer that one might well arrive at, as Lakoff and 
Johnson continue, was that objectivism implies that T o be objective is 
to be rational; to be subjective is to be irrational and to give in to the 
emotions' (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980 : 188). According to this view, 
scientific knowledge, which is equated with rationality, is therefore the 
only true form of knowledge; subjective knowledge, knowledge of 
values and emotion, is of an inferior kind, and should be discounted  
whenever possible. But in the face of the encroaching of the capitalist 
marketplace, as stated earlier, it is precisely this ‘subjective' world o f  
values whose ontological status a whole generation of intellectuals 
were attempting to justify, under the name of aesthetics. Aesthetics 
attempted to deal with, and quantify the world of taste, emotion and 
sentiment that was involved when one ‘appreciates' (for example) a 
work of art.
However, according to the ‘objectivisf viewpoint, all this work was 
worthless; the conclusions it arrived at were not ‘objective'. As Gerald 
Graff puts it.
It was the diminished status of rational knowledge, reduced to mere neutral fact, 
which inspired the romantic invention of imaginative truth as an antidote. But 
[...] the romantic exploitation of imaginative truth was shadowed by the age's 
apprehension that any truth containing a value- component (if not all truth) 
might be no more than an arbitrary construction. Objective facts, for ah their 
unsatisfactory inertness, could at least be verified. If imaginative truth were 
determined from within rather than without, how could a poet know whether one 
myth prompted by his imagination were truer than any other? (Graff, 1977 : 
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224 )
A division had therefore appeared between two modes of cognition; 
modes which had once (it seemed) been united in an organic unity, but 
were now divided. The natural response to those who would question 
the utility o f the world of values, was for their opponents to emphasise 
its importance, and emphasise the shortcomings of the ‘objectivisf, 
rationalist, mechanist viewpoint. The key word was the word ‘truth’. 
Science and rationality justified themselves because their findings were 
objectively true. The obvious response was to retaliate that value 
judgments, emotional states and so forth, were also true. Moreover in 
terms o f the whole person, these truths were more important than 
‘mere neutral fa c f .
As against the ‘objectivisf myth, then, there now appeared the 
‘subjectivist’ myth, defined by Lakoff and Johnson as follows; ‘Art and 
poetry transcend rationality and objectivity and put us in touch with 
the more important reality o f our feelings and emotions [...] it (i.e. 
subjectivism) takes as its allies the emotions, intuitive insight, 
imagination, [...] art, and a ‘higher’ truth’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1980 : 
188).
By attacking the scientific, ‘rational’ side of man and exalting the 
‘irrational’, emotional, artistic side, therefore. Romantic poets 
admitted that a split had taken place and implicitly conceded that a 
unification was impossible. By claiming that value was brought into the 
world by the individual poet, one concedes that values (even poetic
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values ) are to some extent, arbitrary. And this brings up the threat of 
aesthetic relativism; the idea that all value judgments may be only 
subjective, and therefore, perhaps, arbitrary (relativism, in the present 
context, therefore, means aesthetic, or moral, relativism, not 
epistemological relativism).^
And so, when Shelley began his Defence o f  Poetry, it was this division 
that it already seemed natural to begin with; the division between 
‘reason and imagination.‘ He continues that imagination is the 
‘principle of synthesis, and has for its objects those forms which are 
common to universal nature and existence itself, whereas reason 
‘regards the relations of things, simply as relations; considering 
thoughts not in their integral unity, but as the algebraical 
representations which conduct to certain general results’. (Shelley 
1909 : 120). It is reason, therefore, which disrupts the urge towards 
unity in nature, which splits it up. Genuine unity; ‘organic ‘ unity, can 
only be achieved by taking the imagination into account. This
6 It is difficult to find statements made at the time which support these views by definition; the 
Philistines would not write philosophical treatises to support their philistinism. However, by 
examining the thought of Jeremy Bentham one can perhaps see something ciosest to what the 
Romantics feared. To be fair, as Bentham grew older his thought became more democratic and 
radical, but in his youth he was undoubtedly associated with the laissez-faire approach to the 
economy, and a benign authoritarianism (Dinwiddie, 1989).
It was Bentham who wrote ‘Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the 
arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more 
valuable than either. Everybody can play at push-pin; poetry and music are relished only by a 
few [...] it is only from custom and prejudice that, in matters of taste, we speak of false and true’ 
(Bentham, 1843 ; 253-254).
Bentham spends much time ridiculing the idea of ‘value’. If something is popular, says Bentham 
, it is, by definition, good. He thus makes the link between aesthetic relativism (as stated above), 
and a sort of populism that Is deeply distrustful of any suspicion of elitism, especially literary 
elitism.
It is only by realising that, to the Romantics (and, later on, Neo-Romantics), Bentham was 
saying what many people were thinking, that one can understand artist’s  fears for the future of 
the production of serious art.
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irrationality can be misunderstood. Shelley is not of course, advocating 
the abolition of reason; his language, which posits holism, urges the 
reconciliation of the two modes of thought. But because it is 
imagination which most seems to be threatened, he stresses the extent 
to which it is necessary to the artist, and therefore to humanity.
But to accept this dichotomy brings new difficulties to the quest to 
escape from the aesthetic relativism discussed earlier. For by accepting 
this division, and by insisting that the imagination is more important 
(in terms of the whole being) than rationality, it therefore becomes 
difficult to rationally justify a system of aesthetics (by definition; one 
cannot rationally justify something if it is rational justification itself 
that has led to the need for justification). And yet, if art cannot be 
justified by an appeal to some form o f aesthetic value, then it really is 
just a commodity, which must sell in the marketplace alongside boot 
laces and kettles. And, to reiterate, if artistic objects had no intrinsic 
value that could be justified in this way, then their value would be 
wholly contingent on their market value. But the rising bourgeoisie, as 
we have seen, had little taste for poetry that did not exalt their own 
beliefs (or rather, their Romantic critics had little faith that this would 
not be the case). It seemed safe to deduce, therefore, that the market 
value o f texts such as a lyric poem would be small indeed, and, in the 
case o f writers such as Keats and John Clare, their fears seemed to be 
borne out. Poets, therefore, sought a way of reaffirming the value of 
their works without relying on the vagaries of the bourgeoisie.
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Caught in this trap, there was an obvious way out; to posit an 
îrrationalîst defence of aesthetic value. The form which this took will 
be discussed below; the main point to grasp here is that it was 
formulated as a reaction to the fear that art may indeed, in the new 
rationalist, mechanist, capitalist, world, have no purpose.^
The rise o f science and technology also had an impact on people’s 
perceptions o f time. There are, again, two points to be made here. 
Firstly, as opposed to what now seemed to be the stasis o f the past, 
under the influence of the ‘dual revolutions’, time seemed to have 
moved into a new gear; change instead o f stasis became the rule. As 
Poulet writes in Studies in Human Time: ‘The nineteenth century had in 
the highest degree what Renan called the “intuition of becoming’’ [...] 
time seems an essentially continuous motion which can only be 
understood in its trend away from an original cause; it is a becoming 
which is always the future’ (Poulet 1956 : 31-32). Poulet continues;
‘This perceptible time is such only because it is conceived as an 
immense causal chain. Everything is manifested in it, under the form of 
a continuous implication of causes and effects [...] There is from the 
first [...] a generative law, first principle of duration, but lacking 
duration. In order to conceive it, the mind must exile itself from time 
to enter into a kind of negative eternity’ (Poulet, 1956 : 32). And this
7 And may therefore become extinct.The Romantics themselves tended to be too optimistic to 
state this fear, of the redundancy of art openly. As we will see, however, Neo-Romantics like 
Yeats did state it, over and over again. And they specifically linked this fear, that art would 
become extinct, to the rise of the bourgeoisie, and to the bourgeoisie’s  ‘materialism’ (that is to 
say, their denial of metaphysical values). As I will show later on, Wyndham Lewis, Yeats, and 
even, at times, Ezra Pound, all believed that it was possible that high art was dying.
24
other, prior time, is, as Poulet states ‘a purely scientific time, made of 
determinations and effects, it is not the time o f the human being’ 
(Poulet, 1956 : 33). Behind, in other words, the idea of the organic 
time of ‘a becoming’ of, in other words, progress, lies the time that 
has been created by the scientific world; a world that is not organic, 
but consists o f discrete events o f cause and effect; and ‘A world o f  
cause and effect becomes an illusory world, a world that vanishes like 
the mist in shreds of duration, some of which, the more hallucinatory, 
last a little longer than others’ (Poulet, 1956 : 33). And this also, 
clearly links up with Baudelaire’s comment that ‘The ephemeral, the 
fleeting forms o f beauty in our day [...] [are] the characteristic traits 
o f what [...] we have called “modernity’” (Baudelaire, 1972 : 435). Peter 
Nicholls, in M odernisms shows the ubiquity of this idea in the mid 
nineteenth century in Emerson and Marx, among others. And he links 
this with the growth and increasing ubiquity of the capitalist market; 
‘Here, too the particular modernist preoccupation with time begins, for 
as Baudelaire’s comment suggests, the conjunction of greed and inertia 
implies that the market has somehow frozen the movement of history, 
installing in its place a procession of ever “new” commodities’
(Nicholls, 1995 : 7) (it is the ubiquity of the market, together with the 
new sense of ‘becoming’ that it engendered, that makes the experience 
of the capitalist market different from earlier market systems).
This scientific ‘packaging’ of time, again, clearly relates to Shelley’s 
sense o f time being related to ‘place, number and the conceptions’; i.e.
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that which rationally divided things, rather than that which organically 
united them. Shelley writes ‘A poet participates in the eternal, the 
infinite and the one; as far as relates to his perception, time and place 
and number are not’ (Shelley, 1909 : 124). Place and number are o f  
course associated with the particular form of time that is associated 
with rationality. Therefore, Shelley creates another dichotomy; 
between the organic, holistic, and ‘timeless’ world of the imagination, 
and the rational world, which consists of discrete units of ‘packaged’ 
time (this urge for holism is ubiquitous amongst the early Romantics). 
‘All the major romantic writers, and Blake most emphatically, set as the 
goal for mankind, the reachievement o f a unity which has been earned 
by unceasing effort Blake recognised the strength of civilised man’s 
yearning for simple self-unity of the life o f infants and of instinctual 
creatures’ (Abrams, 1971 : 260-261). The packaged time created by 
reason, science and commerce is emotionally unsatisfying; it seems to 
break reality down into mere contingent events. It makes time, and 
therefore life, seem to have no meaning. As John Shawcross writes, 
speaking o f Shelley, ‘It is from his keen sense of the obscurity, the 
complexity, and changefulness of the material world, where “nothing 
endures but mutability” and where so much seems accidental, aimless 
and superfluous, that Shelley’s longing for a world of permanent forms 
and his faith in its existence are sprung’ (Shelley, 1909 : xi). ‘The 
material world’ is therefore, for Shelley, now associated now with 
temporality, which as we have already seen, is associated with
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rationality, technology, and the rest.
Shelley therefore posits the idea that poetry contains ‘eternal truths’; 
it has in a way, defeated Time, which ‘destroys the beauty and the use 
of the story of particular facts’ and he was not alone in doing so. But 
eternity is seen behind, and through, as it were, the apparent world o f  
the moment. The writings of the early Romantics are suffused with this 
cult o f the ‘moment’ in particular the poetry of Shelley and Blake 
(Abrams, 1971 : 387). In all their works, however, the moment in time 
leads to what Abrams calls a ‘timeless revelation’ And Wordsworth’s 
poetry as well, frequently deals with instances in which his ‘ eye is fixed 
on the object [...] the object itself suddenly becomes charged with 
revelation’ (Abrams, 1971 : 388). His ‘higher poetry’ (Le. poetry o f the 
exalted, timeless moment) combines “‘the wisdom of the heart and the 
grandeur o f the imagination”’ (Abrams, 1971 : 393), because it saw 
eternal truth, which was in the final analysis, religious ‘There is an 
affinity between religion-whose element is infinitude [...] and poetry- 
aetherial and transcendent’ (Abrams, 1971 : 395).
Poetry, therefore, had a truth value. And its truth value was not less, 
but more, objective than scientific or rational truth, which were merely 
contingent. Poetic truths were timeless. And here, of course, was a way 
out of the relativist maze. For if a poem had an ‘eternal truth value’, 
then the ephemeral praise (or condemnation) of the bourgeoisie was 
irrelevant; the poem justified itself to society (because it was ‘true’) 
and, at the same time its value was eternal; value had therefore freed
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itself from the charge of relativism; even though public taste may be 
ephemeral, the aesthetic merit o f a poem was established beyond a 
doubt.
But, again, since (for the reasons we have seen earlier) these visions 
of the ‘real’ world that lay behind reality, could not be justified 
‘rationally’ (unlike Plato’s for example) how were they to be justified at 
all? The problems had been stated by the first generation of Romantics, 
but they had generally backed away from the new ‘subjectivist’ world 
they had stumbled into (see, for example, the ‘later’ Wordsworth and 
Coleridge), and the second generation (of Byron, Shelley and Keats) 
had died before they had had a chance to explore these new problems. 
And so it was not until midway through the nineteenth century that 
work really began on working out the implications of the Romantic 
paradigm.
The first major thinker in England to follow through the implications 
of these ideas in a systematic way was Pater. His investigations were to 
have a profound impact on writers for the next half century, up to and 
including, the early English Modernists. This is not to say that all these 
writers were ‘influenced’ by him, but that, as E.G. McGrath puts it in 
The Sensible Spirit, Pater’s texts ‘as a whole present a conceptual 
paradigm that constitutes a substantial portion of the intellectual 
foundations of Modernist aesthetics and that consequently elucidates 
many of the premises, themes, motifs, and techniques of the major 
Modernist texts’ (McGrath, 1986 : 3).
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Pater begins, in his earliest essays, by dealing with the rise of science, 
and the implications of this for the humanities; in other words, with 
the same problems that had concerned the Romantics. ‘Modern 
thought is distinguished from ancient by its cultivation o f the “relative” 
spirit in place of the “absolute” [...] The philosophical conception of 
the relative has been developed in modern times through the influence 
of the sciences o f observation [...] The moral world is ever in contact 
with the physical, and the relative spirit has invaded moral philosophy 
from the ground of the inductive sciences’ (Pater, 1889 : 65-66). One 
must be careful to follow Pater’s language here, or it is easy to 
misunderstand him. Pater is not claiming here that science has 
relativised all knowledge (after all, if science itself was just another 
myth, then it is not clear why its truth claims would matter to the 
humanities, or anything else). He does not say that relativism has 
drifted into the humanities because science itself tends towards 
relativism. Instead, he says that older, more holistic terms for reality, 
have broken down in the face of the more accurate, empirical 
descriptions o f physical science. In the famous Conclusion to The 
Renaissance, he explains why, showing how science’s tendency to break 
things down into their component parts has, in a sense, atomised 
reality; broken it down into discrete units ; ‘What is the whole of 
physical life [...] but a combination of natural elements to which 
science gives their names?’ (Pater, 1980 : 186). It has done this not 
just to external reality, but to internal reality as well. ‘If we begin with
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the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more 
rapid [...] At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of 
external objects [...] but when reflection begins to act upon these 
objects they are dissipated under its influence [...] each object is loosed 
into a group o f impressions [...] in the mind o f the observer (Pater,
1980 : 187). Notice that Pater uses the phrases ‘philosophical (not 
scientific) conception of the relative’ and ‘the moral world’. Inductive 
science is based on the ground (in its empiricism), but it is moral 
philosophy that becomes ‘relativised’. There is no question, for Pater, 
of science having relativised itself; instead by dissolving the old moral 
and metaphysical boundaries, it has helped to relativise ‘moral 
philosophy’ (and, we might infer, the humanities generally. This is of 
course, a reiteration of the Romantic division between ‘hard’ (true, 
scientific), and ‘soft’ (subjective, relative), knowledge) (it is only fair 
to add that Pater’s language is ambiguous, and that whereas he seems 
to be admitting that science is ‘objectively true’ here, in other passages 
he seems to imply that the relativism unleashed by science has 
relativised science as well, which would seem to undermine his whole 
argument: see footnote six).
Pater’s investigation begins, therefore, by commenting that science’s 
seizing of the particular, and its suspicion of theory (with the 
exception of scientific theory), has dissolved what we are used to 
taking for granted; the external world o f ‘objects’ and even our 
subjective sense o f ourselves as being unified personalities. Pater then
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goes on to discuss the implications this has for our sense of time.
Analysis goes a step further still, and tells us that those impressions of the
individual which, for each of us, experience dwindles down, are in perpetual 
fUght; that each of them is limited by time, and that as time is infinitely divisible, 
each of them is iofinitely divisible also; all that is actual in it being a single 
moment, gone while we try to apprehend it [.„] to such a tremulous wisp 
constantly reforming itself on the stream, to a singly sharp impression, with a 
sense in it, a relic more or less fleeting, of such moments gone by, what is real in 
our life fines itself down. It is with the movement, the passage and dissolution of 
impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off (Pater, 1980 ; 188).
For Pater, then, time has been cut into what Poulet called ‘shreds of 
duration’. There is nothing beyond the moment, and so ‘the purpose of 
philosophy, [...] and culture [...] is to startle it into sharp and eager 
observation [...] to give nothing but the highest quality to your 
moments as they pass, and simply for those moment’s sake’ (Pater, 
1980 : 190).
In this emphasis on the moment. Pater is following on from the
innovations of the English Romantics, as he himself is aware (the
influence o f the French Romantics, especially Baudelaire, is also
apparent (Conlon, 1982 : 85-94)). However, his reading of the them
was new (and influential). Wordsworth and Romantic poets in general
were undergoing a revival during the 1870s (Guy, 1991 :109-110), but
they were mainly viewed as being primarily great moralists, whose
concentration on nature was a necessarily wholesome counterpoint to 
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the evils o f the industrial Revolution, and as helping to democratise the 
language of poetry, with their use of the demotic. It is these 
assumptions that Pater attacks. For Pater, Wordsworth’s great discovery 
is, that in the world of the relative, the only sure knowledge was 
knowledge about one’s own thought processes (Pater, 1889).^ ‘In 
much that he said in exaltation of rural life, he was but pleading 
indirectly for that sincerity, that perfect fidelity to one’s own inner 
presentations, to the precise features o f the picture within, without 
which any profound poetry is impossible’ (Pater, 1889 : 49-50).
In this important passage, Pater identifies the ‘picture within’ as being 
the essential component of great poetry. And this picture within can 
only be discerned ‘in select moments of vivid sensation’ (Pater, 1889 ; 
50).In other words, the essence o f poetry is the ‘select moment’ when 
one perceives an inner vision, when one sees that the world of nature is 
not just nature but indicative of something behind or beyond it (and 
Pater is well aware that this points belief points in the direction of 
Platonism or pantheism. This moment, is, therefore, an internal 
revelation in which external reality is seen in a different light. Since the 
‘truth’ o f these visions is open to the same objections to Romantic 
truths as Graff detailed earlier, Pater is fascinated by the pantheistic 
conclusions one would seem to be able to draw from them, but without
8 This follows from Pater’s view of science as reducing reality to inert, desacralised ‘facts’ without 
the older metaphysical philosophical views to, as it were, wrap round them and give them 
meaning. However, even if this Is the case, science still insists that these facts or objects do exist, 
that they are not merely subjective or idealist fragments of consciousness, which is what Pater 
seems to imply when he states that the only things we can ever really know is our own 
consciousness. In other words, Pater too easily elides between a scientific empiricism and a 
phenomenological view of reality without acknowledging the change, it may be that Pater’s  
thought does not make sense here.32
committing himself to whether they are metaphors or not). It is when 
Wordsworth forgets this, and introduces material extraneous to the 
‘inward presentation’ that his poetry falters, according to Pater (Pater, 
1889).
However, even though Pater has now defined the essentials of art, he 
has, as yet, failed to answer why this new approach to art is necessary. 
The purpose  o f describing one’s own inner thought processes is still in 
doubt. For Pater is aware that it is difficult to claim that knowledge has 
been radically relativised without admitting the implications o f this for 
aesthetics. Following the Shelley of The Defence o f  Poetry, he 
concludes that, when all is said and done, truth still exists, and we must 
use the concept to as a basis for aesthetically judging one’s own ‘inner 
thought’: ‘For just in proportion as the writers’ aim, consciously or 
unconsciously, comes to be the transcribing, not of the world, not of 
mere fact, but of his sense of it, he becomes an artist [...] and good art 
[...] in proportion to the truth o f his presentment of that sense [...] 
Truth! there can be no merit, no craft at all without that’ (Pater, 1889 : 
6). Truth is therefore, exempted from the ‘spirit o f the relative’ and 
valorised as an aesthetic criterion; we should judge the work from the 
degree of fidelity the author shows to his ‘inner vision’.
Pater’s next problem in justifying the new poetry is the problem of 
aesthetics. How can we judge the ‘inner vision’ that a poet produces? 
Pater here accepts the ideology of the ‘genius’ that Hobsbawm 
introduced us to earlier; that is, that some people’s inner world has
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greater fundamental worth than others. And he does this because his 
whole task is to face and surmount the problems of ‘the relative spirit’ 
introduced by science. If he were to radically democratise aesthetic 
value (by accepting that anyone’s value judgments were as good as 
anybody else’s) then he would be accepting the aesthetic relativism he 
had set out to face and surmount. And so he builds up a set o f criteria 
by which the true poet will be separated from the masses. He (sic) 
must be a scholar writing for scholars, he will understand tradition, he 
will reject extraneous matter, he will choose the word or phrase that 
corresponds to the internal image, and so forth (Pater, 1889).
What few people have noticed in discussing Pater’s definition of the 
artist in these very early essays, however, is that his definitions are 
tautological. Ultimately, the poet will only be able to justify his own 
sense of worth by turning inward, in line with Pater’s previous 
strictures. For example, the true poet will understand tradition, but 
there are no objective structures of knowledge (to Pater) which exist 
outside himself, by which he can prove his understanding. Pater is well 
aware o f the problem. He attempts to defend himself thus; ‘A 
relegation, you may say perhaps - a relegation of style to the 
subjectivity, the mere caprice, o f the individual [...] Not so! since there 
is, under the conditions supposed, for those elements o f the man, for 
every lineament of the vision within, the one word, the one acceptable 
word, recognisable by the sensitive, by others “who have intelligence” 
in the matter, as absolutely as anything ever can be in the evanescent
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and delicate region of human language’ (Pater,!889 : 34). But Pater 
therefore cannot define who the sensitive are or how they come by this 
knowledge. Those ‘who have intelligence’ understand the one ‘vision  
within’, but are unable to explain how they evaluate the ‘one 
acceptable word’.
So by a process of dialectic, even as Pater embraces ‘the flux’ most 
fervently, he is, at the same time, driven away from it, by his own logic. 
He relativises aesthetic and moral values, and even seems to attempt to 
relativise science and reduce all knowledge to merely a study of the 
individual’s consciousness, but this immediately leads to confusion. As 
discussed in the previous page, despite his relativising. Pater is 
eventually forced to unrelativise the concept of truth, simply in order 
to give meaning to his whole aesthetic. Thus, even as Pater denies value 
and truth, an opposite force to affirm them is set in motion. This 
process begins almost immediately. As Ward puts it in Walter Pater, ‘As 
he (Le. Pater) dwells on the implications of this state of movement [...] 
Pater finds himself, almost in spite of himself, expressing a contrary  
movement o f mind, which is suggested to him first in the word “fixing”’ 
(Ward, 1966 : 33). Pater was, however, loath to simply return to the 
older metaphysical world o f absolutes. Instead he wished to accept but 
surmount the world of relativism and the flux.
Pater begins his attempt by trying to get beyond the view with which 
he starts, that time consists of moments and nothing else. And in his 
attempts to get beyond a view of time as consisting only of moments,
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Pater was driven to see another kind o f time behind them; ‘Pater sees 
evidence for the dual character of time in history  ‘(Ward, 1966 : 53).
It is here that Pater’s dialogue with Hegel begins. Again, this 
fascination must be seen in its historical context. From the 1850s 
onwards, Hegel’s reputation grew in Britain, until at ‘the end of the 
century, Hegel’s thought becomes the dominant force in English 
philosophy’ (Ward, 1966 : 44). The aspect o f Hegel’s thought that 
Pater was particularly interested in was his concept of evolution. This 
was again, a common response to the increasing agnosticism o f science 
in Victorian England (Christ, 1975 : 107-108). ‘In order to answer 
Darwin and the natural scientists, it was clear that categorical refusal 
to accept the validity o f their mode o f reasoning would not do. If the 
independent life of the mind was to be reestablished it was necessary 
to lay the claim open to criteria of empirical verification-to accept all 
the scientist said, but to take his analysis a step further. Evolutionism 
impregnated every branch o f knowledge after 1859’ (Ward, 1966 :
45).
Hegel’s view of history is, o f course, evolutionary, and this is the 
aspect of his philosophy that Pater seizes upon. The actual mechanism  
of this evolution is immaterial, as is demonstrated by the fact that Pater 
lumped together Hegelian and Darwinian theories o f evolution as 
though they were fundamentally the same theory (Iser, 1987 : 77). The 
mechanics o f the evolutionary process were not important (again.
Pater was in the mainstream here (Ward, 1966 : 45-52)). What was
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important was the recognition that evolution existed; that is to say that 
in the material universe, there was a tendency for things to progress 
from simpler to more complex forms. Change occurred, but as part o f  
an overall pattern. Pater was quick to apply Darwinian theories of 
evolution to human evolution, that is to say, history. With a 
‘progressivist’ view of history one could acknowledge change, and yet 
give it meaning (Iser, 1987 : 75-80).
In the essay ‘Winckelmann’, Pater acknowledges Hegel in the text, and 
gives a very Hegelian view of the history of art (Shaw, 1987 : 237-239). 
T he arts may thus be arranged in a series, which corresponds to a 
series o f developments in the human mind itself (Pater, 1980 : 167) he 
writes and goes on to show how, beginning with the Greeks, art 
progresses through architecture and sculpture, to ‘painting, music and 
poetry’; the arts of modernity (Pater, 1980 : 168). The arts are always 
in a state of flux, and, conforming to his anti-metaphysical bias, for 
Pater, unlike for Hegel, there is no end result to this process. ‘Evolution 
seen as the triumph of abstract principles over individual experience is 
alien to Pater, who prizes individual experience [...] Pater’s rejection of 
any philosophy of history has its deepest roots in his concept of time 
as the background to all events. There is no philosophy of history that 
does not, in its own way, focus on the end of time’ (Iser, 1987 : 79). 
Pater is not interested in anything as abstract as the ‘point’ o f history. 
Instead, he sees history ‘as a means whereby the individual could find 
reassurance and self-awareness’ (Iser, 1987 : 78).
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And the individual could do this, because, with history, one could 
find certainty in the flux. Speaking of aesthetics. Pater talks about 
Greek art:
Again, individual genius works ever under conditions of time and place; its
products are coloured by the varying aspects of nature, and type of human form, 
and outward manners of life. There is thus an element of change in art, criticism 
must never forget for a moment that ‘the artist is the child of his time'. But 
besides these conditions of time and place, and independent of them, there is also 
and element of permanence, a standard of taste, which genius confesses. [...] The 
supreme artistic products of succeeding generations thus form a series of elevated 
points, taking each from each the reflection of a strange light, the source of 
which is not in the atmosphere around and above them, but in a stage of society 
remote from ourselves. The standard of taste, then, was fixed in Greece, at a 
definite historical period (Pater, 1980 : 158-159) (my italics).
Pater therefore discovers ‘objective’ standards of taste in history.
And this idea is not antithetical, but complementary, to, his previous 
praise o f the ‘moment’. Writing in the ‘Conclusion’, Pater writes, ‘a 
counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic 
life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest 
senses?’ (Pater, 1908 : 188). These ‘pulses’ clearly parallel the ‘elevated 
points’ o f history. There is a harmony underlying reality, and man 
discovers it through history. When, in Appreciations, he writes of the 
‘’’moments of insight” when the mind is able to penetrate “beneath the 
veil”‘ (Ward, 1966 : 68), he is talking o f moments in which one
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perceives the pattern of history underneath the flux of the moment. If 
one wishes to use Hegelian language, the thesis o f the moment meets 
the antithesis of history, to create a synthesis, which acknowledges 
both. When Pater writes, o f art that T h e hard, gem like flame’ will burn 
(Pater, 1980 : 189), this is a symbol o f this synthesis. The flame 
represents the flux, and the gem represents stasis. Great art will consist 
of both. This, then, is the Pater’s ultimate way out from the threat o f  
aesthetic relativism; what he called ‘the relative spirit’.
Pater’s view of history is an adaption o f Hegel’s, and yet it differs in a 
number of important respects. The most important o f these is that, in 
the final analysis. Pater has not abandoned his relativist views, but has 
attempted to overcome them. He can thus, in the ‘Conclusion’, 
continue to rail against a ‘facile orthodoxy, o f Comte or of Hegel’
(Pater, 1980 : 189). This orthodoxy is facile because it does not keep 
close to experience; ‘the particular spirit’ o f science has destroyed the 
old fashioned idea of systems building. From now on there are to be no 
systems; only experience o f particulars.
The second point is that Pater did not believe in Hegel’s G eist Geist, 
for Pater, is another metaphysical abstraction, which is postulated 
rather than experienced.^ Instead of Geist, Pater substitutes Art. Pater 
‘reverses Hegel’s triad o f absolute spirit and sees art, rather than
9 'For Pater, the self-perceiving mind unfolded in the history of art is human and individual. He 
does not view the world as a substance, but as a being ripened by the constant interplay 
between challenge and response in his dealings with the outside world. Hegel, on the other 
hand, saw the mind, or spirit, as substance, the teleological movement of the absolute on its way 
to self-consciousness. Pater takes over the Hegelian schema of history, but not the ideas that 
gave rise to it'(Iser, 1987 ; 73).
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philosophy or religion, as the most effective and powerful means of 
enhancing our understanding and appreciation of experience’
(McGrath, 1986 : 111). And this is because, unlike religion or 
metaphysical philosophy. Art does not necessarily imply the Absolute 
(McGrath, 1986). And so Pater ‘reverses Hegel’s strategy. Instead of  
freeing a spiritual content from a material form, which is the process 
Hegel analyses. Pater ‘praises art for freeing a refined and attenuated 
form from the bondage of any impure content or contaminating 
message’ (Shaw, 1987 : 238). Therefore, Pater is, as Bloom points out, 
the first person to use the word ‘aesthetic’ in the modern sense, that is 
to say, freed from the philosophy that the Romantics burdened it with. 
For Pater, aesthetic appreciation simply means perception; and nothing 
else; free from the constraints o f thinking about any ‘contaminating 
message’ (Bloom, 1974 : 163).
This does not however mean that the critic simply looks at a work of 
art. Instead, perception is simply the first stage in a complex process 
by which the viewer engages with the artwork. To see how this works in 
practice, we must look at Pater’s famous description of the Mona Lisa.
All the thoughts and experience of the world have etched and moulded there, in
that which they have of power to refine and make expressive the outward form,
the animalism of Greece, the lust of Rome, the mysticism of the middle age with its
spiritual ambition and imaginative loves, the return of the Pagan world, the sins
of the Borgias. She is older than the rocks among which she sits; like the vampire,
she has been dead many times, and learned the secrets of the grave; and has been
a diver hi deep seas, and keeps their fallen day about her; and trafficked for 
40
strange webs with Eastern merchants; and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of 
Troy, and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all this has been to her but as 
the sound of lyres and flutes, and lives lonely in the delicacy with which it has 
moulded the changing lineaments, and tinged the eyelids and the hands. The 
fancy of a perpetual life, sweeping together ten thousand experiences, is an old 
one; and modem philosophy has conceived the idea of humanity as wrought upon 
by and sununing up in itself, all modes of thought and life. Certainly Lady Lisa 
might stand as the embodiment of the old fancy, the symbol of the modern idea
(Pater, 1980 : 98-99).
To begin to understand this description, we must begin with the 
concept o f time as a collection of moments. The picture, the Mona Lisa, 
is perceived 'all at once' (cf. his description o f Browning's poetry.
Pater 1980 : 171). Pater wrote elsewhere ‘We receive from it the 
impression of a one imaginative tone, of a single creative act. To 
produce such effects at all requires all the resources o f painting'
(Pater, 1980: 171-172). For Pater, the 'experience of viewing the Mona 
Lisa is a recapitulation of the history o f art, which is perceived by the 
viewer in an intense moment in the present’ (Ward, 1966 : 85). So for 
Pater, even though the Mona Lisa is an image, perceived in a moment, it 
still contains a historical sense, which is condensed into this moment. 
This is in line with his Hegelian thinking, as discussed eariier.
And yet, as Iser puts it 'The painting becomes the source of a 
diversified chain of impressions, the fashioning of which takes us 
further and further away from the picture itself, and deeper and
10 It is significant that Yeats chose this piece, broken up into free verse, as his first poem of the 
modern era : cf. his Oxford Book of English Verse (1936).
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deeper into Pater's own imagination' (Iser, 1987 : 43-44). The actual 
process of the painting recapitulating and summing up the history o f  
art takes place inside the viewer. Pater's view of aesthetics, is, 
therefore, as stated earlier, phenomenological (Weir, 1995 : 67). 
However, what the phenomenological perception reveals to us, is that 
the art work sets off a chain of associations which show the viewer that 
the history o f art is continually recreating itself, based on the initial 
(and objective) aesthetic criteria of Ancient Greece, but constantly 
going beyond them and demonstrating to the viewer the truth o f  
history. The way the picture works, and its justification, are the same.
And yet, even as it expresses evolutionary time, another kind of time 
is implied. In his description o f the historical events, 'Pater's language 
consists o f blocks of nouns mainly linked by neutral verbs to have and 
to be. He is clearly at pains not to give any one element precedence 
over any other' (Iser, 1987 : 44). But this contradicts the sense of 
progress that one would expect from this view of history. Instead, Pater 
seems to be deliberately echoing much older views of time.
We must remember at this point, that Pater remained in many ways a 
Platonist all his life, even though his was an idiosyncratic interpretation 
of Plato. What he rejected was the metaphysical and absolutist Plato 
(Conlon, 1982). What he is more interested in is Plato as a critical 
philosopher of the dialectic. However, he also thought that his positing 
of Absolutism was understandable give the Heraclitean philosophy o f  
flux that was current in Greece at that time (see Buckler 1987 : 303-
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312 for a discussion o f this. This flux of values Pater may well have 
thought was not dissimilar to the crisis o f values of his own time). Pater 
could never commit himself to any form of Idealism, but he remained 
fascinated by it, surely because he realised that Idealism was the surest 
way to solve the relativist problem. It was, however, not an option for 
him, given his hostility to metaphysics (we will discover a similar 
dilemma in the thought o f T.E. Hulme).
Thus, even though Pater's view of time is nominally progressive, he is 
fascinated by ideas of timelessness, or even the idea (clearly implied by 
the Mona Lisa passage) that time is circular. Take, for example, his 
obsession with the return o f the old Gods. 'Pater leaves no doubt that 
they (i.e. the timeless Platonic forms) are still instruments of cognition, 
and are nothing but guidelines for grasping the meaning o f experience. 
In the final analysis they represent condensed experiences, and so he 
can even go so far as to see in them the rebirth of the Homeric gods' 
(Iser, 1987 : 89)).
By the same principle that motivated him to go back to look back to 
ancient Greece to discover the 'fixed' and therefore essential part of 
the aesthetic experience. Pater looked backwards in time to discover 
the essentials of the human experience. As he wrote: 'Complex and 
subtle interests, which the mind spins for itself may occupy art and 
poetry or our own spirit for a time; but sooner or later they come back 
with a sharp rebound to the simple elementary passions- anger, desire, 
regret, pity and fear; and what corresponds to them in the sensuous
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world; bare, abstract fire, water, air, tears, sleep, silence' (Pater 1889 : 
221-222)11. Iser writes: ‘Evidently the complexities of later civilisation 
cannot hold human interest for any length of time. Sooner or later a 
secret longing to turn back to the primordial forms of existence 
reasserts itself (Iser, 1987 : 107). And so Pater writes about Demeter 
and Persephone, Dionysus, and the Homeric Gods with unmistakable 
nostalgia (Iser, 1987 : 127). And this springs, again, from the longing 
for wholeness that we noted in his thought earlier; even though by 
looking for unity in the past, he admits it may be impossible for 
modern man (Tf classical myth stems from and dramatises visionary 
capacity to accommodate and synthesise difference, Pater's mythic 
fictions suggest such fusion is no longer possible for the modern mind' 
(Moran, 1991: 182)).
However, if the ‘symbol o f the modern idea' contains all the forms 
that have gone before it, then in some sense they must exist now, and 
therefore, on a deeper level, the symbol is a symbol of the organic 
relationship of all times (‘We may take the developing idea of the 
"expanded moment" or the “moment of vision" in which all the 
manifold complexities of experience seem to be present at once'
(Ward, 1966 : 106)). And if this is the case, then we may contact the 
past through the present, and if this is the case, then the past is, in a 
sense, not dead.
Therefore, Art may be a way of contacting, or even resurrecting this
11 Moreover there is also a link between Hegel’s  thought here and that of Vico, in terms of an 
Interest In ‘cyclical’ concepts of temporality; cf. McGrath 1986 :137-139.
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past that only appears to be dead. Pater's task, from which we started, 
was for unity; to reconcile opposites. To quote Iser again, ‘The unity 
that Pater found in Wordsworth was what he himself continued to look 
for, and from this grew his preoccupation with ancient cults and 
myths. In these primordial forms o f existence he hoped to ascertain 
what created the totality which could no longer be found in the 
historical world. The telluric, chthonic, primitivistic beliefs of the 
ancient past, with the primal realities o f earth and birth, blood and 
death, promised him the wholeness that he sought' (Iser, 1987 : 109).
We can see, then, that in the face of the relativist threat. Pater 
evolved a subtle defence that rooted ‘objective' (to again use that 
weighted word) aesthetic values in history. To do this, he posited an 
aesthetic that depended on the symbol as being a moment in time, 
apparently subjective, that justified its objective truth in its 
relationship to history. But given Pater's organicism, this Neo- 
Hegelianism almost imperceptibly elided into a way of looking at time 
that resembled Platonism (given that Pater believed in Platonic forms, 
but did not believe that they were metaphysical absolutes) and the 
cyclic view of time, that we find, for example, in Vico (though Pater 
only ever spoke about the return of the pagan gods in metaphorical 
terms).
Pater was a complex and subtle thinker, who wished to safeguard the 
values o f culture, despite the threat from the materialistic world-view 
that was gaining ground throughout this period (It is only fair to add
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that McGrath sees Pater's system as a response to the Humean 
scepticism, not so much about the value of art, but about the status of 
knowledge. However, it is clear that whatever the cause o f the 
increasing scepticism of this period, it would have implications for 
cultural values as well (McGrath, 1986 : 21-37)). And it is obvious that 
there are two ways his thought could be developed; emphasising the 
sceptical side o f his philosophy, towards greater and greater hostility 
towards metaphysics and the transcendental, and, on the other hand, 
developing his interest in Plato, Vico, and myth. 1 will attempt to argue 
that these are the two main streams o f English Modernism, with T.E. 
Hulme and the original Imagists following the first path, and Yeats and 
Pound following the second.
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Chapter 2 : Yeats Before 
1900
Pater's main influence was, most notoriously, on the English aesthetes 
or ‘decadents' (Hough, 1949). The most famous and influential of 
these poets was W.B. Yeats, and it is the Yeatsian influence I wish to 
trace into the Twentieth Century. The key points to follow are; the ex­
tent to which Yeats felt art was being threatened by the new spirit o f  
relativism, the extent to which (as time became ‘atomised'), he began 
to posit an art based on fragmentary ‘moments' as being the approach 
best suited for the modern age, and the extent to which he looked 
‘behind‘ the moment to find a guarantor o f poetic values in history. 
However, as I trace the development of Yeats's thought, we must re­
member that the resemblance o f Yeats's thought to Pater's thought is 
not necessarily one of simple influence, but instead a similar reaction 
to the threat the encroachments o f science and the market were mak­
ing on the territory of art.
At the very beginning o f his poetic career, Yeats was most deeply in­
fluenced by the Romantics (Ellmann, 1949 : 110). Significantly the au­
thor who had the most influence on him at this period was Blake. Yeats 
was impressed not just by Blake's hatred of science, but by Blake's urge 
(especially in the later poetry) to create what can only be called his 
own private mythology (Ellmann, 1949 : 119-120). The basis of this 
philosophy was the mystical conception of vision: the theory that, in 
heightened mystical states, it is possible to see reality as nothing more 
than representations o f the metaphysical events which is its cause
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(Hough, 1984 : 44-48). As Raine puts it T he created world is, at every 
level, a manifestation (and therefore a symbol) o f anterior causes' 
(Raine, 1986 : 88); and that these anterior causes are not simply crea­
tions o f the mind, but are real. To sum up: T he point for Blake, [...] 
and Yeats is that, once the eye of imagination opens, the figures seen 
are not figments but realities' (Moore, 1973 : 91).
If the artist sees a metaphysical world behind the material world, 
then he is a visionary, and one of the other things Yeats liked about 
Blake's theories was that he stressed the visionary and symbolic aspect 
o f poetry (symbolic used in the mystical sense explained by Raine 
above). We should remember that although we are used to thinking of 
Symbolism as being a French invention, Yeats was quite specific in sta­
ting that he derived his own theories from those o f Blake. Writing some 
time later he claimed that, ‘William Blake was the first writer to preach 
the indissoluble marriage o f all great art with symbol', continuing ‘a 
symbol is indeed the only possible expression of some invisible es­
sence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual flame’ (Yeats, 1903 : 176). 
Yeats therefore links his poetic philosophy (symbolism) and his mysti­
cal philosophy of correspondences, and insists that they are both des­
cended from the Romantic thought o f Blake. (Yeats,
1903)(Interestingly, Yeats's language here is strongly Paterian).
Right from the beginning, then, Yeats was interested in theories that 
saw the material world as being merely a screen, beyond which the 
‘real' world could be ‘read'. This real world had a metaphysical real­
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ity.And we should remember that Blake was influential not just on 
Yeats, but on the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and the English aesthetes; 
and that they too were soaked in Blakean (and therefore mystical) 
ideas (Raine, 1986 : 82-83). i
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that in the late 1880s Yeats then be­
came influenced by the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood; speaking of his 
earlier years, he was later to state ‘I was in all things Pre-Raphaelite' 
(Yeats, 1956 : 114). The Pre-Raphaelites were a group of painters who 
began to associate together in the 1840s, inspired by a dislike of the 
academic style of painting then in fashion. They were inspired to look 
back beyond the Renaissance, to such painters as Giotto, in order to 
discover a genuinely ‘honest' approach to art (Goughian, 1967 : 13). 
They formed a ‘quasi-secret' brotherhood (the Pre-Raphaelite Brother­
hood, or P.R.B.), which was to lead a revolt against what they saw as the 
degeneration of art; a degeneration which had set in with the Renais­
sance (we see here the beginning of Neo-Romantic distrust o f the Re­
naissance which we shall see again in T.E. Hulme).
As opposed to the ‘cleverness' o f the Renaissance painters, the P.R.B. 
returned to nature. Their paintings tended to consist o f extremely real­
istic paintings of nature, because they felt that, as Sister Goughian puts 
it, ‘reality examined and reproduced until it has expressed its inner­
most fact becomes symbol' (Goughian, 1967 : 17). The Pre-Raphaelite
1 Contrary to his reputation as the the enemy of Victorian poetry, and all this it stood for, we 
should remember that other early influences on the young Yeats were Tennyson and Browning. What 
is surprising is that the influence of Browning, at least, seem s to have increased as he got older.
We should bear this in mind when studying the early influences on Ezra Pound (Shmiefsky, 1970: 
702-703). Moreover, Yeats saw Browning as a mystical /occult poet (Larissy,1994 :37).50
approach to art, therefore, has two main components; firstly that they 
were dissatisfied with the status quo and looked to the past for models 
for their art, and secondly that they were in the broadest sense of the 
word, symbolists.
Within Pre-Raphaelitism itself, there were, of course, many different 
strands. The two people that Yeats was closest to aesthetically in the 
movement were William Morris and Rossetti^. Morris was a poet and 
artist, who, in typical Pre-Raphaelite fashion, looked back to the art of 
the Middle Ages, (or rather, to the Nineteenth Century’s view of the 
Middle Ages) for his aesthetic models. He ‘found in earlier "primitive” 
literatures not only romantic subjects, but more importantly a diction 
and imagery which carried associations of great emotion and resonant 
experience’ (Hunt, 1968 : 44). However, he was also, in many ways, a 
man who could be described as a socialist, or even a Marxist, and he 
was also attracted to older ‘epic’ verse forms because he felt that these 
would be the best way to express his political beliefs (Oberg, 1978). 
The most important part of Morris’s political beliefs was that he posi­
ted a ‘Utopian agrarian society’ as the solution to contemporary politi­
cal ills, and that he did that because he ‘opposed industrialism’ (Oberg, 
1978 : 17). (It was under the influence of Morris that Yeats described
2 Of course, to consider these two together we must remember that Dante Gabriel Rossetti was 
actually one of the originators of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, whose journal was The Germ, 
whereas Morris started off as a disciple of Rossetti’s  and was more Involved with the Oxford 
and Cambridge Magazine of the Eighteen Fifties (Stevenson, 1972). But this is not important for 
this discussion.
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his political beliefs in the 1880s as ‘Socialist’ (Yeats, 1956 :146))3.
Yeats admired Morris’s philosophy and poetry, but thought that his 
‘dream’ world, the world of his poetry, was too dreamy; it was not 
rooted enough in the reality of his own native landscape (Yeats, 1956 : 
150). Yeats was determined not to make the same mistake: ‘Morris set 
out to make a revolution that the persons of his Well at the World’s End 
or his Water of the Wondrous Isle, always, to my mind, in the likeness 
of Artimesia and her man, might walk his native scenery; and I, that my 
native scenery might find imaginary inhabitants, half planned a new 
method and a new culture’ (Yeats, 1956 : 152). Yeats’s ‘native scenery’ 
was to be his home town of Sligo.
Morris’s own poetry, therefore, was dreamy and archaic, looking 
back to an idealised middle ages, to remind modern Man of what he 
had lost. (Hunt, 1968 : 41-44). Morris emphasised that the true artist 
was one whose dreams would have a visionary quality; and this was 
again a facet of his thought that was picked up on by Yeats (Oberg,
1978 : 168).
Dante Gabriel Rossetti, on the other hand, was in many ways unlike 
his fellow painters. One of the main tenets of the P.R.B. was that it em­
phasised the social utility of art, as we have seen in the thought of Wil­
liam Morris. Rossetti, however, saw a much more radical distinction
3 Pace Conor Cruise O’Brien, who claims that Yeats’s politics were at their ’least sinister’ in the 
1890s (O’Brien, 1965 : 224), not the 1880s. However, even here we may doubt how sincere 
Yeats's ‘socialism’ was. As Harrison writes in The Reactionaries: ‘It is strange that Yeats was ever attrac­
ted to socialism. He never seemed particularly concerned with the well-being of the masses, 
and he certainly had not the sympathy with ordinary humanity that one would expect a socialist 
to have’ (Harrison, 1966 :41).52
between the world of dream and the world of action. He was, as Carol 
Christ puts it ‘an intensely private poet, oblivious of any social role’ 
(Christ, 1975 : 45). Moreover, he was less convinced than the others in 
the efficacy of political action. In his writings on art appreciation, he 
implies that good taste is confined to the few rather than given to the 
many, and that to pander to a mass audience may well be to the detri­
ment of the work of art (Coughlan, 1967).
The way Rossetti expresses this is that only the gifted can see through 
the painter’s naturalistic guise to see the symbolic world that lies be­
neath (Coughlan, 1967). This is significant, because it is Rossetti’s the­
ory of symbolism that Yeats takes over from the older writer; to the ex­
tent of, in many cases, actually copying his symbols directly (for exam­
ple the Rose symbol, which is ubiquitous in Yeats’s early volumes, is 
taken directly from Rossetti’s paintings (Coughlan 1967 : 168)).^
Years later, Yeats was to describe his very earliest theory of art being 
a theory of vision, ‘meaning by vision, the intense realisation of a state 
of ecstatic emotion symbolised in a definite landscape’ (Loizeaux, 1984  
: 144). Now, the Pre-Raphaelites were mainly painters, and it is not sur­
prising that Rossetti’s theory of symbolism is based on his practice as a 
painter. Yeats follows him in this. ‘It is natural for a painter’s son to be­
lieve that there may be a landscape that is symbolical of some spiritual
4 Again, despite being the older artist and poet, Rossetti in many other ways points forward to 
the future more than Morris. As Stevenson puts it: ‘Rossetti’s  personality and work anticipated 
the next generation. He was the first English poet who entirely filled the public image of the 
poete maudit - manic-depressive in temperament, alienated from the moresoi his time, 
sensually self-indulgent, and disintegrating under the influences of sex, alcohol and drugs’ 
(Stevenson, 1972 : 77).
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condition and awakens a hunger such as cats feel for valerian’ (Yeats, 
1956 : 74). Yeats therefore elaborates the idea of the symbolic reality 
which lies behind mere material reality as being a geographical (or spa­
tial) entity (Loizeaux 1984).
Yeats’s very early philosophy of art is an amalgamation and adaption 
of both Romantic and Pre-Raphaelite aesthetics. We can see it stated in 
T he Song of the Happy Shepherd’ from his very first volume of verse, 
Crossways (1889).
The woods of Arcady are dead,
And over is their antique joy;
Of old the world of dreaming fed;
Grey Truth is now her painted toy;
Yet still she turns here restless head:
But O, sick children of the world,
Of all the many changing things
In dreary dancing past us whirled.
To the cracked tune that Chronos sings,
Words alone are certain good.
Where are now the warring kings,
Word be-mockers? - By the Rood,
Where are now the warring kings?
An idle word is now their glory,
By the stammering schoolboy said,
Reading some entangled story:
The kings of old time are dead;
The wandering earth herself may be
Only a sudden flaming word,
In clanging space a moment heard,
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Troubling the endless reverie.
Then nowise worship dusty deeds,
Nor seek, for this is also sooth,
To hunger fiercely after truth.
Lest all tliy toihng only breeds
New dreams, new dreams; there is no truth
Saving in thine own heart. Seek, then,
No learning from the starry men,
Who follow with the optic glass 
The whirling ways of stars that pass- 
Seek, then, for this is also sooth.
No word of theirs-the cold star-bane 
Has cloven and rent their hearts in twain.
And dead is aU their human truth. (Yeats, 1957 : 64-66)
The poem then goes on to create a Pre-Raphaelite dream world, 
which is contrasted unfavourably with the world of drab material real­
ity.
This poem confirms that, as stated earlier, Yeats’s aesthetic began 
with a distrust o f rationality and science. Moreover, he goes on to con­
trast an older world when myth was still integrated with society; ‘Of old 
the world of dreaming fed’ with the drab, utilitarian world of the pre­
sent. So we can see the same concern with time that animated the first 
generation of Romantics: ‘But O, sick children of the world I Of all the 
many changing things I In dreary dancing past us whirled, I To the
cracked tune that Chronos sings, I words alone are certain good’. The 
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world of time is ‘dreary’; it ‘dances’ and ‘whirls’. This is a reiteration of 
the Romantic’s contempt of time as being meaningless, because ratio­
nalised. The alliteration of ‘dreary dancing’ emphasises that the ‘flux’, 
the ‘changing things’ of time have become boring, because they lack 
meaning. Notice as well that Yeats makes the connection explicit by 
having his condemnation of rationality in the same sentence as his re­
ferences to time.
The poem goes on to praise passivity, ‘Then nowise worship dusty 
deeds’ The world of action is to be disparaged; instead, Yeats praises 
passive contemplation. However, what the poet contemplates is not 
‘external’, or (to use the terminology of the last chapter) ‘objective’ 
truth, but instead the truth that lies within; ‘there is no truth saving in 
thine own heart’.
We see then that Yeats has accepted what I have called the split be­
tween ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ knowledge; or ‘objectivism’ versus 
‘subjectivism’ which lies at the heart of the Romantic world view; ‘the 
cold star-bane has cloven and rent their hearts in twain, I and dead is 
all their human truth’. The word ‘human’ is the key point here, sug­
gesting that scientific truth, the truth of those ‘who follow with the 
optic glass, the whirling ways of stars that pass’, is true merely to hu­
mans. What Yeats wants, even at this early stage, is extrahuman, that is 
to say, metaphysical truths.
Another feature of his early poetry is the concept of division. 
Whereas, for Morris, the dreamworld was simply a pleasant place to
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imagine living, Yeats seems to have been tormented by its existence, 
and many o f his heroes are tormented by the competing claims of ma­
terial and spiritual reality. For example, in T he Stolen Child’, Yeats 
deals with a child who is stolen away to the Otherworld, by the Sidhe, 
or Irish Fairies:
Come away, O human child!
To the waters and the wild 
With a faery, hand in hand,
For the world’s more full o f  weeping 
than you can understand (Yeats, 1957 : 87).
is the cry o f the Sidhe. For Yeats, therefore, the world was a world of 
‘weeping’ and suffering. Thus the Otherworld seemed an attractive pro­
position. However, when the Sidhe are successful, the poem continues.
Away with us he's going,
The solemn eyed:
He’ll hear no more the lowing 
Of the calves on the warm hillside 
Or the kettles on the hob 
Sing peace into his breast,
Or see the brown mice bob 
Round and round the oatmeal-chest 
For he comes the human child,
To the waters and the wild 
With a faery hand in hand,
From a world more full o f  weeping 
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than he can understand (Yeats, 1957 : 88-89).
Thus, the material world, though full o f suffering, is also at least 
known, comforting, and understood. The world o f the faery, is, on the 
other hand, unknown, strange and possibly dangerous. This is explored 
further, in The Man Who Dreamed of Faeryland ‘ in The Rose volume. 
This poem deals with a man who has glimpsed the faery world, and can 
therefore find no happiness in the material world, because it seems so 
inferior to the Otherworld. Yeats now stresses in poems such as ‘A 
Faery Song’ the timeless, (and, therefore, Neo-Platonic) nature of the 
faery world: ‘We who are old, old and gay, I O so old! I Thousands of 
years, thousands of years, if all were told’ (Yeats, 1957 :116). The 
Otherworld is the timeless metaphysical world that is seen by the visio­
nary poet (This idea is developed by, as we have seen, Yeats’s descrip­
tion of the Platonic reality as being a landscape; by positing Platonic 
reality as being spatial he explicitly contrasts this with a view of mater­
ial reality as being temporal (Loizeaux, 1984 : 146)). The Otherworld is 
a timeless (and therefore spatial) reality seen through a Paterian 
‘moment’ in our own, timebound, world.
This undoubtedly reflects Yeats’s own dilemmas. He was, himself 
strongly attracted to the world of metaphysical eternity (which man­
ifested itself in his attraction to magic) and yet also attached to reality 
(represented by his poetry). He was, at present torn between the two
(O’Donnell, 1975).
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Rossetti (and of course, Blake) were major philosophical influences 
on the so called ‘Decadent’ writers or ‘Aesthetes’ of the 1890s 
(Coughlan, 1967). And this leads us on the the next major influence on 
Yeats. In 1891 he helped to form the ‘Rhymer’s Club’; a society for the 
discussion of poetry. Here he was to meet poets such as Lionel Dowson 
and Arthur Symons; writers who were to become known as the Aes­
thetes (Alford, 1966). The Aesthetes were a group of British poets 
whose main contribution to poetry was to rethink the relationship be­
tween art and life. (William, 1966). To the Victorians, art had been clo­
sely allied to its social utility (William, 1966). Amongst the Pre-Raphae­
lites, as 1 have pointed out, Rossetti fought against this idea, but, al­
though he was the leader of the group, he was still in the minority.
Most o f the other artists associated with the movement agreed with the 
beliefs paraphrased by Sister Coughlan; ‘The moral function of art is 
like its intellectual function. The artist is obliged to use art for the pur­
poses of good, especially social good’ (Coughlan, 1967 : 34).
The Aesthetes called this into question, and began to insist on the 
autonomy of art, a position we have first seen stated by Pater: ‘Art for 
Art’s Sake’. The corollary of this, stated more strongly than in Pater, 
was that any activity other than art was worthless, a position we have 
already seen in Yeats’s ‘The nowise worship dusty deeds’. In a world of 
flux and change (’the cracked tune that Chronos sings’), art was the 
only sure belief (’words alone are certain good’). And so, for example, 
Lionel Johnson (a prominent poet of the movement) ‘invested the poet
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with the role of a priest and elevated art to a sacrosanct, hieratic level’ 
(Alford, 1966 : 79).5 Instead of the flux of modernity, the aesthete 
stressed the necessity for a ‘reverence for tradition’ (Alford, 1966 :
79). And, most importantly of all, he denied that art need to have a so­
cial or moral purpose; for the ‘Decadents believed that it was art, not 
life, that really mattered, and if one could perpetuate this doctrine and 
at the same time upset the equilibrium of the middle class, so much the 
better’ (Munro, 1970 :12).
However, if art had no social use, and at the same time was to take 
on the status of a religion, then there was the possibility that this might 
lead to a breakdown between the poet and his audience, especially, o f  
course, if one had an interest in mystical occultism. As Yeats himself 
wrote; ‘I had an unshakeable conviction, arising how or whence I can­
not tell, that invisible gates would open as they opened for Blake [...] I 
must some day-on that day when the gates began to open-become diffi­
cult or obscure’ (Yeats, 1956 : 254). This important passage again 
shows the influence of Blake, and stresses that by the mid 1890s Yeats 
had seen a link between his desire for visionary experiences and the 
development of his poetry; specifically that by becoming more visio­
nary (and as we shall see, this was a direction Yeats very much wanted 
to go in) he would necessarily have to become less intelligible; or, to 
put it another way, less ‘popular’.
5 As well as Johnson, the influence of Symons on Yeats has also, perhaps, been slightly 
overlooked. Symons was particularly important in stressing the idea of the moment, which he 
seems, again, not to have learned from the French, but from Browning (Beckson and Munro, 
1970).
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This did not mean that he was turning his back on Pre-Raphaelitism. 
Instead, he was attempting to surmount it: ‘If Rossetti was a subcon­
scious influence, and perhaps the most powerful of all, we looked con­
sciously to Pater for our philosophy’ (Yeats, 1956 : 302). Now, as we 
have seen, Pater was an extreme relativist, who saw History as a way 
out of Heraclitean flux. He was, in other words trying to achieve a 
synthesis between the two world views; of stasis and flux. And this is a 
project Yeats would have had a great deal of sympathy with (Engelberg, 
1964). It is at least interesting in this respect that, in his own poetical 
theorising, Yeats began where Pater had begun, with the individual’s 
experience. Pater had written ‘our knowledge is limited to what we feel’ 
(Pater n.d.: 113) and this fitted in well with Yeats’s view that ‘there is 
no truth save in thine own heart’. Moreover, as we have seen, Pater saw 
the truths of history as being discernible through art; ‘Pater opposed  
the Philistinism of a materialistic culture, and [...] regarded art with a 
reverence usually consistent with religious worship’ (Nathan, 1965 
:113) another idea that Yeats (and the rest of the Aesthetes) obviously 
found congenial.
Significantly, however, Yeats was more interested in the later Pater 
than the earlier; i.e. the Pater that emphasised stasis and certainty 
more than the flux (Bizot, 1976 : 398). This does not mean that he was 
not interested in ‘the moment’. Writing much later, Yeats wrote: ‘We 
may escape from the constraint of our nature and from that of external 
things, entering upon a state where all fuel has become flame, where
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there is nothing but the state itself, nothing to constrain or end it. We 
attain it always in the creation or enjoyment of a work of art, but that 
moment though eternal in the Daimon passes from us because it is not 
an attainment of our whole being. Philosophy has always explained its 
moment of moments in much the same way; nothing can be added to 
it, nothing taken away; that all progressions are full of illusion, that 
everything is born there like a ship in full sail’ (Ellmann, 1954 : 221). 
Now not just the ideas, but the language (for example, the use of 
phrases like ‘the flame’) is strongly Paterian here. However, whereas in 
the early Pater, the moment justifies itself (’art for arts sake’); Yeats 
stresses ‘that, though temporary existence is constant conflict, the final 
aim and achievement is to transcend such existence, to transcend the 
dimensions of time and space, to stretch out “the moment’” (Melchiori, 
1960 : 283) as Melchiori puts it; in other words, to reach the 
(metaphysical) eternity that lies behind the moment.
This is why, looking back much later, Yeats claimed the ‘The pure 
“gem-like flame” was an insufficient motive’ (Yeats, 1936 : ix), on the 
grounds that ‘We were left to keep our feet upon a swaying rope in a 
storm’ (Yeats, 1956 : 302-303). This interesting metaphor suggests 
(correctly) that what Yeats wanted was a shelter from the storm, or, to 
rephrase this, a foundation for his philosophy. In Pater’s very earliest 
philosophy, he exalted the moment, and saw nothing outside the flux of 
temporality. However, as we have seen. Pater’s defence o f this theory 
became tautological, as it was bound to do. The only sure way in this
62
time to create a sure foundation for aesthetic values was by invoking 
metaphysics. Pater, as a materialist and relativist, was loath to do that 
(although he was fascinated by the project). Yeats, however, was not.
As we have seen, Yeats had already developed a system of symbolism, 
but his theory was of a mystical landscape that lay behind reality,but 
could be read through reality by the visionary poet (Loizeaux, 1984). 
This mystical landscape, or metaphysical reality, was the form that 
structured and gave meaning to the otherwise inert and desacralised 
material world. The system of ‘correspondences’ that followed, was not 
mere metaphor, but the only correct way of ‘reading’ the world. Pater’s 
philosophy was anti-foundationalist (in the early essays. Later he foun­
ded his system of aesthetics, as we have seen, in history) and anti-sys­
tematic (he disapproved of, to use the jargon, Grand Theory). Yeats, 
however, was a foundationalist, and a believer in systematic metaphy­
sical theories. This does not mean that Yeats deserted Pater, but that 
instead, as he developed, he turned from the Pater of the ‘Conclusion’ 
to the Pater of the Leonardo essay; i.e. the Pater that stressed fixity.
The end result of all this was that if the poet was to become a visio­
nary, reporting metaphysical truths, then art would have to become a 
kind of religion. Slightly later, Yeats wrote ‘We write of great writers, 
even of writers whose beauty would once have seemed an unholy beau­
ty, with rapt sentences like those our fathers kept for the beatitudes 
and mysteries of the Church; and no matter what we believe with our 
lips, we believe with our hearts that beautiful things [...] have ‘‘lain
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burningiy on the Divine hand” and that when time has begun to wither, 
the Divine hand will fall heavily on bad taste and vulgarity. When no 
man believed these things William Blake believed them, and began that 
preaching against the Philistines which is as the preaching of the Middle 
Ages against the Saracen’ (Yeats, 1903 : 169-170).
As we have seen, Pater discussed two intertwined ideas that were of 
great interest to the post-Roman tic poet. Firstly, there was the problem  
of how art was to be justified in an increasingly utilitarian and 
‘rational’ era; and secondly there was the problem of providing a foun­
dation for aesthetic standards. There was, o f course, the option of 
positing an anti-foundationalist aesthetic (what we would call postmo­
dern aesthetics) but this was felt to lead merely to a facile relativism. 
Pater, as we have seen, sought an escape from relativism by turning to 
Hegelian theories of History and positing a foundation for aesthetic 
standards in the art of Ancient Greece. For reasons we shall consider 
shortly, Yeats did not wish to adopt this particular view of history. In­
stead, he turned back to the Neo-Platonism that was adopted by the 
earlier generation of Romantics (specifically Blake and Shelley). Pater 
had of course also done this, but what was for Pater a metaphor was 
for Yeats a literal reality. Thus, in the quote above, Yeats argues that 
aesthetic standards have a metaphysical reality. Therefore, since the 
truths of religion are also believed by many to be metaphysical and 
timeless, Yeats is only being consistent when he claims that art and re­
ligion are the same.
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Yeats himself was perfectly aware of why he feels he must make these 
assumptions. He wrote; when ‘they (that is to say educated people, the 
Bourgeoisie) had to explain why serious people like themselves hon­
oured the great poets greatly they were hard put to it for lack of good 
reasons’ (Yeats, 1903 : 169). In other words, again, how does one justi­
fy art (rationally)? Blake is the supreme poet in this view because he 
‘expressed every beautiful feeling that came into his head without 
troubling about its utility or chaining it to any utility (Yeats, 1903 : 
172)(my italics). Contemplating art as product, as an object that might 
have a use, or a monetary value, was the road to disaster; and in this, 
Yeats o f course is following Shelley.
The distrust of utility that follows on from this, leads, o f course, to 
praise o f passivity; one o f the mainstays of the aesthete’s beliefs. 
‘Listening to sermons [...] doing or not doing certain things’ (Yeats, 
1903 : 169) should be of lesser importance. Only the supernatural 
beings that were represented by symbols were important. ‘If the ‘‘world 
of imagination” was ‘‘the world of eternity” [...] it was of less impor­
tance to know men and nature than to distinguish the beings and sub­
stances of imagination from those of a more perishable kind, created 
by the fantasy, in uninspired moments, out of memory and whim; and 
this could best be done by purifying one’s mind, as with a flame, in 
study of the works of the great masters, who were great because they 
had been granted by divine favour a vision of the unfallen world from  
which others are kept apart by the flaming sword that turns every way;
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and by flying from the painters who studied “the vegetable glass” for its 
own sake' (Yeats 1903 : 178-179). Yeats echoes Pater in stating, in a 
circular fashion that the only way to know who the great writers are 
and how to emulate them is simply to read the great writers. There is 
no attempt to give a rational explanation of their greatness except by 
invoking the doctrine of the Symbol; they were 'seers' who looked 
within themselves to see the real world. The only real world is the Pla­
tonic world, but we must remember in this Neo-Platonism the Platonic 
essences are inaccessible, except by introspection. Thus, only by 
painting the inner vision can we paint reality.
As we have seen, Yeats had a strong distrust of science, and a desire 
for visionary experiences, which, however, he wished to order into a 
coherent system. It is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that he felt 
strongly attracted to the occult. His first attraction was to Madame Bla- 
vatsky's Theosophy, which confirmed Blake's belief in the system of 
correspondences (Moore, 1973). However, his real occult initiation 
began in 1890, when he joined the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn 
(Ellmann, 1949). In terms of philosophy, The Golden Dawn's beliefs 
were quite close to those of Theosophy; in other words they believed in 
the system of correspondences. (Ellmann, 1949). However, there are a 
number of ways in which it differs from Theosophy which are signif­
icant for the way that Yeats's philosophy developed. The first major 
difference was that The Order of the Golden Dawn was primarily a se­
cret and hierarchical order.The occult knowledge that one gained in
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the Order was not to be passed on to outsiders (Ellmann, 1949). In­
stead o f the relative democracy of Theosophy, the Golden Dawn took 
over from Rosicrucianism ‘an elaborate system of grades, and a divi­
sion into an outer and inner order' (Ellmann, 1949 : 95).
It is this division between the initiate and the non-initiate that began 
to fascinate Yeats, and the theme dominates his next book o f poems; 
The Rose. The very name of the volume indicates the unity o f his occult 
and literary researches. The Rose, the symbol which unifies the volume, 
is taken directly from Pre-Raphaelite sources (Goughian, 1967). How­
ever, it is also a dominant symbol in Golden Dawn iconography. The 
Golden Dawn took over from Rosicrucianism the symbol of the Rosy 
Cross, which symbolised the mystical union of the male and female 
principles of the universe (Yeats, 1962). However, it was the symbol of 
much more as well. It also symbolised love, beauty, and Ireland, among 
other things. It was obviously the multifarious meanings that could be 
inferred from it that attracted Yeats to the Rose as a symbol (Ellmann, 
1949 : 97). However, in his early poetry, its dominant meaning is un­
doubtedly ‘spiritual and eternal beauty ‘ (Yeats, 1962 : 209) (Yeats 
himself wrote ‘the quality symbolised as the Rose differs from the In­
tellectual Beauty of Shelley and of Spenser in that I have imagined it as 
suffering with man and not as something pursued and seen from afar' 
(Yeats, 1957 : 842)).
The first poem of the volume states the initial theme.
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To the Rose Upon the Rood of Time
Red Rose, proud Rose, sad Rose o f all m y days!
Come near me, while I sing the ancient ways:
Cuchulain battling with the bitter tide;
The Druid, grey, wood-nurtured, quiet-eyed,
Who cast round Fergus dreams, and ruin untold;
And thine own sadness, whereof stars, grown old 
In dancing, silver-sandalled on the sea,
Sing in their high and lonely melody.
Come near, that no more blinded by  man^s fate,
I find under the boughs o f love and hate.
In all poor foolish things that live a day.
Eternal beauty wandering on her way.
Come near, come near, come near - Ah, leave me still 
A little space for the rose-breath to fill!
Lest I no more hear common things that crave;
The weak worm hiding down in its small cave,
The field-mouse running by me in the grass.
And heavy mortal hopes that toM and pass;
But seek alone to hear the strange things said 
By God to the bright hearts o f those long dead,
And leam  to chaunt a tongue men do not know.
Come near; I would, before m y time to go.
Sing o f old Eire and the ancient ways:
Red Rose, proud Rose, sad rose of all m y  days (Yeats 1957 :100-101).
This poem begins by showing Yeats's increasing interest in Irish litera- 
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ture and mythology as a basis for his ‘system' (Brown points out that 
‘Irish nationalism and the occult [...] came to occupy the centre o f his 
life simultaneously', and that for Yeats, these two interests were to be­
come increasingly intertwined (Brown, 1972 : 315)). It is to be the 
Sidhe (the Irish fairies) who are to populate Yeats's mystical landscape.
In its emphasis on eternal beauty (as opposed to the ‘cracked tune 
that Chronos sings' i.e. temporality) Yeats develops another opposition  
we have met before; between the timeless world of the imagination (or 
rather, the timeless, sacred, spatial world that the visionary poet can 
perceive with his imagination), and the material world, enslaved by 
temporality. It is therefore, the ‘eternal' Rose that will give him the 
strength to ‘sing the ancient ways' i.e., overcome the present by re­
turning to the past.
However, Yeats also shows a greater appreciation of the dilemma that 
this dichotomy has set up. For since the dream world is an escape from 
reality (’which is more full of weeping than you can understand' to 
quote from ‘The Stolen Child' again) the temptation is to live in it per­
manently and ignore mere reality; ‘the common things that crave'. This 
is undoubtedly a discussion of his own dilemma; whether to be an art­
ist or an occultist (O’Donnell, 1974). In ‘To Ireland In the Coming 
Times' he writes ‘to him who ponders well, 1 My rhymes more than 
their rhyming tell'; and Yeats links this with his occult experiences. 
Yeats is, therefore an initiate; his poetry contains ‘hidden meanings'. 
‘The red-rose -bordered hem 1 Of her, whose history began, I before
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God made the angelic clan, I Trails all about the written page. ‘(Yeats, 
1957 : 137 - 138). The ‘her’; who one could call the Rose woman, is a 
typical Rosicrucian - Golden Dawn figure; Yeats was well aware that in 
Golden Dawn iconography the Rose was a symbol of the eternal female 
principle (Larrissy, 1994).
However, regardless of how much he felt himself to be a magician, 
Yeats was always held back by his practice of art. For he continued to 
feel that for the sake of his poetry he had to deal with the material 
world as well as the spiritual. But The Golden Dawn stated quite expli­
citly that supreme Adeptship was ‘antithetical to material existence' 
(O'Donnell, 1975 : 58). ‘Despite a continuing admiration of Adeptship, 
Yeats was always an artist, and, as such, could not renounce the physi­
cal universe which provided the materials for communicable artistic 
expression' (O'Donnell, 1975 : 59).
This, then, was his dilemma. And, to understand the solution Yeats 
developed in the later half of the decade, there are a number of points 
to bear in mind. Firstly, there is the extent to which, in response to the 
relativist pressures discussed above, Yeats was driven to create an ela­
borate objectivist and foundationalist metaphysic. This derived from 
Pater, but differed from him in its overtly  Idealist and mystical charac­
ter. Secondly there is the extent to which this metaphysical system in­
fluenced the form of his artistic production, not just in terms of the 
way this was organised, and the ideas which it expressed, but in the 
very manner and style in which his poetry and stories were written.
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Thirdly, there is the extent to which this system became increasingly 
oppositional in nature; that is, the extent to which Yeats's thought re­
acts against what he increasingly saw as the materialist tenor of his 
time. And finally, how this system acts as a link, politically, between 
the socialist Yeats of the 1880s and the more authoritarian Yeats that 
had evolved by the start of World War One.
As we go on to discuss these works o f the late 1890s specifically the 
stories o f The Secret Rose (1897), the poetry of The Wind Among the 
R eeds(lS99) and the essays of Ideas o f  Good and Evil (1903) we 
should remember, that, as Stephen Myers writes, in Yeats’s Book o f  the 
Nineties, ‘Yeats was at war. His enemy, as he perceived it, was the hun­
gry Materialism of the fast-waning century, with Journalism as its 
mouthpiece. Abstraction in its head, and Technology spinning its cogs 
and driving it forward. Words were the weapons he would deploy, and 
he did so tellingly in the three books which together, comprise his 
Book of the Nineties, The Secret Rose, The Wind Among the Reeds, and 
Ideas o f  Good and Evil The first of these offered an introduction to the 
Book of the Nineties, announced The Argument, brought on stage sev­
eral key characters (who periodically entered and exited the book 
thereafter), and, in a significant gesture, gave the Book historical 
grounding. The second, a collection of short lyrics, strained away from 
history even as it fretted over a myriad of worldly frustrations'
(Myers,1993 : 89).
Now, about the time that Yeats began to work on The Wind Among
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The Reeds (that is, the last three years or so of the nineteenth  
century), he became increasingly interested in French Symbolism. This 
is not to say that Yeats suddenly came under the influence of Symbol­
ism directly. What I have tried to show here is that Yeats had already 
discovered an indigenous proto-Symbolist tradition stemming from the 
English Romantics. As Yeats wrote at the time ‘I have not French enough 
to understand the philosophy and criticism ‘that might be ‘hidden in 
the writings of M.Mallarmé'; and Yeats goes on to state that he deve­
loped his own theory of Symbolism from Blake. He also wrote that with 
regards to Mallarmé ‘ I seized on everything that at all resembled my 
own thought' showing that Yeats mainly viewed the Symbolists as 
people who had anticipated his own thinking, rather than an influence 
in their own right (Morris, 1986:116). In any case, as Morris makes 
clear, Yeats was only interested in Mallarmé via Symons, not as an ori­
ginal source.
Now Symons (one of the major aesthete writers and theorists, and a 
good friend of Yeats) had written, in The Symbolist M ovement in Li­
terature ‘Well the doctrine of Mysticism, with which all the symbolical 
literature has so much to do, o f which it is all so much the expression, 
presents us, not with a guide for conduct, not with a plan for our hap­
piness, not with an explanation of any mystery, but with a theory o f life 
which makes us familiar with mystery, and which seem to harmonise 
those instincts which make for religion, passion, and art, freeing us at 
once of a great bondage' (Symons, 1899 :174) and continued ‘it is at
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least with a certain relief that we turn to an ancient doctrine, so much 
more likely to be true because it has the air of a dream' (Symons, 1899 
: 175). In other words these theorists were perfectly aware how im­
plausible their theories sounded; they simply turned round and insisted 
that the more unlikely they sounded the more likely they were to be 
true.
Symon's reading of Symbolism, which is to say, seeing Symbolism as 
having mystical connotations, was a reading Yeats found highly conge­
nial (Starkie, 1960). Moreover, in talking about Mallarmé, especially, 
Symons stresses the French writer's obscurity. ‘Mallarmé was obscure,' 
he writes, ‘not so much because he wrote differently, as because he 
thought differently from other people' (Symons, 1899 : 118). ‘No-one 
in our time has more significantly vindicated the supreme right of the 
artist in the aristocracy of letters [,..] and might it not, after all, be the 
finest epitaph for a self-respecting man of letters to be able to say, 
even after the writing of many books; I have kept my secret, I have not 
betrayed myself to the multitude?' (Symons, 1899 :119). This should 
remind us of Yeats's statement that after he became a visionary, his 
poetry would have to become more obscure. And the stress Symons 
put on literature as a way of ‘keeping a secret', fits in with what Yeats 
was learning in the Order of the Golden Dawn.
This interest in ‘obscure' poetry was in part because he was under 
pressure from other members of the Golden Dawn to decide whether 
he was to be a poet or a magician (O'Connell, 1975). In this he was
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caught in two dilemmas. Firstly, was he to become a real mystic, albeit 
one who occasionally wrote poetry? And secondly, if he decided against 
this, and remained a poet first and foremost, how was he to talk about 
his mystical beliefs without attracting the attention of the profane? 
Yeats's response was to attempt to merge the two activities; to try and 
become a mystical-occult poet. And so he took what he needed from 
Symon's understanding of French Symbolism, and married it to the 
mystical idea of symbolism he had developed from Blake and the Neo- 
Platonists.
It has been argued that Yeats attempted to justify his position as an 
occult poet by looking to history (in much the same way that Pater 
did). However, since his occult view of history was not to be revealed 
to the multitude, he would have to express it secretly (Hough speaks of 
his ‘irritating preference for that which cannot be understood' and 
correctly links this to his occult practice (Hough, 1949 : 228)). In the 
early volumes of poetry, Yeats has set up a system of symbolism in 
which the Rose woman is a symbol for the timeless Idealist world of the 
Gods. In his works of the later ‘Nineties he develops these ideas into a 
more complex system, which he then draws on in his poetry (talking of 
these books, Seiden writes ‘By means of his occult symbology, more­
over, he had explained or defined all of his disconnected metaphysical 
opinions' (Seiden 1962 : 63)). The volumes in which this attempt to 
create a mystical system reach a peak are The Secret Rose (1897) vo­
lume of short stories, and The Wind Among the Reeds (1899). As Mar­
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tin points out, The Secret Rose is not just a collection of short stories, 
but a unified volume that gives an occult history of the last two thou­
sand years (Martin, 1975).
In dealing with the view of history that Yeats had evolved by this 
point, we should remember that it develops out of Pater. Pater's theory 
was, o f course, evolutionary, but, at some points (for example, his de­
scription o f the Mona Lisa) he seems to hypothesise a cyclical view of 
temporality, and of course his interest in Plato presupposes knowledge 
of Plato's theory of timeless Platonic Forms. Pater, therefore, discusses, 
at various points, three views o f time,* evolutionary, cyclical, and the 
theory that time is an illusion, and that timelessness is the only true 
reality. Due, however, to his hostility to metaphysics, he was, ultimate­
ly, unable to reconcile these philosophical positions. Yeats, however, 
had no such fears, and his philosophy of history is just such an at­
tempt.
The volume of stories The Secret Rose, in which the theorising about 
history was explicated, is united, as the title implies, by the symbol of 
the rose. Thus he carried on the development o f rose symbolism he 
had used since The Rose volume (1893), with this proviso; the rose is 
now to be ‘secret'. The stories, in other words, chart the secret and oc­
cult history of the last two thousand years, with the Rose and its corol­
lary, the Rose woman, representing the world of spirit, which is, as 
Yeats says, at ‘war' with the material world. The protagonists of the 
stories ; poets, outcasts, visionaries, are men who have perceived the
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true nature of reality, that is, who know that the spiritual reality repre­
sented by the Rose is the only genuine reality, and that to become a 
true adepts it is necessary to follow Her. For example, in The Binding of 
the Hair' the bard Aodh worships Queen Dectira, whom he calls ‘Rose 
of my Desire' (Yeats, 1995 : 85). This represents the visionaries per­
ception of a timeless Platonic world beyond the merely corporeal world 
of material reality. However, he is beheaded for his love. Thus the in­
compatibility of occult worship of the Rose woman and living in 
‘reality' is stated at the outset.
Yeats's problem is that, since he views the world of spirit and the 
world o f matter as being wholly antithetical, the initiates who live in 
the material world must inevitably meet tragic ends. Worship of the 
Rose woman is simply incompatible with life in the material world. 
Yeats's response is to posit a theory of history in which the war be­
tween spirit and matter is eventually settled; by an apocalypse in which 
the world o f matter will be defeated. This idea comes directly from the 
leader o f the Golden Dawn, MacGregor Mathers. As Yeats wrote ‘He 
(Mathers) began to foresee changes in the world, announcing in 1893 
or 1894 the imminence of immense wars [...] it may have been some 
talk of his that made me write the poem that begins' and Yeats then 
quotes the first few lines of ‘The Battle of the Black Pig ‘from The Wind 
Among the Reeds (Yeats, 1956 : 336).
In line with this belief, The Secret Rose volume describes two thou­
sand years of Irish history from pagan through to Christian times. In
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‘Where There is Nothing There is God' (one of the very earliest stories) 
monks in the early days of Christian Ireland take in a beggar who turns 
out to be a mystical philosopher (when he prays to ‘Thou Who Dwells 
Beyond the Stars' there is a smell o f roses (Yeats, 1995). The monks 
hold him in reverence, the purpose o f the story being that in beginning 
of the Christian era Christianity had real spiritual value.
However as the story ‘The Crucifixion of the Outcast' shows, Yeats 
believed that Christianity had decayed over time. This story, which is 
set a couple of hundred years later, shows how the poet and mystic 
Cumhal attempts to find shelter in a Christian monastery. Here, how­
ever, the monks are shown as being fat, arrogant, stupid and cruel, too 
interested in luxury to listen to what the poet has to say (Yeats, 1995). 
After Cumhal threatens to curse them because of their meanness, they 
decide to have him crucified because ‘the bards and gleemen are an 
evil race, ever cursing and stirring up the people [...] immoral and im­
moderate in all things, and heathen in their hearts [...] railing against 
God and Christ and the blessed saints' (Yeats, 1995 :102-103). But be­
fore they do Cumhal takes out the food he carries with him and an­
nounces he will give it to the poorest person there. The beggars who 
have followed all clamour for the scraps but Cumhal replies ‘“I am my­
self the poorest'", and continues “‘I have heard in my heart the rustling 
of the rose-bordered dress of her who is more subtle than Angus, the 
Subtle-Hearted and more full of beauty than Conan the bald [...] but, 
because I am done with all things, I award the tithe to you'" (Yeats,
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1995 : 105).
Not only is the Rose worshipper persecuted by Christians; he is also 
misunderstood and ignored by the populace. This is another link be­
tween the adept and the artist; both are misunderstood by the masses. 
This is brought out in ‘Out of the Rose' which also contains the clearest 
statement of his occult beliefs at this time.
The story deals with an aristocratic knight who helps some villagers 
in a feud; a noble and courageous act, but one which leaves him mort­
ally wounded. As he lays dying a boy asks him why ‘“you fought like the 
gods and giants and heroes in the stories and for so little a thing'" 
(Yeats, 1995 : 111). The knight replies ‘“I'll tell you of myself, for now 
that I am the last of the fellowship I may tell all'", and continues ‘“I live 
in a land far from this, and was one of the Knights of St John, but I was 
one of those in the order who always longed for more arduous labours 
in the service of the Most High. At last there came to us a knight o f Pa­
lestine, to whom the truth of truths had been revealed by God Himself. 
He had seen a Rose of Fire, and a Voice from out of the Rose had told 
him how men would turn from the light of their own hearts, and bow 
down before external order and outer fixity and that then the light 
would cease [...] Already the wayward light of the heart was shining out 
upon the world to keep it alive, with a less clear lustre, and that, as it 
paled, a strange infection was touching the stars and the hills'” (Yeats, 
1995 : 111). The knight had been ordered to die in the service of the 
Rose, and now he had succeeded.
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We can now see, then, the basic outlines of Yeats's historical view. 
Already, by 1897, Yeats views history as consisting of two thousand 
year ‘blocs'. Each bloc is separated from the other by some form of 
apocalyptic violence (Martin, 1975 : 25-27). Our own era is the era 
of materialism. The antithetical force, the realm of spirit, declines 
throughout this period, and as it does so ‘a strange infection' sets in. 
Since Yeats is explicitly on the side of spirit, he therefore views our 
period as being one o f decline.
Significantly, after the knight has told his story, the boy tries to re­
member it, but fails: “‘He has told me a good tale for there was much 
fighting in it, but I did not understand much of it, and it is hard to re­
member so long a story'" (Yeats, 1995 : 112). He symbolises the ordi­
nary man; ignorant of the Rose, stupid and materialistic, more interes­
ted in his poaching than in spiritual wisdom.
So far, the heroes in these stories have had a simple fate; they have 
worshipped the rose and died for her. However, as the power of the 
rose weakens, the pull of ‘outer fixity' becomes stronger; and later her­
oes in the book are caught between the two worlds (rather like Yeats 
himself, caught between occultism and poetry). They have had the Rose 
vision, but are too afraid to follow this worship to death, which is 
where it inevitably ends.This theme is explored in the Red Hanrahan 
stories, set in the eighteenth century.
Hanrahan, who is the subject o f five of the stories in this volume, is 
the paradigmatic ‘weak' hero. Significantly, he is a poet (most of the
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other heroes have been adepts), who dabbles in the occult without un­
derstanding the meaning, or the danger, in what he reads. ‘The Book of  
the Great Dhoul and Hanrahan the Red' explains how he buys a book of  
occult wisdom from a a bookseller, and decides to call up the spirits 
for ‘he had often longed to see the Shee' (Yeats, 1995 : 141). He suc­
cessfully calls up a spirit woman who tells him that she loves him but 
he rejects her saying: “‘I have had enough o f women'" (Yeats, 1995 : 
143). Angrily she curses him, saying: “‘Owen Hanrahan the Red, you 
have looked so often upon the dust that when the Rose has blossomed 
there you think it but a pinch of coloured dust; but now I lay upon you  
a curse, and you shall see the Rose everywhere, in the noggin, in 
women’s eye, in drifting phantoms, and seek to come to it in vain; it 
shall waken a fire in your heart, and in your feet, and in your hands. A 
sorrow of all sorrows is upon you, Owen Hanrahan the Red'" (Yeats, 
1995 :144).
Hanrahan is now caught. No earthly woman will ever satisfy him, but 
he cannot accept the price of meeting the Rose woman; death (in this 
respect he is rather like Yeats himself) .The rest of the stories explain 
how he is gradually reconciled to his fate, and eventually comes to ac­
cept his destiny in the world o f the Sidhe.
Yeats, therefore, viewed his own era as being one of decay and dec­
line, as drab materialism increasingly destroyed the power o f art and 
magic (which, of course, for Yeats, were the same). However, he also 
thought that we were coming to the end of the two thousand year per-
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iod in which this would be the case. This concept is explored in the last 
three stories o f the volume. These stories are narrated by characters 
who have faced Hanrahan's dilemma, but instead of resolving it, have 
lapsed back into a hypocritical Christianity.
The narrator of the first story ‘Rosa Alchemica', for example, is quite 
like Yeats in that he claims to have ‘passed through strange exper­
iences, which have changed me so that my writings have grown less 
popular and less intelligible' (Yeats, 1995 : 180) the words Yeats him­
self used to describe the path his own poetry used. This narrator has 
also written a book called, of course, ‘Rosa Alchemica'. It is best, how­
ever, to see the narrator as a self criticism of Yeats as he used to be, 
for the narrator very much resembles Marius the Epicurean, the hero 
of Pater's only novel (Nathan, 1965). He writes ‘I had gathered about 
me all gods, because I believed in none' (Yeats, 1995 : 181) thus echo­
ing Pater's metaphorical use o f pagan imagery; using mythology whilst 
denying its literal truth. The narrator remains aloof, apart from the 
world, until he is disturbed by Michael Robartes, who wishes him to 
join the Order of the Alchemical Rose, a secret, Gnostic order, not un­
like the Order of the Golden Dawn.
It is important to remember that Robartes and not the narrator is the 
hero o f the story, when he asks “‘Will you become an initiate of the 
Order of the Alchemical Rose?'". He continues; “‘You have shut the 
world away and gathered the gods about you, and if you do not throw 
yourself at their feet, you will be always full of lassitude, and of waver-
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ing purpose, for a man must forget he is miserable in the bustle and 
noise of the multitude in this world and in time; or seek a mystical 
union with the multitude who govern this world and time”’ (Yeats,
1995 : 184). This is the dilemma all the protagonists of The Secret Rose 
(and Yeats’s early poetry) face.
Robartes goes on to name this multitude; “There is Lear, his head 
still wet with the thunderstorms, and he laughs because you thought 
yourself and existence who are but a shadow, and him a shadow who is 
an eternal god”’ (Yeats, 1995 : 186). In other words the creatures o f li­
terature are the gods. The world of art and the world of magic are the 
same. It is the world of ‘reality’ and temporality that is the false one (it 
follows that the magician and the creative writer are trying to do the 
same thing; communicate with and try to ‘materialise’ these gods).
Robartes wins the narrator over, and they leave for the Temple of 
the Alchemical Rose. As they go they pass a peasant Christian who 
shouts out “‘Idolaters, go down to Hell with your she dhowls”’ (Yeats, 
1995 : 190). He is of course the ignorant common man, who has dared 
to keep with an outdated Christianity. But perhaps there is hope even 
for him, for as Robartes says ‘“A time will come for these people also, 
and they will sacrifice a mullet to Artemis, or some other fish to some 
new divinity, unless indeed their own divinities [...] set up once more 
their temples of grey stone. Their reign has never ceased, but only 
waned in power a little, for the Sidhe still pass in every wind, and dance 
and play at hurley, and fight their sudden battles in every hollow and
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every hill, but they cannot build their temples again till there have been  
martyrdoms and victories, and perhaps even that long-foretold battle 
in the Valley of the Black Pig.”’ (Yeats, 1995 :190). This battle is the 
apocalypse that will announce the victory o f the forces of Spirit over 
Matter.
The narrator begins to prepare for his initiation into the ceremony by 
reading books of occult lore which reveal that ‘the independent reality 
of our thoughts was the doctrine from which all true doctrines 
sprang’ (Yeats, 1995 : 192). This extreme form of Idealism is repeated 
as Yeats’s own belief in essays published only a few years later.
At last it is time for the narrator’s initiation. It will take the form o f a 
circular dance around a room which has a gigantic picture o f a rose for 
a ceiling. As this dance revolves faster and faster, and therefore closer 
and closer to the Rose (one might call this movement a vortex), the 
narrator will be plucked out of time and life, into the immortal (but 
dead) world of the Moods (or Shidhe). However as he dances he sud­
denly realises that his dancing partner is one of the Sidhe, and in his 
horror he passes out. This is his moment of fear, exactly the same as 
that which afflicted Hanrahan, but unlike Hanrahan, he will be given no 
second chance. When he wakes up he finds himself alone.
It is the third story that is particularly interesting, in that it deals dir­
ectly with the theme of Apocalypse which has haunted the whole vo­
lume. It is told by the same narrator, and begins when ‘three very old 
men with stout sticks in their hands’ (Yeats, 1995 : 212) turn up at his
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house late at night. They are three brothers who had lived in one o f the 
western isles ‘and had cared all their lives for nothing except for those 
classical writers and old Gaelic writers who expounded an heroic and 
simple life [...] At last a man, who told them he was Michael Robartes, 
came to them in a fishing boat, like Saint Brendan drawn by some vi­
sion and called by some voice; and told them again of the coming of 
the gods and ancient things; and their hearts, which had never endured 
the body and pressure o f our time, but only of distant times, found 
nothing unlikely in anything he told them, but accepted all simply and 
were happy’ (Yeats, 1995 : 213). This is the beginning of an elaborate 
revision o f the New Testament story o f the birth of Jesus. Michael Ro­
bartes is a mixture of John the Baptist and an angel of the lord. The 
three old men are of course the three wise men, but instead of studying 
astrology, they have studied literature, the new arcane lore.
Years pass, and one day they hear o f the death of Michael Ro­
bartes. While they were still mourning, a voice informs them they must 
set out for Paris, where a woman will tell them the names of the Im­
mortals. With this knowledge they will be able to call them up, and the 
Gods will walk the earth again (Yeats, 1995 : 213). This will mark the 
change from a religion based on ethics to one based on aesthetics. 
Moreover it will mark the change from a religion that is in the world, 
to one that is out of it, that will deal solely with things of the Spirit.
To emphasise this point, everything about this new annunciation is 
different. Instead of Palestine, the home of the New Testament, they
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will set out for sophisticated Paris, the home of Symbolism. Instead of a 
young virgin they will find a dying whore. At first convinced that the 
Gods would never choose such a women they make to leave but 
‘Suddenly the second oldest of the old men crowed like a cock [...] be­
fore they could rise to their knees, a resonant chanting voice came 
from the lips that had crowed and said “I am not a Dhoul, but 1 am 
Hermes the Shepherd o f the Dead, and 1 run upon the errands of the 
gods, and you have heard my sign, that has been my sign from the old 
days. Bow down before her from whose lips the secret names of the 
immortals, and of the things near their hearts, are about to come that 
the immortals may come again into the world. Bow down, and under­
stand that when the immortals are about to overthrow the things that 
are today, and bring the things that were yesterday, they have no-one 
to help them, but one whom the things that are today have cast out"' 
(Yeats, 1995 : 215).
As they leave one o f the old men reflects ‘“He (Le. Hermes) meant, I 
think, that when people are good the world likes them and takes pos­
session o f them, and so eternity comes through people who are not 
good or who have been forgotten. Perhaps Christianity was good and 
the world liked it, so now it is going away and the Immortals are begin­
ning to awake'" (Yeats, 1995 : 216). Yeats develops the idea nascent in 
his earlier poetry, that the world of the spirit is a world of timeless­
ness. To be ‘driven out of time' is to enter the world of the Rose 
woman; and this shows the links between his own theories and Neo-Pla-
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tonism.
This, then, is Yeats's basic view of history. To quote Morton Seiden 
‘in the prose tales in ‘The Secret Rose' the idea of historical cycles - 
symbolised by a winding staircase, geometrical images, and the whir­
ling Sidhe - is very much elaborated on. An age is ushered into being by 
a supernatural influx, it perishes in cataclysm; it achieves heroism and 
Unity of Culture when human life converges upon Anima Mundi; and it 
is superseded by its cultural opposite' (Seiden, 1962 : 56). Yeats be­
lieved that our age was shortly to be replaced by its ‘cultural opposite'; 
a transition that would be preceded by ‘cataclysm'. To say that this 
would be a bad or good thing is, in this view, meaningless; it was simply 
inevitable. However, there is no doubt that in terms o f personal prefer­
ence, Yeats was in favour o f a new world view based on the primacy of 
spirit, magic and art. Years later he wrote ‘When 1 was a boy everybody 
talked about progress, and rebellion against my elders took the form of 
aversion to that myth. I took satisfaction in certain public disasters, 
felt a sort o f ecstasy at the contemplation of ruin [...] Presently [...] the 
sort o f images that came into ‘Rosa Alchemica' and the ‘Adoration of 
the Magi' took their place. Our civilisation was about to reverse itself, 
or some new civilisation was about to be born from ail that our age had 
rejected, from all that my stories symbolised as a harlot, and take after 
its mother; because we had worshipped a single god it would worship 
many' (Yeats, 1966 : 932).
This is the view of history which Yeats had developed by 1899, and it
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develops out of, but goes beyond, Pater's evolutionary viewpoint. 
Change occurs, progress and decline, but within a a cyclical frame­
work. (We have, o f course, seen the germ o f this idea is also present in 
Pater. However, Yeats would also have found it in Blake and Sweden­
borg; (Raine, 1986); and both of those men would have found the idea 
first put forward in the writings o f the Neo-Platonists (Raine, 1986). 
Raine points out that not only the cyclical view of time, but also the 
view of history as being a constant ‘alternation of cultures' is also Neo- 
Platonic). However, in his view that there is a timeless world which 
eternally battles the material world, Yeats also incorporates more con­
ventional Neo-Platonic ideas into his system. Yeats's o f the late 1890s 
uses this view of history as a backbone for his mystical philosophy, 
which he then draws upon in The Wind Among the Reeds.
The Wind Among the Reeds is the public book of poetry, as opposed 
to the private book of occult stories. It deals with the same situations, 
and in many cases the same people, as The Secret Rose, but instead of 
dealing with them in chronological order, as in the book o f stories, it 
deals with them in a non-temporal fashion. The best way of imagining 
the structure of the book is to think o f the dance of ‘Rosa Alchemica'. 
This is a dance round about, and circling in on the Timeless Rose, end­
ing with unification with the Rose, and the initiate being plucked out of  
time. However this can only happen for the individual. For the true 
union of the elite with the Rose, the Apocalypse, as described in ‘The 
Adoration o f the Magi' must happen. However, this event, by definition
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must occur out of time, since it signals the end of time. A book of poe­
try, however much it circles the Rose, can never unite with it, because 
it remains in time. The book therefore must be unfulfilled; the apoca­
lypse has not yet happened.
Since there is no chronological progression, Yeats unites the volume 
by using a system of allusions. Almost every symbol used in the vo­
lume is repeated over and over again, usually with a slightly different 
meaning each time. Words and phrases not just from this volume, but 
from The Secret Rose are used repetitively, until it becomes clear that 
they have a secret meaning. The whole volume in fact is best under­
stood as a spell; an attempt, using personae, to abolish time and raise 
the old gods. But the attempt must be unsuccessful.^
The volume begins with three poems which are narrated by an un­
named first person narrator. They deal with the power of the other 
world, and act as incantatory poems, which set out the theme of the 
volume.It cannot be emphasised too much that Yeats wished to be both 
a magician and a poet, and one of the ways he wished to do this was to 
blur the difference between poetry and ritual magic. To quote Jacob 
Korg; ‘Many of Yeats's shorter poems, as well as part of the longer 
ones, borrow some of the qualities of ritual performance [...] they are 
in the present tense; they employ invocations, questions or exclama­
tions; and they witness some mystic transformation, so that they ap-
6 Instead of a chronological progression, In other words, Yeats chooses spatial organisation. In 
this he is attempting to structure his poetry so that he can build up more complex forms without 
compromising the fact that his poetry still consists of a collection of lyric moments'. We should 
bear this in mind when we come to look at Pound’s  poetry of 1913 and 1914, specifically the 
‘Xenia’ sequence and those that follow It.
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proach the conditions of deed or enactments, rather than mere expres­
sions o f feeling [.»] It was the habit of ritual that led him to see every­
thing as symbolic, so that his images ring with overtones of elusive sig­
nificance (Korg, 1995 ; 33).
This is a perfect description o f the opening poems of The Wind 
Among the Reeds. The first poem is T h e Hosting of the Sidhe'. It begins 
'The host is riding from Knocknarea' .The Host is of course the host of 
the Sidhe,and the present tense used throughout emphasises the ritual 
quality o f the poem. The next four lines are thick with unexplained al­
lusions;
‘And over the grave o f Clooth-na-Bare;
Caoilte tossing his burning hair, And
Niamh calling Away, come aw ay
These allusions are explained in Yeats's footnotes, but not in the body 
of the poem itself. What is significant about them is that, again, they 
create an air of mystery, a feeling that the poet has knowledge which 
he is not necessarily going to explain. Yeats is grounding himself in a 
magical tradition, the tradition of Irish myth. The poem continues;
Empty your heart of its mortal dream.
The winds awaken, the leaves whirl round.
Our cheeks are pale, our hair is tmbound,
Our breasts are heaving, our eyes are agleam,
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Out arms are waving our lips are apart;
And i f  any gaze on our rushing band,
We come between him and the deed o f his hand,
We come between him and the hope o f his heart 
(Yeats, 1957:140).
This is o f course the cry o f the Sidhe to join them (significantly, 
Niamh is a woman). It immediately sets up a complex system of sym­
bolism that we will recognise in part from The Secret Rose. The wind is 
of course a symbol of the Sidhe (Yeats writes ‘the Sidhe have much to 
do with the wind. They journey in whirling winds, the winds that were 
called the dance of the daughters of Herodias in the Middle Ages' 
(Yeats, 1957 : 800). This links the idea of wind, the idea of whirling 
round and round, and the idea o f the dance. In this volume, reference 
to one of these symbols will imply the others. The idea of hair being 
unbound is also a symbol o f the wildness of the Sidhe. The poem then 
returns to the narrator.
‘The host is rushing ‘twixt night and day
And where is there hope or deed as fair?' (Yeats, 1957 : 141)
In other words the narrator has now been convinced that only fol­
lowing the Sidhe can lead to true happiness. The narrator paves the 
way for the dilemmas o f Red Hanrahan and the others in the rest of the 
volume.
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The second poem is ‘The Everlasting Voices' which follows the same 
format. Whereas the first poem dealt with the wildness o f the Sidhe, 
this poem deals with their timelessness. It begins with the narrator be­
gging the Sidhe (this time called the Voices) to leave him alone, for 
whereas they are immortal, he is old and lives in the world o f Time.
Go to the guards of the heavenly fold 
And bid them wander obeying your will,
Flame under Flame, till Time be no more;
Have you not heard that our hearts are old,
That you call in birds, in wind on the hill,
In shaken boughs, in tide on the shore?
(Yeats, 1957 ; 141)
This sets up the symbol o f the flame (usually of a candle) being a sym­
bol for time, and also the prospect o f a time when time be no more'. 
The use o f the Game, is o f course, Paterian, and again, shows that Yeats 
emphasised that the poet looks through the moment' the Game' until 
he perceives eternity. Moreover it sets up more symbols for the Sidhe; 
birds, trees, and the sea. 'The Moods', the third poem in the incanta- 
tory sequence shows us another name for the im m ortals.
Time drops in decay,
Like a candle burnt out.
And the mountains and woods 
Have their day, have their day;
What one in the rout 
of the fire-bom moods
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Has fallen away? (Yeats, 1957 : 142)
The use of the word ‘woods' reminds us of the boughs o f the pre­
vious poem. This time it is used as a symbol of transience, and so while 
trees and so forth remind us of temporality, for the very same reason 
they remind us of the Sidhe.
After having established the theme of the volume and having set 
down some of the symbolism, the poetry proper can begin. The main 
structure o f The Wind Among the Reeds is of the various personae we 
have been introduced to in the The Secret Rose volume addressing ei­
ther the Rose woman or else the host of the Sidhe. As we untangle the 
symbolism, and unearth the layers of meaning, a whole aesthetic and 
philosophical system is unravelled. However, Yeats himself tried to 
cover up the meaning of this volume, almost as though he thought he 
had gone too far in revealing his occult system. For example, most of 
the poems in the book have titles such as T he Lover Tells o f the Rose 
in his Heart' and T he Lover Asks Forgiveness for his Many Moods'. It is 
only when we find out that the original titles were ‘Aedh Tells o f the 
Rose in his Heart' and ‘Michael Robartes Asks Forgiveness for his Many 
Moods' respectively that we see the links between this volume and the 
protagonists of the ‘Secret Rose'. Aedh (or Aodh; Yeats uses both 
spellings) was the first character in the original Secret Rose volume, 
and so it is appropriate that he begins The Wind Among the R eeds . In a 
sense, his is the fourth introductory poem, because it sets out in its
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simplest form the dilemma of the occult poet.
The poem begins with a list o f things that are ‘uncomely'; i.e. aesthe­
tically displeasing. These are things that remind the poet of time, 
human suffering, and the existence of the despised peasantry ('the 
heavy steps of the ploughman'). These things ‘Are wronging your image 
that blossoms a rose in the deeps of my heart'. Thus the poetic Image 
and the timeless Rose are exactly the same thing, and it can only be 
perceived by introspection. Aedh continues: ‘The wrong of unshapely 
things is a wrong too great to be told; 11 hunger to build them anew 
and sit on a green knoll apart' (Yeats, 1957 : 142 -143). Yeats here 
shows what he will make clearer in his essays; that his system attempts 
to replace ethics with aesthetics. Moreover because of this he will try 
to sit ‘apart'; to leave the world and pay attention only to the inner 
rose.
Having stated his themes, Yeats then interrupts the volume with a 
ballad. The poems in The Wind Among the Reeds are linked spatially, 
not chronologically, and Yeats uses poetry in the third person to let us 
know that a new section is beginning. The first four poems have set out 
the themes of the volume and Yeats's literary aesthetic; and it is now 
time to introduce the Rose woman, who will obsess all the rest of the 
characters. The ballad is called ‘The Host o f the Air' and it sets out the 
theme of the next section o f poetry. The protagonist O'Driscoll is a far­
mer who ‘at the coming o f night tide' dreams of his bride Bridget.
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‘He heard while he sang and dreamed 
A piper piping away,
And never was piping so sad 
And never was piping so gay'
(Yeats, 1957 : 143-144)
O'Driscoll sees his beloved, but we know that she is now with the 
Sidhe by the symbolism Yeats uses to describe them; they dance and, 
play music. O'Driscoll scatters the cards and therefore loses Bridget. 
The next section of poetry will therefore be about how the various pro­
tagonists have lost the Rose woman in the same way.
To show how Yeats's occult symbolism works, we can take a poem  
like ‘The Fish' and show how, whilst being technically a love poem, in 
the context o f this volume, it has a deeper meaning.
Although you hide in the ebb and flow 
Of the pale tide when the moon has set.
The people of coming days will know 
About the casting out of my net,
And how you have leaped times out of mind 
Over the little silver cords,
And think that you were hard and unkind,
And blame you with many bitter words 
(Yeats, 1957 :146).
Firstly, the metaphor of the fisherman is used explicitly as a meta­
phor for an occult searcher, and the fish as a symbol of the Rose
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woman in the poem T he Song of Wandering Aengus'. Tale' is also om­
nipresent as a symbol o f the Rose woman's beauty (as in T he Lover 
Mourns for his Loss of Love' with the line Tale brows, still hands and 
dim hair ‘(Yeats, 1957 : 152)). The moon is also a symbol of the Rose 
(as in the line ‘the silver apples o f the moon' also in ‘The Song of Wan­
dering Aengus') and we already know the tide is a symbol of Time. In 
the poem ‘Into the Twilight' we have the line about ‘come clear of the 
nets of wrong and right' (Yeats, 1957 : 147) as an example of the ratio­
nal mind trying to contain the Rose. Silver is also used as a symbol o f  
the occult.
This poem is, therefore, about an occultist who has failed to unite 
with the Rose Woman. He has seen her, but cannot reunite with her be­
cause she eludes him. However ‘The people of coming days' will sym­
pathise. Given Yeats's apocalyptic beliefs, we can guess that these are 
the people who will exist after time and matter have been destroyed, 
and the old gods have been brought back to earth.
This is the theme of the second section of the book; the unattainabil­
ity of the Rose woman. However, this section ends with the ballad ‘The 
Cap and Bells' and is followed immediately afterwards by the ‘Valley of 
the Black Pig' (discussed earlier) which sets quite a different tone:
The dews drop slowly and dreams gather: unknown spears 
Suddenly hurtle before my dream-awakened eyes.
And then the clash of fallen horsemen and the cries 
Of unknown perishing armies beat about my ears.
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We who still labour by the cromlech on the shore.
The grey cairn on the hill, when day sinks drowned in dew,
Being weary of the world's empires, bow down to you,
Master of the still stars and of the flaming door (Yeats, 1957 :161).
Yeats's note informs us that the persona o f this poem is another 
peasant visionary, and that T he Valley of the Black Pig ‘ is the legen­
dary Irish apocalypse; a final battle that will signal the end o f the 
world. We may link this with the coming of the Antichrist in The Se­
cret Rose volume and the apocalyptic imagery of Yeats' poetry in 
general. The theme of this last section of the poetry is that truly 
being reunited with the Rose woman can only happen when Time and 
Space have come to an end. In ‘He tells of a Valley full o f Lovers' 
(original title ‘Aedh tells o f a Valley full of Lovers') Aedh cries out:
'G women, bid the young men lay  
Their heads on you r knees, and drown their eyes with yo u r hair,
Or rem em bering hers they will find no other face fair 
Till all the valleys o f  the world have been withered away’
(Yeats, 1957 :163).
Again, in context and with the key mention of the word ‘valleys' we can 
see that this is not a conventional lover's cry, but instead a desire for 
apocalypse.
This section ends with the poem in the third person ‘The Blessed' and 
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then continues with T h e Secret Rose' the most direct poem so far. It is 
direct in that it makes explicit the connection between this volume and 
the book of stories, and also in that it makes clear that the rose and 
beauty and the rose woman ‘a woman of shining loveliness' are the 
same and that only after ‘the stars blown about the sky' has happened 
can he be reunited with it. The poem ends
‘surely thine hour has come, thy great wind blows.
Far-off, most secret, and inviolate Rose?' (Yeats, 1957 : 170)
The first section announced the theme of the volume. The sec­
ond section explored this theme. The third section introduced the 
idea of the Apocalypse. The last section deals with the idea that 
the apocalypse is not only necessary, but imminent. It trembles 
on the brink of revelation. The hope is therefore greater than the 
rest of the volume, but so is the despair that the revelation might 
not occur.
But the volume ends with Mongan despairing because ‘1 know 
all things now' (Yeats, 1957 : 177). Mongan has achieved all he 
can on this earth, but the apocalypse has not come. Indeed the 
apocalypse cannot come in this volume because the book and 
poetry are still in time, however much it wants to escape. The 
apocalypse will signal the end of time. The volume therefore ends 
as it began, on a note o f longing.
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This chapter may have seemed to be a digression from the main 
thrust o f the thesis, which promised an elucidation of Anglo-American 
Modernism. However, it was necessary in order to explicate the links 
between the ‘early' and the ‘later' Yeats, and the extent to which there 
was continuity between the two position. Before going on to discuss the 
political implications of this theorising, we should sum up the implica­
tions o f this book of poetry for later writers.
Firstly this demonstrates that, above all, Yeats was, at this stage, an 
occult poet. Secondly that his view of occultism, influenced partly by 
Symbolism and partly by the Order o f the Golden Dawn, necessitated 
an insistence on secrecy, and that, therefore, the form o f Yeats's poetry 
was designed to be, as he said, ‘obscure' as opposed to ‘popular' (see 
below). Thus the system of allusions which unify the volume are im­
portant not just to create unity, but also to create an air o f mystery, 
and to render the work opaque to non-initiates. Thirdly, that Yeats did 
not write mere individual poems, but books of poetry, unified by a phi­
losophy, and united by a sophisticated but non-chronological pattern, 
or series of patterns. This pattern, which could not be chronological 
(because, as a Platonist Yeats knew that time was a delusion) had to be 
structured spatially. ^  And finally that Yeats explicated his theories with 
the use of masks or personae. We should bear all these points in mind 
when we come to look at the poetry o f Ezra Pound.
7 In other words, Yeats’s  distrust of temporality (which, as we have already seen, he and the 
Romantics generally associated with materialism, and therefore, relativism), stemmed from his 
metaphysical beliefs, and his use of spatial rather than temporal forms had its origins in this 
metaphysic.
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Now, as we have seen, Yeats had decided to ground his mythology in 
Ireland, under the influence o f the revolutionary John O'Leary (Yeats, 
1956 : 101). Yeats was a Romantic first, and only afterwards decided  
to become a thoroughly Irish poet; as Edward Hirsch puts it ‘Yeats 
aligns himself in a thoroughly Romantic tradition, but he localises that 
cult, and, as it were, grafts it onto Irish folk tradition' (Hirsch, 1982 : 
77). Thus, Yeats's poetry and his view of Ireland were intimately bound 
together, just as his poetry and his occult beliefs were also bound toge­
ther.
In 1904 he made a speech in which he discussed his views on Irish 
development .We must remember that Yeats's primary concern was the 
survival of art, and that he saw this as being menaced by the material­
ism of science and capitalism. So he begins by stating two views o f the 
world. The English world view, which the Irish must try and avoid 
being contaminated by, is the world o f industrial capitalism and mater­
ialism. Against this he argues that Ireland should stay loyal to the pre­
industrial, agrarian world, ‘Ireland will always be in the main an agri­
cultural country' (Ellmann, 1949 : 116). And this is because the 
‘English' way of life destroys the life o f the spirit.
Ireland, however, if it turns its back on the English idea o f ‘progress' 
will keep ‘an imaginative culture and power to understand imaginative 
and spiritual things distributed among the people' (Ellmann, 1949 : 
116). In other words ‘we wish to preserve an ancient ideal o f life' 
(Ellmann, 1949 :116) because ‘In Ireland alone among the nations that I
99
know will you find, away on the Western seaboard, under broken roofs, 
a race of gentlemen keep alive the ideals of a great time when men 
sang the heroic life with drawn swords in their hands' (Ellmann, 1949 : 
116).
This essay was written after Yeats had discovered Nietzsche, and it is 
possible that his praise o f the ‘heroic life' was drawn from him, but on 
the other hand his thought had always tended in this direction (In his 
autobiography he wrote that when his father met Maud Gonne in the 
early 1890s ‘She vexed my father by praise of war, war for its own 
sake, not as the creator o f certain virtues, but as if there was some vir­
tue in excitement itself and he continues ‘I supported her against my 
father' (Yeats, 1956 :123)). This again returns to his concern for art; 
for the heroic life as the concomitant o f the myths that Yeats had deci­
ded should be the basis for art.
And so Yeats turned his back on the idea of ‘progress' and insisted 
that art could only be safeguarded by rejecting materialism, and any­
thing that menaced ‘the heroic life'. Ireland was still in a position to do 
this. Yeats therefore started off by wishing to spontaneously write 
popular poetry with a subject matter ‘known to the whole people', and 
the poems o f his first collection Crossways (1889) reflect this (Yeats, 
1903). True popular poetry, for Yeats ‘presupposes the unwritten tra­
dition' (Yeats, 1903 :10) and is, therefore, folk poetry. However, as we 
have seen, as Yeats developed, he became increasingly under the influ­
ence o f Symbolism and the occult, both o f which stressed the idea of
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‘secrecy'. And so Yeats began to posit as well a ‘poetry of the coteries' 
which presupposed ‘the written tradition' (Yeats, 1903 .TO). In the be­
ginning o f Irish society, both o f these traditions existed side by side, 
and they both complemented each other; ‘the art of the people was as 
closely mingled with the art o f the coteries as was the speech of the 
people that delighted in the [...] unchanging speech of poets' (Yeats, 
1903 T3-14). However, at some point the serpent of the Middle Clas­
ses arose in this Eden ‘the counting house had created a new class and 
a new art without breeding and without ancestry ‘(Yeats, 1903 :13). It 
is this new class, the Bourgeoisie, who menace Ireland with their Engl­
ish materialism and technology. 8 
We must always remember, to follow Yeats's argument at this point, 
that Yeats was an occult poet, who saw magic as being inseparable from 
poetry. Thus Yeats argues that the peasantry ‘cannot separate the idea 
o f an art or craft from the idea o f a cult with ancient technicalities and 
mysteries' (Yeats, 1903 :13) (and he is, of course, talking about his 
own poetic practice as well). Thus, authentic ‘popular (or folk) poetry' 
must also consist of ‘words and verses that keep half their secrets to 
themselves' (Yeats, 1903 :13). By a complex process o f argument Yeats, 
who begun the essay by calling for popular poetry, has ended up by
calling for a poetry that even though it is still folk poetry (in Yeats's ra-
8 And Yeats makes very clear just why he is worried by the rise of capitalism, and the class that 
benefits from it, the Bourgeoisie, The arts have failed', he writes, continuing, ‘fewer people are 
interested in them every generation. The mere business of living, of making money, of amusing 
oneself, occupies people more and more, and makes them less and less capable of the difficult 
art of appreciation’ (Yeats 1903:320) (my italics). And it is because of this, that ‘If we would win 
the people again’ we must ‘take upon ourselves the method and the fervour of the priesthood’
(Yeats 1903 :320). Yeats is therefore concerned that ‘high’ art is doomed in an industrial society.
See note 4, Chapter Nine.
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ther specialised use of the phrase) should be at least partly incompre­
hensible to outsiders. To show how important this idea of a cult was 
with him one of the few criticisms of he makes of Shelley and Blake is 
that neither of them have a system of belief that is tied to the people. 
Blake was a ‘A symbolist who had to invent his symbols' (Yeats, 1903 
:173) and this makes them arbitrary, not universal.
We have seen how Yeats's thought developed from his dislike of sci­
ence and technology, to a dislike of ‘progress' as such; and thus to a 
cyclical view of time. However, one of the other interesting things 
about this essay, is its praise o f a society based on ‘the hut and the 
castle'; i.e. a hierarchical society. To follow this aspect of his thought, 
we must look at his beliefs as part o f The Order of The Golden Dawn. 
By 1900 the group was in crisis. It was almost impossible to keep such 
a group o f eccentric and individualistic people organised (Harper 1974 
: 106-120). Moreover, the group were suspicious of Yeats' insistence 
that poetry was a kind of Magic (Harper 1974 : 99). Yeats, therefore 
made two attempts to make his position clear. Characteristically, this 
was done in two ways, a private way and a public one. Firstly in 1901, 
he wrote the essay Ts the Order of R.R. and A. C. to remain a Magical 
Order?' (Yeats, 1974 : 68). This was an attempt to make his position 
clear to his fellow occultists; an attempt to show why the Order must 
remain united, and to show something o f Yeats' beliefs in the unity of 
poetry and magic. This is the private version of the ideas that Yeats 
publicly expressed in the essays printed as Ideas o f  Good and Evil,
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which we have already looked at.
The essay begins by stating that the order must remain true to the 
ideals o f the past, and must stress the idea of obedience. The Order can 
only be saved by
T: Insisting on a strict obedience to the laws and by laws.
2: By making the giving out o f the knowledge lectures dependent on 
the passing of examinations' (Harper, 1974 : 71).
Then Yeats goes on to a deeper question; why have a mystic order at 
all? Moreover, what is the point o f a secret hierarchical magical order?
‘The passing by their means from one Degree to another is a evoca­
tion of the Supreme Life, a treading o f a symbolic path, a passage 
through a symbolic gate, a climbing towards the light which it is the es­
sence o f our system to believe, flows continually from the lowest o f the 
invisible degrees to the highest o f the Degrees that are known to us 
(Harper, 1974 : 73). For Yeats the Degrees were literally, a ladder into 
Heaven (Harper, 1974). It was the task of the occultist to ascend this 
ladder, but if it was not done properly, the result would be chaos; 
‘disorder and disquiet' (Harper, 1974 : 80). Since Yeats believed that 
the occult path was the preferable one it is easy to see that he is 
‘arguing for the metaphysical validity of a hierarchical order of exis­
tence' (Harper, 1974 : 11). One must ascend the ladder in the right
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order; therefore the higher rungs must be secret.
Yeats's belief in a hierarchical order o f existence therefore came 
from the beliefs he had been taught in The Order of the Golden Dawn; 
a modernised version of the Mediaeval ‘Great Chain of Being'. These 
are the beliefs that motivated Yeats to found ‘The Castle o f Heroes' ‘the 
headquarters of a new cult through which the truths of the spirit might 
be disseminated to the materialistic nations' at the turn of the century 
(Ellmann, 1949 : 124). It is significant that approval o f hierarchical, se­
cret, occult groups is incompatible with democracy, but as Yeats wrote 
in the same essay, ‘in our day every idler, every trifler, every bungler 
cries out for his freedom' (Harper, 1974 : 75) and continued ‘It was 
the surrender of freedom that taught Dante Alighieri to say “Thy will is 
our peace'" (Harper, 1974 : 85). The form of Yeats's poetry (which 
tends to differentiate between initiates, and non-initiates), his belief in 
hierarchy, and his dislike of democratic ideals (albeit, at this stage, 
only in the context o f the Order o f the Golden Dawn) are all bound up 
in his occult philosophy.
104
Chapter 3 : The New Yeats
To see how Yeats set the course for Anglo-American Modernism, we 
must now look at how he reacted to the demands of the twentieth 
century.
The first decade of the new century proved to be a time of transition 
for Yeats. To begin with, he was beginning to become disillusioned with 
The Order of the Golden Dawn. As it became more and more difficult to 
keep such an egotistical and eccentric group of people organised (Hone, 
1962 : 170-171) his interest in the practical aspects of magic waned. At 
the same time, the Rhymers club, and the fm de siècle aesthetic which lay 
behind it, was also in decline. Beardsley, Dowson, Johnson and Wilde all 
died early in the new century. In his personal life as well he faced acute 
disappointment over his failure to marry Maud Gonne (Hone, 1962 : 
156-157).
As if to escape from the difficulties of his personal life, he became more 
interested in practical matters, such as the running of the Abbey Theatre, 
which he had set up on 1899. Instead of a political revolution (which his 
association with people like O'Leary had led him to want), Yeats began to 
think of a cultural Renaissance, which would, however, lead  to a political 
Renaissance. He began to posit the idea that a new theatre which 
produced ‘poetic' plays on Irish themes could wean the intelligentsia 
away from both the commercial theatre and ‘the northern phantom' of 
Ibsenite realism (Yeats, 1975 : 163). This would lead to a new intellectual 
outlook which would help Ireland to fulfil her destiny; to bring ‘a new 
national agreement, and the political tumult begin again' (Yeats, 1975 :
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196), for at this point Yeats still believed that Ireland had a special part 
to play in the new world order (Yeats, 1975 : 199).
Yeats's new found interest in the theatre was indicative of a slow but 
steady change in his views on art. In many ways this is symbolised by his 
discovery of Nietzsche. Yeats was introduced to the German philosopher 
in 1902 and immediately began to read him voraciously (Bridgewater, 
1972 : 67). It was clear that Yeats saw Nietzsche as a way of overcoming 
the Idealist, ‘decadent' approach to poetry that he had previously taken, 
and that he was now beginning to think about poetry that was more 
closely involved with present day reality. It was under Nietzsche's 
influence that Yeats wrote ‘the close o f the last century was full o f a 
strange desire to get out of form, to get some kind of disembodied 
beauty, and now it seems that the contrary influence has come' (Yeats, 
1954 ; 402). Moreover, he now began to value the idea of ‘hard' 
‘masculine’ and precise poetry as opposed to ‘soft', over emotional 
poetry, a distinction, which, again, seems to come from Nietzsche 
(Oppel, 1987 : 39-40). And Yeats was not only influenced by Nietzsche's 
ideas (many of which seemed a confirmation of his own) but by the 
German's epigrammatic style. As early as 1902, in the play Where There 
is Nothing Yeats had begun to purify his diction and to move away from  
the fin de siècle tone he had adopted up until this time (Liebregts,1993 : 
120-125) (see also his attempts to stage The Shadowy Waters ; as Yeats 
himself writes, he found his earlier, fin de  siècle style unsuitable for the 
stage, and had to cut back on his rhetoric to make it stageable (Yeats,
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1966 : 1293)). Therefore the simple act of writing plays that had to be 
playable in front of an audience forced him to abandon much of the 
flowing and diffuse ‘fin de siècle' diction he had used up until this point. 
This was the general tendency of Yeats's revisions of his plays at this 
point; to make them ‘harder' and more concise (Oppel, 1987 : 114-158).
This should not be interpreted as Yeats turning his back on his earlier 
views. In a letter he wrote to George Russell (AE) in 1900 he stated ‘To 
write of a material object being “fiery footed" is almost always to write 
from the phantasy rather than the imagination. The imaginative deals 
with spiritual things [...] the phantasy has its place but it is a subordinate 
place [...] vague forms, pictures, scenes etc. are rather a modern idea of 
the poetic and I would not want to call up a modern kind of picture. I 
avoid every kind of word that seems to me either"‘poetical" or “modern" 
and above all I avoid suggesting the ghostly (the vague) idea about a god, 
for it is a modern conception. All Ancient Vision was definite and 
precise’ (Yeats, 1954 : 343 my italics). This is a complex passage, but the 
general point of it is clear. Yeats had adopted an approach in the 1890's 
that was, in the broadest sense of the word, reactionary; he looked to the 
past as a guarantor of poetic values. He was by no means abandoning 
these values, but he was beginning to see that the fin de siècle, Symbolist 
approach, was itself a symptom of modernity. It was, in a sense, a 
‘decadent' art (that is to say, decadent in Nietzsche's sense, and not just 
in the sense that the Decadents themselves used it). Instead, the effects 
of the earliest (and therefore, to Yeats, best) poetry had been, he
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thought, gained by precision and definiteness, not the vagueness and 
suggestiveness he had championed up until this point (Fascinatingly, 
these are exactly the distinctions that Ezra Pound will make in 
modernising his own poetry ten years later; between ancient clarity, and 
modern diffuseness).
As Flannery writes; T 900 marks the beginning of a conscious effort on 
Yeats's part to sift from his life, from his magic, his philosophy, and his 
poetry all that was vague and imprecise [...] Yeats solidly prefers 
Imagination over fantasy, the precise over the vague, Just as he 
constantly prefers Magic over Mysticism, for Magic had come to mean 
control and command over form for him' (Flannery, 1977 : 110).
Previously, Yeats had been proud to have been thought a Mystic, with 
its connotations of dreaminess, imprecision. Idealism, and so forth. Now, 
however, he wished to become a Magician, and this was the task he 
would set himself in the new century (Foster catches this antithesis Tn 
the end Blake, like Russell, was a mystic, wrapped in obscurities, and 
Yeats was an apprentice mage, determined to penetrate beyond them' 
(Foster, 1997 : 101).
It is as a result of this new thinking that Yeats began to change the 
emphasis of some of his previous thought. Under the influence of 
Florence Farr, he began to reemphasise that poetry was influenced by the 
speech of the people. Yeats had met Farr in the 1890's, and she had 
impressed him by the way she chanted poetry, as opposed to reciting it a 
more conventional manner. Between 1905 and 1907 they even went on
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lecture tours together, to explain and demonstrate their chanting 
approach to poetry (Schuchard, 1984 : 210-211). It was under Farr's 
influence that Yeats began to loosen the metre of his poetry, and start to 
abandon the strict forms he had always previously used. Farr had argued 
that a poem, as well as having a conventional, metrical, rhythm, also had 
a deeper, ‘organic' rhythm as well, and that the greatest poets would 
break the conventional rules of metre rather than ignore organic rhythm. 
As a critic puts it Yeats and Farr ‘held that the visual image finds its 
greatest power in the auditory imagination and that the cadence of the 
living voice, which gives expression to the imagination, gives metre the 
semblance of freedom' (Schuchard, 1984 : 214). However, we must 
remember again, that this was in no way Yeats expressing a desire to be 
‘modern'. Farr argued that the ancient bards of Ireland had based their 
poetry on ‘organic rhythm' and that conventional metrical forms were a 
modern innovation. Thus, Yeats looser forms fitted in with his 
reactionary ideas; using organic rhythm and chanting poetry would lead 
to a resurgence of the oral tradition, with all that that implied 
(Schuchard, 1984 : 211).
We have already seen that the practical demands of writing for the 
theatre were partly responsible for the clarification of Yeats's diction 
that went on throughout the first decade of the century. However, Yeats 
was by no means interested in Realism. Instead, he began to be interested 
in the idea of chanting words in the theatre or reciting words in a way 
that stressed rhythm. Yeats wished to create a theatre that was down to
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earth, and of the people, and yet anti-Realist; a theatre as he imagined 
that of ancient Greece would have been like.
Another influence on the purification of his diction at this time, was 
that between 1904 and 1907 Yeats rewrote The Secret Rose volume with 
the help of Lady Gregory. With her help and greater knowledge of the 
speech of the peasantry, he began to simplify his prose and to eliminate 
the Celtic Twilight feel o f the volume. This project exemplified his 
development in this period; in 1914, looking back at the turn of the 
century, he said; ‘We wanted to get rid not only of rhetoric but of poetic 
diction. We tried to strip away everything that was artificial, to get a style 
like speech, as simple as the simplest prose' (Yeats, 1974 : 413).
As quotes o f the time show, Yeats admired Gregory immensely; and in 
fact linked her aristocratic outlook with that of Synge; next to Nietzsche 
the greatest influence on Yeats at this point in his life (Yeats, 19721)).
Yeats had first met Synge in Paris in 1896, but it was not until 1899 that 
Synge decided to give up the Bohemian life and live in the Aran Islands 
(Yeats liked to claim that he was responsible for the move, but this is 
doubtful (Grene, 1984)). He thereby gained knowledge that Yeats himself 
never had; how the peasantry actually thought and spoke. This interest in 
the ‘primitive' fitted in with the general direction of Synge's thought;
1 It is commonly believed that at a time of great mental stress, Yeats was taken in and saved by 
Lady Gregory. This has an element of truth, but it is also the case that at this time Yeats was 
becoming increasingly interested in the idea of the aristocracy; specifically that of the Anglo-Irish 
Ascendancy, and that he was positively seeking out aristocratic contacts at this time.The reason he 
was engaged in such a quest was part and parcel of his move from writing of mythical, imaginary 
worlds (the Otherworld) to his increasing use of contemporary themes and subjects, which 
necessitated writing about real people, as opposed to the m^hological figures he had previously 
written about. And so, whereas, in the nineteenth century, Yeats had written of a spiritual 
aristocracy who were to lead the world, he now had to find (or invent) a rea/aristocracy, with 
whose fate he could intertwine himself (Hone, 1965 :131).
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civilisation, Synge argued, was declining as Men lost touch with the old 
traditions. The poet's task was to reintegrate society with all that was 
‘primitive' in Man (Henn, 1950 and Kilroy, 1971). Moreover, Synge was 
increasingly stressing that toughness, even aggression, was necessary for 
great art and Yeats followed him in this. As Yeats wrote in 1908 ‘Even if 
we grant that exalted poetry can be kept successful by itself, the strong 
things of life are needed in poetry also, to show what is exalted, or 
tender, is not made by feeble blood. It may also be said that before verse 
can be human again it must leam  to be brutal' (Henn, 1950 : 76). (It is 
obvious how this must have fitted in with Yeats's reading of Nietzsche; 
see below. Henn writes ‘There was something in Synge that accorded with 
Yeats's desire for brutality and violence' (Henn, 1950 : 78).
Synge's language too had an influence (Yeats found room for eleven of 
his poems in his Oxford Book o f  Twentieth Century Poetry  (Yeats, 1936)). 
Synge's plays were written in a style that was undoubtedly ‘tough' and 
‘realistic' and yet which avoided Naturalism completely. They recalled, 
Yeats thought, the way speech must have been presented in the drama of 
Classicai Greece (which again fitted in with what he was learning from 
Farr). Synge's language was symptomatic of his general approach, to 
bring language (and poetry) back in touch with the uncivilised and the 
primitive. In doing this he showed that there was an alternative to Tin de 
siècle attenuation on the one hand and linguistically pallid realism on the 
other' (Sidnell, 1996 : 77) (Since this ‘alternative' was to be the basis for 
what we now know as the ‘later Yeats' it is obvious that Synge was very
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influential indeed. Pound himself thought that the influence of Synge was 
the main force that created Yeats's ‘modern' style (Longenbach, 1988 : 
15)).
It is in the context of these events that we must view the In The Seven 
Woods volume (1904), Yeats's first book of poetry in the new century. 
The first thing to be said about it, is that, like The Wind Among the 
Reeds, In The Seven Woods, is, above, all, a book, and not just a selection 
of poems randomly arranged (again, as I will demonstrate, this method 
o f publishing poetry was taken up by Ezra Pound).
Unfortunately (and again this is what happened to The Wind Among the 
Reeds), Yeats later chopped up the volume so that its essential unity 
became almost impossible to discern. However, in the original, as well as 
the lyric poems which still go by that name, were printed the long 
narrative poems, The Old Age o f  Queen Maeve, and Bailie and Aillinn, as 
well as the play On Bailie’s Strand. Yeats himself, in the introduction, 
wrote: ‘The first shape of it (i.e. On Bailie’s Strand) came to me in a 
dream, but it changed much in the making, foreshadowing, it may be, a 
change that may bring a less dream-burdened will into my verses' (Yeats, 
1966 : 814) demonstrating that he was aware of the new direction his 
work was taking (the play itself is heavily influenced by Nietzsche, thus 
demonstrating again that Yeats himself saw Nietzsche as being to a large 
extent behind the creation of his new style (Oppel, 1987 : 147-158)).
It is the long narrative poems that are the most interesting in this 
respect, in that thematically they point ahead to new directions not just
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for Yeats, but for modern poetry as a whole. The major differences 
between these poems (and the volume as a whole) from the poems in the 
The Wind Among the Reeds is the absence of the Rose Woman. Instead, 
the mythical women who are referred to (Deirdre, Aillinn) exist in time 
(as opposed to the timeless Rose Woman), or rather, in narrative. For the 
pattern of the longer, narrative poems yet again deals with the problem  
of the war between reality and the Otherworld, but this time the battle is 
far more equal For example, in The Old Age o f Queen Maeve we are 
presented with yet another Yeats surrogate; a ‘certain poet in outlandish 
clothes' (line 1); but notice that this man is undoubtedly a poet (and 
therefore in the world), and not a mystic or magician (who looks out of 
the world). Instead of looking out to a timeless. Idealist, reality, he 
instead tells a mythological story, which unequivocally happened in the 
past. This is the pattern of Bailie and Aillinn as well. However, in both 
poems the poet is perpetually distracted from his mythological narration 
by the demands of the present day:
O Unquiet heart,
Why do you praise another, praising her,
As if there was no tale but your own tale 
Worth knitting to a measure of sweet sound?
Have I not bid you tell of that great queen,
Wlio has been buried some two thousand years? (Yeats, 1957 : 181)
Now, this is how the poet (such as Hanrahan) was kept from earthly 
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love in The Secret Rose volume, but as the poet makes clear, this other 
woman, who tears the poet away from the world of myth, is n o t the rose 
woman; this is, instead, a real woman who is in time and who will, 
therefore, eventually die. Whereas Red Hanrahan could not love a real 
woman because of the Rose woman, (in other words, he was distracted 
from reality by the demands of the Ideal world). Here the poet is being 
distracted from the Ideal world by the demands of reality.
Even clearer in this respect is Bailie and Aillinn. The theme of this poem  
(which is again, a narrative) is the love story between the eponymous 
mythological protagonists. However it is interspersed again with the 
interpolations of the narrator who continually interrupts the story to 
with complaints such as:
O wandering birds and rushy beds.
You pu t such folly in our heads 
With all this crying in the wind,
No common love is to our mind,
And our poor Kate or Nan is less 
Than any whose unhappiness
Awoke the harp-strings long ago (Yeats, 1957 : 190).
In other words, the narrator poet resents the existence of myth, 
because it prevents him from enjoying real corporeal reality, the love of 
‘Kate’ or ‘Nan’. However, the mythic events happened a ‘long ago’ 
(compare ‘two thousand years’, above); that is to say, in the past 
(whereas, in The Wind Among the Reeds the mythic events were taking 
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place, in some sense, even as the poet wrote; that is to say, in an Idealist 
Timeless reality). The world o f material reality is unsatisfying, but 
inescapable.
So, in these poems, poets replace mages, and mythical narrative 
replaces the timeless world o f the Rose Woman. However, the dilemma, 
of the difference between 'spiritual' and 'material' reality, remains. One 
may, therefore, see this as representing no great change from his earlier 
poems. But this ignores the theme that is absent from these poems; the 
theme of apocalypse. In The Wind Among the Reeds Yeats was almost 
unequivocal that the world of spirit was about to annihilate the world of 
matter, that a new order was about to appear. Now however, he is less 
certain, and by omission he raises the possibility that this is ju s t the w ay  
the world  i5, that the poet's role, instead of preparing for apocalypse, 
will have to become that o f dealing with the world of the 'real' (this is 
also the case for the volume as a whole, except for one brief enigmatic 
reference to a 'Great Archer' who but 'waits His hour to shoot' in the 
title poem; Foster calls this reference 'ironic' Foster, 1997 : 301).
This is an important development, and it was achieved with the help 
of Synge. In his Autobiography, Yeats acknowledged this, writing '1 did 
not see, until Synge began to write, that we must renounce the deliberate 
creation of a Holy City in the imagination, and express the individual' 
(Yeats, 1956 : 493-494). However, this was a judgment made much later 
in the day, and one may doubt if it is wholly accurate. For surely Yeats, 
even in these poems, does not renounce the Holy City. The mythological
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events of these poems happened a long time ago, but there is no question 
but that they are real. Yeats was never a materialist. Instead, he engages 
in a dialectic between the world of myth and the world o f reality, a 
dialectic, that, at this stage, has no chance of ending, except in 
contradiction. Asked to choose, he chose both “‘pure imagination” and 
the “tumult of blood”' (Sidnell 1996 : 86) (Synge himself seems to have 
been aware of this, cf. Stallworthy, 1972), and Yeats, the poet, is still 
caught in the middle. 2 
If the narrative poems pointed the way forward thematically, a few of 
the lyric poems indicated his future style in terms of style and diction. 
The most famous of these is ‘Adam's Curse', now generally agreed to be 
Yeats's first ‘modern' poem (Foster, 1997).
We sat together at one summer’s end,
That beautiful mild woman, your close friend, 
And you and I, and talked of poetry.
I said: ‘A line wiU take us hours, maybe;
Yet if it does not seem a moment’s thought,
Our stitching and unstitching has been naught. 
Better go down upon your marrow-bones 
And scrub a kitchen pavement, or break stones 
Like an old pauper, in all kinds of weather;
For to articulate sweet sounds together 
Is to work harder than all these, and yet
2 It is vital to grasp the point that here Yeats is using myth as a yardstick by which contemporary 
society may be compared, contrasted, and, in rhetorical structure at least, ordered. As Sidnell 
points out, this is the beginning of what Eliot called ‘the mythic method', which he insisted was the 
main ordering process for works such as Ulysses and The Waste Land {Sidnell, 1996).
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Be thought an idler by the noisy set 
Of bankers, schoolmasters and clergymen 
The martyrs call the world.'
And thereupon 
That beautiful mild woman for whose sake,
There's many a one shall find out all heartache 
On finding that her voice is sweet and low 
Replied: ‘To be bom woman is to know- 
Although they do not talk of it at school- 
That we must labour to be beautiful.'
1 said : ‘It's certain there is no fine thing 
Since Adam's fall but needs much labouring.
There have been lovers who thought love should be 
So much compounded of high courtesy 
That they would sigh and quote with learned looks 
Precedents out of beautiful old books;
Yet now it seems an idle trade enough.’
We sat grown quiet at the name of love;
We saw the last embers of daylight die,
And in the trembling blue-green of the sky 
A moon, worn as if it had been a shell 
Washed by time's waters as they rose and fell 
About the stars and broke in days and years.
I had a thought for no one’s but your ears:
That you were beautiful, and that I strove 
To love you in the old high way of love;
That it had all seemed happy, and yet we’d grown 
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As vveaiy^-hearted as that hollow moon (Yeats, 1967 : 204-206).
Firstly we should notice the purification of diction that has been 
undergone. Instead of the Pre-Raphaelite use of ‘Thees' and Thous', we 
have a description of speech that might be described as colloquial. There 
are no archaisms. Moreover, the theme is neither mythological, nor a 
conventional love lyric; instead we have a more or less realistic picture 
of three people sitting about on a lawn; it could be an Impressionist 
painting.
It is the way the poem is structured, however, that points to a far more 
complex and ironical rhetorical structure than Yeats had used before.
The poem begins with the poet propounding the ironic theory that 
whereas poetry is one of the most complex and difficult of activities, it 
must present itself as being easy to the reader. This is itself a more 
complex view than the views presented in his earlier poetry where 
‘work' and ‘activity' were associated unequivocally with the ‘world' the 
poet wished to escape.
Moreover, this view presents a further ambiguity. Whereas before,
Yeats had (as the Romantics taught him), equated poetry with truth, here 
we see Yeats broaching the idea that poetry may deceive. The poem poses 
as something that only required ‘a moment's thought'; the reality, 
however, is very different.
Then the poet iterates a claim that was a staple of fin de siècle poetics,
that poetry is harder work than mere manual labour, but the ‘noisy set';
the Bourgeoisie, would never recognise or admit this. However, again,
119
whereas before Yeats was one o f those who called these people ‘the 
world', now those that think like this are treated ironically; ‘the martyrs'. 
By this phrasing, and with our knowledge of their tragic lives, we can 
identify these ‘martyrs' as the Rhymers club. Yeats is, therefore, 
ironically distancing himself from the position he himself had held up 
until this point.
In this third stanza the poet discusses the way that ‘fine things' have 
passed out of the world. He contrasts the old ways of courtly love, how 
lovers used to ‘sigh and quote with learned looks I Precedents out of 
beautiful old books'. Yeats of course, was not unlike this when he was 
younger. Now however, it ‘seems an idle trade enough'. The word ‘idle' of 
course, recalls its use in line 12; the ‘idle set'. In the modern world ‘since 
Adam's fall' we now no longer see the point of such courtly thought and 
expression. The ironic idea that poetry needs hard work but must seem  
not to, is further ironicised, by the play on the word ‘idle', meaning not 
just lazy, but futile. Now that we see that everything requires work, the 
courtly expression of aristocrats seem to be merely the idle amusements 
of the rich. In the modern world we are so far from the world of courtly 
love that we no longer see the point.
And now, at the end of the poem, Yeats returns to his 1890s diction, in 
order to provide a rhetorical contrast with what has gone before.
He identifies himself with the courtly lovers of old. He recalls the days 
when he had loved the woman (that is, Maud Gonne), but now ‘we'd 
grown as weary hearted as that hollow moon'. In the same way that in the
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new century, the ways of courtly love (and the ideas of the fin de siècle) 
seem merely ridiculous, his love for Maud Gonne was something that 
somehow now belonged to the past.
Here clearly we have a radical new development in Yeats's poetic. In 
his use of the word ‘martyr', Yeats acknowledges that there was 
something self fulfilling in the Decadent's prophecies of personal doom. 
In other words, their attempt to stand apart from the world was a failure; 
they unwittingly became implicated in the process they attempted to be 
describing. In the complex third stanza, he toys with the idea that 
whereas previously, lovers ‘worked' at ‘love', we now see this as being 
idle because
a) it no longer looks like real work to us, who see ‘real' work as 
breaking stones ‘like an old pauper' and
b) it seems pointless in the utilitarian modern world (in precisely the 
way that poetry does to the ‘noisy set').
No-one is left unjudged in this poem, for the narrator (who is not 
Yeats, but is clearly a part o f Yeats) himself admits that his own attempts 
to ‘love' in the ‘old high way of love' have failed, leaving him ‘weary- 
hearted'. Maybe his attempt to ignore the modern world, like ‘the 
martyr's', was a failure, ignoring the fact that ‘time's waters' will always 
flow, despite Man's protests. And yet, there is no doubting the pessimism  
about the new world that the poet expresses.
This poem exemplifies the dialectical approach Yeats was now 
adopting. Unwilling to abandon his Romanticism, he now holds it within a
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rhetorical structure that questions it, but does not unequivocally 
abandon it. This cautious ambiguity was to be his approach for the next 
five years, as he experimented with the Abbey Theatre, and his attempt 
to bring about an Irish literary (rather than political) Renaissance. These 
hopes were to receive a sharp blow with the controversy over The 
Playboy o f  the Western World.
This riots provoked by this play have been discussed many times 
before, and there is no need to repeat the story here (cf. Strand, 1996 
for a discussion). The point, for Yeats, was not just that his plans for a 
theatrical Renaissance might have to be abandoned; it was that it was 
part of a more general disillusionment with Ireland. His involvement 
with Maud Gonne had already disillusioned him with practical politics (a 
process that continued during this period. By 1907 Yeats was openly 
opposed to Sinn Féinn, and ‘pious nationalism' (Foster, 1997 : 360)),
Now he began to think that his dream of recreating a theatre like the 
Greek Classical theatre of Aeschylus and Sophocles was impossible; 
impossible because the available audience was not up to the demands 
that playwrights of this calibre might make.
When Synge died in 1909, Yeats thought that the crowd who jeered the 
Playboy were partly to blame (Yeats, 1956). This was more important, for 
Yeats, than simply the death of a talented playwright. As we have seen, 
Yeats was increasingly under the influence of Nietzsche at this point, and 
Synge, for Yeats, did not merely write like Aeschylus or Homer; he was a 
man of their stature. Like them, he had expunged his own personality to
122
express the true feelings of the race (Liebregts, 1993 : 138-143). In fact, 
Synge was a Nietzschean Übermensch who was, like Zarathustra, ‘lonely 
and brooding' (Liebregts, 1993 :139). Now it was easy to see him as a 
great man who had been torn apart by the mob.
He also had troubles closer to home. The Abbey Theatre had taken up 
so much of his time that he had written little lyric poetry since the 
publication of In The Seven Woods. He wondered if his powers had failed 
him, and privately despaired that he would have the creative energy to 
continue as a poet (Yeats, 1972 ; 171). When he published his Collected 
Poems in 1908, many people thought that this volume marked the end of 
his career, and Yeats must have feared that they were right (Foster, 1997 
: 400-401). Moreover, in 1908, Arthur Symons collapsed into a manic 
psychosis. It was the final death-knell for the 1890's generation (Foster, 
1997 : 391-392). With Synge's death only a year later it seemed that 
Yeats’s generation had finally passed into literary history (Foster, 1997 : 
399). As T.S. Eliot wrote later ‘Yeats did not appear, until after 1917, to 
be anything but a minor survivor of the ‘90s' (Longenbach, 1988 : 17).
It was in this mood of despair that he first met Ezra Pound.
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Chapter Four : The Early Pound
The first three chapters of this thesis have deal with the background 
to the birth of Anglo-American Modernism. I have tried to show how  
Romantic aesthetics evolved as a response to the cultural threat of 
relativism, which challenged the accepted position of the artist in 
society. These attitudes problematised ideas that had been at the very 
core of the Western artistic tradition. In response to the atomising 
force of Modernity, in which the artist's very sense of time was torn 
apart and reconstituted, artists were driven to contemplate different 
and older philosophies of temporality, such as the idea of time as being 
circular, or the Platonic (and Neo-Platonic) view that there was a 
timeless Idealist reality that could be perceived through Poulef s 
‘shreds of duration'. Yeats in particular hypothesised a spatial Idealist 
landscape which could be perceived by the visionary occult poet, and 
which would act as (as it were) a scaffold on which aesthetic values 
could be hung (in other words, a metaphysical foundationalism or 
objectivism).
Artists were also driven to reevaluate their views of history, and the 
relation o f human endeavour and artistic achievement to that history. 
As we have seen, Pater saw Hegel (and Darwin) as a way out of the 
relativistic maze, in that both of them seemed to offer a way to imbue 
reality with meaning through the medium of history. History 
acknowledged change, and yet provided continuity within that change. 
It has been demonstrated that it was a particularly extreme variety of 
this concept that the early (post-Paterian) Yeats chose to adopt. Yeats's 
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view o f history was, indeed, that it was the key to understanding 
reality, and that art justified itself in historical progress, but he added 
the twist that his view of history was apocalyptic. By hypothesising two 
thousand year blocs of time, each of which was the reverse of the 
other, and each of which ended in cataclysm, he had formulated a 
philosophy of history that explained and yet denied progress, which 
gave the artist the chance to comment on change, and yet to stand 
apart from the process.
Now, however, we must move on to the development of Anglo- 
American Modernism proper, and for this we must examine the 
development of Ezra Pound. The main point to remember is that, as a 
poet. Pound was subject to exactly the same problems, o f audience, 
the fragmentation of time, and of history, as Pater and Yeats. Moreover, 
Pound developed his own Modernism from the groundwork laid down 
by these earlier writers. I therefore agree with Robinson when he states 
‘There is, I contend, an unbroken continuity in avant-garde aesthetics 
from the fin de siècle to Vorticism' (Robinson, 1985 : xiii).
In beginning to discuss Pound, it is necessary to go back to his very 
earliest poetic influences, in order to demonstrate that his early 
development was in many ways a recapitulation of the views we have 
already discussed. For the purposes of this chapter, then, I will examine 
his very earliest poetry, that is, the poetry he wrote before the Canzoni 
volume, which I will argue was his earliest attempt to ‘modernise' his 
diction and themes. In discussing this early work, we must begin by
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looking at the earliest influences Pound had available to him.
Perhaps the earliest influence on the work of Pound was that of 
Browning. For Pound, Browning was a poet who raised the question of 
the situation he felt himself to be in; that is ‘the position o f art in a 
time o f social fragmentation ‘(Gibson, 1995 : 53). For right from the 
beginning of his poetic project, Pound was obsessed with the problem  
of formulating an audience for his poetry, an audience that the 
pressures o f contemporary society seemed set to prevent from  
appearing (Gibson, 1995). The theme of the ‘alienated artist ‘who is 
unable to relate to his fellow human beings, who is somehow ‘other', is 
ubiquitous in Pound's early poetry. For example in ‘Anima Sola', one of 
his earliest poems, he wrote
Exquisite loneliness:
Bound of my own caprice,
1 fly on the wings of an unknown chord 
That ye hear not.
Can not discern.
My music is wild and untamed.
Barbarous, wild, extreme,
I fly on the note that ye hear not.
On the chord that ye can not dream (Pound, 1965 : 31)
Here the poet condemns and yet revels in his own alienation from 
society. The ‘you', who is clearly the reader, is already stated to be 
someone who cannot understand poetic inspiration; the note ‘that ye
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hear not'. However, the use of words such as ‘caprice' demonstrate, 
the poet is, even while regretting his apartness, also responsible for it. 
The loneliness is loneliness, but it is still ‘exquisite'. This is, I would 
argue, the key theme of his early poetry in terms of ideas. Certainly 
almost all the poems from his first two volumes of his verse deal with 
‘the beleaguered original genius striving to make its mark upon the 
world against negative forces from within and without' (Jackson, 1968 
: 6).i
The reasons for Pound's estrangement from conventional society are 
not hard to find in his poetry, as can be shown by analysing the poem  
‘In Durance' which dates from 1907. Unlike much of his other early 
poetry, we can be sure that the T  o f this poem is Pound and not a 
persona (Ruthven, 1969 : 154). It can therefore reasonably be taken as 
an unironic statement of poetic beliefs. It begins
'I am homesick after mine own kind' and elaborates
I am homesick after mine own kind
Oh I know there are folk about me, 
friendly faces.
But I am homesick after mine own kind.
1 Pound stresses not just that the poet is ‘other’ (a belief he would have found in Browning), but 
that the poet is superior to the public who mock him. Thus, he accepted Shelley’s idea that poets 
were the ‘unacknowledged legislators of the world’ (Bernstein, 1977). His elitism, therefore, has 
Romantic roots.
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“These sell our pictures"! Oh well,
They reach me not, touch me some edge or that,
But reach me not and all my hfe’s become-
One flame, that reaches not beyond
My heart’s own hearth
Or hides among the ashes there for thee.
“Thee”? Oh, Thee’ is who cometh first
Out of mine own soul-kin.
For I am homesick after mine own kind 
And ordinary people touch me not.
And I am homesick 
After mine own kind that know, and feel 
And have some breath for beauty and the arts 
(Pound, 1984:20).
This last sentence is self explanatory, Pound is alienated from 
conventional society because he is artistic; he understands aesthetic 
value. This, according to Pound, puts him in a minority, but a privileged 
minority. He has established this point by (significantly) quoting 
Browning “These sell our pictures”' to show why. It is the ‘sell' here 
that is important. Pound is alienated from the conventional ‘art-loving’ 
establishment who justify aesthetic phenomena by appeals to 
commercial value, to what ‘sells our pictures'. As Ruthven puts it, 
Pound, therefore accepted that ‘art (had become) debased by 
becoming a middle class commodity' (Ruthven, 1969 : 154). Pound is 
therefore protesting against the view that art is simply another
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commodity (in the way that was discussed in Chapter One), and against 
the class that espouses this ideology; i.e.. the Bourgeoisie. Pound is 
therefore in alliance with Pater and Yeats in his espousal o f a Romantic 
rejection of the utilitarian commodification of art. Pound (and as the 
‘we' indicates, artists in general) is therefore set apart from 
conventional society; ‘ordinary people touch me not'.
All this will be discussed further below, but it is first of all necessary 
to explore the fundamental Neo-Romantic concept of the artist's 
alienation that underlies all these early poems; for Pound is careful, 
even from the very beginning, to imply that his position is not 
completely unique. Instead he is keen to ally himself with others as ‘Li 
Bel Chastens' makes clear;
But circle-arched, above the hum of life 
We dwelt among the ancient boulders,
Gods had hewn and druids runed
Unto that birth most wondrous, that had grown
A mighty fortress while the world had slept
And we awaited in tlie shadows there (Pound, 1965 : 43).
It is the poems ‘The Decadence' that reveals that the ‘we' are 
associated with keeping art alive, and as other poems make clear 
therefore the ‘we' are artists, or, to extend this slightly further, artists 
and lovers of art. Moreover, this ‘we' are openly counter pointed to 
the unartistic nature of the Philistine masses (as the line ‘and ordinary 
people touch me not' makes clear).
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This is the Romantic dilemma par-excellence, and it is no surprise 
that at this point, Pound looked back to the Romantics and their 
successors for poetic inspiration. And this brings us back to Browning.
As we saw above, Pound began by drawing a sharp distinction 
between himself and the mass of humanity; leading to ‘exquisite 
loneliness'.He would have found a confirmation of this viewpoint in 
Browning. It is significant in this respect that the poem Pound 
particularly looked at was Sordello (Makin, 1985 : 56). In Sordello 
Browning demonstrates that he accepts that ‘the poet is a man set 
apart from those less sensitive than himself, and that his major 
advantage lies in the perception of beauty', and the poem deals with 
the poet's attempt to create poetry in a ‘grimy imperfect society' 
(Collins, 1967 : 62).
It is significant in this respect that Browning does not deal with this 
problem as himself, but instead adopts a persona; the poet Sordello. 
Moreover, he frames the question of the poets relationship to society 
not in terms of contemporary society, but by recreating the world of 
Frederick the Second (Collins, 1967 : 62). This approach, which 
Browning was to make famous, is generally referred to as the ‘dramatic 
monologue' in which a character from history is recreated and reveals 
himself in the first person. Browning therefore enters into an 
engagement with history, but it is important to notice here that 
Browning's approach was very different from the approach of a 
historian. Instead, Browning has a ‘capacity to penetrate the historical
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narrative of his chosen epoch and feel it from within by identifying 
with Sordello and reconstructing his individual consciousness. The 
result, a “mask” or “persona” was what Pound also sought' (Woolford, 
1993 : 10).
This method of empathetic engagement with the past, is not to be 
confused with the method of the conventional historian. Instead, 
Browning recognised that ‘historical knowledge, far from consisting of 
archival fragments waiting to be scrutinised, is an imaginative framing 
and re-enactm ent of past events. The historian's knowledge is also self- 
knowledge, a discovery of his own place in history’ (Shaw, 1987 : 56 
(my italics)). As we shall see. Browning’s ‘historicism' as we may call 
this method, was a strong influence on the early Pound. 2
Now, we have seen, one of the main problem’s faced by the 
Romantics was what to do when faced with the contemporary 
‘atomisation of time'. This could also represent itself as a battle 
between the universal and the particular; that is to say, between 
analysing the individual object in itself, (which corresponds to ‘the 
moment'), as opposed to a more ‘organic' or ‘abstract' view of 
phenomena (Fundamentally, does one look for differences, or 
similarities between entities. In terms of temporality, this former view 
would accord with views of time that emphasise history and 
continuity). We will remember Pater condemning abstraction, and his
2 To be more specific, we might follow Longenbach (after Jameson) and describe Browning’s  
approach as an existential historicism. He elaborates ‘For the existential historian, history does 
not exist as a sequence of events that occurred in the past: rather it is a function of the historian's 
effort to understand the past in the present’ (Longenbach, 1987 :14).
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distrust o f metaphysical theories; in other words ostensibly adopting a 
quasi-scientific empiricism, bordering on reductivism, as opposed to a 
more holistic viewpoint (although in practice Pater's aesthetic more 
closely resembles phenomenology). This is a consequence of his praise 
of the individual object. And it is interesting for Pound's own 
development that Browning follows Pater in this respect; that is to say, 
he was on the side of the particular in his own poetry. As Carol Christ 
puts it in The Finer Optic: T he characters in Browning's dramatic 
monologues [...] spring from an insistence on the priority of the 
individual over classification, and delight in the very multiplicity, 
[Matthew] Arnold had condemned' (Christ, 1975 : 66).
And it is this emphasis on particularity (and therefore, a lack of 
interest in generality) which led him to be interested in ‘the moment' 
which, as we have already seen, is another one of the bases of Pater's 
poetics. In Browning's dramatic monologues we so often come across 
people in the process of engaging in an act that will take a moment, but 
that will affect their whole lives; a moment of crisis, or of doubt.^ 
(Writing of his own Browningesque monologues, Pound wrote: ‘I catch 
the character I happen to be interested in at the moment he interests 
me, usually a moment of song, self analysis, or sudden understanding 
or revelation' (Pound 1951 :3-4). And this ‘moment' raises the question 
of the relationship between this moment and the character's lives, or, 
to put it another way, between the moment, and the more general
3 We will remember at this point that Symons, too, saw Browning as being a poet of ‘the 
moment’ and that this was the reading he helped to pass on to Yeats (Munro and Beckson, 
1970).
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temporality in which we must live.
To quote Christ again ‘Browning's vision of the particular moment as 
the medium in which man creates himself leads to the problem of how 
the moment attains a continuity beyond itself, how a good moment can 
become an infinite moment' (Christ, 1975 ; 113). And this is, again, 
the problem that Pater had faced; how to find the infinite in the finite; 
how to contact the universal from with the particular. As we shall see, 
it was also a problem that faced Ezra Pound.
As stated above, the method Browning chose to attempt to do this, 
not just in Sordello, but in many other poems as well, was the 
dramatic monologue. Here Browning could go back, and imaginatively 
reconstruct the moment in someone's life when they attempted to 
transcend the moment, and attempt to wring all the emotional 
significance of this that could be found. This donning of a ‘mask' is, as 
we have seen. Pound's approach to the past as well. And it is 
significant given Pound's alienation from the commodified world of the 
present, that the ‘personae' Pound tended to adopt were of the 
‘artistically minded misfit in ordinary minded society' (Jackson, 1968 : 
5). For example in ‘Cino' which begins:
Italian Campagna 1309, the open road
Bah! I have sung women in three cities.
But it is all the same;
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And I will sing of the sun.
(Pound, 1984 : 6)
Pound creates a dramatic structure in which the womanising singer 
Cino can explain his own contempt for the society of the time; and not 
just the form, but the diction is strongly Browningesque (the poem  
‘Mesmerism' is even more striking in this respect; not only quoting 
Browning and parodying his diction but containing the line ‘You,
Master Bob Browning, spite your apparel, I Jump to your sense and give 
praise as we'd lief do' (Pound, 1971 : 13) (cf. Bernstein, 1977 : 35-37, 
for a discussion of Browning's influence on this poem).
Much of Pound's early poetry consists o f Browningesque monologues 
(such as ‘Cino' and ‘Scriptor Ignotus') in which Pound imaginatively 
recreates the poets and outcasts of the past that he wishes to align 
himself with; thus creating a ‘tradition' of outcast poets (this is 
particularly strong in ‘Ignotus' which deals with Bertold Lomax, who 
planned, but never began, an epic poem, as we know that Pound was 
already planning an epic poem by 1906 (Writers at Work, 1963 : 39)).
However, the rest of Pound's earliest work tends to be influenced, 
not by Browning, but instead by the Pre-Raphaelites and Decadents. 
Given this interest in Neo-Romantic aesthetics, it is no surprise that 
Pound became interested (just as Yeats did) in the writings of the Pre- 
Raphaelites.
As we will remember from Yeats's own readings of Rossetti, Morris and 
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so on, Pound would have found confirmation of Browning's emphasis 
on the moment in Pre-Raphaelite poetryA Pound was, in fact 
particularly interested in Rossetti, and if we examine Rossetti's 
aesthetic we can find more influences on Pound's early work (Jackson, 
1968). Firstly, and most essentially, is Rossetti's expression of the 
belief that the poet was alienated from the drab world of contemporary 
reality. As we have seen, this is a theme Pound (and Yeats) felt 
particularly attracted to (Howard, 1972).
Secondly is the strong visionary quality in Rossetti's poetry. Now, 
Rossetti was a painter as well as a poet, so we would expect to find a 
pictorial aspect to his poetry (and,again, it was ‘pictorial' aspect which 
endeared him to Yeats), but Rossetti goes beyond being merely a 
‘painter in words', by continually suggesting the fusion of the outward 
world and the inner. As Rees puts it ‘Not only sea and sky, but roads, 
hills, flame and coverts are prominent in his repertoire of symbols. His 
use of the natural world to provide images of elusive, fragile, deeply- 
affecting but scarcely graspable inner experiences is one of the most 
distinguishing marks of his poetry' (Rees, 1981 : 76) (Words such as 
‘flame' were taken over directly by Pound to suggest this ‘fusion'). By 
the use of words such as ‘fragile' and ‘elusive' we get again the idea of 
the momentary nature of these experiences, and how this would fit in 
with Pound's reading of Browning is obvious.
Pound's early poetry is filled with these ‘moments'.
4 See Christ, 1975 ;110 for a discussion of the similarity between this epistemologlcal view to 
Pater’s.
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Sometimes I feel thy cheek against my face 
Close-pressing, soft as is the South’s first breath 
That all the subtle earth-things summoneth 
To spring in wood-land and in meadow space.
Yea sometimes in a bustling man-filled place 
Me seemeth some-wise thy hair wandereth 
Across my eyes, as mist that halioweth 
The air a while and giveth all things grace.
Or on still evenings when the rain falls close
There comes a tremor in the drops, and fast
My pulses run, knowing thy thought hath passed
That beareth thee as doth the wind a rose (Pound, 1965 : 47).
In this poem, the poet describes three brief moments when he
achieves poetic insight (what sort o f insight he achieves will be
discussed below). The language Pound uses emphasises the fragmentary
and elusive nature of these insights; for example the contrast between
the ‘stilP evening; emphasised by the alliteration of the sibilants in line
9, and the “tremor” caused when the moment of understanding is
achieved. It is important to notice that the ‘drops' of rain continue to
fall; that is to say, outside; material reality is unaffected. This is an
internal illumination. In the second stanza. Pound reiterates the sense
of alienation felt by these ‘man filled’ place (i.e.. a place ‘ordinary
people' go) the poet seems has a visionary experience, and it is this 
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knowledge that is instrumental in setting him apart from ordinary 
people in the first place (the poem is entitled ‘Comraderie'; i.e.. it is 
the visionary experience that constitutes the contact that provides 
emotional support for the alienated poet).
In a note to these poems Pound explained his early aesthetic (this was 
written sometime around 1909).
Beauty should never be presented explained. It is Marvel and Wonder, and in art 
we should find first these doors - Marvel and Wonder - and, coming through them, 
a slow understanding (slow even though it be a succession of lightning 
understandings and perceptions) as of a figure in mist, that still and ever gives to 
each one his own right of beheving, each after his own creed and fashion
Always the desire to know and to understand more deeply must precede any 
reception of beauty. Without holy curiosity and awe none find her, and woe to 
that artist whose work wears its “heart on its sleeve” (Pound 1965 : 87).
Pound therefore states the link between aesthetic claims and truth
claims. Art is, for Pound, fundamentally motivated by the urge towards
knowledge (we will remember similar claims by Shelley); and the
illumination that is the aim of Pound's aesthetic is described as being a
state of ‘understanding'. However, Pound also emphasises his own
version of the ‘moment' or series of moments which he describes as ‘a
succession o f lightning understandings and perceptions'. We should by
now be able to recognise these moments o f understanding as being
similar to the moments sought by Pater and Yeats. Pound goes on to
state that the understandings sought, since they are of ‘Wonder', must 
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not be immediately comprehensible. This is standard enough. If one 
wishes the reader to see the world anew, then the moment of poetic 
insight should leave a sense of strangeness (or Wonder), and thus the 
poet must not wear his ‘heart on his sleeve'.
Now, in the poem above, these moments of insight are feminised; 
that is the vision is framed in the context of a mysterious idealised 
woman (c.f. e.g. Pound, 1965 : 47). To understand the féminisation of 
these moments of insight, we must understand another of Rossetti's 
tropes, the Ideal woman. Rossetti's paintings (and poetry) are filled 
with representations of this perfect, unworldly. Woman (Riede,1992 : 
122). This was more than simply a symbol. Instead, as Rossetti went on 
to develop the theme in poems such as House o f Life, he began to 
suggest that it would be possible to engage in a union with this perfect 
lover, culminating in the union of ‘“two souls” in one heaven' (Riede, 
1992 : 123) a process that takes both of them beyond the world of the 
senses. This may imply, of course, that it may take them beyond the 
world of corporeal reality and Riede admits that Rossetti's thought here 
is ‘mystical' (Riede, 1992 : 123). Whether Pound followed Rossetti in 
this ‘mysticism’ will be discussed below.
We have seen, then, that Pound is deeply indebted not just to the 
ideas but to the very words and diction of the Pre-Raphaelites, 
especially of course Rossetti. This alone might lead us to Yeats, but in 
actual fact. Pound was already steeped in Yeatsian thought. By 1903 
Pound was reading the Decadents; Symons, Dowson and Yeats, but
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especially Yeats (Carpenter, 1988 : 41,63). This influence goes further 
than merely an influence in terms of poetic tropes and diction, though 
these are undoubtedly there. To quote Schneidau ‘Pound wanted from 
Yeats not only edifying insights into the practice of poetic composition 
but also much more: he wanted, in fact the key to the wellspring of 
true poetry, the secret and mystical key to the past' (Schneidau, 1965 : 
222). What Schneidau means by the word mystical in this context will 
be discussed below, but to demonstrate the Yeatsian influence here is 
Pound's note to his poem ‘La Fraisne', which is steeped in Yeatsian 
imagery and diction.
When the soul is exhausted in fire, daen doth the spirit return unto its primal 
nature and there is upon it a peace great and of the woodland [...] Then becometh 
it kin to the faun and the dryad, a woodland-dweUer amid the rocks and streams 
[...] Also has Mr Yeats in his Celtic Twilight treated of such, and I because in such 
a mood, feeling myself divided between myself corporeal and a sett aetherial, “a 
dweller by streams and in wood-land” eternal because simple in elements [...]
Being freed of the weight of a soul “ capable of salvation or damnation,” a 
grievous striving thing that after much straining was mercifully taken from me; 
as had one passed saying as one in the Book of the Dead, “I, lo I, am the assembler 
of souls,” and had taken it with him, leaving me thus simplex naturae, even so at 
peace and trans-sentient as a wood pool I made it (Pound, 1965 : 14).
The reference in the last line of the above poem is Yeatsian (cf. the
reference to the Rose woman), and there are many such references in 
this early poetry. ^
5 ‘La Fraisne’ is also notable for being Pound’s first exercise in what Carpenter calls ‘fractured 
narrative’; i.e. the principle of disjunctiveness which is such a notable feature of the Cantos. We 
see techniques that were elaborated on when Pound claimed to be a ’modernist’ originating in 
the period when Pound was openly a Yeatsian Neo-Romantic(Carpenter,1988 : 67)
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Now, we have seen that in his early poetry, Pound is interested in 
moments of illumination which lead to insight; insights which is of 
'slow understanding'. In other words we have a recapitulation of 
Yeatsian access to eternity through the moment. Now the question is, 
does Pound follow Yeats in hypothesising a Neo-Platonic mystical realm 
that lies beyond the moment, which can be accessed by the poet? To 
answer this question, we must look more deeply at his early poetry, 
i.e.., the poems Pound wrote before he left for Europe in 1908. It is in 
these works that Pound's earliest obsessions and themes can be seen, 
and I will argue that Pound's later development was an elaboration of 
these positions rather than a denial of them. This, however, begs the 
question, which is, what, at bottom, was his earliest philosophical 
position? In an early poem. Pound had written.
But for all that, I am homesick after mine own kind 
And would meet kindred even as I am.
Flesh-shrouded bearing the secret (Pound, 1971: 20).
What is this 'secret'? As we have seen, Pound differentiated artists 
from the rest of humanity. Did he then (as Yeats did) go on to give 
this belief an occult interpretation? This depends to a very great extent 
on the extent to which Pound was influenced by not just Yeatsian 
rhetoric, but by Yeatsian thought. Now, the evidence is that between 
1903 and February 1908 (when Pound left for Europe), as we have 
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seen, Pound had immersed himself in the writings of the Decadent 
poets, especially, o f course, Yeats himself. (Pound, 1951 : 92). It was in 
this period that he had written:
Aye I am wistful for my kin of the spirit 
And have none about me save in the shadows 
When come th ey , surging of power, "DAEMON",
"Quasi KALOUN" S.T. says Beauty is most that, a 
"calling to the soul".
Well then, so call they, the swirlers out of the mist 
of my soul,
They that come mewards, bearing old magic (Pound 1984 : 20).
The S.T. in this poem is C o le r id g e .6  Now, the 'they' in this poem are 
clearly closely related to Yeats's Sidhe. They bear 'old magic', and are 
therefore old themselves, if not immortal. However they swirl out of 
the p oet's soul; despite being real, they are in some way internal as 
well, and can therefore only accessible by turning inward. Moreover 
they are synonymous with Beauty. The similarities with Yeats's thought 
hardly need to be stressed, and become even more obvious with use of 
Yeatsian language; 'flame' ‘blossoms' and 'singing' for example, all 
language used not just by Yeats, but by Rossetti. All this is fairly 
standard for a Neo-Romantic poet, as Pound was at this time. The
question is, are these Sidhe like creatures merely a poetic trope, or did
6 It is interesting In this respect that this poem contains one of the first uses by Pound of what 
one might call the 'allusive method', in which unreferenced (and untranslated) fragments of other 
works of literature are used in the body of the poem. Interesting in that this is also one of 
Pound’s most Yeatsian early poems ('The allusion (i.e. to Coleridge) is made in a manner that 
prefigures the elliptical mode of the Cantos’ (Ruthven, 1983 ; 154)). Of course we have seen a 
similar use of allusions, albeit without quite this level of obscurity, in Yeats's own poetry.142
Pound believe in their literal existence? (I will deal with this question 
below). Firstly, however, we should examine the influence o f Neo- 
Platonism on Pound's early work (See Surette, 1993 for a discussion 
of the importance of Plato to occultists). Another very early poem is 
worth quoting in its entirety.
P lotinu s
As one that would draw through the node of things,
Back-sweeping to the vortex of the cone,
Cloistered about with memories, alone 
In chaos, while the waiting silence sings:
Obhviate of cycles' wanderings 
I was an atom on creation's throne 
And knew all nothing my unconquered own. 
God! Should I be the hand upon the strings?!
But I was lonely as a lonely child.
1 cried amid the void and heard no cry,
And then for utter loneliness, made 1 
New thoughts as crescent images of me.
And with them was my essence reconciled
While fear went forth from mine eternity (Pound 1965 : 56).
Here the poet is 'on creation's throne' which is at the 'vortex of the
cone' while chaos spins around him. This place is his 'eternity'. To 
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counter the loneliness inherent in his position he must look inside 
himself and create ‘images'. The mention of a ‘Vortex of the cone' in a 
poem this early is interesting, for it is an explicitly occult term. The 
occultist Allen Upward (who we shall meet again) referred to a ‘whirl- 
swiri' which Surette glosses as ‘the vortex, or funnel that is reported in 
many mystic visions of the other world' (Surette, 1993 : 137). This 
should make us suspect that what Pound is talking about here is a form  
of mystical illumination. Now, as the name suggests, this poem is 
concerned with Neo-Platonic cosmology. Pound himself was fascinated 
by Neo-Platonism, and spoke approvingiy of Neo-Platonic mysticism in 
this period (see Jackson, 1968 : 77-89 cf. also Flory, 1980 : 20-23). 
Given this, we might then surmise that the subject of this poem is the 
poet's communion with the Neo-Platonic ‘nous' that is the essence of 
the ‘real'; that is to say metaphysical and mystical, reality.
The poet gains a mystical identification with this Neo-Platonic reality, 
that gives the poet the sense that he is in ‘eternity'. This reality is 
therefore associated with a sense of timelessness; and we will 
remember this sense of a mystical escape from temporality in Yeats. 
The poet's task is to create ‘images' the only way to remove ‘fear'.
Now, in a letter to William Carlos Williams written in 1908 Pound lists 
his main task as a poet as ‘1: To paint the thing as 1 see it’ (Pound, 1951 
: 39). However, as ‘Plotinus' suggests, it may be a mistake to think 
that Pound is limiting himself to visual sight. Much later on in his 
career, Pound discussed the definitions of the mediaeval theologian
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Richard of St Victor, especially Richard’s idea that the Christian mystic 
could reach a state of ‘contemplation’ a transcendental unification 
with an object; an overcoming o f corporeal limits. Richard of course, 
was discussing a mystical unification with God, but Pound was prepared 
to take the idea of ‘contemplation’ out of its Christian framework, and 
use it as a definition of the act of mystical transcendence that was to 
be the basis o f his aesthetic (Stock, 1964). It is in this context that we 
should analyse the final stanza of ‘Plotinus’, with its line about creating 
‘images’ of himself. Pound, like Yeats, is prepared to make the next step 
and posit an inner sight, which looks inside the poet, but therefore is 
truer than mere external sight (and again, this is a Paterian idea); a 
sight which produces ‘images’, which are the poets true subject. The 
poet, therefore, looks inside himself and, by an effort of will, unites 
with ‘the object’; it is from this process that the poet’s ‘images’ are 
created.
Now of course, as we have seen, Yeatsian thought is also Neo- 
Platonic. The actual world of the Sidhe is one of eternity and 
timelessness (represented in The Secret Rose by a painting of a rose). 
Moreover, Yeats and Pound saw both themselves as visionaries and 
seers; that is to say they privileged the idea of sight. But this is second 
sight as well as first; seeing with the inner eye as much as the physical 
eye. Pound wrote, in a letter to William Carlos Williams that ‘Men think 
and feel certain things not with the bodily vision. About this time I 
begin to get interested’ (Pound, 1951 : 3-4). In this early work, then,
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Poundian thought and Yeatsian thought are fundamentally in 
agreement.
As we have seen, Pound took the idea of ‘Personae’ from the dramatic 
monologues of Browning. However, he would also have seen this 
technique used in eariy Yeats, especially, of course, the Yeats of The 
Wind Among the Reeds, (cf. Jackson, 1968 : 48 and De Nagy, 1960 : 
132)). In Yeats, these ‘masks’ functioned as aspects of the poet himself, 
and Pound followed Browning’s practice o f ‘historicism’ in other words, 
an empathetic identification with figures of the past that remind the 
contemporary poet o f his own situation (Gibson (following Jameson) 
calls this practice ‘existential historicism’, and points out the links 
between this belief and those of Pater, and the concurrent speculations 
of Croce and Dilthey. She also points out the strong Romantic basis of 
these beliefs (Gibson, 1995 : 6)). In other words, both poets saw their 
disguises as subjective interpretations; either of figures of the past or 
of fictional characters. The purpose of these ‘masks’ was, therefore, to 
illuminate the contemporary poet’s situation.
Pound, however, was prepared to take his identification with figures 
of the past further than Yeats. In this early poem, ‘Masks’ he wrote.
These tales of old disguisings, are they not 
Strange myths of souls that found themselves 
among
Unwonted folk that spake an hostile tongue,
Some soul from all the rest who'd not forgot
The star-span acres of a former lot 
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Where boundless ‘mid the clouds his course he swung,
Or camate with his elder brothers sung
Ere ballad-makers lisped of Camelot? (Pound, 1965 : 52)
This poem discusses Pound’s use of characters such as Miraut de 
Garzales in ‘La Fraisne’, and as we have seen, Pound saw the use of 
Browning’s monologues as a way of aligning himself with this 
‘tradition’; a tradition of outcasts. However, we should observe the 
language here; Pound talks o f old ‘disguisings’. What does he mean by 
this? He begins by talking about ‘souls that found themselves among I 
Unwonted folk that spoke a hostile tongue’. This was of course, the 
position that Pound himself felt himself to be in. ‘Myths’ are the stories 
of those who felt themselves in this position, but who could not reveal 
themselves to the populace. Hence the ‘disguising’. We have met this 
theme many times before in Pound’s early poetry. However, here the 
language used is more enigmatic. The creator of these ‘strange myths’ 
was ‘carnate with his elder brothers’, and ‘boundless mid the clouds’. 
The reference to ‘elder brothers’ will be discussed below, but the 
language of ‘boundless mid the clouds’ suggests some sort of mystical 
state of ‘weightlessness’. It is possible, therefore, to see this poems as 
going beyond merely romantic elitism, and into what we could call 
occult or mystical elitism, the idea that there are truths too profound 
to be revealed to the masses. Some people; ‘elder brothers’ know these 
truths. Like them. Pound will use masks because he too has seen things 
that he wishes to preserve from people who speak a ‘hostile tongue’
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(Longenbach, 1988 : 21-23).
More evidence to support this thesis can be found in the poem  
‘Histrion’:
No man hath dared to write this thing as yet,
And yet I know, how that the souls of all men great 
At times pass through us,
And we are melted into them, and are not 
Save reflexions of their souls.
Thus am I Dante for a space and am 
One François Villon, ballad lord and thief,
Or am such holy ones I may not write 
Lest blasphemy be writ against my name;
This for an instant and the flame is gone.
‘Tis as in midmost us there glows a sphere 
Translucent, molten gold, that is the T'
And into this some form projects itself:
Christus, or John, or eke the Florentine;
And as the clear space is not if a form's 
Imposed thereon 
So cease we from all being for the time,
And these, the Masters of the Soul, live on (Pound 1965 ; 108).
This at least is clear enough. The personality of the poet is a 
receptacle for the dead souls of the past. This was of course known (by 
the occultists who Pound admired) but the poet is the first to speak of  
it; ‘No man has dared write this thing as yet’. Pound takes the word 
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‘flame’ from Yeats and Rossetti, but in this early poetry, the flame is 
always synonymous with a mystical state; the ‘flame’ here is, then, the 
mystical act of communing with the souls of the past and giving them  
voice. The ‘sphere’ of light is the soul which all of us possess; however, 
for such as Pound, this soul can be kept, as it were, blank, so that some 
spirit could project its form onto it. ‘So cease we from all being for the 
time’; during this period of illumination, we are outside temporality; 
instead the ‘Masters of the Soul’ live through time through us. Giving 
the dead voice is the important point here: for if Pound was writing a 
poem in which the dead person was raised, this meant that the poem  
itself became an incantatory, exhortary act; a mystical ritual (Korg, 
1995 : 71-82). Pound’s relationship with his personae is, as I said, one 
of empathetic identification, within a mystical context that posits the 
existence of immortality. In other words, the idea that characters such 
as Villon were really dead, merely because their corporeal existence 
was over, was not a position that Pound would have regarded as being 
definitely proven. In the poem.
On His Own Face in a Glass
O strange face there in the glass!
O ribald company, O saintly host!
O Sorrow-swept my fool,
What answer?
O ye myriad 
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That strive and play and pass,
Jest, challenge, counterlie,
I? I? I?
And ye? (Pound, 1965 : 53)
he is not (or at least, not just) metaphorically writing about the 
problem o f identity. There is also the suspicion that the poet may 
actually be the receptacle of the dead spirits of men from the past (As 
McDonald writes; ‘Whether through the imitation of an admired poet’s 
style, through translation, or through prosopopoeia, to act as a 
prophet, to be spoken through is to be merged with other. Making is 
akin to metamorphosis. [Pound] became Villon, as he could become a 
tree. And as with his use of Neo-Platonic metaphysics, this prophetic 
stance became for Pound a way of signalling communion with spirits 
and gods, an act taking the poet out of time and out of self [...] Pound 
extends his metaphysic to inciude not just the gods, but the great of all 
time, and thus the past lives through him and in him’ (McDonald, 1993 
: 19)).
One of the main functions of the early Yeatsian project especially, of
course, The Wind Among the Reeds is to express the wisdom of
worshipping the Rose woman. As we have seen Pound was already
inspired by Pre-Raphaelite poetry to embrace the idea of an Idealised
woman, with whom mystical knowledge could be obtained by a
mystical act of identification. It is no surprise then, that Pound found
this aspect of Yeatsian rhetoric, again, highly congenial:
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Soul,
Caught in the rose-hued mesh 
Of o’er-fair earthly flesh,
Stooped you this thing to bear 
Again for me? (Pound, 1965 : 41)
And again
T - even I - am he who knoweth the roads 
Through the sky, and the wind thereof is my body.
I have beheld the Lady of Life,
I, even I, that fly with the swallows’ (Pound, 1965 : 58)
However Pound’s vision is, again, slightly different. The Rose woman 
in Yeats is, more often than not the source of torment; the man who 
has seen her can never live happily in the real world again. Pound, 
however, sees physical contact with the woman as itself as leading to 
visionary (and therefore poetic) states. As Oderman puts it, ‘To 
understand [these] early Pound poems, dealing with the same complex 
of ideas, it is important to focus on the fact that the lover’s experience 
with the woman involves a “‘bust thru from the quotidian into the 
divine or permanent world’” (Oderman,1986 ; 14). And this is 
portrayed as being an unalloyed good.
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The other aspect of Yeats’ thought that is entirely missing from these 
poems is the idea of apocalypse. Whereas Yeats’s thought is, in general 
pessimistic, in that his Gnostic beliefs lead to a rejection of reality in 
favour of a tormenting Ideal; Pounds’ thought is distinguished by a 
radiant optimism (cf. Surette, 1993). Pound came to believe that a 
change was coming in Western Culture, but for him this was to be a 
new Renaissance, unmarked by tragedy.
In this chapter, 1 have been attempting to chart the influence of 
Yeats’s thought on the earliest thought of Pound. We have discovered 
not just influences of diction and poetic form, but convergences in 
their thought, as well. However, most of the evidence that has been 
marshalled has been in the form of Pound’s own poetry, and so the 
suspicion must remain that these are merely rhetorical tropes. In 
other words, did Pound really believe Yeats’s mystical beliefs? To find 
out, we must now look at Pound’s view o f history.
Now, as we have seen, both Pater and Yeats saw the ultimate 
foundation of their aesthetic beliefs in history. Did Pound follow them  
in this?. And, strangely enough, this question is bound up with another 
question; to what extent was Pound a committed occultist, like Yeats? It 
would be worthwhile here to quote Pound’s own statement of his 
religious beliefs, and to remember that this was written as late as 1918;
What is a god?
A god is an eternal state of mind.
[...] When does a man become a god?
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When he enters one of these states of mind.
[...] By what characteristic may we know the divine forms?
By beauty [...]
What are the kinds of knowledge?
These are immediate knowledge and hearsay [,..]
What is the greatest hearsay?
The greatest hearsay is the tradition of the gods [...]
To what do they (i.e.. the gods) appear when formed?
To the sense of vision (Pound 1973 : 47),
(to those that might argue that Pound was using the word god 
metaphorically, to represent a psychological state, here is an essay 
from 1921: The intimate essence of the universe is not of the same 
nature as our own consciousness. [...] God, therefore, exists. That is to 
say, there is no reason for not applying the term God, Theos, to the 
intimate essence’, and he goes on to make clear that Gods are created 
from this non-material essence (Pound, 1973 : 49-52).
Unless one is to take these statements ironically (a position for which 
there is not a shred of evidence) this is conclusive enough. Pound was 
not, in these early poems at least, a materialist. He was, instead, a Neo- 
Platonist, with strong mystical leanings (c.f. Bernstein, 1980 : 84-91). 
Pound’s poetry is, therefore, visionary in the same way that Yeats’s is. It 
frequently (as in the examples above) deals with mystical unification 
with T heos’, the mystical force that lies behind mere material reality.
Now, to reiterate, Yeats and Pater ultimately grounded their aesthetic 
in history. Pound rejected Yeatsian apocalyptism, but had a strong
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interest in the past, history, and ‘the tradition of the gods’. However, 
he did not, as Yeats did, look to history as a metaphysical grounding 
for his aesthetic system. Instead, he attempted to ground himself in a 
tradition, descending from the Greeks.
And this brings us to the last major influence on the early work of 
Pound, the work of the Mediaeval French-Italian Troubadours. Most 
scholars have contented themselves with discussing the influence of 
the style and diction of these troubadours on Pound’s own poetry (for 
example, Kenner in The Pound Era). Pound would have discovered the 
Troubadours at University (Carpenter, 1988) (For more on the 
nineteenth century cult o f Provence, see Alexander,1979). Here, 
however, I wish to discuss their influence on his theory of history.
And this takes us into very murky waters indeed; the extent of 
Pound’s occult links. For, in his theories about history. Pound was 
influenced, directly or indirectly, by writers such as Abbe Barruel, 
Joséphin Péladan and Gabriele Rossetti- all occultists (Surette, 1993). 
These writers argued in favour not of Hegelian or even Platonic views 
of history, but instead for what one could call a ‘secret’ ‘paranoid’ or 
‘occult’ theory (cf. Surette: Pound’s thoughts about History ‘do not 
really qualify as metahistorical. They are not Viconian, Hegelian, 
Blavatskian, or Spenglerian, in their treatment of history [...] They 
belong rather to secret history. They are intended to reveal the hidden 
truth about the conspiracies-both malign and benign-that have 
formulated the past, control the present, and generate the future’
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(Surette, 1993 : 65)).
This view of history had two main components. Firstly, it was 
predicated on the idea of decline; that there was a secret wisdom that 
was once generally known, and which has now been lost to the majority 
of people. (What this wisdom may have consisted of will be discussed 
below). Secondly, that History, with a capital ‘H’, does not exist.
Instead of the mass movements of social history. Pound views history 
solely in terms of individuals. For Pound, it is individuals, and not social 
or metaphysical causes that are responsible for ‘events’. This latter 
opinion is, o f course, an idea that fits in well with his elitism. In 
practice, it is only the ‘few’, the ‘initiated’ who really  change history. 
To quote Rainey ‘Civilisation, for Pound, consists not in a network of 
institutions or web of social structures, but in the constructive activity 
of [...] the mysterious creative force of an elect minority’ (Rainey,
1991 : 131).
This is obviously very different to Yeatsian History, though there are 
affinities. But for Pound, there were two reasons why Yeatsian History 
was unacceptable. Firstly, he had, as we have seen, rejected apocalyptic 
thinking. And secondly, to Pound, the ‘Modernist’, History must have 
seemed an unnecessary abstraction, merely a rewrite o f Hegel. 
Bizarrely, Pound’s mysticism and his view of his history were inspired 
by the same attitude: the preference for the ‘empirical’ over the 
‘abstract.’ Moreover his history justified his elitism and his optimism; 
for if the wisdom had once been widely known, it might become so
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again.
To discuss concretely what these views of history amounted to, we 
must look at Psychology and Troubadours, an essay by Pound that was 
reprinted in The Spirit o f  Romance, This essay was requested by George 
Mead, an occultist friend of Pound’s, for his magazine The Quest, a 
mystical/occult magazine, in 1916 (Surette, 1993). It is beyond the 
scope of this essay to elucidate fully Pound’s influences here, but it 
was, as well as the writers mentioned above, influenced by Friedrich 
Creuzer, who ‘read myths as accounts of transcendental experiences 
that have been esoterically concealed beneath an exoteric surface’ 
(Surette, 1993 :31). In other words; myths are hidden knowledge that 
have been concealed from the profane.
Pound starts from the groundwork laid by a book he reviewed in 
1906 called The Secret o f  the Troubadours by Joséphin (sic) Péladan.  ^
Péladan was a Rosicrucian (like Yeats) and his thesis was that there was 
a secret ‘mystic extra church philosophy or religion’ (Carpenter, 1988 : 
67) (Péladan was also an influence on Yeats, cf. Larrissy, 1994). This 
sect was descended from the Greek mysteries and had been kept alive 
by amongst others, the mediaeval Troubadours of France and Italy, who 
Pound was also reading (Carpenter, 1988). This idea would have been 
appealing to a young man; Pound later described this period o f his life 
as one o f ‘mysticism’ (Carpenter, 1988 : 63).
7 Péladan was an occultist, a ‘self styled magus’, and, significantly, an aesthetician associated 
with the more mystical side of the Symbolist movement. That there was a mystical, even an 
occult, aspect to Symbolism is something we should bear in mind when we come to discuss 
Pound’s idea of symbolism ‘in its profounder sense’ (Dorra, 1994 : 261).
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Péladan went on to argue that the Troubadours were the origin of all 
‘modern’ poetry (that is poetry in the Western tradition), as the Melic 
poets were the origin of all the poetry of the ancient world. Therefore 
the Troubadours were the origin o f the Western tradition; a tradition 
that, as we have seen. Pound wished to be a part of. Troubadour 
poetry. Pound argued in Psychology and Troubadours had a double 
relevance for the contemporary poet; its ‘involved forms’ and its 
‘veiled meanings’ (Pound, 1954 : 94) i.e. its technical discoveries and 
the wisdom it revealed (and concealed).
He therefore accepted the idea that Troubadour poetry contained 
hidden mystical knowledge (this is, incidentally, typical of Pound’s 
thought, which almost invariably looks backward for inspiration. For 
example, Pound looked back, at first, to the Greeks for his views on 
free verse; ‘If the earnest upholder of conventional imbecility will turn 
at random to the works of Euripides, [...] it is vaguely possible that the 
light of vers libre might spread some faint aurora upon his cerebral 
tissues’ (Pound, 1954 ;93), and not to his contemporaries, the 
Symbolistes. For Pound the tradition was a living tradition, in which the 
poet tried to live up to and emulate the standards o f the past) .
In other words, he argued that ‘the poetry of the Provence and the 
Italian deucento was charged with values that were extra literary. It 
marked not just the spread of specific literary forms and practices, but 
the transmission of an ethic-religious culture whose most salient 
expression had been the poetry of the troubadours’ (Rainey, 1991 :
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39). Pound believed that one could gain access to this tradition by 
reading texts that would reveal it to the initiated, and directly, by 
making contact with other initiates.^ This should remind us of Yeats’s 
experiences with the Golden Dawn; belief in ‘enlightened souls’ or 
‘initiates’ who understand what the profane do not, is ubiquitous in 
occult thinking (there is, incidentally, no doubt that Pound did believe 
in these ‘initiates’ (Surette, 1993 :136). Rainey perhaps sums up 
Pound’s attitude best: ‘distaste for the world engendered by capitalism  
is structured through a radical anti-materialism that rejects both [...] 
bourgeois culture and [...] socialism. Meanwhile the “middle” (read 
“mediocre”) socioeconomic strata are rejected in favour of an 
imaginary cultural aristocracy that is unified with the vitality of a 
traditional-rural folk, and this imaginary construct becomes a vehicle 
for values uncontaminated by [...] capitalist industrialism [and] 
materialism’ (Rainey, 1991 : 68). Of course, all these things could also 
be said about Yeats).
Pound goes on by restating the Romantic belief in the superiority of 
the artist to the rest of the populace, and then explicitly links this to 
the artist’s apprehension of a mystic vision; the public’s 
misunderstandings of art are because they have not had the same 
mystical illumination (Pound, 1952 : 88-90). The artist is therefore a 
mystic, he has the power of ‘vision’, and his artistic task is to relate
8 Schneidau writes; ‘He (i.e. Pound) had developed the belief that he could receive the living 
spirit of past literature from the actual laying on of hands of those he regarded as incumbents 
“in a sort of apostolic succession”. In other words, physical contact with those who had known 
the great masters would enable him to absorb their essences’ (Schneidau, 1965 ::222).
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this vision as precisely as possible. However, to be precise does not 
mean to be clear; because the true visionary artist will not wish to 
make his occult knowledge too clear to the masses.
There are, therefore, two kinds of poet; the poet who is 
comprehensible to the masses; ‘that poetry, especially lyric poetry, 
must be simple; that you must get the meaning while the man sings it. 
This school had, and has always, the popular ear’ (Pound, 1952 : 88). 
The other kind of poet is different. His poetry is a ‘ritual’, it is ‘subtler’, 
it makes its ‘revelations to those who are already expert’ (Pound, 1952 
: 89). Though Pound is not contemptuous of the first kind of poet he 
makes it clear that he prefers the second. He also makes it clear that 
he believes the Troubadours were of this sort. He takes a line by 
Arnaut Daniel and shows how it could be interpreted in any number of 
ways. However Pound prefers ‘the visionary interpretation’ (Pound, 
1952 : 90); in other words; to understand Daniel’s poetry as a mystical, 
visionary occuit kind of poetry, that does not reveal its meanings to the 
profane; ‘The “chivalric code” was, as I understand it, an art, that is to 
say, a religion. The writers of “trobar clus” did not seek obscurity for 
the sake of obscurity’ (Pound, 1952 : 87).
If the chivairic code of the Troubadours was a religion, what sort of 
religion was it? Pound argues: ‘Consider the history of the time, the 
Albigensian Crusade, nominally against a sect tinged with Manichean 
heresy, and remember how Provençal song is never wholly distinct 
from pagan rites of May Day. Provence was less disturbed than the rest
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of Europe by invasion from the North in the darker ages; if paganism  
survived anywhere it would have been, unofficially, in the Langue d ’Oc, 
That this spirit was, in Provence, Hellenic is seen readily enough by 
anyone who will compare the Greek anthology with the work of the 
troubadours [...] The question; Did this “close ring”, this aristocracy of 
emotion, evolve, out of its half memories of Hellenistic mysteries, a 
cult “ a cult stricter, or more subtle, than that of the celibate ascetics, a 
cult for the purgation of the soul by a refinement of, and lordship over, 
the senses?’ (Pound, 1952 : 90). What Pound is doing here is tracing an 
occult tradition from Ancient Greece (what he elsewhere called the 
mysteries of Eleusis^) and counterpointing this against another occult 
tradition; that of the Manichean. What Pound disliked about the 
Gnostic tradition, was simply, that it was too gloomy in its yearning for 
Apocalypse and hatred of the body. Pound on the other hand posits a 
sect that worships the body, and, moreover, which stresses the 
mystical possibilities of the sexual act. Walker summarises Pound’s 
views here thus: ‘Pound’s Eleusianism is fundamental to his whole 
project [...] Eleusis is, for Pound, a veneration of the creative or 
generative urge of the vital free will, a force that [...] underlies erotic 
passion, evolutionary development, divine revelation, artistic 
invention, and civilised culture. The core of this revelation was. Pound 
believed, a sort of higher eroticism “a certain attitude toward, a certain 
understanding of, coitus, which is the mysterium”. As he argued in The
9 In ‘Rosa Alchemica’ the narrator asks Michael Robartes ‘Even If I grant that I need a spiritual 
belief and some form of worship, why should I go to Eleusis and not to Calvary?’
(Yeats,1995 :185). Eleusis is used here as a synonym for the Order of the Alchemical Rose. 160
sp ir it o f  Romance, (and elsewhere), the gai savoir of Eleusianism had 
found its characteristic expressions in “archaic Venus worship, 
Christian Mariolatry, Provençal and Italian cults of Amor, troubadour 
poetry, and (outstandingly) Dante’s Commedia’” (Walker 1989 ; 41).
Pound argues that the poets of Langue d’Oc had had visions of ‘Amor’ 
(Pound, 1952 : 91) which was the root o f their poetry; this tradition 
culminated in Dante’s vision of Beatrice (Pound, 1952). ‘There is the 
final evolution of Amor by Guido and Dante, a new and paganish god, 
neither Eros nor an angel of the Talmud’ (Pound, 1952 : 92). ‘I believe,’ 
he continues, ‘in a sort of permanent basis in humanity, that is to say I 
believe that Greek myth arose when someone having passed through 
delightful psychic experience tried to communicate it to others and 
found it necessary to screen himself from persecution [...] We should 
consider carefully the history of the various cults or religions of orgy 
and o f ecstasy, from the simpler bacchanalia to the more complicated 
writes of Isis or Dionysus [...] One must consider that the types which 
joined these cults survived in Provence, and survive, today - priests, 
maenads, and the rest, though there is in society no provision for 
them’ (my italics) (Pound, 1952 : 92-95).
Therefore we can now state quite clearly that Pound’s Neo-Platonism 
is not merely metaphorical. Instead, he is an anti-materialist, who 
believes that the world is split into merely corporeal reality and the 
metaphysical, timeless, ‘universe of light’. This is the visionary level, 
where the Gods live (or at least, where the Neo-Platonic ‘essence’, a
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non-material force that we interpret in the form of Gods, exists). As 
Jackson puts it
‘Pound [...] would insist on the inadequacy of any strictly scientific conception of 
life and the universe (T)he gods [...] exist and we should know them [...] he 
has again and again called for a vital interaction between human beings and the 
universe around them, a universe suffused with energy- life force, nous, the 
Supreme Intelligence [...] He is a religious poet in a curious sense, whose religion 
is a strangely occult kind of humanism. The poet, in his ecstatic or revelatory 
moments, is preeminently such a sentient man, suddenly aware -spiritually, 
emotionally, viscerally - of the life force emerging into form (Jackson, 1968 : 82- 
82).
Now, Pound frequently gives these moments of ‘ecstasy’ a sexual 
dimension; in other words stating that the sexual act can give the 
visionary poet these mystical moments of insight (Pound, 1952 : 92-94) 
(This linking of sex and vision is an idea that Pound was prepared to 
take very far; c.f. his belief that occult vision (which we know as myth) 
is due to an outpouring of semen in the brain (Pound, 1958 : 203- 
217)). See Oderman (1986 : 25-49) for a discussion of this essay. His 
statement ‘The danger in reading Pound is to read symbolically what is 
meant literally’ should always be remembered by all readers of 
Poundian ‘philosophy’ (Oderman, 1986 32)). This is again, quite close 
to what Yeats believed, lo
10 As Henn writes; ‘Yeats's view of the sexual act is the traditional one of both Hindu and 
Kabballstic mythology. In it is symbolised the reconciliation of all opposites in the divine world. 
The lovers, the paired extremities, can achieve perfect unison only in the after life, but earthly 
union may offer a Platonic shadow of the joy that is eternity. Perfect consummation would result 
in the cessation of time’ (Henn, 1950 ; 103).
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To sum up, the true occult (and therefore poetic) tradition is of 
occult sex worshipping visionaries, the mysteries o f Eleusis, which 
were founded in Ancient Greece, However, with the fall of Grecian 
civilisation, the tradition had to go underground. ‘Man is concerned 
with man and forgets the whole and the flowing. And we have in 
sequence first the age of drama and then the age of prose’ (Pound, 
1952 : 93). So Pound posits two different kinds of religion. ‘There is 
the Mosaic or Roman or British Empire type, where someone, having to 
keep a troublesome rabble in order, invents and scares them with a 
disagreeable bogie which he calls a god.’ On the other hand there are 
‘ecstatic religions’ which are less concerned with morality than with 
the ‘life force’. These ‘old cults’ are mystical and above all secret 
(Pound, 1952 : 95); and it is as one of these religions that we are to 
count the mysteries of Eleusis. The remarkable thing is that, as I 
highlighted above, Pound states explicitly that he believes these cults 
still exist.
Psychology and Troubadours is such an eccentric essay that it is 
easy to overlook its significance. I think it is best approached, as I have 
said, as a counterpart and a rival to Yeats’s essay ‘Magic’. What Pound 
is trying to do is to form a defence for ‘difficult’ or ‘obscure’ poetry. 
Like Yeats he states that religion and art are the same, but that this has 
nothing to do with morality, as Christianity does (Pound, 1952 : 97). 
Instead, poetry is the expression of a mystical, occult tradition, wholly 
bound up in the idea of a secretive cult. Outsiders, therefore, cannot
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be admitted lest the mysteries be profaned. This tradition, which 
originated in ancient Greece, still continues in Italy and France. Just as 
Yeats believed that the Irish peasantry were still connected with the 
Sidhe, so Pound believed that in Italy Christianity had not yet 
triumphed. And just as Yeats decided to use the Irish mythology as the 
basis for his system so Pound decided that his own, less systematic 
beliefs, would be based in Italy. Hence his frequent visits to Italy; these 
were, literally, pilgrimages.
This chapter, which began by discussing the influence on Pound of 
Browning, has ended up by talking of secret societies, seances and so 
on. But it was necessary to get ahead of our story, and discuss, at least 
briefly, the vast influence of mystical-occult thought on Pound. And it 
is clear, also, that in many ways we have not come that far. Browning’s 
technique o f using emotional empathetic identification for expressing 
figures from the past, could easily be given an occult ‘twist’ to suggest 
that the identification became literal. Browning’s and Rossetti’s 
outsiders have now become magicians, but the sense of alienation felt 
by them is the same. Pound’s visionary philosophy may be eccentric, 
but we should remember that fundamentally the same 
Paterian/Yeatsian paradigm is being used. The poet still perceives 
‘images’ or ‘symbols’ of eternity, through the Romantic ‘moment’, just 
as in Browning.
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Chapter Five : Pound Between 1908
and 1911
It is important to retain a sense of chronology here. I will argue that the 
first phase of Pound's development was his early work, from the turn of 
the century until 1908, when he moved to London. Pound continued to 
write poetry after he had arrived in Europe, but this added little to the 
work he had done in America (These are the poems contained in A 
Quinzaine for this Yule (1908), Personae (1909), and Exultations (also 
1909). (He also published a volume called Provença in 1910, but this 
consisted entirely o f reprints from earlier books (Ruthven, 1968)).
It was not until 1911, therefore, that he published a volume of wholly 
new poems, the Canzoni volume. In this chapter, I will deal with Pound's 
development between his earliest poetry, (which we have already looked 
at) and 1911.1 will argue that there were three main themes that 
interested him at the time. Firstly, there was his increasing interest in fin 
de siècle aesthetics, especially that of the early Yeats. Secondly, there 
was, again, an increasing interest in the Troubadours, and especially in 
what he felt were the implications of certain aspects of their diction on 
his own poetic project. And lastly, there was the problem of form; 
specifically, the problem of how to overcome the 'romantic moment' and 
try and build a poem of greater length than the lyric moments he had 
created up until this point.
It is, again, important to study Pound's changes of location, and to 
understand his real motivations for these changes. When Pound first left 
America, he moved to Italy. Given what he believed about Italy this is not 
a surprising choice. Moreover, it is significant that the only contact he
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had there at this time was Kitty Heyman, an occultist and mystical writer 
he had met in the USA (Carpenter, 1988 ; 48-50). However, after a few 
months, (during which he published his first volume), he moved to 
London. Why?
Doubtless, the potential for furthering his poetic career was a major 
consideration. In 1908-1909, London was at a nadir, especially in terms 
of poetry. Apart from the 'Forgotten School o f Imagism' (whom I will 
deal with below) there was little o f any poetic value being produced. 
However, this could be an advantage. If the world of London poetry was 
small, it would be easy to get in touch with all the important poets 
(Carpenter, 1988 : 97). And if the general level of poetry was low, it 
would be easier for a young poet to make his mark.
However, there were other reasons as to why Pound would be attracted 
to London. As we have seen, he was deeply attracted to the fin de siècle 
at this time, and moving to London would enable him to meet some of 
these poets personally. This was more than simply being a 'fan'. As we 
have seen. Pound was obsessed with the idea of joining a tradition, a 
tradition of outcast poets like himself. Previously he had restricted 
himself to merely reading their works, but now he wished to actually 
make contact with his contemporaries, to meet them in the flesh. And so 
he embarked on a systematic attempt to meet all of the Decadent writers 
personally (Carpenter, 1988 : 120). This action in itself was not without a 
mystical component. As he wrote in the important (unpublished) article 
‘How I Began' (extensively quoted from in Noel Stock's Poet in Exile)
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'Besides knowing living artists I have come in touch with the tradition o f 
the dead. [...] There is more, however, in this sort o f Apostolic 
Succession than a ludicrous anecdote, for people whose minds have been 
enriched by contact with men of genius retain the effects o f i f  (Stock, 
1964 : 31). As Schneidau puts it: 'He seems to have literaily believed in a 
laying-on o f hands: those who had touched the great dead could pass on 
a power to him” (Schneidau, 1969 : 113). Thus, for Pound, travelling to 
London, was, literally, a 'journey to the land of the dead' (Schneidau, 
1969 : 113)
However, of all the decadent writers he wished to meet, Yeats was the 
most important. Pound wrote later that 'I went to London because I 
thought that Yeats knew more about poetry than anybody else' (Writers 
at Work, 1963 : 43), and he quickly began to seek out as many of Yeats's 
friends as he could (Yeats was actually in Dublin in this period, and so 
Pound did not succeed in meeting Yeats personally until 1909 
(Longenbach, 1988 : 11)). The difference was a quantitative one. The 
decadent writers, whilst being impressive, were primarily figures of the 
past. Yeats however, was still worthy of note; he was, as Pound put it, the 
'only living man whose work has more than a temporary interest' 
(Parkinson, 1 9 5 4 :2 5 8 ). It was vitally important for Pound to seek out, 
and become friends with, the man who he considered to be the greatest 
living poet. It is not impossible that at this point. Pound was still unsure 
of his poetic vocation. If, however, he was recognised by a genius, it 
would validate his decision. It is important to note, however, that Pound
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viewed Yeats as someone who had brought the decadent tradition into 
the modern age; in other words, he had kept the tradition living. He did 
not see him as the start of anything 'new'. (It is necessary to stress this 
point, in the face of the persistent myth that Yeats's later style is directly 
indebted to the influence of Pound. See Godwin (1966) for conclusive 
proof that this is impossible).
As Pound looked to make contact with poets working in the same 
tradition as himself, he also scouted around for work. He was lucky 
insofar as he was permitted to teach a series of lectures on ‘Romance 
Literature' at the London Polytechnic, at the same time as he was given a 
contract from Dent publishers for a study of mediaeval literature 
(Carpenter, 1988). He therefore managed to combine the two projects in 
an intensive study o f the troubadours, which was eventually published as 
The Spirit o f  Romance in 1910. This was a crucial work which was to 
guide his interests for the next year. It is important for two reasons; 
firstly because it is the first major statement of his attitude towards 
history, and 'the tradition' (what I have called his 'historicism') and 
secondly because of what it showed him about how the form of 
troubadour poetry shaped its content.
What his study o f the troubadours convinced him of was the virtue of 
precision. Up until now, as we have seen. Pound worked with Yeatsian 
rhetoric to obtain a sense of suggestiveness and vagueness, which he had 
decided were the best ways to discuss his mystical viewpoint. He had 
always valued the idea of craft but, as he studied the troubadours, he
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began to see that the mystical viewpoint he believed they expounded had 
not been achieved by looseness and vagueness in their poetic diction, 
but, on the contrary, by stating the vision clearly. Talking, for example 
about Guinicelli, he says 'Here the preciseness of the description 
denotes, I think, a clarity of imaginative vision. In more sophisticated 
poetry an epiphet would suffice, the picture would be suggested. The 
dawn would be "rosy fingered” or "in russet d ad”. The Tuscan poetry is, 
however, o f a time when the seeing of visions was considered 
respectable, and the poet takes delight in definite portrayal of his vision' 
(Pound, 1952 : 105).
Here Pound identifies over-complexity (in the shape of 'epiphets') with 
'sophistication' or modernity. Now, as we have seen. Pound and Yeats 
both, in their different ways, looked back to the past, both as a 
guarantor of poetic value, and for models o f societies less hostile to 
artistic production than their own. Pound, in particular, looked back to 
the past as a time when the mysteries o f Eleusis were accepted and 
worshipped, as opposed to the barren materialism of modernity. To see 
complexity as being associated with the present was, therefore, definitely 
a pejorative description. Instead, Pound sees the mystical insight of the 
troubadours (their imaginative vision) as being best expressed in terms 
of simplicity, without the 'epiphets' (or poetic diction) he had used up 
until this point. This is a theme that is constantly repeated throughout 
the volume. For example, discussing Shakespeare and Dante he says that 
'If the language of Shakespeare is beautifully suggestive, that of Dante is
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more beautifully definite' (Pound, 1952 : 159) and makes it clear that he 
prefers the practice of Dante.
It is significant that when The Spirit o f  Romance was reprinted. Pound 
insisted that it was altered to included 'Psychology and Troubadours'. 
And in that essay, again, he writes of the virtues of precision, though this 
time in an explicitly mystical context. Mystical visions. Pound insists, 
were seen by the troubadours, and written about precisely; this is what 
they can teach the modern poet. It was with the Renaissance that decline 
(in the shape o f vagueness and rhetoric) set in (The view that the 
Renaissance was the beginning of the West's cultural decline is strangely 
reminiscent o f the thought of T. E. Hulme. See below).
As Pound investigated the Troubadours he became more and more 
interested in the fact that the purity of their sexual/religious vision was 
mirrored by the purity of their diction. In his later essay 'Cavalcanti' 
Pound wrote that he believed there he once been a world of mystical 
poetry (a sort of golden age), but that this had been lost by the time of 
Petrarch. 'The difference between Guido and Petrarch is not a difference 
in degree, it is a difference in kind' (Pound, 1954 :153). This manifested 
itself in the different styles with which the two writers chose to express 
themselves; 'In Guido the "figure”, the strong metamorphic or 
picturesque expression is there with a purpose to convey or to interpret 
a definite meaning. In Petrarch it is ornament, the prettiest ornament he 
could find, but not an irreplaceable ornament, or one that he couldn't 
have used just about as well somewhere else' (Pound, 1954 : 154). In
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other words; fake poets used ornaments or vagueness to obscure the 
lack of what should have been there: the mystical element (Carpenter, 
1988) (N.B. it might seem to be getting ahead of the story to quote from 
the Cavalcanti essay; but although it was published in 1936, it was begun 
in 1910).
This is the beginning of Pound's theory o f what one might call mystical 
precision. This is, o f course, very similarly to Yeats's distinction between 
the Mystic and the Magician (which we saw in the last chapter), but it is 
still a difficult concept. It must, however, be understood if Pound's 
development is to be followed. Schneidau elucidates 'Pound does not 
think of mysticism, such as he finds in the Troubadours, as bodiless 
transmission of vague visions [...] Even of mystic visions. Pound 
predicated exactness, precision, definition as the life giving components 
[...] Pound's comments on the Middle Ages ceaselessly reiterate that they 
teach a lesson of precision’ (Schneidau, 1969 : 124).
It was a result of his increased knowledge of Troubadour poetics, 
therefore, that Pound began to be interested in the concept of clarity, 
and precision. As Kenner puts it: from the Canzoni 'Pound learned not 
only to prefer crisp sounds to sleek, but to invest elaborate forms with 
spoken diction, to make it new, quickening conventions while passing 
through their forms, and to let structural analogies, reinforced by 
rhythm, do the work of assertion' (Kenner, 1972 : 374-375). And, as I 
have shown, this was in no way a reversal o f his previous thought, but 
was instead complementary to his mysticism. Mystical precision,
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therefore, denotes a belief that it is only through clarity, exactitude and 
the avoidance of unnecessary verbiage and rhetoric that a truly mystical 
or occult poetic can be created.
It is significant in this respect that the next project he embarked upon 
was a series of translations of Cavalcanti. As Carpenter writes 'He was 
drawn to Cavalcanti, because he believed that the Tuscan had managed to 
say, very  accurately, some of the things that he himself was struggling to 
express, ' (Carpenter, 1988 : 145 (my italics)). In his introduction, Pound 
writes: 'Than Guido Cavalcanti, no psychologist of the emotions is more 
keen in his understanding, more precise in his expression; we have in 
him no rhetoric, but always a true delineation [...] of that stranger state 
when the feeling by its intensity surpasses our powers of bearing and we 
seem to stand aside and watch it surging across some thing or being with 
whom we are no longer identified' (Cavalcanti, 1982 : 12). This makes it 
clear that it was the hard, clear aspect of Cavalcanti's thought that 
interested him (and we may notice that it is Cavalcanti's precise 
description of what seems to be a mystical state that Pound particularly 
admires).
There are two things o f importance here. Firstiy, that Pound became 
interested in clarity, and precision, by looking back to Provence; that is, 
the earliest movement towards the 'later' Pound were still prompted by a 
reactionary outlook. And secondly, that this railing against rhetoric, 
viewing it as a modern decadence, is exactly the same position that Yeats 
had arrived at a few years earlier.
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And yet, to look at the Cavalcanti translations, we see lines such as 
these:
'Korè my heart is, let it stand sans gloze!
Love's pain is long, and lo, love's joy is brief!
My heart erst always sweet is bitter grown;
As crimson ruleth in the good green's stead' (Carpenter, 1988 : 157) etc.
Pound's anti-rhetorical rhetoric notwithstanding, this is as archaic as 
ever. What has gone wrong? The problem is that Pound was still under 
the spell of Rossetti (Dekker 1963 : 112). Rossetti himself had translated 
Cavalcanti, and Pound had simply taken over Pre-Raphaelite diction and 
tropes to produce a very old fashioned Cavalcanti indeed. When the 
voiume was published, it was savaged for being old fashioned, verbose, 
and, fundamentally, for being a second rate copy of Rossetti. 
(Homberger, 1972 : 86-92).
However, it is significant, again, that rather than lose interest in 
Troubadour poetics, the failure of the Cavalcanti volume seemed only to 
spur him to new efforts. Pound moved to Italy for a holiday, after which 
he moved briefly to Paris. Here he worked with a friend on 
reconstructing the music of the troubadours, producing a book that was 
published a few months later. After this he devoted himself to another 
series o f transiations; this time of Arnaut Daniel, the troubadour whom  
Dante had called ii mîgglîor fabbro (Arnaut Daniel, 1991 and Carpenter,
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1988  : 155).
And it is significant that it was Pound's interest in the Troubadours, and 
especially the Canzon verse form they sometimes used, that was the 
inspiration for his next volume o f original poetry, Canzoni, This volume 
is significant in two ways; firstly as yet another attack on the problem of 
form, and secondly, because it contains the first hints of Pound's iater 
manner.
In order to see why Pound chose to write the Canzoni volume as he did, 
we must first backtrack and return to Pound's idea about the tradition.
As we have seen. Pound had no grand theory about History. However, he 
did value the 'tradition' which he interpreted in an explicitly Neo-Platonic 
manner (his interested in Neo-Platonism was particularly strong at this 
point, to the extent of planning a book on the subject (Carpenter, 1988 : 
156)). Whilst it is true he did not pontificate about History, he did 
believe in a timeless Neo-Platonic realm that lay, as it were, behind and 
beyond history. It was this realm that the poet could, in certain 
moments, interact with. And so, as Pound puts it in a famous passage 'All 
ages are contemporaneous. It is B. C., let us say, in Morocco. The Middle 
Ages are in Russia. [...] this is especially true of literature, where the real 
time is independent of the apparent' (Pound, 1952 : 8). Yet again, there 
are strong parallels with Yeats's thought. Pound, however, laid greater 
stress on the poet's ability to interact with other men from past ages.
As we have noticed. Pound believed in a tradition of outcast poets, the 
personae of whom he could adopt in a way that became a sort of
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empathetic identification, a process that was not without its mysticai 
elements. And Pound combined his belief in a timeless Tradition with this 
empathetic philosophy, to create a theory that the poet could interact 
with poets in this tradition, thereby creating a 'vital' tradition, 'Vital 
tradition is capable of making the dead live [...] because it is made by 
[„.] authors [...] presenting particulars that cannot be worn away by 
time' (Schneidau, 1969 : 123).
This was, then, the framework which Pound had arrived at by the time 
of the Canzoni volume, and that volume would attempt to elucidate and 
explain this tradition, via a process that would energise and reinterpret 
that same tradition. In other words, by revealing the tradition. Pound 
would make it live for the next generation.
However, we cannot talk about Canzoni without dealing with another 
probiem Pound was wrestling with; the problem of form. To recap again, 
Pound, iike Yeats, beiieved there were isolated moments when the poet 
could interact with the timeiess Neo-Platonic 'nous', and his own poetry 
was, from now on, to relate these moments with as much precision as 
possible. Thus, his poetry increasingly concentrated on fragmentation; 
not for its own sake, but because in these fragments of time, or 
moments, the holistic (and timeiess) reality that lay behind these 
'luminous details' would present itself.
The problem was, that since 1904, Pound had been planning an epic 
poem; considering this to be the highest form of literature (Writers at 
Work, 1963). However, it was clear that an aesthetic that privileged the
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idea of poetry consisting of the presentation of a series o f moments 
would be extremely bad at narrative, or, indeed, development of any 
sort; the development that would be necessary to power any sort of long 
poem.1
The obvious solution, then, was to create a form that consisted of 
bringing together a sequence of moments, and presenting them in a 
particular order; and this is in fact what Pound now attempted to do. The 
result was ‘an inherently fragmented structure proceeding through a 
sense of felt rightness in the succession o f parts and their relations 
‘(Fogelman, 1988 : 35). He had begun this arranging very early, but the 
Canzoni volume was to be his first attempt to do it systematically (and 
yet again, we are reminded of Yeats writing not merely poems but books 
of poetry)(Fogelman, 1988).
The next question was; what was the structure around which one could 
arrange these poetic moments? At this stage in his development. Pound 
settled for the most obvious of all narrative structures; a chronological 
schema. Pound, as we have seen, saw the poetry of Provence as being the 
beginning of all modern poetry. The Canzoni volume, would, therefore, 
begin in Provence, and trace the poetic tradition from this point to the 
modern world. As Pound put it himself; it attempts to ‘be a sort of 
chronological table of emotions; Provence, Tuscany, the Renaissance, the 
XVI11, the XIX, centuries, external modernity (cut out), subjective 
modernity [...] The plan is filled in, as you see, with translations and old
1 Pound wrote later ‘I began The Cantos about 1904 the problem was to get a form’
(Writers at Work, 1963 ; 36).177
stuff more or less revised' (Pound and Shakespeare, 1984 : 38) (Pound's 
model for this schema was Victor Hugo's La Legende Des Siècles a book 
that was important for him because it attempted to express chronology 
by presenting small poetic episodes from that chronology (Longenbach, 
1987)).
Now, some of Pound's earlier books of poetry had also been planned in 
a set order. But these volumes had still been lost in the past; the diction 
and themes explored had been restricted by the fin de siècle diction  
which had ruined the Cavalcanti translations. Now, however, his interest 
in the troubadours had interested him in the possibilities of purifying his 
diction, and therefore being able to broaden the range of subjects he 
could deal with.
And this was Important, because he wished to explore further the 
concept o f the tradition; what it consisted of, and how he could relate to 
it. Hence the chronological theme of Canzoni. This was to be a study of, 
and an attempt to preserve, what was important in the tradition, and how 
the tradition of the past lived on in the present. As Longenbach puts it Tn 
Canzoni, Pound adopts the super-historical point of view; he searches for 
the eternal element in art, the element of the past still relevant to life in 
the present' (Longenbach, 1987 : 78). And what ‘is still relevant' is what 
we have already seen; the poetic/occult tradition that descends from 
Provence. The book therefore begins with the five ‘Canzon'; recreations 
of the courtly love theme of the troubadours of Provence. As we have 
seen, Pound gave this idealisation of the woman an occult meaning. In
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‘Ballatetta' the poet writes of seeing what he elsewhere in the volume 
calls the ‘Lady of Life’;
The light became her grace and dwelt among 
Blind eyes and shadows that are formed as men;
Lo, how the light doth melt us into song:
The broken sunlight for a helm she beareth 
Who hath my hearth in jurisdiction.
In wild-wood never fawn nor fallow fareth
So silent light; no gossamer is spun
So delicate as she is, when the sun
Drives the clear emeralds from the bended grasses
Lest they should parch too quickly, where she passes (Pound, 1984 : 38).
This makes a link between the light (the illumination given by the
woman) and song; the creative process. The light she radiates is beyond
anything mere nature can produce; even the sun watches to clear her
path. A contrast is also make between the ‘us’ who sing her praises, and
the ‘shadows’ who are ignorant of such things.
The poems continue by tracing this tradition through to the
troubadours of Tuscany, and from there to to the Renaissance, and 18th
and 19th Centuries (Significantly, the nineteenth century poems begin by
discussing the influence of Pater (Longenbach, 1987 : 71)). However, it is
the last twelve poems in the volume which are of particular importance.
These are (again) a poetic sequence; the Und Drang sequence. These
recapitulate the themes of the volume as a whole; that is to say, they 
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trace the mystic tradition o f the mediaeval troubadours. However, for 
the first time, Pound traces this tradition into the modern world; the first 
time he attempted to do so. He could now broaden and develop his 
theme; using the Tradition as a benchmark against which modern reality 
could be compared. This has been obscured because Pound cut out six of 
these poems for the published volume; leaving only the concluding 
poems. And so, the sequence now begins with T he House of Splendour’.
In T he House of Splendour’ the poet sees his Lady out ‘beyond the 
worldly ways’. She is in her house, but she has also created it. Her 
symbol is light ‘through the claret stone, 1 Set to some weaving, comes 
the aureate light’. And the seeing her is a mysticai illumination; ‘there are 
powers in this which, played on by the virtues of her soul, I Break down 
the four-square wails of standing time’ (Pound, 1984 : 49) (we are of 
course reminded of Yeats when we read that the mysticai illumination 
brings about a sense of timelessness). Here, then, is the initial statement 
of belief. Pound increasingly associates ‘light’ with the wisdom of the 
Troubadour tradition. Seeing this idealised woman is therefore an 
initiation into this tradition; what we know as the tradition of courtly 
love.
However, one could argue that ‘The Flame’ is the key poem of the 
volume in terms of ideas. It tells us that the ‘game’ i.e. the game of 
courtly love, was not about what the vulgar thought it was about;
Tis not a game of barter, lands and houses,
Provence knew.
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Instead to the wise there is a deeper meaning to the worship of the Lady;
man doth pass the net of days and hours.
Where time is shrivelled down to time's seed com
We of the Ever-living, in that light
Meet through our veils and whisper, and of love.
And this is because
there is the subtler music, the clear Hght 
Where time bums back about th'etemal embers 
[...] Sapphire Benacus, in thy mists and thee 
Nature herself s turned metaphysical.
Who can look at that blue and not believe? (Pound, 1984 : 50).
And the poem goes on to state that this world is accessible when the
poet merges his soul with the Lady; this timeless state gives the poet
immortality: ‘This thing that moves as man is no more mortal’ (Pound,
1984: 51).
This is an absolutely crucial poem in that it states Pound’s mystical
philosophy as clearly as he was ever to state it. Here we have all the
themes we have dealt with so far. ‘’Tis not a game’; that is to say, courtly
love, the belief system o f the Troubadours, was not merely an
entertainment, or a literary trope. ‘Provence knew’; that is to say, this
knowledge was current in the era of the Troubadours, in Provence, but
has subsequently been lost. Instead, courtly love is a way of discussing
the real bases of this belief system, that of ‘immortal moments’. In other 
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words, in a moment of inspired vision, ‘time’s seed corn’, the visionary 
(‘we of the ever-living’) can see through to the Neo-Platonic mysticai 
realm of timelessness that lies behind the moment; ‘man doth pass 
through the net of days and hours’. Moreover, this is the realm of the 
Gods, as the poem explains later: ‘Lo, there are many gods who we have 
seen’. However, Pound stresses that these beliefs must remain a ‘dark 
secret’, known only to the mystical elite ‘who are wise beyond your 
dreams of wisdom’.
In the next two poems, ‘Blanduia, Teneila, Vagula’ and ‘Horae Beatae 
Inscriptio’, Pound goes on to clarify his beliefs that true knowledge is 
only accessible in these erotic states of epiphany: ‘The right was love- 
making and the result was illumination’ (Makin, 1978 : 245).  ^This, then, 
is the tradition with which Pound was dealing in this volume. Pound, does 
not, however, deal with the matter as chronologically as he makes out in 
his note. Instead there is a movement ‘from one polarity of sensibility to 
another, from Provence to the modern world, by presenting luminous 
details characteristic of these extremes’ (Fogelman, 1988 : 13).
The meaning of the phrase ‘Luminous Details’ mean will be discussed in 
chapter six, but it is enough to say here, that it is a poetic moment in 
which the poet empatheticaily interacts with a person (or persona) in the 
past. As a result of the empathy, the tradition is illuminated for the 
reader, as explained earlier.
But it is the tracing of the tradition into the modern world that is really
2 It is perhaps interesting here, considering that this is the beginning of Pound’s 'modernity' that the 
'Und Drang’ sequence is still saturated in Paterian and Yeatsian ideas (McDougall, 1975).182
interesting, because this was new territory for Pound. It is worthwhile 
dealing with the climactic poems of the sequence at some length because 
they are the first poems to be written in Pound’s later manner.
Au Salon
I suppose, when poetry comes down to facts,
When our souls are returned to the gods 
and the spheres they belong in,
Here in the every-day where our acts 
Rise up and judge us;
I suppose there are a few dozen verities 
That no shift of mood can shake from us:
One place where we'd rather have tea 
(Thus far hath modernity brought us)
"Tea” (Damn you!)
Have tea, damn the Caesers,
Talk of the latest success, give wing to some scandal. 
Garble a name we detest, and for prejudice?
Set loose the whole consummate pack 
to bay like Sir Roger de Coverley’s
This our reward for our works, 
sic crescit gloria mundi:
Some circle of not more than three 
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that we prefer to play up to,
Some few whom we'd rather please 
than hear the whole aegrum vulgus 
Splitting its beery jowl 
a-meaowling our praises
Some certain peculiar things 
cari laresque, penates 
Some certain accustomed forms, 
the absolute unimportant {Pound, 1984 : 52).
The poem is a vast step forward in terms of technique. Pound brilliantly
contrasts the anarchy of modernity with the order of the initiated
(’some three we prefer to play up to’) by the use of freer forms for the
first section, contrasted with the Iambic/Anapestic regularity of the
second. The poems that that were printed immediately before ‘Au Salon’
in the Canzoni volume were translations from Heine (the first section of
the ‘Subjective Modernity’ part o f the volume), and it is in these
translations that Pound shows the first signs of being interested in the
use of ‘natural’ speech; writing poetry with the language that people
actually use on a day to day basis (Raffel, 1982 : 29-30). This is
reinforced by mixing colloquialisms and Latin to create a sophisticated
tone. Again, therefore, Pound discovered his ‘modernity’ via adapting
another, older, poet’s technique.
But it is significant as well that ‘Au Salon’ it makes clear that Pound’s
initiated audience would consist of no more than that three. Thus his
occult elitism (which, at the risk of repetition, we have seen he 
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developed by studying Yeats) is still very much a motivating force, even  
as he clarifies his diction. And the reference to the Gods makes clear the 
occult, mythic framework. What Pound has done is ‘to set against the flux 
of morality and against chaotic modern fragmentation [...] what is 
essentially a mythic order that helps to impart unity to the volume’ 
(Fogelman, 1988 : 136) (This may well remind us of Yeats’s approach in 
In the Seven Woods).
This was to be Pound’s way of coping with the new century. He would 
not, anymore, ignore the new realities. Instead he would adapt the ways 
of the past to cope with them. This is brought home for the reader in ‘Au 
Jardin’ the climactic poem in the volume. This is, again, a poem that 
deals with the relationship between the poet and the public; as we have 
seen, perhaps the most important of all poetic themes to Pound. The 
poetic protagonist is a mediaeval troubadour, and the poem is a response 
to Yeats’s earlier poem, ‘The Cap and Bells’ This was written when Yeats 
was still presenting an unalloyed decadent aesthetic, and his poem deals 
with a jester who, after having failed to gain the heart of a lady, presents 
her with his cap and bells.
Pound’s poem is more, tough, colloquial and matter of fact than 
Yeats’s, presenting a poet who rejects the idea of pining away for the love 
of a mere woman. But this is not a rejection of Pound’s metaphysical 
philosophy in favour o f materialist ‘realism’. Instead, the poet insists that 
he is not interested in mere romantic love, because he desires a 
relationship that transcends mere physical sexuality; in other words; a
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mystical relationship with an idealised lady, recalling the ‘Lady of Life’ 
(Makin, 1978 : 36).
But this poem, with its purified diction, and its harder, more aggressive 
mysticism, is more than merely an updated version of Pound’s previous 
poetic endeavours. Instead, by referring to Yeats, it shows Pound’s 
growing interest in Yeatsian philosophy, and, moreover, his increasing 
desire to follow Yeats in adopting a new approach to suit the new 
century. It is the new approach that Yeats and now Pound had adopted to 
which we must turn (Longenbach, 1988 : 8).
After Canzoni was written Pound arrived back in London, and began a 
period o f heterogeneous activity, in which he attempted to soak up as 
many influences as he possibly could. He had so many interests in this 
period that it is difficult to keep track of his activities; however, some 
main themes stand out. Firstiy, and most importantly, he began to attend 
the weekly Soirées Yeats was holding. As we have already seen, meeting 
Yeats had been one of the main motivations behind his move to London, 
and now he finally achieved his aim. He had not lost any of the 
admiration he had felt for Yeats when he had been in America. ‘I find Mr 
Yeats the only poet worthy o f serious study’ he wrote at the time (though 
this was revised later. In the original he wrote ‘I find Mr Yeats the only 
poet worthy of my serious study. ’ (Longenbach, 1988 : 20)). It was, 
therefore, flattering, when Pound became not just an acquaintance, but a 
confidant o f Yeats. Carpenter describes how Pound ingratiated himself 
with Yeats to such an extent that at times he (and not Yeats) seemed to
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dominate Yeats’s Monday night meetings (Carpenter, 1988 : 171).
However, despite the regard in which he held the older poet, up until 
this point he had seen Yeats as predominantly a poet of the past; and 
Pound’s own work up until this point had been an attempt to position 
himself in relation to the tradition of the past. But in the Canzoni volume 
he had begun to see a way o f extending the tradition into the present 
day, thus providing him with a philosophy and method by which he could 
cope with modernity. For the first time, a new note begins to appear in 
his poetic theorising. He begins to associate the hardness and clarity he 
had learnt from the troubadours with the demands of the new century. In 
December 1911, Pound wrote ‘As to Twentieth Century poetry, and the 
poetry which I expect to see written in the next decade or so, it will, I 
think, move against poppy-cock, it will be harder and saner, [...] It will 
be as much like granite as it can be, its force will lie in its truth, its 
interpretative power [...] We will have fewer painted adjectives impeding 
the shock and stroke of it. At least for myself, I want it so, austere, 
direct, free from emotional slither’ (Pound, 1954 : 12). This statement 
recalls what Yeats had begun to state in 1902, and it is interesting that 
Pound at this point (that is to say, the beginning of 1912) seemed to 
recognise, for the first time, that Yeats was moving away from the fin de  
siècle diction o f the Eighteen Nineties (which Pound had slavishly 
copied). Certainly, ‘Au Jardin’ acknowledges Yeats’s ‘Adam’s Curse’ in 
terms of language; and ‘Adam’s Curse’ is a poem written in what we 
would call Yeats’s later style. Previously, (i.e. in in his pre-Canzoni phase)
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Pound had been baffled by the new developments in Yeats’s poetry, and 
had kept his allegiance to the past. Now, however, he began to 
recapitulate Yeats’s own modernisation, and to become interested in the 
poetic demands of the new century (Longenbach, 1988: 13-17).
This new interest in the Tater’ Yeats, was encouraged by his slow 
realisation of the meaning of The Green Helmet volume of 1910. For in 
this volume, even more than the In the Seven Woods volume, there were 
poems that show an unmistakable new development in Yeats’s poetry, the 
most famous of which is ‘No Second Troy’.
Why should I blame her that she filled my days
With misery, or that she would of late
Have taught to ignorant men most violent ways.
Or hurled the little streets upon the great.
Had they but courage equal to desire?
What could have made her peaceful with a mind 
That nobleness made simple as a fire,
With beauty like a tightened bow, a kind 
That is not natural in an age like this,
Being high and soUtary and most stem?
Why, what could she have done, being what she is?
Was there another Troy for her to bum? (Yeats, 1957 : 256)
This poem continues the trend in Yeats’s poetry to deal with the 
present day, and real people, as opposed to the mythical figures he had 
deal with in his poetry of the 1890s. ‘She’ is of course, Maud Gonne. We 
should notice two themes that have been carried on, and developed since
1 8 8
the time of ‘Adam’s Curse’. Firstly, there is the Nietzschean idea of a 
spiritual aristocracy, a nobleness that is ‘simple’ (compare Yeats on 
Synge), and ‘solitary’ (compare Zarathustra on solitariness). This, Maud 
Gonne embodies. And yet, cutting against this, is the other main theme of 
the poem, the decline in noble values o f the present day. This is of 
course, another Nietzschean idea. The aristocratic values of the past have 
been swamped by the democratic, egalitarian values of the present (‘little 
streets upon the great’). These ideas combine together to create the 
ironic conceit that defines the atmosphere of the poem; that even though 
it is still possible to have genuine aristocrats, society has abandoned 
their beliefs to the extent that they can find no place in that society.
This irony is felt very strongly, and the implications of it are thought 
through. For, at this time, many people, not least in the nationalist 
movement, looked backwards to the heroic values of the past for an 
imprimatur o f their own beliefs (and o f course, Yeats himself had done 
this). The nationalist leaders of Sinn Féinn were busy resuscitating the 
heroic Irish values of the past, as opposed to the utilitarian English values 
of the present. Now, however, Yeats will have no more truck with this 
idea. The nationalist leaders he had only ten years previously associated 
with, were now merely ‘ignorant men’. Politics, or indeed association of 
any kind, were beneath the dignity of the Übermensch.
However, in the final irony o f the poem, Maude Gonne receives a 
backhanded compliment. At least she has attempted to do something. 
Given that this is not the age of Homer, the implication is that she did
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her best to achieve something heroic (and Yeats may well have 
sympathised; thinking the nationalist struggle was ‘heroic’ was a mistake 
Yeats himself had made). There was, after all, no Troy for her to burn. A 
woman of the stature of Helen, she could find no place for her values in 
society.
And neither, is the the implication, could Yeats. This poem marks a 
break in Yeats’s thought; a sign of his disillusionment with Nationalist 
(or, indeed, any) politics, and an indication that he now regarded the gap 
between society and the aristocracy (spiritual and artistic, but also, 
possibly, financial) as being absolute. And this fits in well with his new 
rhetoric of hardness, toughness, and so on; he pitches these ‘heroic’, 
‘aristocratic’ values against the egalitarian slush with which he was 
surrounded. Only by safeguarding the heroic values of the past 
(something that is now seen as being the task of the individual 
sensibility, rather than something which could be easily brought back to 
society at large) could the present be g a u g e d .3
However, as important as the literary contacts that Pound was able to 
make through Yeats, were the occult contacts. At Yeats’s meetings he 
met, among others, Allen Upward, a mystical writer. Pound wrote reviews 
of Up ward’s books (he called The Divine M ystery  ‘indispensable to 
clergymen, legislators, students of folk lore, and the more intelligent 
public’ (Pound, 1973 : 375)) and later claimed to have read all of them
3 This volume also contains ‘Upon the Land Agitation', which, for the first time, extols the virtues of 
the rea/Anglo-Irish aristocracy, against the demands of the general populace (as opposed to the 
‘fantasy’ aristocracy of the spirit he had praised up until now). For the political background to this 
poem see  Moynahan, 1995 : 217-220.
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(Schneidau, 1965 : 226)4  upward was fond of using scientific terms as 
metaphors for the occult and Pound was to follow him in this. It was 
through G. R. S. Mead, an occultist friend of Yeats that Pound's essay 
'Psychology and Troubadours' (which we have already looked at) was 
published in the occult magazine, The Quest This essay was itself 
influenced by Upward. During 1912 and 1913, therefore. Pound was 
increasingly interested in (and influenced by) his occult friends, as we 
shall see when we examine his poetry of this period.
Pound also regained contact with what was left of the Forgotten School 
of Imagism (see below), and it was by renewing his acquaintance with T. 
E. Hulme that he was introduced to A. R. Orage, editor of the The New  
Age. Orage was impressed by the young American, and commissioned 
him to write a series of articles on poetry for the magazine, which 
appeared under the title of 'I Gather the Limbs of Osiris'.
These articles (which appeared in the Winter of 1911-1912) have two 
main themes running through them. Firstly, Pound attempts his first 
printed explication of what he was to call the New Method in literary 
Scholarship; the backbone of which was the concept of the Luminous 
Detail (which we have already met). Secondly, there was a discussion of 
poetic technique, which contained Pound's thinking on the forms that 
poetry for the new century had to take.
Pound begins by discussing his new method of scholarship. However, 
and characteristically. Pound goes on to explain that his new method is 
not really new at at all. Instead, it is a return  to the values of the past
4 See Davie (1982 ; 63-72) for a further discussion of Upward’s Influence on Pound.191
that have been obliterated by modernity (McDonald, 1993 ;151-152). 
This new method was explained as being the theory of the 'Luminous 
Detail'. This meant that the scholar (i.e. Pound) would no longer have to 
have encyclopaedic knowledge of a subject, but would instead look for 
the one detail that would illuminate the rest: '[Cjertain facts give one a 
sudden insight into circumjacent conditions, into their causes, their 
effects, into sequence, and law' (Pound, 1973 ; 22). 'The artist seeks out 
the luminous detail and presents it. He does not comment. His work 
remains the permanent basis of psychology and metaphysics' (Pound, 
1973 : 23). And, as we have seen from studying Pound's historicism, what 
Pound meant is that the imaginative scholar (Pound) would be able to 
look back into the past, seize the moment, and then wring the 
imaginative significance from this moment of the past with his 
empathetic poetic imagination. It is this theory, of the luminous detail, 
that had animated the Canzoni volume. And it is easy to see how this 
theory is basically a development of the theories he had been working on 
since he studied Browning; o f grasping a moment in someone's life in the 
past and making its significance live for the present. One should note in 
passing that Pound describes the luminous detail as being the permanent 
basis of metaphysics. We may, therefore relate this to arguments about 
the contemporaneity of all ages; and see Pound's view of history being 
developed as a series of moments (usually experienced by members of 
Pound's tradition), which were in themselves all that is permanent about 
that history. Pound therefore stresses that the scholar must be a
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historian; he must know all the relevant facts about the moments which 
he wishes to understand (and the individuals who experienced those 
moments at their maximum intensity).
But this does not mean that the scholar was to become merely a 
historian. Gail McDonald in Learning to be Modern, argues that, without 
doing much violence to Pound's thought, we could equally well express 
Pound's new method as the belief that 'to employ the main metaphor of 
Pound's essay, gathering limbs can, if done with care and reverence for 
the gods, raise the dead' (McDonald, 1993 : 152). For Pound, accurate 
scholarship is merely a means to an end; to make the tradition live again 
(and we must remember again, that given Pound's mysticism, this may 
well need to be taken literally). Pound's scholarship is an attempt to find 
a middle way between mysticism and history 'a teacher may derive 
authority from intermittent visions of "light" and yet remain firmly 
attached to the particulars o f history and the present moment.' 
(McDonald, 1993 : 153). Pound's stress on accuracy and scholarship are 
in no way antithetical to his mysticism; instead they are part of the same 
project, in the same way that his emphasis on clarity in poetry is in no 
way a repudiation of his mystical philosophy. ‘For Pound, the historian 
who borrows the tools of positivism is powerless to understand the past: 
but the historian who is endowed with the magical powers of the artist 
may penetrate its mysteries' (Longenbach, 1987 : 51-52).
In the second part of these essays. Pound wrote about poetry, and 
these articles illustrate his views on poetry in the Winter of 1911. Pound
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writes that as regards rhythm one should again follow the troubadours 
(and of course Yeats) in trying to find the right melody for the idea of 
the poem. The poet is 'apt to find barriers in the so called "laws" of 
music or verse' (Pound 1973 : 37). One must use all forms of verse, 
including quantitative verse, to find the 'inner form' of the poem (Pound, 
1973 : 38) (these views recall Florence Farr's; so influential on Yeats), 
adding 'I have no especial interest in rhyme' (Pound, 1973 : 42). The idea 
that poetry had to rhyme to remain poetry was another rule that may 
have to be discarded in the search for 'inner form.'
In terms of diction. Pound speaks more clearly than ever before in 
favour of simplicity. 'As far as the 'living art' goes, I should like to break 
up cliché, to disintegrate those magnetised groups that stand between 
the reader and the drive of it [...] for it is not until poetry lives again 
'close to the thing' that it will be a vital part of contemporary life [...] I 
mean by that that one must call a spade a spade in form so exactly 
adjusted, in a metric itself so seductive, that the statement will not bore 
the auditor'. To sum up; 'we must have a simplicity and directness of 
utterance’ (Pound, 1973 : 41). This is more forthright than, but clearly a 
development out of, the ideas engendered by his study of the 
Troubadours.
However, despite this emphasis on direct utterance etc., this does 
n o t indicate a break from the fin de siècle ideas that Pound had held up 
until this point. Instead, it is best viewed as the latest development of 
Pound’s thinking about his concept of ‘mystical precision'. Pound insists,
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against those who would model poetry on the speech patterns of 
ordinary people, that 'there are few fallacies more common than the 
opinion that poetry should mimic the daily speech'. Instead the poet's 
simplicity must be 'something which exalts the reader, making him feel 
that he is in contact with something arranged more finely than the 
commonplace' (Pound, 1973 : 41) (this Romantic exaltation is exactly 
what Hulme was writing against in the same magazine; thus 
demonstrating how little Pound was influenced by him at this point). Nor 
does this directness of utterance result in poetry that is less 'indefinite' 
in the Symbolist sense.
When I say that technique is the means of conveying an exact impression of exactly 
what one means, I do not by any means mean that poetry is to be stripped of any of 
Its powers of vague suggestion. Our life is, in so far as it is worth living, made up in 
great part of things indefinite, impalpable; and it is precisely because the arts 
present us with these things that we - humanity - cannot get on without the arts. 
The picture that presents indefinite poems, the line of verse that means a gallery of 
paintings, the modulation that suggests a score of metaphors and is contained in 
none; it is these things that touch us nearly that 'matter' (Pound, 1973 : 33).
'The Seafarer', a translation from an Anglo Saxon poem, was published 
by Pound in November 1911 in the New Age, and is therefore a good 
example of the concrete influence his new theories were having on his 
poetry. The poem is too long to print here in its entirety, but it begins
May I for my own self song's reckon,
Journey’s jargon, how I m harsh days
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Hardship endured oft.
Bitter breast-cares have I abided,
Known on my keel many a care's hold.
And dire sea-surge, and there I oft spent 
Narrow nightwatch nigh the ship's head 
While she tossed close to cliffs (Pound, 1984 : 64).
There are two main points to be made about this poems, and the first is
about language. As we have seen, from about 1909 onwards, Pound had
become interested in getting beyond the Pre-Raphaelite diction he had
used in his poetry up until this point, and from 1911 he had become
interested in developing a language that could cope with the realities of
the twentieth century.
And his reading of the troubadours he had begun to work out a way to
do this. He wrote in 1912 Thought is perhaps important to the race, and
language, the medium of thought's preservation, is constantly wearing
out' (Pound, 1973 : 331). This was one objection to Rossetti's language; it
was too old fashioned for the present time; it had worn out. But Pound
also insisted that translation was to be an attempt to recapture the
essential simplicity of the older period. Where Rossetti had gone wrong
was to represent the middle ages in the language and diction of his own
time, by using florid ianguage, he had failed to capture the simplicity of
the language of the troubadours (Pound, 1973).
For Pound, therefore, translating poetry of the past was n o t to be an
attempt to make the past 'up to date', or to see the past through the eyes
of the present. On the contrary, it was the past's pastness, its 
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foreignness, which the translator must attempt to represent through his 
diction. Whilst all ages were the same, it was nonetheless true that each 
era should be seen through its own eyes; and therefore the poet must 
avoid the arrogant presumption that only the diction of 'modernity' was 
valid for poetry.
And it is as a result of these theories that 'The Seafarer' reads the way 
it does. Anglo-Saxon techniques (kennings, alliteration, and so on) are 
used to highlight the strangeness o f the poetry. This explains what may 
have seemed puzzling in the Canzoni volume; why such archaic diction 
(as in the Canzon) could exist side by side with the 'modern' diction of 
the Heine translations, and the final poems. The answer is, that for 
Pound, the diction should match the theme. While an ironic, colloquial 
presentation would be good enough for contemporary London, there was 
no question about using these methods to deal with Provence.
'The Seafarer' was a controversial poem, in that it was widely attached 
by Anglo Saxon scholars for its 'inaccuracy'. As Ruthven points out, in 
many respects Pound only had himself to blame. If he had presented the 
poem as a version, or a free rendering, he would probably have been left 
alone. However, Pound wrote instead: "'The Seafarer" was as nearly 
literal, I think, as any translation can be' (Pound, 1973 : 39). And yet, the 
poem is riddled with inaccuracies (that some of these were clearly 
intentional is beside the point). What did Pound mean?
The answer lies in the title under which it was originally published: ‘An 
Example of the New Method of Literary Scholarship' (Ruthven, 1983 :
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213). What this meant is that Pound took the luminous detail (i.e. the 
moment of the poem) as it was happening in the poet's mind (the poet 
who becomes, therefore part of the tradition), and attempts to recreate 
it, in a language as close to the poet's own as possible, whilst remaining 
comprehensible to readers in the present day. Another way of putting 
this, of course, is that Pound is attempting to raise the poet from the 
dead, to make him, and his work, live for a new generation. The poem is 
literal, therefore, in a special sense; in the sense that Pound attempts to 
becom e  the author of T he Seafarer' as much as possible. To criticise the 
poem for errors, therefore, misses the point; Pound attempts to recreate 
the sense of the poet's personality, to become the poet in the form of a 
persona, something far more important than merely knowing the 
'correct' meaning of the individual words.
Over the Winter of 1911, Pound had been working on his new volume 
Ripostes, which was to embody these new ideas. In February he handed it 
over to the printers; though it was not published until October 
(Carpenter, 1988 : 173). The timing is crucial in that, famously, it was in 
1912 that Pound coined the term 'Imagisme', and set down certain 
aesthetic tenets which were to dominate his thinking for the next two 
years.
Ripostes is as much a transitional volume as Canzoni, but it contains 
more hints as to what Pound's later manner will be. Pound was at this 
time formulating the ideas of Imagisme, but there is not a poem here that 
could be described as Imagiste (and there are concrete reasons for this;
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see below). Instead there are mystical Yeatsian poems, and tougher, more 
precise poems in his later style. It would be Pound's task for the next two 
years to try and combine these two modes.
As T he Cloak' shows, Pound had not yet shifted away from Yeatsian 
diction;
'Thou keep'st thy rose-leaf 
Till the rose-time will be over,
Think'st thou that Death will kiss thee?' (Pound, 1984 : 67).
The use of the Rose as a m ystical/erotic symbol of course derives from 
Yeats, but the diction is far more archaic than Yeats would have used by 
this point; showing yet again that Yeats 'modernised' his poetry before 
Pound. Other poems continue to propound Pound's erotic mystical 
philosophy; 'The Alchemist' (subtitled 'Chant for the Transformation of 
Metals') compares the alchemist's magical transformation of lead into 
gold with the transforming power of mystical erotic worship; they are 
seen as being identical. 'Apparuit' continues Pound's symbolic linking of 
light, flowers, and mystical states. Other poems show the increasing 
influence of Yeats's mystical philosophy. 'Pan is Dead' mourns the decline 
of the old Pagan deities. 'The Return' however, posits that soon a Pagan 
Renaissance will come (cf. 'Rosa Alchemica'). Pound seemed to look 
forward to the cruelty that this would involve.
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Gods of the winged shoe!
With them the silver hounds, 
sniffing the trace of air!
Haie! Haie!
These were the swift to harry;
These the keen scented;
These the souls of blood (Pound, 1984 : 74).
This idea that the Gods will return is new in Pound, and obviously 
derives from Yeats (Yeats himself was very impressed by this poem and 
specifically associated it with his belief that the Christian era was coming 
to an end; for a discussion o f this, and the poem's use of looser verse 
forms see Kirby-Smith (1996)). As Longenbach puts it 'this poem is about 
the ancient spiritual presences which Pound wants to restore to his work 
in order to resurrect “the aristocracy of the arts". The poem also 
announces (as Yeats wrote) “some change of style", but for the initiated 
members of the secret society of modernism, the poems is a manifesto of 
a new artistic, social, and political order' (we shall look at what form this 
'new order' would take later on (Longenbach, 1988 : 94)).
But the form of this poem derived not from Yeats but instead from 
Régnier, and this points towards a major new influence on Pound; French 
Symbolism. Pound had managed to avoid much contact with Symbolism 
up until this point (that is to say, French Symbolism. There was also the 
Yeatsian brand of symbolism, which, o f course, he did know of) (He
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wrote 'Avec toute modestie, je crois que j'étais orienté avant de 
connaître les poètes français modernes' and went on 'L'idée de l'image 
doit “quelquechose" aux symbolistes français via T. E. Hulme, via Yeats < 
Symons < Mallarmé' (Pound 1951 : 293-295). Pound was aware that up 
until now his knowledge o f Symbolism had come from Hulme, and of 
course, Yeats. He went on to say that 'Que J'ai profité de leurs 
inventions techniques (comme Edison ou aucun autre homme de science 
profite des découvertes' (Pound, 1951 : 293)). Pound was, he said, 
mainly interested in the French as technical innovators.
Significantly, the poet who had the earlier and profoundest influence 
on Pound was Gautier. Gautier was important for Pound, because he 
hammered home the idea that poetry must be precise and 'chiselled' 
(Again, this is in no way a break from fin de siècle poetics, but a 
development from them. Symons had written of Gautier in much the 
same way (Temple, 1953 : 131)). Baudelaire himself described him as 
master of 'le mot propre, le mot unique' (Hamilton, 1992 : 32)). Gautier 
used this approach to create a poetry that was more realistic, that could 
more easily deal with the facts of the modern world. But this realism was 
not Naturalism; it was a 'satirical realism' that attacked the modern 
world at the same time as it described it (Hamilton, 1992 : 13), This is 
the way an important strand of Pound's own poetry would develop. But 
this is only one side of Gautier's poetry. For as well as a satirist, Gautier 
was also a proto-Symbolist, who first proclaimed the doctrine o f 'Art for 
Art's Sake'. He upheld the philosophy of Ideal beauty and his satirical
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pose stems from his contrast between this Platonic Beauty and the 
degraded world of reality. Pound sometimes stressed Gautier's satirical 
side, but he could also compare him to Lionel Johnson or Swinburne; 
posing Gautier as a decadent avant la lettre. He was very aware of the 
Romantic underpinnings of his satire (Hamilton, 1992 ; 27-29).
Gautier had his mystical side too, as did de Gourmont and Régnier, the 
other main French influences on the Ripostes volume, and Pound took 
not just the form, but some of the mystical essence of Régnier's 
'Médaillés d'argile' to make 'The Return' (Hamilton, 1992 : 43). 'Both 
poems emphasise the borderline existence of the divine realm and the 
necessity of creative vision in order to evoke the presence o f these gods' 
(Hamilton, 1992 : 43). So Pound, in the final analysis was interested in 
the French for more than just technical reasons; but it was only insofar 
as they confirmed his own mystical speculations. Gautier and Régnier's 
belief that 'Les dieux vivent dans l'homme' (Hamilton, 1992 : 47) was 
something Pound would have agreed with, and he would have been 
impressed by the way Gautier in particular could believe this and yet still 
insist on absolute precision of diction. This idea of 'mystical precision' 
was exactly what he was looking for in the Indian poet Rabindranath 
Tagore at the same time (see below). Gautier showed another way ahead.
In August 1912, F. S. Flint wrote his groundbreaking essay 
'Contemporary French Poetry' in The Poetry Review (Pondrom, 1974). 
This essay had a double significance. Not only did it now make the study 
of French poetry essential for any practising poet, it also finally brought
202
the British intelligentsia up to date with activities on the continent. Up 
until now, even the most avant-garde poets in Britain had spoken of the 
çenacle Symbolists of the 1890's and early twentieth century as though 
they were contemporaries.
But now at last, the British could see what genuinely contemporary 
French writers were creating. British readers heard of the 'Unamistes' 
and the 'Futurists' for the first time. From this point on, Pound 
increasingly turns to the Symbolists to try and help him find a language 
that he can use to explore the new century's realities.
At the end of Ripostes he had written approvingly (for the first time) of 
‘The Forgotten School of Imagism', and announced that its future lay in 
the hands of a new movement 'Les Imagistes'. At the time there was no 
such movement; and no Imagistes. Why Pound chose to make this 
statement is a mystery, but a clue is that he was finally catching up with 
the innovations of Hulme three years previously (His new volume 
included The Complete Poetical Works o f  T. E. Hulme). Pound had known 
about Hulme's innovations for some time, but his own poetic theorising 
had been too old fashioned to make sense of them. Whether he ever 
understood Hulme's position is debatable (he certainly lacked the 
knowledge of contemporary French philosophy that Hulme had) but his 
own reading of the troubadours and the later Yeats, now enabled him, at 
least to understand Hulme’s poetry itself.
This brings us to the question of what Hulme's theories were. This is 
what the next chapter will explore.
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Chapter 6 : T.E. Hulme and
Imagism.
Modernism is simply an adaption of Decadent aesthetics, which are 
themselves merely adaptions of Romantic thought. However, the 
Yeatsian tradition is only aspect of what was to become the English 
version of Modernism. Alongside the Yeats /Pound school, another kind 
of poetry was being developed in England. i This new way of writing 
poetry which was later to be called 'Imagism' had, itself, two main 
subdivisions. Firstly, there was English adaptions of French Symbolist 
aesthetics (as opposed to the indigenous, English, proto-Symbolist 
tradition, which Yeats drew on). Secondly, there was a strand which drew 
not only on Symbolist aesthetics, but from French Associationist 
psychology. This aspect of Imagism derives from T.E. Hulme.
Hulme was born in 1883 in Staffordshire, enrolling at Cambridge in 
1902 (interestingly, he chose to study mathematics, not the humanities). 
However, he was dismissed in 1904, for some unspecified offence, and, 
after some years of travelling and casual employment, returned to 
London in 1908 (Jones, 1960 : 22-25). It was in this period, (that is to 
say from 1904-1908) that he worked out his earliest philosophical 
beliefs.
1 It is important to realise that there are two main strands of British Modernist poetry: the 
Hulme-Associationist-Bergsonian viewpoint, and the Yeatsian, Poundian, mystical viewpoint. 
Kayman is one of the few critics to grasp this point in his book The Modernism o f Ezra Pound 
(Kayman, 1986) (I am assuming for the purposes of argument that Georgian poetry is not 
genuinely Modernist). One might add that there are, as well, at least two strands of the British 
Modernist Novel: that stemming from D.H. Lawrence, which was Bergsonian/Nietzschean (this 
also includes the very early work of Wyndham Lewis), and that stemming from Ford Madox 
Ford/Joseph Conrad, which was, broadly speaking, Impressionist. It is often thought that this 
Impressionist Modernism was highly influential on Ezra Pound, but this is false: see chapter 
eight).
I am also ignoring the Bloomsbury movement on the grounds that it did not produce genuinely 
Modernist novelists until the post-war works of Virginia Woolf and E.M Forster. See chapter nine 
for a discussion of Bloomsbury art aesthetics.
2 0 5
In discussing Hulme it is important to remember that, although he 
wrote poetry at one point, he was a philosopher and critic, not a poet. In 
other words the fear of the redundancy o f art in the Capitalist 
marketplace, which was a matter of such concern for writers such as 
Yeats, does not feature greatly in his thought. Instead Hulme raised the 
issue of the impact of science on what we may call the humanistic 
tradition: specifically the impact o f the rise of what Hulme saw as logical 
or scientific language, and the concurrent increase in belief in 
materialistic determinism (as mentioned above, his interest in the 
relationship between the humanities and science may have stemmed 
from his University experiences). His earliest philosophical position was 
based mainly on his reading of contemporary French psychology. This 
philosophy is contained in two unpublished manuscripts, 'Cinders' and 
'Notes on Language and Style', which are important not just because they 
state Hulme's earliest position but also because traces of this early 
philosophy are discernible throughout all o f his intellectual development.
In 'Cinders', the earlier document, Hulme attacks first and foremost 
the ideal of a Grand Theory: 'Formerly one liked theories because they 
reduced the world to a single principle. Now the same reason disgusts us' 
(Hulme, 1994 :10), and this is because 'All is flux. The moralists, the 
capital letterists, attempt to find a framework outside the flux, a solid 
bank for the river, a pier rather than a raft(Hulme, 1994 : 10). 
Metaphysical thinking, which tried to formulate grand abstract theories 
to explain reality, was therefore, always doomed to failure 'The ruling
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analogy, which is quite false [...] is that of the eagle's eye. The 
metaphysician imagines that he surveys the world as with an eagle's eye 
[...] Hence we can see the world as pure geometry [...] But [...] the eye is 
mud [...] Pure seeing of the whole process is impossible' (Hulme, 1994 : 
19). And T he absolute is invented to reconcile conflicting purposes. But 
these purposes are necessarily conflicting, even in the nature o f truth 
itself (Hulme, 1994 : 13). Thus he concludes: 'Philosophical syntheses 
and ethical systems are only possible in armchair moments. They are 
seen to be meaningless as soon as we get into a bus with a dirty baby and 
a crowd' (Hulme, 1994 : 13).
Previously, faced with this extreme epistemological scepticism, 
thinkers could at least console themselves with the 'objectivity' that 
could be gained by the natural sciences. Hulme's scepticism, however, 
cuts deeper: 'The aim of science and of all thought is to reduce the 
complex and inevitably disconnected world o f grit and cinders to a few 
ideal counters, which we can move about and so form an ungritlike 
picture of reality' (Hulme, 1994 : 11)
(These speculations are clearly indebted to Nietzsche. Hulme actually 
mentions the German in 'Cinders' and the form of the document is 
obviously modelled on Thus Spake Zarathustra (Hulme, 1994)).
In other words, reality is meaningless without human consciousness to 
give it meaning, ('Only in the fact of consciousness is there a unity in the 
world' (Hulme, 1994 : 10)) but consciousness (at least rational 
consciousness), always fails, due to the basic structure of our thought,
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which is dependent on the basic structure of language. We always 
perceive (and therefore, to an extent create) reality through the prism of 
language. However, language does not exactly mirror the flux of 
existence. Hulme compares language to an artificial grid which we 
impose on the meaningless flux of reality. Words are mere counters and 
'the world [...] is not reducible to counters' (Hulme, 1994 : 9).
Instead, the world consists o f a dialectic between the 'cinders' of 
brute, corporeal reality, and the human concepts by which these are 
ordered. The result of this is that what we see as being 'objective' reality 
is, at least in part, a human creation, or as Hulme puts it, 'Truths don't 
exist until we invent them' (Hulme, 1994 : 20). Having established his 
perspectivism, Hulme then goes on to express his scepticism about 
rationality, claiming that we invent these 'truths' for emotional and 
sociological, as opposed to logical, reasons. Hulme writes, 'Note the fact 
that all a writers's generalisations and truths can be traced back to the 
personal circumstances and prejudices o f his class, experience, capacity, 
and body' (Hulme, 1994 : 13) (Hulme may well have been influenced 
here by the German philosopher (and cultural relativist. Max Scheler, 
though it is not clear precisely when he read Scheler. See Roberts, 1971).
Hulme begins, therefore by criticising philosophy and science. Both of 
these activities try to fit the flux of existence into a 'mould' into which it 
will not fit. Reality, is not, therefore, rationally comprehensible. It always 
eludes Man's efforts to impose order on the flux (This distrust of 
rationality and science was typical of Edwardian thinking: see Hynes,
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1968). For Hulme, there is only one constant in this Heraclitean flux: 
human nature. Like Nietzsche he sees human desires as unalterable. T he  
unalterability of motives. Motives are the only unalterable and fixed 
things in the world [...] They are more than human motives, they are the 
constitution of the world' (Hulme, 1994 :16). It is not clear why Hulme 
thinks this, when everything else is conceived of as being pure flux, but it 
possibly because o f the difficulty o f creating a worldview of pure 
relativism. If all cultural systems are completely arbitrary, it is not clear 
why there should not be infinite variation in human conduct. But this is, 
of course, not the case, and Hulme explains this by invoking the idea of 
an unchanging 'human nature'. (Possibly, as well, he found it difficult to 
conceive of a completely anü-foundaüonaljst epistemology.) Moreover 
this idea o f the impossibility of changing 'human nature' doubtless fitted 
in with Hulme's deeply pessimistic world view.
Hulme's philosophy is therefore very similar to Nietzsche's, but unlike 
the German, Hulme could not get surmount his nihilism and create the 
great affirmation of Thus Spake Zarathustra. For Hulme, nihilism (except 
with regard to human motives) was irrefutable: yet nihilism meant 
despair. 'Ennui and disgust, the sick moments- not an occasional lapse or 
disease, but the fundamental ennui and chaos out of which the world has 
been built' (Hulme, 1994 :13). One way out of the dilemma would be 
hedonism, but for Hulme this is a false escape: 'The pathetic search for 
the different (cf. Gide). Where shall they find it? Never found in sex. All 
explored sex is the same' (Hulme, 1994 :15). The only sane philosophy to
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cope with nihilism is egoism 'the common return to egoism, the 
roundness o f the world, the absence of all infinitude, the denial o f all 
Utopias- are extended to the ultimate nature of the world' (Hulme, 1994  
: 8) but even this brings no joy: 'Disillusionment comes when it is 
recognised that all heroic actions can be reduced to the simple laws of 
egoism' (Hulme, 1994 : 15)(this position is clearly similar to Max 
Stimer's, though again, it is not clear whether Hulme had read Stirner at 
this point (Hansen, 1980 : 384-385)). We have seen similar positions in 
Pater, and of course, in Nietzsche. But Hulme goes beyond Pater in his 
scepticism, and beyond Nietzsche in his relentless pessimism.
For Hulme repeatedly writes about his pre-Bergsonian philosophy (i.e. 
the philosophy of the 'Cinders' manuscript) as leading to a state of 
'nightmare' (Hulme, 1994 : 127). What was the cause of this nightmare? 
Hulme is explicit- his earliest philosophy was unendurable because it was 
materialist (Hulme, 1994 : 140-141). However, Hulme was not, in the 
conventional sense, a religious man. It is important to realise that Hulme 
did not so much oppose materialism as such, as what he thought 
materialism implied. For Hulme materialism implied two things: firstly, 
determinism (which in turn implied the non-existence of free will) and 
secondly, aesthetic and moral relativism.
In his early writings Hulme is so anxious to demonstrate that 
materialism means determinism, and that this is an emotionally 
unacceptable viewpoint, that in one document he devotes a whole page 
to scientists who equate the two positions. For example, he quotes
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Laplace: '"An intellect which at any given instant knew all the forces with 
which nature is animated and the respective situations of the beings that 
compose nature-supposing that the said intellect were vast enough to 
subject these data to analysis-would embrace in the same formulae the 
motions of the greatest bodies in the universe and those of the slightest 
atom: nothing would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the past, 
would be present to its eyes”' (Hulme, 1994 :140). In our own post- 
Quantum world, we have less difficulty in separating the scientific world 
view from this Laplacian determinism. However so strongly were the two 
linked at this time that Hulme uses that two (or mechanism as he calls it) 
as synonyms. But for Hulme, any philosophy that denied free will, and 
therefore denied free moral choice, made life meaningless. Hulme was 
therefore not so much reacting against materialism as against the 
nineteenth (and eighteenth) century view of the world as a vast machine 
(the links between Hulme's thought here and Romanticism are 
obvious) (Hulme, 1994 : 140-141).
Hulme's other objection to materialism was that it seemed to lead to 
relativism. He writes 'The world is pictured as a mass of atoms and 
molecules, which are supposed to carry out unceasingly movements of 
every kind. The matter o f which our bodies are composed is subject to 
the same laws as the matter outside' (Hulme, 1994 : 141) and goes on 'Is 
it possible to believe in any values o f this kind (i.e. moral and 
aesthetic) and at the same time [...] hold the mechanistic view of the 
world?' (Hulme, 1994 : 145). He then answers his own question: 'Now in
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such a world (i.e. the materialistic worldview) the word “value” clearly 
has no meaning. There cannot be any good or bad in such a turmoil of 
atoms [...] If this view of the world is the true one, then all the bottom  
drops out of our set of values' (Hulme, 1994 :145) (Thus we can see that 
despite their differences, there were clear similarities between the 
thought of Yeats and Hulme). It is this deep sense of pessimism that 
resulted from what Hulme saw as materialism that underlies all his 
thought. And in the same way that, as we will see, Hulme stiU continued 
to believe certain aspects of his early philosophy until he died, so he 
never managed to shake off the sense of despair that this philosophy 
engendered. He was untouched both by the optimism of the Edwardian 
period, and by the more messianic optimism of the Continental avant- 
gardes: the Futurists and Expressionists.
There is one aspect of his earliest philosophy that is positive, however, 
and that is his writing on art. Hulme's theory of art is developed from his 
linguistic speculations. Hulme, as we have seen, adopted a position of 
extreme scepticism, especially as regards language (cf. Hulme, 1994 : 29 
'large clumsy instrument'). Language is portrayed as being a chessboard 
which human beings lay over the indefinable flux-like nature of reality. 
Given this view, language is merely the manipulation of counters, which, 
as we have seen, he did not believe to be capable of accurately describing 
reality. Some forms of language were definitely to be considered worse 
than others at achieving this task, however. Hulme particularly deplores 
'rational' or 'scientific' language: 'In expositional reasoning, the
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intermediate terms have only counter value' (Hulme, 1994 : 24). Rational 
prose, being abstract, fails to make contact with the real corporeal 
nature o f reality. 'In expositional prose we get language divorced from  
any real vision' (Hulme, 1994 : 24).
The other main enemy of language that possesses 'real vision' is 
language that uses cliché. A cliché is a 'counter' word or phrase that no 
longer provokes an emotion: it has become separated from the 
emotional reality that originally produced it. To use words as counters is, 
however, the tendency of modern prose: ('that dreadful feeling of 
cheapness when we contemplate the profusion of words of modern 
prose' (Hulme, 1994 : 25). Hulme puts it like this: 'Compare in algebra, 
the real things are replaced by symbols. These symbols are manipulated 
according to certain laws which are independent of their meaning. N.B.
At a certain point in the proof we cease to think of x as having a meaning 
and look upon it as a mere counter to be manipulated. An analogous 
phenomenon happens in reasoning in language. We replace meaning (i.e. 
vision) by words. These words fall into well-known patterns into certain 
well-known phrases which we accept without thinking of their meaning, 
just as we do the x in algebra' (Hulme, 1994 : 24).
Against this view of language Hulme pitches the concept o f 'vision'. 
Vision is superior to language because it is less abstract: it is physical (as 
opposed to merely rational, an abstract thought process), and because 
'all emotion depends on real solid vision or sound' ((Hulme, 1994 ;24) 
Hulme is making clear that as far as art is concerned, anyway, emotion is
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preferable to the workings of the intellect (there are obvious parallels 
here with the thought of Pound, and before, him, the Romantic tradition 
generally: specifically the Pre-Raphaelites). It follows, then, that even  
though reality can never be contained by language, language which is 
based on the emotion caused by vision will fail less badly than discursive 
prose: 'A man cannot write without seeing at the same time a visual 
signification before his eyes. It is this image which precedes the writing 
and makes it firm' (Hulme, 1994 : 25). Literature, to most accurately 
describe the real, should therefore consist of visual images: T he art of 
Literature consists exactly in this passage from the eye to the voice' 
(Hulme, 1994 : 31).
In adopting this position, Hulme was greatly indebted to the French 
school o f  Associationist psychology, especially the work of Th. Ribot. 
Ribot was concerned with providing a materialist account of mental 
phenomena, and particularly for mental events that had previously 
seemed to have required a metaphysical explanation such as the creative 
imagination (Rae, 1989). Central to his account of creativity was his 
concept of the 'image'. Ribot distinguished between two kinds of 
thinking: abstract and concrete or 'symbolic'. Abstract language, 
according to Ribot, tended to manipulate words according to the rules 
of language: they therefore tended towards becoming merely 
manipulatable counters. Concrete language, on the other hand, has 
emotional significance: and tends towards what Ribot calls the 'logic of 
images' (Rae, 1988 : 80). Hulme picked up on this distinction, and saw
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that it could be used as the basis for a poetic language that would by pass 
the rationalism of 'counter language' (Ribot uses this phrase).
Ribot differentiated between 'concrete' and 'symbolic' images. 
Cbncrete images, according to him, relate to the immediate bodily 
sensations that flow directly from reality. Symbolic images, on the other 
hand, are mediated through the intellect. It is easy to see that Hulme 
could relate the idea of 'concrete' images to some of the ideas he had 
worked out in the 'Cinders' document: specifically the insistence on 
visual images bypassing rational thought (Csengeri, 1982 : 22). Ribot 
wks a scientist, whose aim was, more or less openly to secularise 
Symbolist thought, and to rid it of its mystical components (as we have 
seen, it was precisely its mystical elements that fascinated Pound and 
feats). He does not, therefore, choose between logical and 'Imagistic' 
thought, regarding them as both being equally valid modes of cognition. 
However, in the writings of Jules de Gaultier (1885-1942), which Hulme 
WcLS also reading at this time, he would have discovered that Gaultier, 
khilst accepting Ribot's distinctions, insisted that poetic language was 
thé superior form of discourse (Csengeri, 1982 : 21). In his book Le
’ iBdvaiysme, he argues that 'because of the attribution of the imagistic 
associations of words, most of them have lost their precise descriptive 
and denotative values, thus becoming mere “notions'" (Martin, 1970 : 
?01). Moreover, these ideas were standard in the French psychological 
tradition. (N.B. it used to be thought that Remy de Gourmont was a main 
lource for these ideas, in his book Le Problème Du Style. This is a
bii
somewhat old fashioned viewpoint, now that it has been realised that the 
reasons for the similarities between de Gourmont's ideas and Hulme's 
are that they both are indebted to the Associationists (Martin 1970)).
We can see then that, despite the fact that they were facing the same 
problems, Hulme comes from a completely different tradition from that 
being created concurrently by Yeats. Hulme himself was aware of the 
difference. He suspected, correctly, that Yeatsian thought led to a 
mystical brand of Idealism: 'W.B. Yeats attempts to enable his craft by 
strenuously believing in supernatural world, race memory, magic, and 
saying that symbols recall those where prose couldn't. This an attempt to 
bring in an infinity again' (Hulme, 1994 : 43). As opposed to Yeatsian 
Neo-Romanticism, Hulme is very much a Post-Romantic. He no longer 
believes (as Pound still did) the great Romantic idea of the poet being the 
'unacknowledged legislator of the world'. As I stated at the beginning of 
this thesis, Romantic thought, whilst proclaiming the power of the poet, 
also acknowledges, at the same time, the ontological uncertainty that 
underlies this idea. Hulme, explicitly (rather than implicitly) brings out 
and analyses this uncertainty. He suggests that the Romantic concept of 
the artist as having access to more profound, metaphysical truths than 
the mass of the population will no longer hold. Instead, once one has 
conceded the reality of the scientific worldview, then the metaphysical 
beliefs that gave meaning to Romantic philosophy collapses. This is not a 
rejection o f Romantic aesthetics: instead he gives the other side of the 
coin. It is, in a real sense, the return of the repressed: the return of what
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had to be repressed to create Romantic glorification of the artist. ‘Poetry 
after all for the amusement of bankers and other sedentary armchair 
people in after dinner moods. No other [...] So no infinite nobleness and 
function about that ‘(Hulme, 1994 : 38). As we have seen, the view of 
poetry as being merely ‘entertainment for the bourgeoisie' is what the 
Romantics were protesting against. Hulme admits that the battle was 
lost.
Or does he? Even though Ribot was a scientist, his philosophy of art 
was still based on Symbolist principles, albeit reconceptualised to give 
them a materialist slant (There is not even anything particularly new 
about his materialism. Martin points out the intellectual debts to 18 th 
century materialism (Martin, 1970)). And many writers have noted the 
similarities between even this early thought of Hulme's and a certain 
kind of Romanticism (E.g. Krieger, 1953). For example, even though 
Hulme denies art has any spiritual or metaphysical meaning, in the very  
same docum ent he describes certain images of poetry as leading to 
‘ecstasy'. ‘Life as a rule tedious, but certain things give us sudden lifts. 
Poetry comes with the jumps cf. love, fighting, dancing. The moments of 
ecstasy' (Hulme, 1994 : 44). This clearly implies that literature is one of 
the few things that make life worth living (the classic Aesthetes' 
position). Moreover it is easy to see how the idea of poetry as leading to 
‘ecstasy' or ‘illumination' could lead to mystical ideas (though Hulme 
would not have seen this as desirable). The debate over Hulme's 
Romanticism has not ended, nor will it. However, it is fair to say that
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whether one regards Hulme as being, in the final analysis a Romantic or 
not, it is not difficult to see how his thought could be adapted to a 
Romantic tradition (And this is merely the published work. In his 
unpublished work he reveals the debt his aesthetic owes to that of 
Symons, therefore showing even more openly the continuities between 
Symbolist thought and his own (Harmer, 1975 ).2 Hulme had developed  
these early ideas in isolation, but when he arrived back in London in 
1908, he started to search out people who agreed with his views that 
contemporary language (especially, of course, literary language) was 
worn out, and needed to be renewed.
In Chapter Two of his book Poetry, Painting and Ideas, Robinson 
demonstrates that the Decadent movement in England of the 1890s failed 
to be as important a movement as the Symbolists in France both because 
they were not radical enough in breaking with the poetic norms of the 
period, and because they lacked the philosophical knowledge of the 
French. And so, after the failure of the Aesthetes to reroute the 
mainstream of English poetry along French lines, British poetry regressed. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, English poets were notable 
mostly for their ‘insufficiencies o f language, their often mechanical 
attitude to poetic form, the inadequacy of their language' (Harmer, 1975 
: 6). However, by the second half of the decade, new forces were 
emerging- These were based around the ‘little magazine' The New Age.
2 However, the main distinction between Hulme and Pound/Yeats remains. For Pound and Yeats, the romantic 
‘moment’ is a brief moment of insight into the ‘real’ Neo-Platonic world, Hulme, however, disbelieves in this world; for 
him, these moments remain moments: they do not act as a pathway to an Idealist, timeless world behind them. In 
this, he is closer to the anti-metaphysical position of the early Pater.
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The New Age had been a radical socialist magazine with a small 
circulation, until it was taken over by the New Zealander Holbrook 
Jackson, and the English critic and thinker A.R. Orage in May 1907. For 
the next seven years, The New Age was to be to be undoubtedly the 
foremost intellectual journal in England. From 1908 onwards Orage 
(Holbrook left the magazine that year), began to publish articles not just 
on politics, but on literature and culture in general. And it was Orage's 
appointment as poetry editor, F.S, Flint who began the revolution in 
English poetry (Sullivan, 1985). In his first article for The New Age Flint 
wrote (reviewing a translation of Japanese poetry): Tt is a pity that the 
translators did not choose some other measure than the heavy English 
rhymed quatrain [...] I could have wished that the poems in this book had 
been translated into little dropping rhythms, unrhymed. To the poet who 
can catch and render, like these Japanese, the brief fragments of his 
soul's music, the future lies open. The day of the lengthy poem is over- at 
least for this troubled age' ((Flint, 1974 : 51) written in July 11 1908). 
This was the beginning of a whole new way of looking at poetry, one that 
stressed looser forms, ignored the conventions of the typical English 
poem of the time, and, most importantly, concentrated on short poems, 
‘fragments' as opposed to the epic.
Flint was employed by the magazine's editor A.R. Orage at least partly 
because he believed in free verse, a position Orage had arrived at at least 
12 years previously (Orage, 1974). He therefore used his reviews to 
propound his new viewpoint, and when he reviewed a book of poetry by
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Edward Storer he realised he had found a kindred spirit. Storer had 
independently (strongly influenced by the French Symbolists) worked his 
way to a position where brevity and free verse were seen as being the 
essence o f poetry.He also talked of poetry as expressing the ‘image’: a 
concept he had adapted from Symbolist aesthetics (Coffman, 1972 : 104- 
106). He contacted Storer, and together, they began to formulate a new  
philosophy of poetry.
The aesthetic system they began to develop was very much a reaction 
against what was then the literary establishment. Until 1908, the most 
famous figures associated with The New Age were George Bernard Shaw, 
H.G. Wells and Arnold Bennett, all socialists, prose writers, and ‘realists’. 
However, Wells and Shaw stopped contributing articles in 1907 (Bennett 
continued untii 1911 (Ferrall, 1992 : 660-661)), and it was round about 
this time that interest began to pick up in Symbolism, the great literary 
enemy of ‘realism’ and ‘naturalism’. Classic Symbolist texts began to 
come back into print after having been neglected for years (Symons’ 
collected poems were republished in 1906 and The Symbolist M ovem ent 
in Literature in 1908 (Martin, 1967 : 167)). Moreover, editorials written 
by Orage at this time began to attack the aesthetic position of writers 
such as Shaw and Bennett, and to insist that that the way forward for 
English Literature was to look to the Symbolists rather than the 
Naturalists. Quotes from Flint and Storer made at the time show that they 
very much considered themselves as trying to finish an unfinished 
revolution, the introduction of French (Symbolist) influences into English
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poetry (Martin, 1967 : 168-174) (some of them (Hulme included) had a 
native model very much in mind as well: W.E. Henley. He was admired 
not just for his tough matter of fact attitude to poetry, but also for his 
use of free verse (Hulme 1994 : 50)). And so, by 1908, these new 
attitudes were very much in the air.
As 1 have already stated, Hulme arrived back in London Just as this sea 
change in English literary culture was beginning. It is not surprising that 
he wished to join in the ongoing debate, and so, early in 1908 he joined 
the ‘Poets’ Club’, a society dedicated to the discussion and public recital 
of poetry, and quickly became Secretary (Harmer 1975 : 18). The Poets’ 
Club was not in any way avant-garde or innovative, but it gave Hulme the 
first chance to propound his own poetic theories. In 1908, he made a 
speech at the Poets’ Club in which he publicly propounded his poetic 
credo for the first time. His views may have been original, but it is more 
likely that he had already begun to read The New Age where he had been 
exposed to the early theories o f Flint and Storer. His article is therefore 
an attempt to merge his own ‘Cinders’ philosophy with what he had 
learned from the French and the English Symbolism of the older men. 
However, he was also using what he was reading about contemporary 
French Symbolist theory (The main sources for his thought at this time 
seem to have been Gustave Kahn, de Gourmont, Guyau, de Gaultier, 
Beaunier, and Ribot (Harmer, 1975 : 115-119)). After about 1900, 
Symbolists referred less and less to ‘une idée’ as the poetic source of 
inspiration, but to ‘une image’ (Martin, 1967 : 174). Hulme adapted this
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concept o f the image to his own theory o f ‘emotional vision'. So, for 
Hulme, this ‘image' was now to be the basis of modern poetry (for a 
discussion of the Symbolist, and therefore, he argues, basically Romantic 
basis for Hulme's Imagism, cf. Kermode's Romantic Image).
We must remember, in reading this paper, that Hulme was only 25 
when he wrote it, and some of the things he says (such as ‘1 am of course 
in favour of the complete destruction of all verse more than twenty years 
old' are undoubtedly meant to shock the ‘older generation' he would 
have been reading to, and are in any case directly contradicted by things 
he wrote for his own private notebooks. Hulme therefore accentuates the 
aspects o f his aesthetic that are materialistic and anti-idealist, (in both 
senses). However the basic premise of the article in undoubtedly 
genuine: Hulme was arguing that the English poetry had stagnated, and 
that only by the importation of French Symbolist techniques, specifically 
vers libre, could it be improved. He begins by stating a position very 
close to that he propounded two years earlier in ‘Cinders'. He argues that 
poetry is simply a means o f expression and should not be discussed with 
the use of abstract metaphysical phraseology. He then goes on to claim  
that ‘there is an intimate connection between the verse form and the 
state o f poetry at any period' and continues ‘it must be admitted that 
verse forms like manners and like individuals develop and die' (Hulme 
1994 : 50). He goes on ‘The latter stages o f the decay of an art form are 
very interesting and worth study because they are peculiarly applicably 
to the state of poetry at the present day' (Hulme, 1994 : 51) (Hulme's
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argument here is translated directly from Gustave Kahn in his book 
Premiers Poèmes. Kahn was one of the premier French propagandists for 
free verse at this time (1897) (Hulme, 1994) ‘The new technique was first 
definitely stated by Kahn. It consisted in a denial of a regular number of 
syllables as the basis of versification. The length of the line is long and 
short, oscillating with the images used by the poet: it follows the 
contours o f his thoughts and is free rather than regular: to use a rough 
analogy, it is clothes made to order, rather than ready made clothes’ 
(rather strangely, Hulme continues: T he kind of verse I advocate is not 
the same as vers litre , 1 merely use the French as an example of the 
extraordinary effect that an emancipation of verse can have on poetic 
activity’ (Hulme, 1994 : 52). Since Hulme never defines what he does 
advocate, and since his own poetry fits Kahn’s description exactly, I think 
that all Hulme is trying to say is that his view does not imply that poetry 
will become completely unstructured, merely that it will no longer rely 
on regular metre).
Hulme then argues that the reason free verse is necessary is that the 
philosophical underpinning that underlay the old metric have been 
knocked away: T he ancients were perfectly aware of the fluidity of the 
world and of its impermanence: there was a Greek theory that the whole 
world was a flux. But while they recognised it they feared it and 
endeavoured to evade it, to construct things of permanence which would 
stand fast in the universal flux which frightened them Living in a 
dynamic world they wished to create a static fixity where their should
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might rest [...] They wished to embody in a few lines a perfection of 
thought. Of the thousand and one ways in which a thought might roughly 
be conveyed to a hearer there was one way which was the perfect way, 
which was destined to embody that thought to all eternity, hence the 
fixity of the form of the poem and the elaborate rules of regular metre’ 
However ‘Now the whole trend of the modern spirit is away from that, 
philosophers no longer believe in absolute truth. We no longer believe in 
perfection, either in verse or in thought, we frankly acknowledge the 
relative. We shall no longer strive to attain the absolutely perfect form in 
poetry [...] (the modern poem) no longer deals with heroic action, it has 
become definitely and finally introspective and deals with expression and 
communication of momentary phrases in the poet’s mind’ (Hulme, 1994  
: 52-53) (Hulme probably developed these ideas after reading Guyau, 
but we have seen similar arguments in Pater. The concentration on 
smaller forms echoes Flint, and in any case fits in well with Hulme’s 
relativistic viewpoint (Csengeri, 1982)).
When Hulme continues ‘What has found expression in painting as 
Impressionism will soon find expression in poetry in free verse’ (Hulme, 
1994 : 53) it becomes obvious that he is simply trying to import the 
Symbolist techniques of the 1880’s and 1890’s into contemporary English 
poetry. He then restates views that we have already come across in his 
private notebook; prose is the language o f dead metaphors, only the poet 
can ‘make it new’; poetry is to be read not sung or chanted (therefore 
rhythm is not so important; Robinson argues that this is an attack on
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Yeats’ view of rhythm) the day of the long poem is over (cf. Flint). He 
concludes That is my objection to metre, that it enables people to write 
verse with no poetic inspiration, and whose mind is not stored with new 
images’ (Hulme, 1994 : 55).
The question remains, to what extent did Hulme believe these views 
himself? As we have seen he was terrified of the idea of the flux and had 
a longing for fixity, an attitude that is seemingly contradicted by his 
public statements. The answer is, I think, that though Hulme had read 
Bergson at this point, he did not see that the metaphysics of the 
Frenchman would give him a way out o f the materialist-relativist maze. It 
was therefore safer to hold a materialistic view in public, and attempt to 
form a poetic from that, than to posit an objectivist theory which may 
have had no validity. However, the fact remains that in 1908 Hulme was 
a relativist, a materialist, and an innovator (’I have no reverence for 
tradition’ (Hulme, 1994 : 56)), even though, as with Pater, a t the very  
same time as he was propounding this viewpoint he was beginning to 
develop opposing ideas.
It was only when the Poets’ Club published its first anthology in January 
1909 that Hulme came to the attention o f Flint. This book, For Christmas 
MDCCCCVIII was savagely attacked by Flint in The New Age for being 
dilettantish, provincial and old fashioned (Harmer 1975 : 19-21). Hulme 
replied to defend the club, but after meeting Flint his opinions changed. 
Flint had a deep knowledge of contemporary French poetry: moreover 
he was friends with Orage and could introduce Hulme to poets who were
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working along the same lines as him. In March 1909, therefore, Hulme 
founded the Secession Club, which met regularly in ‘The Eiffel Tower’ a 
Soho Restaurant (the name of this club was, as Harmer puts it ‘at least a 
side-glance’ at the Sezession painters in Germany, who anticipated the 
Expressionists (Harmer, 1975 : 22)). This was the beginning o f Imagism 
proper, and the people who attended these meetings made up the 
‘Forgotten School’ of 1909. They were: Edward Storer, Joseph Campbell, 
Francis Tancred, Florence Farr (the occultist and friend of Yeats), Flint 
and Hulme himself (Ernest Radford and Ernest Rhys may also have 
attended). Ezra Pound began to attend their meetings slightly afterwards: 
being introduced to the group by Elkin Matthews, a bookseller closely 
associated with the Aesthetes of the 1890s (Schuchard, 1984 : 215). 
Hulme became the unofficial leader of the movement because he was the 
most interested in creating a new theory of poetry. Martin argues 
strongly that most of the members of the Secession Club were poets first 
and theorists afterwards, and that their most pressing interest was to 
‘achieve a reintegration of form and content’ (Martin, 1967 : 164).
Hulme on the other hand was more interested in the reasons why they 
were doing this and why such a task had become necessary at the present 
time.
What, then, were the views of these poets and theorists, who were later 
to become known as the first, ‘forgotten’ school of Imagism? Firstly I 
think we have to make a distinction between Flint, Storer, Hulme, and the 
rest of the group, Flint and Storer were of course the two poets who
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decided they had most in common, and it was their separate discovery of 
Symbolist techniques that led to the formation of the school. Hulme 
followed and became an immediate acolyte. However, from his own 
reading of Symbolism (more the theory than the poetry itself) he had, by 
the start of 1909 evolved a style of poetry that looked remarkably like 
theirs.
Then there are Farr, Tancred, Campbell and the others (including, at 
this stage, Ezra Pound). They were less interested than Flint in creating a 
new kind of poetry, and less interested than Hulme in creating a new 
aesthetic. Instead, they were content, on the whole to use more 
conventional forms, but they wished to tighten these up: and to eliminate 
verbiage (Martin, 1967). They wished mainly for a group where 
intelligent conversation about poetry could take place, and where their 
own poems could face intelligent criticism.
The dominant figure in the beginning was undoubtedly Flint (Pondrom, 
1974). Flint probably knew as much about contemporary French poetry 
as anyone in Britain. He knew not only about the Symbolist masters 
(Baudelaire, Rimbaud etc.) but also about the post-Symbolist or ‘çenacle’ 
Symbolists: those poets who began writing after Symbolism had been 
established as a movement in 1886. These included not only the theorist 
Gustave Kahn (who Hulme had already read, as we have seen) but also 
poets like Verhaeren, Régnier, and de Gourmont. These poets were 
included in an anthology Poètes de Aujourd'hui which rapidly became the 
bible o f the Imagist group (Pondrom, 1974).
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What sort of poetry did the Imagists write? According to Flint, the ideas 
they were interested in were Vers libre  [.„] the Japanese tonka and haiku 
[...] the sacred Hebrew form and [...] rhymeless poems. There was 
also a lot of talk and practice among us, Storer leading it chiefly, of what 
we called the Image. We were very much influenced by modern French 
Symbolist theory’ (Flint, 1974: 301). To see what this looked like in 
practice, take this early poem by Hulme.
Above the Dock
Above the quiet dock in mid-night,
Tangled in the tail masfs corded height,
Hangs the moon. What seemed so far away 
Is but a child’s balloon, forgotten after play.
(Hulme, 1994:3)
The purpose of this poem is to express this visual image of the moon. 
However, every aspect of the poem is designed to downplay any mystical 
or ecstatic possibilities this vision might have had. Instead the imagery is 
homely: ‘forgotten after play’. The moon is portrayed as being ‘Tangled’ 
in the (man made) ship. This moon, which at one point (either at first 
glance, or in the past) ‘seemed so far away’ is, by use of the imagery 
made to seem childish, vaguely absurd. This sets the pattern for Hulme’s 
poetry, which usually consists of the poet observing nature. However 
whereas in the past this may well have prompted ideas of the union of 
Man and Nature or some sort of mystical illumination, here the imagery 
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is always kept commonplace: down to earth.
The poem ‘Autumn’ which was the poem that attracted Flint to Hulme 
in early 1909, is more revealing in this respect (it is partly based on 
Henley’s Midsummer Night Skies’ (Martin, 1967).
Autum n
A touch of cold in the Autumn night- 
I walked abroad,
And saw the ruddy moon lean over a hedge 
Like a red-faced farmer.
I did not stop to speak, but nodded.
And round about were the wistful stars 
With white faces like town children.
(Huhne, 1994 :3)
Here regular metre and rhyme has been abandoned altogether. Instead,
enjambement and the length of the line is used to downplay any
pantheistic or mystical significance of the moment and concentrate the
readers mind on the two images. Notice especially how the short third
fourth line downplays the usual emotional implications of the image of
the red moon (which might more normally represent anger or the wrath
of God or something of that sort).
Again, if we compare this poem to a High Romantic lyric like ‘Tintern
Abbey’ we can see that the emotional implications of the experience have
been toned down. Whereas Wordsworth’s vision led him to reconsider his
whole life: all the poet here does is ‘nod’. This is all part of Hulme’s Post- 
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Romantic project: to recast the visionary and colloquial aspects of 
Romanticism for the needs o f a materialist and relativist era.
However, when we look at other poems written at the same time, the 
matter is not so simple. The untitled poem
Oh Lady full of mystery
Is that blue sea, beyond your knee.
My dreaming languorous voyage
To where the same blue sea doth breaking 
cambric surf all framed with lace 
On white strands far from this dull place.
(Jones, 1960:179)
Here there is again the same concentration on the Image: this time the
dress, which is metaphorically seen to resemble the sea. But this time
there is an emotional interaction: because the Image represents the
theme of escape that Hulme was later to represent as the essence o f
Romanticism. Moreover, a dreamy eroticism hangs over the whole poem
that recalls the fin de siècle. Rather than a sharp break with Symbolist
aesthetics, then, Hulme’s practice at this time might well be said to be
more concerned with moving the emphasis in his poetry from the
ecstatic or mystical sense of communion with the Image that had (he
claimed) characterised Romantic aesthetics, to purifying his diction, and 
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expressing visual impressions in a way that emphasised the empirical 
nature o f the experience.
The other poets in the group were less interested in undercutting the 
‘Romantic Moment’ and more in portraying the Image itself with the 
minimum of excess material. Surprisingly enough at this point Flint was 
one of the least successful at doing this. His best poetry was not written 
until Ezra Pound’s Imagiste anthology of 1912. However we can see what 
he was groping towards if we look at the first section of the poem ‘He 
Meets Her in a Wood at Night’ from his first anthology In the Net o f  the
Stars (1909). This is the most ‘modern’ poem of the anthology.
This is a rose of burning wine- 
Tliis is a star.
This is a rose that grew on a star- 
This is a star in a battle Üne 
Of whirring worlds 
Chanting a hymn of flight 
In the fight 
With Night-
This is a rose of burning wine- 
Our love
(Flint, 1909 : 53).
This is not a good poem (Hughes calls it ‘an amateurish mixture o f  
infelicitous music and inexcusable imagery’ (Hughes, 1960 :155), but the 
way it points forward to more successful poems is clear. Firstly regular 
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metre has been abandoned. It has been replaced by repetition (as in the 
Bible) alliteration and unusual rhyme schemes to give a sense of unity, 
Flint attempts to concentrate attention on the image, but unfortunately 
the image is too complicated. It is actually three images: the rose, the 
star, and the burning wine. However, they do not illuminate each other. 
The images themselves are symbols for what the poem is really about: his 
love. However, this is too readily stated, and merely seems bathetic at 
the end of the poem. Nevertheless, a start has been made: all that is 
necessary is for the poet to clarify his diction, and concentrate more 
fully on simpler images which speak for themselves: and this is in fact 
what Flint went on to do. At this stage however, he was more important 
to the Imagists for his knowledge o f French poetry than as a poetic 
example.
A poet who had more success at concentrating on the image was 
Joseph Campbell (‘Seosamh MacCathmhaoiF). One of his poems 
collected in his 1909 collection The Mountainy Singer contains a poem, 
‘The Dawn Whiteness’, that exemplifies much of the practice of eariy 
Imagism.
‘A dawn whiteness.
A bank of slate-grey cloud hanging heavily 
over it.
The moon, like a hunted thing, dropping 
into a cloud’
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(Campbell, 1981 : 45). Campbell’s project at this time was simply to 
present visual images: an aim which led him to consider eliminating 
verbs from his poetiy^ altogether (Martin, 1967 : 160). In pursuing this 
aim, Campbell had managed to eliminate cliches or archaisms from his 
poetiy^ to a greater extent than ail the other Imagists with the exception 
o f Hulme: moreover, he was doing it earlier than any of the others (he 
was writing free verse by 1906) (Harmer, 1975 : 26).
Campbell leads us to another hidden influence on the ‘Forgotten 
School’: Impressionism. Three years later, Impressionism would have 
been repudiated by the Imagists and Imagistes, but in 1909 Storer wrote 
about Impressionism in a highly favourable way, explaining that it was 
the only coherent aesthetic for the twentieth century. He then went on to 
link Impressionism to the development of free verse (Storer, 1909 : 40).
A distinct odd man out when we regard what Imagism meant three 
years later, was Francis Tancred.Whereas the other poets were influenced 
by contemporary French poetry, Tancred went back to the rhyming 
couplets of Pope:
‘The sex enchants me, and 1 like to view 
Their knacks and laces, or run through 
The silks in folio, and brocades
Unfurled to show their glistening shades’ (Harmer, 1975 : 23).
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And so forth. Despite the apparent dissimilarities between their poetry 
Hulme was friendly with Tancred and they often worked together 
(Pondrom, 1974 : 301). What they shared was a concern for using exactly 
the right word, and a dislike for vagueness in their poetry. Martin 
speculates that Hulme may have got the idea of a ‘Neo-ClassicaP revival 
from studying the works o f Tancred.
Whereas in retrospect the ideals of Imagism may have seemed self 
evident, therefore, at the time the project seemed a lot less clear cut.
The original Imagists were interested in French Symbolist and Post- 
Symbolist theory, Impressionism, Neo-Classicism, Bergson, Japanese 
poetry, the Bible and an indigenous free verse tradition stemming from 
Henley. All they had in common was a feeling that fin de siècle poetry 
was too sloppy and needed to be tightened up, and an interest in any 
other kind o f poetry that might help them to achieve this.
Possibly the most interesting theorist of the movement apart from 
Hulme and Flint, was Edward Storer. The first poem in his 1909 collection  
Mirrors o f  Illusion is actually entitled ‘Image’, and shows the ‘Forgotten 
School’s’ use of free verse, compression and concision.
‘Forsaken lovers,
Burning to a chaste white moon,
Upon strange pyres of loveliness and drought’ (Storer, 1909 : 2)
More important than his poetry, however, is the fact that his ‘Essay’
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published in November 1908, was the first ‘coherent argument for free 
verse produced by any writer in English’ (Harmer, 1975 : 26). Not only is 
this ‘in some ways a blueprint for subsequent Imagist formulation’ it 
was written before Storer had come into contact with Hulme or Flint (it 
is reprinted in Mirrors o f  Illusion). Interestingly, Storer sees free verse 
developing out of Impressionism, not Symbolism. He stresses the need 
for brevity, and the use of visual ‘impressions’ as the backbone of 
modern poetry. (Coffmann, 1972 : 104-106) (Storer was also to develop  
a political theory that in some ways resembles Hulme’s: see below).
Of course the most famous member of this forgotten school was Ezra 
Pound. However his relationship to the rest of the Imagists was 
ambiguous. Pound first attended the club about a month after it has 
started to meet. Moreover, according to Harmer ‘he had very little to 
offer the discussions, and certainly went out of his way to deny that he 
had learned anything’ (Harmer, 1975 : 30-31). The attitude of the other 
Imagists was ambiguous.
Flint approved of Pound’s use of looser forms, but disapproved of his 
(very un-Imagist) use of foreign words and phrases (what 1 have called 
Pound’s allusive method) (Homberger, 1972 : 47). Hulme held Pound in 
some contempt. (Jones, 1960 : 33).  ^ Pound himself had little interest in 
any French philosophy (’DAMN Bergson and frog diarrhoea’ he once
3 Pound wrote later The critical LIGHT during those years immediately pre-war In London shone 
not from Hulme, but from Ford {Madox etc.) in so far as it fell on any writing at all’ (This Hulme 
Business’ reprinted in Kenner. 1951 : 307).This confirms the small influence of Hulme on Pound, but 
would seem to contradict my argument that the most influential creative forces working at this time 
were Yeats on one hand, and the school of Hulme on the other. However, although Ford was 
influential on Pound in terms of diction, and certainly in terms of Pound’s prose, fundamentally his 
Impressionistic aesthetic was antipathetic to Pound’s mystical Symbolism. (Longenbach 1988 ; 39 - 
40).See below.235
wrote (Carpenter, 1988 : 114)), nor, at this point, in contemporary 
French poetry (Flint wrote later,'He could not be made to believer that 
there was any French poetry after Ronsard’ (Flint, 1974 : 302)). 
Carpenter’s comment that ‘he brought comparatively little to the Hulme 
group, and for the moment leam t almost nothing from it that advanced 
his poetry’ seems justified (Carpenter, 1988 : 117). Certainly, the volume 
he was writing at the time of his association with them. Exultations 
(1909) showed no sign of their influence.
The reason that 1909 was a turning point in Pound’s life was not due to 
Hulme or Flint but because he had finally met Yeats. As he said himself ‘I 
went to London because 1 thought Yeats knew more about poetry than 
anybody else’ (Paris Review 1962 : 36). Pound was still obsessed with the 
fin de siècle, and he thought that by meeting Yeats, not only would Yeats 
help him to improve his own poetry, but Yeats would act as a conduit to 
the living tradition of the past.
Despite the fact that the Forgotten School were, in many ways, the 
beginning of modern English poetry, the group began to disintegrate in 
the Autumn of 1909 (Hughes, 1960). One of the main reasons was that 
Hulme, who had become the mainspring o f the group, became less and  
less interested in poetry. As we have seen, he had just been introduced to 
the thought of Bergson, and when he retired briefly from public life in 
1910, it was to assimilate Bergsonian philosophy, and see to what extent 
it could be adapted for his own purposes.
Why did Hulme find Bergson’s philosophy so congenial? Firstly, they
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had the same intellectual roots. Bergson knew the Associationist 
viewpoint well, and when he referred to their work, is was more often 
than not the work of Ribot to which he referred (the middle chapters of 
Bergson’s M atter and M em ory are devoted to a rebuttal of Associationist 
views). Bergson argued against the Associationists, but he also developed  
and used many of their initial concepts, and it was these thinkers that 
Hulme had used to develop his own early philosophy (Rae, 1989).
Moreover in terms of art, Bergson’s views developed out of 
Associationism. We have already seen that both of them used the word 
‘image’ frequently to describe the purpose of art. Both Bergson, the 
Associationists, and Hulme were steeped in Symbolist aesthetics. Again, 
Bergson refers to the abstract qualities o f language obscuring our sense 
of the real: again, this is quite close to Hulme’s ‘counter language’ to 
which he contrasted the living, visual, language of art. However, despite 
these similarities, Bergson and the Associationists were very different. 
And it was for this reason that Hulme valued him. For whilst Bergson 
accepted the Associationist viewpoint qua science, he rejected their view  
that reality could be reduced to scientific materialism.And this was 
precisely why Hulme wished to reject Associationism, although before he 
read Bergson, he lacked the philosophical equipment to do so.
Hulme first mentions Bergson in an article dated 1st July 1909 (the 
Forgotten School meetings began on the 25 th March, and ended 
sometime in the Autumn of that year: it is therefore unlikely that, as is 
too often stated, Hulme’s earliest poetic production was produced under
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the influence of Bergson), and for the next two years, he was to come 
increasingly under the influence of the French philosopher.
Bergson was born in 1859 and had taught at various lycées before 
being offered a job at the Collège de France in 1900 (Burwick and 
Douglass, 1992). By this time he had published Essai sur les Données 
Immédiates de la Conscience (translated as Time and Free Will{first 
published 1889), M atter and M em ory {first published 1896) and 
Laughter (first published 1900). His reputation was really established, 
however, by Creative Evolution which was published in 1907. For reasons 
we will examine later, Hulme was uninterested in this later book, and a 
study of its contents was the beginning of his disillusionment with 
Bergsonian philosophy. When he discusses Bergson, then, it is these first 
three books (and a short essay, ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ which he 
transiated) which he has in mind.
In his first book, Bergson begins by discussing the idea of intensity and 
duration (Bergson, 1910 : 1-50). He remarks upon the fact that while it 
makes sense to state that one number is greater than another it is not 
clear that one may make the same sort of statement about mental states, 
although this is often done. He goes on to demonstrate, to his own 
satisfaction at least, that emotional states and feelings are not amenable 
to this analysis, because, unlike number, (and physical phenomena), 
emotions cannot be dissected. On the contrary, they are fundamentally 
indivisible. It is meaningful to say that four is twice as big a number as 
two, but not that someone’s feeling of pain is twice the amount of
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someone else’s. ‘We shall not compare a pain of increasing intensity to a 
note which grows louder and louder, but rather to a symphony, in which 
an increasing number of instruments make themselves heard’ (Bergson, 
1910 : 35), Assuming to be the case, it points to a fundamental 
distinction between (some) mental phenomena and physical phenomena. 
How, then, has the confusion arisen between mental phenomena and 
physical phenomena? It arose, says Bergson, because of a fundamental 
confusion between space and time. Time, for Bergson, is associated with 
sensations and space with the material world. ‘When we speak of 
material objects, we refer to the possibility of seeing and touching them: 
we localise them in space’ (Bergson, 1910 : 85). However, ‘states of 
consciousness’ cannot ‘be regarded as numerical without the help of 
some symbolic representation, in which a necessary element is space’ 
(Bergson, 1910 : 87).
When we discuss our emotions, our inner life, then, we discuss them  
using symbols, symbols which are moreover, reconceptualised in terms 
of space (which implies divisibility, the material world and so on: for 
Bergson, number is a spatial phenomenon (Bergson, 1910 : 79)). 
However, this reconceptualisation, whilst useful, misses a crucial point 
about our inner states o f consciousness: that they exist not in space but 
in time, a time, moreover, which is not analogous to number (Bergson, 
1910 : 105). This inner state of time, Bergson here calls inner duration, 
the ‘melting of states of consciousness into each other’ (Bergson, 1910 : 
107).
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Now, Bergson goes on to argue that motion is susceptible to the same 
analysis. We generally state that motion occurs in space. However, ‘we 
see that the successive positions of the moving body really do occupy 
space, but that the process by which it passes from one position to the 
other [...] eludes space’ (Bergson, 1910 : 111). Therefore ‘science cannot 
deal with time and motion except on condition of eliminating the 
essential and qualitative element - of time, durations and of motion, 
mobility’ (Bergson, 1910 : 115). This ‘mobility’ as we have already seen, 
Bergson associates with the ‘inner life’ of the emotions. There are, 
therefore, two ways o f looking at reality, from the point of view of 
mechanism (with its associations of number, divisibility, matter, and 
space) and dynamism (indivisibility, fluidity, consciousness, and time) 
(Bergson, 1910 : 141). However, Bergson points out that because of the 
structure of language and thought, we often lose sight of this ‘dynamism’ 
and delude ourselves that ‘mechanism’ is the only way o f looking at the 
world. (Bergson, 1910 : 128).
The reason these arguments are important is explained in the last 
chapter of Time and Free Will when Bergson writes that ‘Physical 
determinism, in its latest form, is closely bound up with mechanical or 
rather kinetic theories of matter’ (Bergson, 1910 : 143). As we have 
already seen, Hulme thought the same, and Bergson makes it clear that 
the theories he is aiming at are the same Associationists that Hulme had 
been reading (Bergson, 1910 : 148). However, determinism only holds 
insofar as the mechanical theory of matter is true. Bergson argues that it
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is not true (or at least not the whole truth), and that ‘attentive 
consciousness’ shows us that ‘inner dynamism’ is a ‘fact’ (Bergson, 1910  
: 172). Since the ‘inner duration’ is not mechanical, and moreover, is 
incapable o f division into discrete units, it cannot be understood by the 
laws o f cause and effect (Bergson, 1910 : 210-215) (which presuppose 
discrete units acting with forces upon each other). Moreover, ‘inner 
causality is purely dynamic, and has no analogy with the relation o f two 
external phenomena which condition one another. For, as the latter are 
capable of recurring in a homogeneous space, their relation can be 
expressed in terms of a law, whereas deep-seated psychic states occur 
once in consciousness and will never occur again’ (Bergson, 1 9 1 0 :2 1 9 ).  
Because our will is a process, not a thing, it cannot be adequately 
scientifically analysed. To conclude: ‘Freedom is therefore a fact’ 
(Bergson, 1910 : 221).
Starting with an analysis of time, Bergson has developed a frankly 
dualistic viewpoint. In M atter and M emory he develops this view by 
positing that reality is perceived in terms of ‘images’. Images are a sort of 
halfway point between the Idealist’s ‘representation’ and the Realist’s 
‘thing’ (Bergson, 1991 : 9). By contrasting the spatial/material world 
with the temporal/spiritual world, Bergson can, moreover, introduce the 
concept of ‘intuition’. Intuition can see the temporal/continuous world 
in a way that is denied to our other senses. ‘Pure intuition [...] is that of 
undivided continuity. (Bergson, 1991 : 183). Our rational senses, by 
ignoring this continuity, have left us with the sense that ‘all knowledge is
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relative, and the ultimate nature of things to be inaccessible to the mind’ 
(Bergson, 1991 : 184). However, by using intuition, ‘we may restore to 
intuition its original purity and so recover contact with the real’
(Bergson, 1991 :185).
This ‘real’ would be perceived in the form of ‘memory-images’ which 
Bergson contrasts with mere mechanical memory of events.They come 
and go independently of our will, which is why we must develop rote 
memory, but Bergson makes clear that ‘memory’ of ‘spontaneous images’ 
are the only way to contact the real ‘durée’ which is at the heart of 
reality.
In Laughter Bergson develops this theory to apply it to artistic 
endeavour. He posits the idea that language, by dealing in generalities, 
helps to shield us from the particular, which is the real world of 
‘duration’ (Bergson, 1956 : 153) what he calls the ‘individuality of things’ 
(Bergson, 1956 :152). Artists, however, can penetrate beneath this veil o f  
language, (which is the expression of a ‘spatialised’ consciousness), and 
‘bring us face to face with reality itse lf which is the world of duration 
(Bergson, 1956 : 158).
Now these concepts clearly have something in common with Idealism.
It is possible that Bergson developed his ideas directly from the German 
Idealist tradition, but more likely that he came into contact with them  
through French adaptions of these theories, by men such as Ravaisson 
and Guyau (Scharfstein, 1943 : 22-32). However, the there are two main 
differences. Firstly Bergson was less of a ‘pure’ philosopher than the
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Germans and was always careful to back up what he was saying with the 
latest discoveries of science. Secondly, and more importantly, whereas, 
since Plato, the metaphysical reality that lay behind the concepts of the 
mind, was always perceived as being static, Bergson postulated a dynamic 
metaphysical reality (‘In a reversal of virtually all Western metaphysics’ 
(Dasenbrock, 1985 : 49 ))(It is only fair to state that Patricia Rae (1989) 
denies that the early Bergson is a metaphysical thinker. This is to a 
certain extent true, but I think that the problem lies with Bergson’s own 
ambiguity. Certainly, he is loath to define his durée  in metaphysical 
terms, but he also states that he is frankly a dualist, and that he believes 
in spirit (Bergson, 1991). 1 cannot therefore agree with Rae that he does 
not believe in any kind of Universal Spirit).
We have seen what Bergson said: but from the articles that Hulme 
wrote at this time, we can see what Bergson meant to Hulme. The first 
articles that Hulme ever published were reviews of current philosophy 
books, and Hulme used this as an excuse to compare and contrast 
Bergson with various other thinkers of the time.
From the first article that Hulme ever published (a review o f James’ A 
Pluralistic Universe) we can see that the most important aspect of 
Bergson’s’ philosophy at the time was that he was (according to Hulme) 
an anti-rationalist. ‘Others have attacked Rationalism, but his is the only 
radical attack, the only attack which concedes nothing ‘(Hulme, 1994 ; 
86) he writes. This fitted in well with the direction Hulme’s own thought 
was going in. Hulme had begun by attacking the worldview of science,
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but when, he stated that the logical (and therefore rational) language o f  
science was incapable of grasping the flux o f reality, he was clearly 
showing that he believed that it was the rational attitude that lay behind 
science that was responsible for the growing acceptance of soulless 
materialism, as opposed to the world o f values.
Then Hulme goes on to relate Bergsonian philosophy to the ‘Cinders’ 
document. The Bergsonian flux of durée (or duration, Bergsonian time), 
Hulme relates to his own ‘chaotic cinder heap’: the rational intellect he 
relates to his own ‘chess board’ model of language (Hulme, 1994 : 86).
Hulme was prepared to be very radical in his support of Bergson at this 
time. He followed Nietzsche in saying that the decay of Western culture 
started with Plato, and for much that same reason: Plato was the 
beginning of Western Rationalism (Hulme, 1994 : 86). Moreover Hulme 
was prepared to state (in a way that he would certainly not do two years 
later) that Bergson’s achievement consisted o f his ‘extreme originality’ 
(Hulme, 1994 : 87) (Moreover he states correctly that ‘this (i.e.
Bergson’s metaphysics) is the exact antithesis o f the Platonic 
metaphysics, where the changing flux is dismissed as appearances and 
reality is found in the stable concepts of the intellect’ ((Hulme, 1994 : 
88)). His originality consisted in being the most advanced thinker o f the 
general trend of European thought at the time, which he saw as being 
‘anti-intellectualist’. Nietzsche, Hulme thought, was a profound thinker, 
but because he was an earlier thinker he could only express in an 
obscure fashion what Bergson could say clearly (Hulme, 1994 : 86).
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(Hulme therefore thinks that Nietzsche was a metaphysical thinker 
(Hulme, 1994 : 86)).
Hulme is attacking what he previously attacked, but by 1909 was far 
more convinced that the trend of European thought was on his side. His 
task is still to attack the claims of Materialism and Idealism whilst 
retaining the old ideals of free will and aesthetic and moral value. Thus 
he echoes Bergson’s belief that in evolution ‘the stable order of concepts’ 
grew up ‘in evolution [...] as an annex to action, destined specially to deal 
with matter’. The intellect, which thinks spatially, attempts to capture 
‘the intertwined unseizable flux’. However, this is doomed to failure, 
because the flux cannot be contained in static representations. This 
proves that ‘reality is non-rational in its constitution’ and that logic can 
never grasp reality (Hulme, 1994 : 87). It is unsurprising that Hulme has 
only contempt for those who either think that philosophy should model 
itself on science or that science could replace philosophy. The essence of 
philosophy is that it is an ‘art and not a science’ (Hulme, 1994 : 101). 
Again, this is an idea that Hulme was prepared to take very far, and 
shows that he was still a thorough going subjectivist. There is, Hulme 
claims, no answer to the question of whether Bergson’s (or anyone 
else’s) philosophy is ‘true’. It makes more sense to judge a philosophy on 
aesthetic, rather than rationalist, grounds ‘One must judge [...] 
philosophy as one judges a landscape’ (Hulme, 1994 : 103).
There is a great deal of debate over whether Bergson was an 
irrationalist. (The French critic Julian Benda (later to be influential on
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Wyndham Lewis) was a chief critic of the ‘irrationalist’ Bergson. 
(Piikington, 1976)). However, there is no doubt that Hulme’s Bergson is a 
thoroughgoing irrationalist. Hulme pays lipservice to the idea that the 
philosopher has to have some knowledge of science. But he makes no 
bones about the fact that logic, mathematics, science and reason itself 
are definitely inferior as ways of describing reality to Bergson’s idea of 
‘intuition’, for ‘By intuition one can identify oneself with the flux’
(Hulme, 1994 : 91). And so, by denigrating science, one helps to refute 
the deterministic (and value free) world of materialism. And then Hulme 
goes on to explicitly link this to his philosophy of art.
In a review of a book by Haldane, Hulme discusses his theory of art as 
propounded in ‘Notes on Language and Style’ and attempts to link it to 
Bergson’s ideas. He talks about his idea of the difference between a 
‘counter’ philosopher and a ‘visual’ philosopher. Poetry, he states is ‘not 
a counter language, but a visual concrete one [...] it always endeavours to 
arrest you, and to make you continuously see a physical thing, to prevent 
you gliding through an abstract process’ (Hulme, 1994 : 95). The 
opposite of this ‘abstract process’ is the concrete, visual and (now) 
Bergsonian visual intuition-the image: ‘Images in verse are not mere 
decoration, but the very essence of an intuitive language’ (Hulme, 1994 : 
95).
Hulme elaborates on these ideas in his two main treatises on the 
positive aspects of Bergson’s philosophy: ‘The Philosophy of Intensive 
Manifolds’ and ‘Bergson’s Theory of Art’ (he also wrote ‘Notes on
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Bergson’ at around the same time, but these are more concerned with 
the psychological reasons he felt attracted to Bergsonism, rather than 
actually explicating his philosophy). In T he Philosophy of Intensive 
Manifolds’, Hulme gives a thoroughgoing and, indeed, very accurate 
account of Bergson’s three main books. He therefore explains the aspects 
of Bergson’s philosophy that we have already looked at; the difference 
between time and space, the reality of Time, the existence of free will 
and so on. What is interesting is that for most of his Modernist 
contemporaries (D.H. Lawrence, George Bernard Shaw and so forth) 
Bergson’s really interesting book was Creative Evolution and his really 
important idea was that of the 'Élan VitaF (Lehan, 1992 : 316). Though 
Hulme mentions this book, and makes clear that he believes in the ‘Life 
Force’, he is less interested in this than in the idea that Bergson is an 
enemy of Rationalism, and all that this leads to (especially materialism 
and reductivism) (Hulme, 1994 : 119 -121).
For, as we have seen, Hulme thought that materialistic philosophy led 
to a state of ‘nightmare’. And so, merely to describe Hulme’s discovery 
of Bergsonian concepts as a purely intellectual development is to miss 
much o f the point of what Bergson meant to Hulme. Hulme talks 
repeatedly of his discovery of Bergsonism as being similar to a religious 
conversion. Bergson meant that it was now intellectually respectable to 
reject materialism.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that Hulme began, at this point, to 
become interested in religion itself.This may seem a strange attitude for
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someone who had stressed so strongly that he disapproved of Idealism, 
but Hulme valued religion not so much as a system that made truth 
statements about the world, but instead as a culture, ‘Hoffding had, 
indeed defined religion as a “belief’ in the conservation of values, and 
the definition is as accurate as definitions of such indefinable things can 
be’ (Hulme, 1994 : 143) he says.
And to be the conserver o f values was now to become one of the main 
ambitions of Huhne’s programme. For Hulme, therefore, religion had a 
similar function to Bergsonian philosophy: both were a bulwark against 
the nihilism that he felt was a consequence of materialism.
Moreover, Bergson helped to clarify Hulme’s thought as to what was 
wrong with contemporary philosophy. Hulme believed that the general 
direction of western culture was towards what one might call the 
scientific viewpoint. However, science, for Hulme, implied materialism 
(and therefore the non-existence of free will, relativism, and so on). 
Therefore, from this point on, Hulme increasingly begins to react not 
just against science, but against the very idea of ‘newness’ itself. As 
Hulme himself writes ‘There is a tremendous consolation in the idea of 
fixity and sameness’ and continues, talking about the soul ‘If the various 
possible ideas about the soul at the present moment are represented by 
certain struggling factions in the marketplace, then my own opinion in 
this flux and varying contests seems, if I confine myself to the present, to 
be a very thin and fragile thing. But if I find that a certain proportion of 
the men of every generation of recorded history have believed in it in
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substantially the sane form that I myself hold it, then it gains a sudden 
thickness and solidity’ (Hulme, 1994 : 135). In other words, Hulme saw 
looking to the past as a way of grounding his own beliefs. It gave his 
views stability, and banished the threat that some ‘new’ philosophy 
would come along and destroy the wisdom and culture of the past. And 
so he begins (from 1911 onwards) to stress that Bergson is in no way a 
break from the grand tradition of Western thought, but that he is merely 
stating old beliefs in a new way (Hulme, 1994) (In the same way, three 
years later, he would attempt to show that the breakthrough of abstract 
art was not in fact anything new at all, but was instead a return to the 
non representational art of the Byzantine Empire).
And so he starts to emphasise the links between Bergsonian 
philosophy and earlier traditions o f Western thought. Looking at for 
example at Bergson’s philosophy of art, Hulme describes the new 
Bergsonian view in language that smacks of conventional (Kantian) 
Metaphysics. He writes o f ‘reality as a flux of interpenetrated elements 
unseizable by the intellect’ (Hulme, 1994 :193) (Of course, as we have 
seen, there were links between Bergson and older forms of Idealism, but 
up until this point Hulme had stressed the differences between the two 
systems, not the similarities). Because of the spatial intellect we are 
unable to come into contact with this flux. Action has created a ‘veil’: ‘If 
we could break through the veil which action interposes, if we could 
come into direct contact with sense and consciousness, art would be 
useless and unnecessary’. But we can’t. Only artists can do that. They
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‘dive down into the inner flux, comes back with a new shape which he 
endeavours to fix. He cannot be said to have created it but to have 
discovered it, because when he has definitely expressed it we recognise it 
as true’ (Hulme, 1994 : 194). And if we recognise it as true, and it 
represents the real, then it has value. Bergson, having refuted 
determinism, is also, according to Hulme, some way towards refuting 
aesthetic relativism.
He continues, ‘This makes it easier to see clearly what one means by an 
individual way of looking at things. It does not mean something which is 
peculiar to an individual, for in that case it would be quite valueless. It 
means that a certain individual artist was able to break through the 
conventional ways of looking at things which veil reality from us at a 
certain point, was able to pick out one element which is really in all of 
us, but which before he had disentangled it, we were unable to perceive’ 
(Hulme, 1994 : 195). Whether this is what Bergson actually said is a 
moot point, but by claiming that he does, Hulme can claim that there is 
nothing very ‘new’ about Bergsonism. For, if it was to turn out that 
Bergsonian thought was innovative, this would clash with his increasing 
desire to deny novelty, and to conserve traditional Western values.
However there is no question at this point of his abandoning 
Bergsonism. Hulme’s thoughts and concepts are still all taken from 
Bergsonian ideas, and he is still trying to adapt Bergson’s ideas to his 
‘Cinders’ philosophy.
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Chapter Seven : Imagisme
As we have seen, by late 1912, Pound was beginning to take an interest, 
for the first time, in contemporary French Literature. His knowledge of o f it 
was not as great as it was to become over the next two years, but he knew 
that they tended to form schools of poetry, and it is significant that it is at 
this point that he began to talk about a new poetic movement he called 
‘Imagisme’, a name which he obviously took from the Forgotten School’s 
‘Imagism’ (It is likely that he added the ‘e’ to Imagist to make it sound more 
French). Pound’s first use of this word was in his volume of 1912 Ripostes 
when he wrote ‘As for the future, Les Imagistes, the descendants of the 
forgotten school of 1909, have that in their keeping’ (Pound, 1971 : 251).
At this time, however, there was no such movement. Why, then, did Pound 
pretend there was? A contemporary’s guess is significant “My own belief is 
that the name took Ezra’s fancy, and that he kept it in petto for the right 
occasion. If there were no Imagistes, they would have to be invented’ 
(Aldington, 1941 : 135). As Martin Kayman puts it, ‘Imagisme is not so 
much avant la lettre, as avant la chose. ’ (cf. Kayman, 1986 for a discussion 
of the non-existence of Imagisme as an organised movement. I do not agree, 
however, that this proves that it was a break from Symbolist techniques and 
attitudes).
Far from being a well thought out artistic movement, with clear aesthetic
goals, therefore, Imagisme was an essentially ad hoc arrangement, its name
coined before any meaning was attached to that name; described as a 
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movement when in fact the only member was Pound himself. Pound’s efforts 
over the next few months were fundamentally practical; to attract more 
people to his ‘movement’ and to publicise it, rather than to work out a well 
thought out aesthetic manifesto. This is not to say that Imagisme had no 
meaning; merely that because (as Aldington suggests) it was formed more 
for the sake of forming a movement rather than from overriding aesthetic 
imperatives, we should be suspicious o f theorising that postulates Imagisme 
as constituting a sharp break from Pound’s earlier aesthetic position.
Early in 1912, Pound was introduced to Richard Aldington (Carpenter, 
1988). When he looked at Aldington’s poetry he was impressed by what he 
saw. Like Pound, Aldington had gone back to previous forms of poetry (in 
his case the ancient Greek) to cast off the Rossettian diction which 
dominated English verse at this time, developing his own version of free 
verse from studying Euripides (Carpenter, 1988). Here at last was a young 
poet who shared Pound’s ideas. By examining this early poem of Aldington’s 
we can see why Pound may have thought that Aldington deserved the title of 
Imagiste.
A m alf i
We will come down to you,
O very deep sea,
And drift upon your pale green waves
like scattered petals.
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We will come down to you from the hills,
From the scented lemon-groves,
From the hot sun 
We will come down,
O Thalassa,
And drift upon
Your pale green waves
Like petals (Jones, 1972 : 54).
Absolutely the first thing one notices about this poem is the complete 
absence of Georgianism about it. There is no poetic diction to speak of, nor 
periphrases, nor inversions. All, in other words, the identifying marks that 
previously marked out a poem as being ‘poetic’ have been dispensed with. 
Secondly, regular strophes have also been dispensed with, though, of 
course, this is very far from being free verse in the sense that Whitman or 
D. H. Lawrence was to use it. Instead, the poet constantly alludes to 
established verse forms whilst always being prepared to break them in the 
pursuit o f what he has to say. The normal ‘flow’ of an English poem of this 
time is being perpetually thwarted, by, for example, the trochaic beginnings 
of lines five, six, seven and eight. There would, moreover, have been 
nothing to stop Aldington running the last three lines together to create a 
perfectly regular line of iambic pentameter (with a feminine ending). 
However, it his desire to thwart the metrical expectations of the reader, to
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break down the structure o f the poem further than iambic pentameter 
would allow, into smaller phrases that can more accurately ‘catch the 
moment’.
The theme of the poem, however, is clearly influenced by Aldington’s 
reading of the Greek, and is animated by an almost pantheistic regard for 
nature that one suspects Pound would have approved of. It is a hymn of 
praise to the sea (‘O Thalassa’), and, as the use of phrases such as ‘scented  
lemon groves’ and ‘hot sun’ make clear. Aldington is by no means limiting 
himself to a modern urban environment as a setting for his poetry. Instead 
he has evolved a diction that can evoke the mystical pantheistic religious 
sense of the Greeks (we may notice as well that the use of imagery is similar 
to Pound’s, in the superimposition o f the description of the sea, and then  
the metaphor o f the ‘petals’).
If one compares Flint’s poem
London
London, my beautiful,
it is not the sunset
nor the pale green sky
shimmering through the curtain 
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of the silver birch, 
nor the quietness; 
it is not the hopping 
of birds 
upon the lawn, 
nor the darkness 
stealing over all things 
that moves me.
But as the moon creeps slowly 
over the tree-tops 
among the stars,
I think of her 





to the moonlit tree-tops,
that my blood may be cooled
by the wind (Jones, 1972 : 75).
Here the theme and the language are modern. The setting is specifically 
urban, unlike the dreamy archaic environment of Aldington’s poem. 
Moreover, unlike Aldington’s poem (which among other things, uses non- 
English words (Thalassa’)) this poems contains little that is remote from
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ordinary speech. However, in its freer approach to metrics, it resembles the 
approach of Pound’s school; iambic trimeters are perpetually alluded to but 
rarely given in their ‘correct’ form; instead, they are used as a springboard 
from which the poet may depart if necessitated by the demands of the 
‘images’. For, if one looks at the structure o f the poem, one can see that, 
instead of a ‘logical’ argument, the poem progresses by means o f images. 
The first stanza simply describes the sunset, and then the darkness, the 
second the moon. Aldington’s poem contains much less of this, except in 
the second stanza, where it has more mystical connotations. This is not to 
say that Flint’s poem is somehow more Imagist that Aldington’s, merely that 
the Poundian and the Hulmean conceptions of Imagism were very different, 
as was shown by their different names.
Pound and Aldington became friends, and Pound introduced Aldington to 
Hilda Doolittle (later to be known as H. D.), a friend/lover of Pound’s from  
his schooldays in America (she moved to America in an attempt to make 
Pound marry her; she later married Aldington). The threesome even went on 
holiday together. These three were to become the backbone of Imagisme. 
However, at the time. Pound was less interested in establishing Imagisme as 
a movement, than exploiting his new friendships with Harriet Monroe and 
Rabindranath Tagore (Carpenter, 1972 : 186).
Harriet Monroe was an American poet, who, at the age of fifty two, was
finding it increasingly difficult to get published. She therefore decided to
start her own poetry magazine, Poetry, and sought out Pound as a possible 
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contributor. Pound not only agreed to write for her, but saw that here was 
a chance to publish his friends and himself without editorial interference. 
Thus, he appointed himself Foreign Correspondent. The magazine could, he 
thought, be the springboard for a new artistic Renaissance. Yeats (and now, 
as we have seen, Hulme) believed a change was coming in Western thought; 
Pound followed them in this, but, again, he was far more optimistic. The 
new Renaissance ‘will make the Italian Renaissance look like a tempest in a 
teapot!’ he wrote (Pound, 1951 : 44).
Pound had already decided, therefore, that there was to be a movement
called Imagisme, that its approach to poetry would presage, (or constitute)
a new artistic Renaissance, and that Poefiy might be a means to get the new
poetry published, before there were any Imagiste poets, or any idea what
the aesthetic tenets of the movement might consist of. Pound’s activities
over the next year were, to reiterate, practical; he had to find poets who
would be amenable to being considered Imagistes. As we have seen.
Aldington was already friends with Pound, and their approach to free verse
and diction were vaguely similar. Pound may well have considered Aldington
to be a possible Imagiste from the first time he saw Aldington’s poetry.
However, he made another discovery, when, late in 1912, (that is to say,
just as the Ripostes volume was being published) H. D. showed him some of
her poetry. Pound was impressed, and scrawled ‘H. D. Imagiste’ underneath
it. He then turned to Aldington and announced that they were both
Imagistes. (Doolittle 1980 : 18) This was the first time either of them had 
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heard the word. To look at a contemporaneous poem of hers, ‘Sea Rose’ 
(1915) it is possible to see why he made such a statement.
Rose, harsh rose, 
marred and with stint of petals, 
meagre flower, thin, 
sparse of leaf,
more precious 
than a wet rose, 
single on the stem- 
you are caught in the drift.
Stunted with small leaf, 
you are flung on the sand, 
you are Ufted 
in the crisp sand 
that drives in the wind.
Can the spice-rose 
drip such acrid fragrance 
hardened in a leaf? (Jones, 1972 : 67)
As well as using the rose as an image (which Pound would have liked for 
its Yeatsian connotations), the most obviously impressive aspect of this 
poem is that Georgian diction has been entirely abandoned (we will be 
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reminded of Aldington here). With the possible exception of the word ‘stint’ 
in line two, there is no use o f euphuisms, periphrases, or of the whole 
elaborate and unreal diction of Georgian/Victorian poetry. All of the words 
used in this poem are, as Pound once wrote: ‘nothing you couldn’t, in some 
circumstance, in the stress of some emotion, actually say’ (Jones, 1972  
:141). Moreover, regular metre has been abandoned; the gain that this gives 
is that extraneous material that might have been used to ‘pad out’ the poem  
can be omitted, giving a ‘pared down’ feel. This fits in well with (on the one 
hand) Ford Madox Ford’s insistence of the language of modern English, and 
Pound’s ‘mystical precision’ on the other. The language of the poem is hard, 
tough, bare.
The poem itself describes a rose cast up on the beach; the rose is
‘marred’, ‘meagre’, ‘stunted’. Despite the fact that it is a ‘sea-rose’, the
harsh salt water has left it bereft of the usual attributes of beauty; it is
‘sparse of lea f and ‘stint of petals’. However, the poem then goes on, in
stanza two, to state that this rose is ‘more precious I than a wet rose, 1 single
on the stem’. All the usual metaphors of desirability in Western poetry;
something wet, something alive ‘single on a stem’ are here inverted. The
sea-rose is here praised precisely because it is ‘harsh’ with an ‘acrid
fragrance’. The wetness of the sea has, paradoxically, purified it of the
superfluous attributes of life, leaving it to be ‘lifted’ on the ‘crisp sand’.
Perhaps it is the last line (which praises the roses hardness) that is the most
significance; the hardness and toughness of beauty were themes that Pound 
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would soon begin to stress.
In this poem, therefore, the traditional attributes of Western beauty are 
reversed. Moreover, there is a praise of hardness, and (implicitly) deadness, 
that fit in well with the harder, tougher aesthetic Pound was developing.
But again, we should be wary o f assuming, therefore, that H. D was a 
materialist. Pound knew well that she had her mystical side, (alluded to in 
End To Tonnent) and much of her poetry alludes to Greek mythology, 
frequently dealing with subjects such as mortals’ visions o f the Gods. These 
were things that Pound’s own poetry did. Pound therefore now knew that 
Aldington and H. D. were working on similar lines to him. This was enough 
to base a movement on, and now he had the ability to get them both 
published. But his main interest remained Yeats, and, now, Yeats’s new 
protege, Rabindranath Tagore.
To understand why Pound was so influenced by Yeats at this time, we must
understand what he looked for in poetry, in a Renaissance, and in Yeatsian
philosophy. As we have seen, Pound was an elitist in the strictest sense of
the word; that is, that he believed that elites had been the driving force
behind world histor)/, and that minorities always dominated the majority .^
Not that he objected to this state of affairs. On the contrary, he thought that
elitism might be the only bulwark against industrial Capitalism’s tendency to
destroy the values of the past. In 1913 Pound wrote ‘I have longed for some
order more humane than the Benedictines who should presence even the
vestiges o f our present light against that single force whereof the ‘ha’penny’ 
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press and our present university and educational systems are but the 
symptoms of surface’ (note the use of the word light, indicating that it is a 
mystical tradition that Pound is discussing here). This hypothetical 
‘unfounded order’ he called the ‘Brothers Minor’ (Longenbach, 1988 : 26). 
Hence his desire to become friends with Yeats, to work with him, to share 
his ideas. In July 1911 he wrote that he and Yeats were ‘in one movement 
with aims more or less identical’ (Longenbach. 1988 : 18). He wished to 
create the Brothers Minor, a mystical (and secret) brotherhood with Pound 
and Yeats at the head. The importance of Yeats to Pound is shown by the 
fact that Pound lobbied hard for Yeats to receive the first annual 
‘Guarantor’s Prize’ in Poetry. Since we have seen that Pound considered that 
Poetry might become the launch pad for his new Renaissance, and that he 
was at the time making clear that he wished Yeats to have this first prize as 
a statement of aesthetic intent, the significance of this gesture becomes 
apparent (Longenbach 1988).
And so, between 1912 and 1914, Yeats and Pound worked together, wrote
together, and, for some of the time, lived together (at Stone Cottage, in
Ireland). And between June 1912 (when Yeats and Pound met him in the
home of William Rothenstein) until August 1913, when he sailed home to
India, Rabindranath Tagore was to be the most influential poet on both
Pound and Yeats (Hurwitz 1964). Yeats (who had heard of Tagore first, and
introduced him to Pound) was quick to call him ‘greater than any of us (and
to proclaim that ‘1 know of no man in my time who has done anything in the 
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English language to equal (his) lyrics’ (Hurwitz, 1964 ; 57)). He helped 
Tagore to work on the English translations o f his poetry and wrote the 
introduction to the resulting volume (Hurwitz, 1964). It is necessary to 
study the affect of Tagore on The Brothers Minor at this point to see how 
their idea of a Renaissance developed.
Yeats had been interested in Indian mysticism from the time of the
Crossways volume, and now Tagore revealed to him ‘a world 1 have dreamed
of all my life long’ (Tagore, 1917 : xiii). Tagore appealed to Yeats because
he seemed to embody all the social ideas he had formulated up until this
point. Tagore was aristocratic, a mystic and a ‘great man’, possessing the
essential ‘childishness’ that, since reading Nietzsche, Yeats associated with
the Übermensch (Tagore, 1917). Moreover the Indian society he came
from was similar to the unified folk culture Yeats had posited as a model for
Ireland. Instead of being concerned with making money or politics, India
was ‘content to discover the soul’ and ‘surrender’ to ‘spontaneity’ (Tagore,
1917 : xx). Tagore’s poetry was the work o f a ‘supreme culture’ yet
appeared to be ‘as much the growth of the common soil as the grass and the
rushes. A tradition, where poetry and religion are the same thing, has
passed through the centuries, gathering from learned and unlearned
metaphor and emotion, and carried back again to the multitude the thought
of the scholar and of the noble’ (Tagore, 1917 : xiv). These are ideas that
would have appealed to Pound as well; he thought that Tagore was as great a
poet as Dante and in September wrote that Tagore’s poetry was going to be 
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'the  sensation of the Winter’ (Pound, 1951 : 44). But he was also looking 
forward to his Renaissance; and in Indian he thought he might have found 
something that would inspire it, in the same way Greek literature had 
inspired the first Renaissance (Longenbach, 1988).
As well as this. Pound was fascinated by the Bengali verse forms 
themselves, which he compared to those of ancient Provence. Pound was 
fascinated (and intrigued) by the fact that, despite the intricate verse forms 
he used, Tagore still attempted to use as simple a diction as possible 
(Hurwitz, 1964). Pound went so far as to attempt to learn Bengali and was 
decided that in Bengali one could have real precision since you could ‘have 
a specific word for everything’ (Schneidau, 1965 : 230). Tagore, therefore 
(according to Pound) possessed the linguistic precision that for Pound now 
constituted the essence of poetry.
And yet, despite this linguistic purity, Tagore was saturated in the 
religious philosophy o f the Indian tradition, and Pound hoped that his 
poetry would have a spiritually enlightening effect on the materialistic 
world of literary London (Hurwitz, 1964). In other words, he thought he 
had found a contemporary poet, who, like the Troubadours, had combined 
precision and plain diction with mysticism.
Pound’s relations with Yeats and Tagore dominate his thought at this
time. With regards to the Imagistes, Pound’s attitudes to his fellow poets is
significant. By the Winter of 1912, he had christened H. D. and Aldington
‘Imagistes’ but had still not told them what the word meant. Moreover it 
264
was made very clear that compared to the Brothers Minor (Yeats, Pound, 
and now, Tagore) they were of lesser interest. As Aldington puts it ‘Another 
trying time was when the inner group of London literati tried to put over 
Tagore. Of course he hit Yeats bang in the Blavatsky. Ezra, too, had a streak 
of superstition [...] I wasn’t allowed to see Tagore, as being too profane, but 
1 could always tell when Ezra had been seeing him, because he was so 
infernally smug’ (Aldington, 1941 : 108-109). This fits in well with the 
statement that Pound treated his fellow Imagistes like his ‘pet dogs’ 
(Carpenter, 1988 ; 179).
At the same time as Pound was getting interested in Tagore he was writing 
the Lustra poems. The more modern sounding poems of Lustra were still 
inspired by his theory of ‘mystical precision’. ELowever, he was beginning to 
broaden his knowledge o f French Symbolism and, as we have seen, catch up 
with the discoveries of the Forgotten School (especially as regards Japanese 
poetry). His work in early 1913 is an attempt to synthesise all these new 
influences as well as to launch his mysterious new movement of ‘Imagisme’.
By March 1913, public interest had become interested in Imagisme to the
extent that Flint decided to publish an ‘Interview with an Imagiste’ in Poetry.
This interview took Flint’s name, but was in actual fact almost entirely
written by Pound. It took the form of an ‘interview’ with an anonymous
‘imagiste’ (Pound) followed by five pages o f injunctions written by Pound
under his own name. As we have seen, there was no radical ‘break’ with fin
de siècle poetics by Pound. Instead, he grew ever more precise in defining 
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his own poetics, but always developing from his initial Romantic beliefs, 
which he had stated by 1907. T he Imagistes admitted that they were 
contemporaries of the Post Impressionists and the Futurists; but they had 
nothing  in common with these schools. They had not published a manifesto. 
The were n o t  a revolu tionary school; their only endeavour was to write in  
accordance with the best tradition, as they found it in the best writers of all 
time, -in Sappho, Catullus, Villon [...] They had a few rules, drawn up for 
their own satisfaction only [...] They were;
1: Direct treatment of the Thing', whether subjective of objective.
2: To use absolutely no word that did not contribute to the presentation.
3: As regarding rhythm to compose in sequence of the musical phrase, not 
in sequence of a metronome They also held a certain 'Doctrine of the 
Image', which they had not committed to writing; they said that it did not 
concern the public, and it would provoke useless discussion' (My italics 
(Jones, 1972 : 129)).i 
This 'manifesto' represents the end result of six years o f thinking about 
and writing poetry. It shows that Pound viewed this process as one of 
'circling in' on what was truly important in the poetic tradition. He had 
begun with a highly stylised Rossettian/Yeatsian kind of verse, but had 
slowly come to see that the poetic diction (and the Romantic metres) he 
had been using was superfluous to his needs. Instead of the looseness of
1 As we shall see, this manifesto demonstrates how little Pound had in common with the mainstream of 
the European avant-garde, which at this time meant the Futurists. Pound wished to conserve the 
tradition, not destroy it.
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these forms, he had decided that concentration was to be the essence of 
poetry.
To see why this was the case we must backtrack a little and return to
Pater, who, as we have seen was such an influence of Yeats. But he was also
an influence on Pound (Witemeyer, 1969 : 110). As we have seen, Pater saw
the essence of poetry as the capturing o f the fleeting moment. Pound
himself saw the essence of poetry as the capturing of the Vision' a phrase
that, for him, usually had mystical connotations. From his very earliest days,
he had been interested in times when (usually in a sexual context) the veil
o f normality fell away and one saw beyond to the timeless Platonic world
that lay beyond our own. Pound had already begun to concentrate more and
more exclusively on describing these states precisely. Imagisme, was not
therefore primarily a visual aesthetic. Instead it dealt with an artist’s inner
vision which m ight be cast 'upon the visual imagination' (Pound, 1954 :
25). But there was something else noteworthy about these visions. Not only
were they precise and real, they were also fleeting. The vision arose only in
particular times under conditions of great emotion. Then the veil fell down
again. Thus he praised in Provence poetry, T he exalted moment, the vision
unsought, or at least the vision gained without machination' (Pound, 1952 :
97). This notion of The exalted moment' clearly fitted in with Pater's ideas
of capturing the fleeting moment. And so Pound, in attempting to get to the
essence o f poetry, to clear away all the inessentials, began to see that the
clearest possible description of the ‘exalted moment' was to be the task of 
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his poetry. As he writes later on in the same essay ‘An “Image” is that which 
presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant o f time' (Jones 
1972, : 130). We have already seen, again in Pater, the desire to get beyond 
the scientific antitheses of the ‘intellectual' (i.e. rational thought) and the 
‘emotional' (or artistic). Pound's Image, like Pater's, would unify these two 
aspects o f the mind that had become separated. Pound therefore places 
himself, as Kermode has seen (in Romantic Image)y in the Romantic 
mainstream. And when Pound writes of the ‘thing' (i.e. ‘image') which is 
either subjective or objective, it might be best to gloss this as saying that 
the image is both subjective and objective (‘An image, in our sense, is real 
because we know it directly (Pound 1960 : 86)). It is subjective in that it is 
seen with ‘the mind's eye' but but it is objective in that it represents the 
‘real' Platonic world behind the world o f mere appearances. So in his 
formulation of Imagisme, Pound had pared poetry down until he had found 
what he thought was the essence of genuine poetry. Remember that his 
statements about the ‘thing' etc. are singular. At this point, Pound was not 
interested in more complex visions. Instead, he was interested in simply the 
one fleeting moment or vision, of timelessness. Pound's poetry is static, 
deliberately so.
Before we examine a typical Imagist poem by Pound, it would be well to
look briefly at the influence o f Japanese poetry on Pound's work, for
Japanese forms influence his most famous Imagiste poem. Pound became
interested in Japanese poetry in 1913, that is, as he was formulating his 
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philosophy of Tmagisme' and just as he was becoming disillusioned with 
Rabindranath Tagore (Hurwitz, 1964). He seems to have been influenced by 
a British translator named Chamberlain, who had published an essay on  
Japanese poetry in 1902; this was republished with some translations o f  
this poetry in 1911 (Harmer, 1975). What Pound was particularly interested 
in was the Japanese Haiku (or Hokku as he called it) short three line 
poems. Though Pound was influenced by the brevity o f this form, he had no 
great interest in Japanese poetry as such, and it is interesting mostly 
because it was the Japanese tradition that seems to have led him to China, 
and the Fenellosa manuscripts. In any case, Tn the Station at the Metro' is 
not a proper Haiku; that is, it does not follow the strict metrical patterns o f  
a genuine Japanese Haiku (Harmer, 1975) (However, Pound remained 
interested in Oriental art in general. See below).
To give an practical example of Pound's Imagisme, we should look at how  
Pound came to write one his most famous Imagiste poems; ‘In the Metro' 
which he was writing at about the same time as this manifesto. Pound tells 
us
Three years ago in Paris, I got out of a 'metro' train at La Concorde, and was suddenly
struck by a beautiful face, and then another, and then another, and then a beautiful
child's face, and then another beautiful woman, and I tried all that day to find words
for what this had meant to me, and I could not find any words that seemed to me worthy,
or as lovely as that sudden emotion. And that evening, as I went home along the Rue
Raynouard, I was still trying and I found, suddenly, the expression. I do not mean that I 
2 6 9
found words, but there came an equation [...] not in speech but in little splotches of 
colour. It was just that - a 'pattern' or hardly a pattern, if by 'pattern' you mean 
something with a 'repeat' in it. But it was a word, the beginning, for me, of a language 
in colour [...] The Japanese have understood the beauty of this sort of knowing. A 
Chinaman said long ago that if a man can't say what he has to say in twelve lines he 
had better keep quiet. The Japanese have evolved the still shorter form of the hokku 
[.,.] The ‘one image poem' (or hokku) is a form of super-position, that is to say it is one 
idea set on top of another. I found it useful in getting out of the impasse in which I had 
been left by my metro emotion. I wrote a thirty-hne poem, and destroyed it because it 
was what we call work 'of second intensity'. Six months later I made a poem of half that 
length; a year later I made the following hokku like sentence;-
'The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals, on a wet, black, bough'
I dare say it is meaningless, unless one has drifted into a certain vein of thought. In a 
poem of this sort one is trying to record the precise instant when a thing outward and 
objective transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective (Pound, 1960 :
87-89). 2
The impulse that lay behind this poem, then, was an image or vision Pound 
had of faces in a metro station. But unlike the Impressionists, Pound is not 
interested in representing this vision pictorially (immediately after this 
passage. Pound explicitly states that he is not interested in Impressionist 
representation; as we will recall, many of the Forgotten School were
2 Longenbach (1988) shows the links between this method of ‘superimposition’ (which Pound claimed 
to have invented) and earlier Symbolist and Romantic techniques.
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influenced by the Impressionists. This is the main difference between them  
and Pound; Pound follows the post-Symbolist road to the theory of the 
Image). Instead he wishes to capture the emotional significance of his 
vision. For this he must create an emotional substitute for the original 
vision. This substitute Pound calls an 'equation'.
To understand Pound's strange use here of the language of mathematics, 
we must look at the passage where he explains the philosophy of Imagisme. 
Pound begins by explaining that ‘there are four different intensities of 
mathematical expression [...] One can write, in ascending order: 3x3 + 4x4 == 
5x5. Or one can write 3 2 plus 42 = 52 . However by increasing the level of 
abstraction, one can the create a rule that a2 + b2 =c2 or finally 
(x-a)2 + (y-b)2 = r2. This,' says Pound, ‘governs the circle. It is the circle. It 
is not any particular circle it is any circle and all circles [...] It is the circle 
free of space and time limits. It is the universal, existing in perfection, in 
freedom from space and time’ (Pound, 1960 : 91). Pound then goes on to 
state that ‘Great works of art contain this fourth sort of equation [...] By the 
“image” I mean such an equation; not an equation o f mathematics, not 
something about a, b, or c, [...] but about sea, cliffs, night, having 
something to do with mood' (Pound, 1960 : 92). Pound was fond of using 
scientific or mathematical analogies to illustrate his theories (as was Allen 
Upward), but the reference to the ‘universal' gives the game away; Pound is 
here talking about the Platonic form of the circle, which exists outside time 
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and space. When he says he was looking for the ‘equation' for his image, he 
is therefore saying that he was looking for the Platonic equivalent for his 
emotional vision. In the same way that Platonic forms do not represent (say) 
any particular table, but all tables, so Pound's representations will 
represent, not the precise emotional details of what it was like to stand in 
the metro at that time, but the universal aspect of that experience. It is the 
representation of a thing that is both subjective and objective; the Platonic 
equivalent of an emotional vision; discernible through intuition. Pound was 
iater on to go to some length to dissociate this poetic from Symbolism but 
this is disingenuous. He claimed that ‘symbolist's symbols have a fixed value 
like the numbers in arithmetic, like 1,2, or 7. The imagiste's images have a 
variable significance, like the signs, a,b, or x, in algebra' (Pound, 1960 : 90- 
91). This is not, in fact what the symbolists did at all (in fact, a Symbolist 
such as Valéry could use an almost identical example of the equation as a 
definition of symbolism  (Wilson, 1967 : 59-60)).  ^ However, Pound’s
3 Pound explains ‘Imagism is not symbolism. The symbolists dealt in “association”, that is, in a sort of 
allusion, almost of allegory [...] one can be grossly “symbolic" for example by using the word “cross" to mean 
“trial". (Pound, 1960 ; 84 (my italics)) (one may note that Pound’s example is indeed of allegory).
Compare Yeats on the difference between allegory and symbol; ‘There had been allegorists and 
teachers of allegory in plenty, but the symbolic imagination, or, as Blake preferred to call it "vision” is 
not allegory, being “a representation of what actually exists really and unchangeably”. A symbol is 
indeed the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual 
flame; while allegory is one of many possible representations of an embodied thing, or familiar 
principle, and belongs to fancy and not imagination; the one is revelation, the other, an amusement’
(Yeats, 1961 :116). When we remember that Pound associates symbolism with allegory then we see  
that Yeats’s definition of allegory (a ‘familiar principle’), is the same as Pound's ‘fixed meaning’ (that is, 
what Pound’s definition of literary Symbolism), and Yeats's symbol (which consists of ‘vision’ and 
‘revelation’) is the same as Pound’s algebraic principle of Imagisme (which is a vision ‘free of space 
and time’). Pound’s Imagisme, is, therefore, Yeatsian Symbolism by another name. What Yeatsian 
Symbolism is precisely, and how it differs from the mainstream of literary Symbolism, will be discussed 
below.
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arguments hère are practical and polemical; he wishes to dissociate his own 
‘school’ from any other school that it may be confused with; in other 
words, in setting out his stall in the literary market, he is trying to show that 
his product is unique, and owes nothing to its commercial rivals. A more 
accurate reason for dissociating himself from Symbolism is that ‘One does 
not wish to be called a symbolist, because symbolism has usually been 
associated with mushy technique' (my italics) (Pound, 1960 : 84). That is to 
say. Symbolism had been brought into disrepute by the failed experiments 
of the Decadents. However, in a very important passage immediately before 
this. Pound writes:
I said in the preface to my Guido Cavalcanti that I beheved in an absolute rhythm. I
belief that every emotion and every phase of emotion has some toneless phrase, some 
rhythm-phrase to express it.
(This belief leads to vers libre and to experiments in quantitative verse).
To hold a like belief in a sort of permanent metaphor is, as I understand it,
'symbolism' in its profounder sense. It is not necessarily a belief in a permanent world, 
but it is a beUef in that direction (Pound, 1960 : 84).
Firstly this demonstrates that it was Pound's studies o f Cavalcanti that first 
led him to free up his metre. Secondly, we will remember the links between 
Pound's ‘absolute rhythm' and similar ideas being propounded by Farr and 
Yeats. Therefore, Pound's use of free verse was developed under the 
influence of Farr and Yeats (and not Ford Madox Ford, or the Forgotten 
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School).
Thirdly, as a concomitant of his belief in an ‘absolute rhythm', Pound goes 
on to state that he believes in ‘permanent metaphor'. And, slightly later, he 
explains that ‘The Return' and ‘Heather' (discussed below) are 
‘impersonal', which therefore means that they use ‘absolute metaphor. They 
are Imagisme' (Pound, 1960 : 85). But Pound has just stated that ‘permanent 
metaphor’ is the same as ‘“Symbolism” in its profounder sense'. Therefore, 
Pound makes a distinction; between ‘Symbolism' (which he dissociates 
him self from), and ‘Symbolism in its profounder sense', which is Imagisme. 
What is this Symbolism in its profounder sense? Pound is quite clear it leads 
to a belief in a ‘permanent world'; that is, a metaphysical world.
I will discuss further what Pound meant by ‘symbolism in its profounder
sense', when explicating his poem ‘Heather', but for now it should be clear
that Pound's repudiation of symbolism is, as stated before, highly
disingenuous. As is, for that matter, his repudiation of Imagisme's Romantic
roots. For those who were brought up on the myth of Neo-Classicism, it is
well to remember that whereas Pound was perfectly capable of attacking
Romanticism for polemical reasons, and to fit in with the prevailing
Zeitgeist, the Romantic origins of Imagisme were something that he never
denied. We have seen how he openly acknowledged that his elitism had
romantic roots. He was, moreover, fond of reminding his critics that their
beloved Romantics (for example, Keats and Shelley), had also been attacked
for being obscene and obscure, just as he was (Pound also admired Byron’s 
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poetry, to the extent of writing a poetic sequence, 'L'homme Moyen Sensuel' 
an attempt to write a modern ‘Don Juan' (Bornstein, 1977 : 27)). And we 
have seen his early praise of Coleridge. But the most impressive evidence 
for a link is his statement that ‘Wordsworth had an unquestioned genius [...] 
for Imagisme' (Pound, 1955 : 277). The general context is in which 
Wordsworth is being discussed here is unfavourable, but his calling 
Wordsworth an Imagiste is still startling. The context merely goes to show 
that Pound believed the Romantics had seen their images but had then gone 
wrong and lost them in a sea o f poetic diction and conventional forms.
But the most important link with this tradition was still Yeats. Given
Pound's view of the Brothers Minor, and his attitude towards the Imagistes,
it would be strange if Yeats had had no influence on Imagisme. It should
come as nor surprise, then, to find Pound reviewing Yeats's new volume
Responsibilities 1914) thus; ‘Is Mister Yeats an Imagiste? No, Mr. Yeats is a
Symbolist, but he has written Des Images as have many good poets before
him' ( Longenbach 1988 : 32). Yeats was, therefore, for Pound, a poet like
Wordsworth, who sometimes went astray, but who still had the capacity to
form and represent the images that were the essence o f poetry. It is
possible. Pound makes clear, to create ‘Images' (which, we will remember,
are but symbols ‘in a profounder sense') whilst not belonging to the school
of ‘Imagisme' (and when we remember that one may doubt whether such a
school existed, this stricture becomes even less severe). But his kinship
with Yeats went further than this. The poem Pound used to show that Yeats 
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had created ‘Images' was one o f the most obviously occult poems of the 
volume;
Now as at all times I can see in the mind’s eye,
In their still, painted clothes, the pale unsatisfied ones 
Appear and disappear in the blue depth of the sky 
With all their ancient faces like rain-beaten stones,
And all their helms of silver hovering side by side (Yeats, 1957 : 318).
This is a poem about what the poet experiences in ‘the mind's eye', in 
other words, it is a visionary poem. The poet experiences this visionary 
state, not just in a moment but ‘at all times’, demonstrating that this 
visionary insight is part o f his permanent consciousness, illuminating all the 
other spheres of his life. For Pound, therefore, this is the desideratum, the 
state o f mind of the real Imagiste. The key point about it, that would have 
led Pound to count this as a poems containing ‘Imagisme' is that the vision  
is left to stand on its own; it is not explained. The vision is accurately 
delineated, and it is self sufficient. It is not in free verse, and it uses 
conventional poetic forms, so it is not technically an Imagiste poem, but it 
is certainly an Imagiste poem in Pound's ‘profounder’ sense. (This poem  
incidentally follows in the tradition of Yeatsian Apocalyptic poetry, and 
presages ‘The Second Coming' in its prophecy of a ‘bestial' future).
This brings us to the last point o f Pound's manifesto, that there is a ‘secret 
doctrine' o f the Image. This doctrine not even nominal members of the 
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Imagistes such as Flint or Aldington were told about. These were men who 
knew about the technical aspects of Imagisme, but knew nothing o f the 
visionary impulse that lay behind it. This was a truth known only to Pound 
and Yeats. But that is not to say that Pound did not reveal it. In December 
1913 Pound wrote a short prose poem for the magazine The Cerebralist 
Longenbach argues convincingly that this is as close to the ‘secret doctrine 
of the image' as we will ever get.
It is in art the highest business to create the beautiful image; to create order and 
profusion of images tliat we may furnish the life of our minds witii a noble 
surrounding. And if- as some say, the soul survives the body; if our consciousness is 
not an intermittent melody of strings that relapse between whiles into silence, then 
more than ever should we put forth the images of beauty, that going out into tenantless 
spaces we have with us all that is needful- an abundance of sounds and patterns to 
entertain us in that long dreaming; to strew our path to Valhalla; to give us rich gifts 
by the way (Pound and Shakespeare, 1985 : 277-278).
Images are therefore, a creation that comfort the immortal soul on its 
path to eternity. The mysticism inherent in Imagisme could not possibly be 
made any clearer. And not only the content, but the language of this piece is 
strongly Yeatsian; the Yeats o f the fin fin de siècle essays such as 
‘Symbolism'. Pound's conception of Imagist poetics will be made cleared by 
examining a slightly less cryptic poem than the ‘Metro', ‘Ortus', published 
at the same time, and in a context that shows that this, too, was intended to
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be a Imagiste poem.
How have I laboured?
How have I not laboured 
To bring her soul to birth,
To give these elements a name and a centre!
She is beautiful as the sunlight and as fluid.
She has no name, and no place.
How have I laboured to bring her soul into 
separation;
To give her a name and her being!
Surely you are bound and entwined,
You are mingled with the elements unborn;
I have loved a stream and a shadow.
I beseech you enter your hfe.
I beseech you learn to say “I,"
When I question you;
For you are no part, but a whole,
No portion, but a being (Pound, 1984 : 84).
In the context of Pound's oeuvre we can easily identify this as one o f  
Pound's erotic/mystical poems. This is the culmination of Pound's first 
phase of mystical poetry, his quest for mystical precision. This poem uses 
no neologisms, or poetic diction. It does not use the allusive method. It is 
written in limpid free verse, and contains little that ‘one could, under some 
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circumstances, actually say'. And yet this is still a profoundly mystical 
poem. It deals with a visionary experience of a woman surrounded by Tight' 
this particular kind of visionary sunlight, is as we have seen, is always 
associated with the supernatural in Pound's poetry. Pound tells us she has 
no name and no place; i.e. no corporeal existence. The poems is about 
Pound's attempt to separate her; i.e. to separate her from reality and make 
her an object ‘outside time and space'. When she achieves this ‘pure form' 
she will truly come to existence both as vision and work of art, for this 
poem is also a poem about creating poetry, because for Pound the visionary 
and the poetic impulses are the same (Ruthven, 1969 : 187). Pound was 
fascinated by his new technique and experimented with it in some of the 
short poetry he wrote at this time. By looking at this, rather than some of 




Three spirits came to me 
And drew me apart 
To where the olive boughs 
Lay stripped upon the ground:
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Pale carnage beneath bright mist (Pound 1984 : 92).
(N.B. this is how the poem was originally published (Ruthven, 1969 : 39))
More obviously than some of his other poetry, this shows how Imagisme 
created mystical poetry. The three spirits are taken from Dante (as well as 
being allusions to some Pound’s own T he Tomb at Akr Çaar’ (Ruthven, 1969  
: 39). The poem details how the poet is transported and taken away from  
temporal reality. Immediately afterwards, we are given the image. There is 
no logical or chronological link between the two parts, because we are 
meant to concentrate on them both at the same time; only by the fusion of 
the two events can we get a sense o f the timelessness of the affair.
Another poem of the time gives the same idea.
G entiidonna
She passed and left no quiver in the veins, who 
now
Moving among the trees, and clinging
in the air she severed.
Fanning the grass she walked on then, endures;
Grey oUve leaves beneath a rain-cold sky (Pound, 1984 : 92). 
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This woman (if she is a mortal woman) ‘endures' she is both corporeal 
and noncorporeal, a dichotomy which is caught by comparing her to both 
‘grey' olive leaves (metaphysical reality) and the ‘rain-cold' sky (corporeal 
reality).
These poems of late 1913 and early 1914, express the high point of
Pound's Imagiste practice. However, no sooner had he perfected his
technique of catching the moment, than he ran into difficulties with it.
Since he had started writing poetry he had been attempting to hone in on
what he felt was really important. His poems had become masterpieces of
concision, and his poetry was now supreme at capturing the fleeting
mystical moment, and rendering it in precise language. They manifested this
technique as the essence o f poetry. The problem was that Pound himself did
not actually believe that this was the essence of poetry. Since he was a
teenager, he thought that the highest form of literature was the epic poem,
and that he himself would be the Homer o f a new age. As he said himself in
the Paris Review interview, he had been working on the ‘form' for an epic
poem, since about 1904/1905 . But his new technique for rendering the
moment was, by definition, particularly bad at narrative and development;
all the things that were absolutely necessary if one wished to write a long
poem. As we have seen. Pound had continually been working at this
problem, first by creating poetic sequences,and secondly by structuring his
volumes o f poetry. But since Canzoni, Pound had increasingly emphasised 
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the timeless; aspect of the ‘exalted moment’ the extent to which one could 
access eternity through the moment.
But how could one work with an aesthetic principle that denied time, or
tried to surmount it, and still work within a chronological framework,
which, by definition, invoked time more than any other? In previous
chapters, I have argued that Pound adapted a view of history, and historical
knowledge, from Browning and Yeats, a view I have termed (following
Jameson) Existential Historicism. In an important passage, Longenbach
comments, ‘Like the existential historians, Pound and Eliot proceed from the
assumption that knowledge does not lie on the surface o f events, waiting to
be collected by an impartial observer, but lurks within them. To uncover
that knowledge, the interpreter must penetrate that surface- and such an
effort demands the investment o f the interpreter’s own experience into his
work. The “poems including history” written out of these presuppositions
about the nature of historical knowledge consequently take the form o f a
“palimpset” rather than a chronological schema. The Cantos [...] display a
present that is woven from the past in a complex tissue of allusions’
(Longenbach, 1987 :27-28). As we have seen, for Pound (and Yeats) it was
their positing of a timeless Idealist reality that ‘does not lie on the surface
of events’ but ‘lurks beneath them’ that forced them to posit an empathetic
theory of historical understanding; claiming that the poet could grasp this
reality as a gestalt, all at once, through the visionary moment. In the
Canzoni volume, Pound had experimented with unifying his poetic sequence 
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with a chronological schema. However, Pound’s increasing antipathy to 
chronology (his increasing preference for the values o f space over time), 
meant that from now on, only an anti-chronological patterning would be 
acceptable (we will remember that this was a position Yeats had reached 
fifteen years earlier, in The Wind Among the Reeds), And it is this belief, 
that chronology is, in a sense, a deception, that led to the use of the 
‘palimpset’ or, rather, a spatial, rather than temporal, organisation of poetic 
material.4 The question was, how was this material to be organised? What 
new form could give unity to what might otherwise simply lead to random  
collections o f heterogeneous material? Pound’s work from this point on was 
an attempt to solve this problem of form.
And so at the very same time as Pound worked on presenting timeless 
visionary moment of Imagisme, he was also trying to organise these
moments to create order from the chaos (Fogelman, 1992 : 53-60). From
4 This is an allusion to Joseph Frank’s classic essay ‘Spatial Form in Modern Literature’, in which he 
correctly noted that many works in the tradition of Anglo-American Modernism have a spatial, rather 
than a temporal aesthetic. However, there are two extra points he glosses over. Firstly, just because 
there is no chronological structure in these works, that does not mean that there is no structure at all 
(as I will hopefully demonstrate In the following pages)(Dasenbrock 1985 :142-147). And secondly, he 
does not discuss the metaphysical, Neo-Platonic beliefs that lie behind the move towards the spatial 
(although he does allude to them whilst discussing Proust). However his view that the Modernist’s 
intermingling of past and present, and their interest in myth, was associated with this spatial urge (and 
therefore Neo-Platonism) is basically correct (Frank, 1963)(Of course, the spatial approach was 
pioneered by Yeats, as was the interest in a mythic structure).
And as Longenbach also points out, a concentration on spatial forms was not the only consequence of this 
denial of time. I have noted that part of the purpose of what I have called ‘the allusive method’, which 
originated with Pound, but had Its roots in Yeats’s  practice in The Wind Among the Reeds, was to 
preserve the language and thought of his poetry, to ensure that true comprehension of its metaphysical 
tenets would remain the preserve of the initiated few. However, this is not to deny that it had other 
purposes as well. The constant use and reuse of the texts of the past in one’s own work helps to 
stress that that one’s own poetic project is an engagement with that past, and that the present is 
perpetually engaged with, and is the sum of, that past. It is a way of announcing that there is a tradition 
of poetic succession which one is a part of, and that by alluding to it (in other word, by preserving it in 
one’s own work), that one preserves it and makes it live. (Longenbach, 1988 ; 91-92)283
now on, in Pound’s work, the reader was to be offered ‘fragments’ that 
would build up to create a poetic whole that would contain the essence of 
what Pound wanted to say. It has, unfortunately, become difficult to track 
the development of this procedure, because when Pound republished his 
poetry o f this period, in the Lustra volume (1916), he had an entirely 
different sequence in mind, and omitted part of the poetry that now seemed  
superfluous to his needs (Fogelman, 1992). In order to see what Pound was 
attempting to do in the poetry he wrote immediately before World War One, 
therefore, it is important to see them as they were first published.
Pound’s first attempt at creating an ordered sequence of poetic fragments 
that was not, however, chronological, was the short sequence he called 
‘Xenia’ (published December 1913 (Ruthven, 1969)). Like Canzonf this was 
patterned on an older poetic sequence; this time Goethe and Schiller’s 
‘Xenien’ or ‘Epigrams’ (published in 1796). As I say, the original sequence o f  
poetry has been obscured, but in the original it looked like this.
Xenia
: The Song of the Degrees.
1; THE STREET IN SOHO
Out of the overhanging gray mist




The cool fingers of science delight me; 
For they are cool with sympathy,
There is nothing of fever about them.
3;
Rest me with Chinese colours,
For I think the glass is evil.
4;
The wind moves above the wheat- 
With a silver crashing,
A thin war of metal.
1 have known the golden disc,
1 have seen it melting above me.
I have known the stone-bright place, 
The hall of clear colours.
5;
O glass subtly evil, O confusion of colours!
O light bound and bent in, O soul of the captive.
Why am 1 warned? Why am I sent away?
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Why is your ghtter full of curious mistrust?
O glass subtle and cunning, O powdery gold!
O filaments of amber, two faced iridescence!
ITÉ
Go, my songs, seek your praise from the young 
and from the intolerant,
Move among the lovers of perfection alone.
Seek ever to stand in the hard Sophoclean light 
And take your wounds from it gladly,
Dum Capitolium Scandet
How many will come after me
singing as well as 1 sing, none better;
Telling the heart of their truth 
as I have taught them to tell it;
Fruit of my seed,
O my unnameable children.
Know then that 1 loved you from afore-dme.
Clear speakers, naked in the sun, untrammelled 
(Ruthven, 1969 : 224 and Pound, 1984 : 95-96).
The theme of this sequence is the story of Pound’s own poetic and
spiritual development, obviously a theme close to his heart at his point.
However, instead of the comparatively crude devise of of having the form of
the poetry mirror its position in the chronology, the form o f this sequence 
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is best compared to the techniques used by pointillist painters. What Pound 
chose to do in these poems was to arrange a number of Imagist fragments in 
an order that explicated how Pound’s own consciousness (and, therefore, 
poetic practice) was illuminated ‘by degrees’. The order that he chose to do 
this was complex.
The poem begins proleptically, by recapitulating the whole of the poem in 
the first three lines. The grey ‘overhanging grey mist’ represents the 
atmosphere of the fin de siècle. The ugly little man is Pound as he first came 
to London. However, he is carrying ‘beautiful flowers’. This, then, is Pound’s 
view of his earlier poetry;the content (the flowers) was good, but the form  
he chose to express it in (fin de siècle diction) was wrong and ‘ugly’. This 
announces the sequence is to be about Pound’s struggle to remake his 
poetry (Incidentally, this is clearly an example o f a symbol having a ‘fixed 
value’ in the way Pound claimed that Imagistes did not do).
The second section states that Pound is delighted by ‘the cool fingers’ o f  
science as opposed to ‘fever’. But science is cool with ‘sympathy’. As 
opposed, then, to a poet who would wildly throw himself into the 
Bergsonian flux, or would succumb to Decadent hysteria. Pound wishes to 
balance his ‘sympathy’ for the poetic object, with analytic ‘coolness’. This is 
clearly a description o f Imagisme, where the technique used by the poet 
controls the emotions expressed in the poem.
The enigmatic third section becomes clearer when one understands that
the ‘glass’ or mirror, is evil because it reflects the ravages o f time (Ruthven, 
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1969). Pound counterpoints the ‘rest’ o f China (I will discuss the growing 
influence o f the Orient on Pound below) to the flux of time. This clearly fits 
in with Pound’s anti-temporal Platonism.
The first paragraph of the fourth section is pure Imagisme. We are given 
an Image, and then a subjective interpretation of it. This last refers us back 
to Pound’s own ‘The Alchemist’ ( line 15). ‘The Alchemist’ is, as one might 
expect from the title, an occult poem, and contains the information that the 
Philosopher’s Stone contains a mixture of male and female principles, or 
symbolically, gold and silver, the sun and the moon (line 25 /26 ). When 
Pound mentions the sun in the next paragraph, initiates (that is, those 
familiar with alchemical thought), would therefore see that he is stating that 
the highest form o f poetic vision would be achieved by this union of the sun 
and the moon; that is to say, o f the union of the male and female principles 
(which ties in, of course, with Pound’s sexual mysticism). ‘I have seen it 
melting above me’ is a statement of Pound’s belief in his own occult, 
visionary powers, backed up by the reference to his own ‘The House of 
Splendour’ in the last line (another poem proclaiming his visionary powers). 
The ‘it’ is the mystical vision engendered by the mystical state discussed 
above. The ‘thin war’ is Pound’s attempt to contain this vision in a durable, 
tight, ‘metallic’ form (as opposed to fin de siècle rhetoric and prolixity).
Stanza four is therefore a restatement of the ‘Secret Doctrine’ o f
Imagisme; visionary content in the most unadorned possible form. Having
stated this. Pound then goes on to express the torment this gives to the 
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poet, forever trying to find the pure Platonic forms, scattered throughout 
the false world of Time.
However, despite this torment. Pound ends with a hortatory statement of 
belief in his own mission. In Tté’ he praises the quality o f ‘hard [...] light’ in 
his poetry, and expresses his faith that his poems will find an audience. The 
last poem shows his belief that his own practice will begin a poetic 
renaissance that will lead to many poets like himself coming after him.
This poetic sequence therefore uses techniques ranging from Imagisme to 
allusions to his own poems, to tell a ‘story’, the story of how Pound 
‘modernised’ his poetry. However, it does not ‘tell’ this story in narrative 
form. Instead it offers us a series of significant points or illuminations that 
will guide initiates along the path of understanding what he had to go 
through. And, most importantly, the form chosen to express this is not 
temporal. For example, the first section o f the poem does not make sense 
until one has read all the rest. This sequence is structured spatially, not 
temporally.
By using techniques such as these, Pound had found forms,that, he hoped, 
he could use to build up longer poems. The problem of describing process, 
however, still remained. In ‘A Song of the Degrees’ ( the degrees are of 
course the degrees by which Pound modernised his poetry) we are merely 
given significant points along the road of Pound’s development. We get no 
real sense o f the process  o f Pound’s change as a poet.
It was to solve this problem, I will contend, that led Pound to become 
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interested in ‘Vorticisd aesthetics. Firstly however, we must look at the new 
influences on Pound; Ford Madox Ford, Oriental poetry, and the Neo- 
Classicism o f T. E. Hulme.
2 9 0
Chapter Eight: Yeats. Pound and 
'Neo-Classicism'.
Before continuing, we should briefly look at the influence o f Ford 
Madox Ford on the early work o f Pound. It is often claimed that Ford, and 
not Yeats, is the major influence on Pound's Imagisme (cf. Grieve, 1997 : 
39-40). However, most o f the evidence for this is taken from texts 
written by Pound as much as twenty years after the events they 
described, in a period, moreover, when Yeats and Pound were no longer 
friends (Carpenter, 1988 : 503-505). To see these statements in context, 
we should look at what Pound said at the time.
To begin with, we should remember that Pound’s earliest insistence on 
simplicity, eschewing poetic diction and so on, are contained in The 
Spirit o f  Romance, written at a time when Pound stated that he disagreed 
'diametrically' with Ford about almost everything (Schneidau, 1969 : 12). 
Pound made that statement in 1911, at the same time as he published his 
Canzoni volume, which contained Pound's earliest experiments in his 
'later' style (in the Heine translations and the 'Und Drang' sequence). 
Pound's move towards clarity and freer verse forms began when Pound 
rejected Ford and everything he stood for.
However, it was Ford's reaction to the earlier (more Rossettian) poems 
in that volume that seems to have prompted Pound to change his mind. 
Famously he wrote later 'He (i.e. Ford) felt the errors of contemporary 
style to the point o f rolling [...] on the floor of his temporary quarters in 
Giessen when my third volume displayed me trapped [...] in a jejune 
provincial effort to learn [...] the stilted language that then passed for
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“good English”; [...] that roll saved me two years, maybe more’ (Pound, 
1973 : 431 --432). There are three major points to be made about this 
statement which are frequently passed over in discussions o f Pound’s 
'Modernism’. Firstly, as we have seen, not all the poems in Canzoni were 
written in 'stilted language’. Secondly (and related to this first point), 
Pound wrote this piece in 1939, after Yeats had attacked the Cantos in 
his Oxford Book o f  M odern Verse, and the two had grown apart 
(Carpenter, 1988 : 503-505). Pound, was, therefore, keen to emphasise 
Ford’s influence as opposed to that o f Yeats, as the context makes clear; 
the paragraph immediately preceding this praises Ford at Yeats’s expense. 
Pound therefore glosses over the fact that his initial impulse towards 
simplicity and purity of diction came when he was still under Yeats’s 
influence. (Pound wrote 'I Gather the Limbs of Osiris’ immediately after 
he returned from Giessen; in this he specifically denies that poetry 
should be based on ordinary speech, the essence of Ford’s approach 
(Pound, 1973 : 41)). Thirdly, (and most importantly), all that Pound is 
claiming here is that Ford saved him some time. There is no suggestion 
that Ford sent Pound off on a radically new path. Pound was purifying his 
diction anyway.
Ford’s real accomplishment at this time at this time was to introduce 
Pound to the French prose tradition, specifically Stendhal and Flaubert; 
the Realists (Hermans, 1982 : 91-92). This gave Pound a new benchmark 
with which to judge the new poetry, and from now on he begins to insist 
that his task is 'to bring poetry up to the level of prose’ (Pound, 1960 :
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83). However, this does not mean he was converted to Ford’s aesthetic, 
which was described by Ford himself as Impressionism (Ford, 1964 : 34- 
35) ('Imagisme is not Impressionism, although one borrows, or could 
borrow, much from the impressionistic method of presentation’ (Pound, 
1960 : 85)). In 'A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste’ Pound goes out of his way to 
attack Ford’s poetry (without naming him), making clear that Ford was 
not an Imagiste. Ford was never one of the Brothers Minor (Longenbach, 
1988).
In 1913 Pound spent his first Winter with Yeats in Stone Cottage.
Despite having worshipped Yeats from afar. Pound had spent little time 
with the older poet on his own, and he was understandably anxious that 
their friendship might become strained. But his fears were not born out. 
Yeats, who had until recently worried about his poetic vocation, was 
reassured that the most interesting of the younger generation looked up 
to him as the greatest living poet. And Pound felt that he had finally 
created 'The Brothers Minor’; two aristocratic poets working on great art 
far from the rabble. Yeats encouraged him in this belief (Longenbach, 
1988). Yeats was at this time working on the poems that went into the 
Responsibilities volume (published 1914), and this was a volume that not 
only turned its back permanently on the nostalgic fin de siècle tone that 
had still occasionally surfaced in his poetry; it also reaffirmed his dislike 
of both democracy and rhetoric. Poems such as 'To A Wealthy Man Who 
Promised A Second Subscription To The Dublin Municipal Gallery If It 
Were Proved The People Wanted Pictures’, as well as confirming him in
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his practice of a newer, harder, diction, also affirmed his dislike of that 
'blind and ignorant town’ (Dublin) (Yeats, 1957 : 287), and showed a 
hankering for an idealised view of the Renaissance in which noble 
aristocrats gave money in an disinterested fashion to the arts. The poem  
stresses that literary values were preserved by this aristocracy because 
they had no concern for the thought of the common people ('What cared 
Duke Ercole, that bid I His mummers to the market-place, 1 What the 
onion sellers thought or did?’ (Yeats, 1957 : 287). This is something Yeats 
would, from now on, attempt to emulate.
A poem like 'September 1913’ showed an even sharper disillusionment. 
With its refrain of 'Romantic Ireland’s dead and gone, I it’s with O’Leary 
in the grave’ the poem is a despairing cry of anguish that the noble 
Ireland of the past had been betrayed by those who 'But fumble in a 
greasy till’; i.e. the Bourgeoisie (Yeats, 1957 : 289). Up until now, as we 
have seen, however elitist, Yeats had had faith that in Ireland at least, 
enough of the old ways existed to counteract the new forces o f capitalist 
democracy. After the 'Playboy’ furore, however, and the fiasco over the 
Municipal Art Gallery in 1912 (in which modern painting meant for 
Ireland paintings ended up going to America amid widespread public 
apathy), Yeats began to lose faith in Ireland, and, more importantly, the 
mass of the Irish people itself. i It is no coincidence that at the very same
1 This poem seems, at first sight, to be about the betrayal of the Irish Republican Brotherhood by 
spineless middle class pacifism, but a closer look at the context reveals that, yet again, Yeats was 
more concerned with the values of art, and the antipathy of the Bourgeoisie to those values. The 
difference is that whereas before, Yeats thought that these values were being menaced by soulless 
materialism, now he was beginning to suspect that irreparable damage had been done, and that an 
artistic renaissance may not be possible (Brown, 1972).
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time as he was arriving at this self consciously aristocratic political 
position, he was also committing himself fully to eliminating poetic 
diction and rhetoric from his poetry. In 'A Coat’ he wrote
I made my song a coat 
Covered with embroideries 
Out of old mytliologies 
From heel to throat;
But the fools caught it.
Wore it in the world's eyes 
As though they'd wrought it.
Song, let them take it,
For there's more enterprise 
In walking naked (Yeats 1957 : 320).
This poem is, in a sense, a counterpart to the ‘Xenia’ sequence
discussed above. More traditional than Pound, Yeats was still writing
about the same experience, that o f the changed tone of his poetry; the
new way he had chosen to treat the new century. And it is clear that, for
Yeats, the problem with his earlier poetry was that, far from being too
difficult, it had proved not to be difficult enough. Instead of limiting his
audience, as it had been intended to do, the euphuistic Pre-Raphaelite
diction had become a style, readily parodied and copied. The ‘fools’
(who one may infer were the masses, the middle classes, journalists),
had ‘caught’ this style, and the dreamy Pre-Raphaelite phraseology he had
pioneered was now the essence o f what the middlebrow public expected 
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of a poem. Now, however, he would devote himself to writing plainly, 
‘walking naked’. This was not, of course, any move in the direction of 
egalitarianism or democracy. Instead as with Pound, the form would 
become cleaner, harder, more ‘metallic’, less ‘poetic’; it would not flatter 
the Bourgeois with their sentimental ideas of poetry.
These are all ideas that Pound found deeply sympathetic. His own 
poetry was moving in the same direction. 2
When Pound arrived at Stone Cottage, he found Yeats beginning to take 
an interest in the Japanese Noh Drama. Only five years previously, Yeats 
had attempted to create a genuinely popular drama that would speak to 
the people in their own language. The ‘Playboy’ fiasco, and the death of 
Synge,
had, however, persuaded him that popular theatre was simply 
impossible; in the future any artist who wished to write drama would 
have to choose an aristocratic form.
Hence the attraction of the Noh. It was written for the aristocracy, and 
would as Miner put it ‘give [...] expression in all the beauty which art and 
intelligence can provide, instead of vulgarising them to the standards of 
taste and the notions o f the ignorant’ (1958 : 255). Speaking of his own 
imitation o f the Noh, ‘Three Plays For Dancers’ Yeats wrote ‘1 have 
invented a form of drama, distinguished, indirect and symbolic, and
2 In his review of Responsibilities, Pound makes a number of statements that show that he had 
finally (May 1914) caught up with the innovations of Yeats. As we have seen, he praises Yeats for 
his Imageistic tendencies (he calls The Magi’ ‘a passage of imagisme', for his ‘prose directness’
(the new definition of quality he developed under the influence of Ford) and for his ‘hard light’.
Moreover, for the first time, he acknowledges that Yeats’s  poetry has changed, that this change 
was detectable as far back as 'No Second Troy’ (as we have seen, actually one could argue that it 
dates back to ‘Adam’s Curse’), and that The Coat' discusses this change. In terms of poetic value,
Pound Is unequivocal; Yeats is 'the best poet in England’ (Pound 1954 ; 378).297
having no need of mob, or press to pay its way - an aristocratic form’ 
(Yeats, 1961 : 221).
Now, of course. Pound, too, was interested in Oriental art and 
philosophy. As we have seen, for his most famous Imagiste poem ‘In A 
Station At The Metro’ he had chosen the form of the Haiku, (which he 
had, of course, been introduced to in the days of the Forgotten School), 
and in the ‘Xenia’ sequence he had praised the coolness of the Chinese as 
a counterbalance to Occidental hysteria.^ Partly this was just an interest 
in artists in other cultures who had faced similar problems to himself, 
but there were deeper reasons as well. As we have seen, Pound was still 
looking forward to his artistic Renaissance, and was looking for a culture 
that would have the same place in his Renaissance as Greece and Rome 
had in the earlier one. He thought he had found it in Indian culture and 
the writings of Rabindranath Tagore, but since Tagore had left for India 
that Summer, his interest had waned (Carpenter, 1988 : 186). Now 
however, his attention turned to Japan and, then, to China. However, 
what he was looking for in these cultures remained the same.
As with India, Pound thought that Chinese and Japanese culture had 
been ‘aristocratic’ and static (Longenbach, 1988 : 44-46). He, too, 
became interested in the Noh. With Yeats he read Confucius and works 
such as Brinkley’s Japan and China; Their Arts History and Literature. 
From this last, Pound mistranslated an ideogram describing the activities
3 As usual we must be careful of our chronology here. It is significant in terms of the development 
of Pound’s thought that his very next project after the ‘Xenia’ sequence was yet another sequence 
with almost the same title; the ‘Zenia’ sequence. It was not until February 1914 that Pound 
published the first of his Chinese poems; that is to say, after he had been exposed to Yeats’s 
Orientalism.
298
of Japanese nobles, to get the phrase ‘listening to incense’ (Longenbach, 
1988 : 44). He explained: ‘For “listening to incense” the company was 
divided into two parties, and some arbiter burn many kinds [...] of 
perfume, and the game was not merely to know which was which, but to 
give each of them a beautiful and allusive name, to recall by the title 
some strange event o f history, or some passage o f romance or legend. It 
was a refinement in barbaric times, comparable to the art of polyphonic 
rhyme, developed in feudal Provence’ (Pound, 1953 : 214). As well as 
showing how highly he regarded this form of art by comparing it to his 
beloved Provençal poetry, it also showed why he identified with it; he, 
too, was attempting to achieve ‘refinement’ in ‘barbarous times’.
However, there were technical reasons Pound was interested in the 
Noh, as well. As he wrote: ‘The art o f allusion, or this love o f allusion in 
art, is at the root of the Noh. These plays [...] were made only for the 
few, for the nobles, for those trained to catch the allusion’ (Pound, 1953 
: 214). Pound’s own poetry, which was, o f course, allusive in the extreme, 
and becoming more so, was also aimed at the ‘few’; initiates, who one 
might term spiritual nobles. As well as the other functions described 
above, therefore, Pound was quite clear that one of the purposes of his 
allusive method was to keep the profane from understanding his mystical 
doctrines. His poems were obscure to ‘the masses’ and were meant to be.
Moreover, Pound was undoubtedly under the impression that studying 
the Noh would help him with his problem of how to structure a long 
poem. In Gaudier-Brzeska he wrote: ‘I am often asked whether there can
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be a long Imagiste or Vorticist poem. The Japanese, who evolved the 
hokku, evolved also the Noh play. In the best ‘Noh’ the whole play may 
consist of one image. I mean it is gathered about one image. Its unity 
consists in one image, enforced by movement and music. I see nothing 
against a long Vorticist poem’ (Pound, 1960 : 94). As well as showing the 
synonymity of the terms Imagiste and Vorticist in Pound’s mind, this also 
demonstrates that Pound was hoping to use the technical aspects o f the 
Noh to help him structure a long poem without losing the concentration  
on the image that his poetry now depended on.
The next sequence o f poems that Pound wrote were adaptions from the 
Chinese, and it is clear that he discovered Chinese poetry through his 
experience of Japanese poetry. Moreover, it is also clear that he became 
interested in Chinese poetry for the same reasons he had been interested 
in Japanese and Indian poetry; that is, for technical reasons (i.e. the 
precision of their diction, and their solutions to the problems of form) 
and for sociological and mystical reasons (that is, whether their societies 
seemed to be better orientated towards the production of poetry and 
occult thinking than our own). It is significant in this respect that it was 
the occultist Allen Upward who first introduced Pound to Oriental poetry 
(Carpenter, 1988 : 218).
Pound began his exploration of Chinese poetry under the impression 
that Chinese ideograms were pictorial, or to be more precise, that 
Chinese was a language that had the precise correlation between 
expression and sensation he now sought in his own work. Pound thought
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that each ideogram would correspond to a sensation undergone, and not 
to a sound, as in English (Miner, 1958 : 128-131) (He had previously 
been under this misapprehension about Tagore’s Bengali, as we have 
seen).
Moreover, Chinese poetry, like Imagiste poetry, concentrated on exact 
description, rather than explanation. The average Chinese and Japanese 
lyric poetry leaves the reader to infer what is being said from 
presentation o f the image. As Pound put it, ‘Chinese poetry has certain 
qualities of vivid presentation; and it is because certain Chinese poets 
have been content to set forth their matter without moralising and 
without comment that one labours to make a translation’ (Yip, 1969 : 
34).
To see what Pound meant, we should look at ‘The Jewel Stairs’ 
Grievance’ by the Chinese poet Li Po (Pound used the Japanese version of 
his name; Rihaku). Here is a rough English translation of the Chinese:
Jade steps grow white dew (s)
Night late : soak gauze stockings (s)
Let(s) down the crystal blind
(To) see, glass clear, the autumn moon (Yip, 1969 : 68).
All that happens here is we are given various visual images. There is no 
comment. There is not even a poetic ‘I’; we are given the images 
impersonally. And yet, as Pound points out, we are given these images
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because they stand for emotional states. Pound translated this as follows
The jewelled steps are already quite white with dew,
It is so late that the dew soaks my gauze stockings.
And I let down the crystal curtain
And watch the moon through the clear autumn.
and writes; ‘Jewel stairs, therefore a palace. Grievance, therefore there is 
something to complain of. Gauze stockings, therefore a court lady, not a 
servant who complains. Clear autumn, therefore he has no excuse on 
account o f the weather, also she has come early, for the dew has not 
merely whitened the stairs, but has soaked her stockings. The poem is 
especially prized because she utters no direct reproach’ (Pound, 1970 : 
194).
This is, again, a poem where not only are the images simply presented 
as plainly as possible, (even more plainly in the original Chinese, than in 
the
English translation above) and not only do these stand as (as it were) an 
equation for an emotional state (reproach), but where the work is more 
or less incomprehensible unless one knows the conventions of Chinese 
court poetry, which, for once. Pound explains for us. It has, as he writes 
‘great vigour and clarity’ but at the same time ‘require the reader to 
puzzle over it’ and ‘play Conan Doyle’ (Yip, 1969 : 36). This 
demonstrates that ‘Pound had never been a precisionist in the sense that
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he eschewed the suggestive m ode’ a suggestive mode that has been most 
frequently been linked with Symbolism (Yip, 1969 : 37).
Moreover, this presentation of images without comment, and without a 
specified poetic ‘I’ gives the reader, as Yip writes, a feeling as if ‘all these 
occur dramatically before ‘the reader’s eyes - time and space become 
meaningless’ (Yip, 1969 : 68). This last phrase has mystical implications, 
and leads us back to another reason Pound found Oriental poetry 
intriguing.
For both Pound and Yeats discovered the Chinese and Japanese poetry 
were filled with occult lore. Pound wrote o f the Noh, that ‘These plays are 
full of ghosts, and the ghost psychology is amazing. The parallels with the 
Western spiritist doctrines are very curious’ (Pound, 1970: 222). He also 
described how Yeats spent a whole Winter correlating the data he had 
acquired from Irish folklore, with the ‘data’ of the ‘occult writers’, and 
explained that the ‘world of the Noh’ is that of the priest eager to see a 
vision (Pound, 1970: 236-237). This was an insight that Yeats was to 
make use of in his essay Swedenborg, Mediums and the Desolate Places. 
These parallels convinced both men they were on the right track to study 
the Orient more closely. Pound at this point was beginning to read occult 
literature systematically, rather than in the dilettante way he had done 
up until now, and his work became increasing mystical (Longenbach, 
1988). Take, for example, ‘Heather’ which he wrote at Stone Cottage.
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The black panther treads at my side,
And above my fingers 
There float the petalTike flames.
The milk-white girls 
Unbend from the holly-trees,
And their snow-white leopard
Watches to follow our trace.'^ *’
The flames (we will remember the significance of light) do not burn, 
and girls cannot unbend out o f trees. This is a mystical poem, which does 
not advertise its mysticism (like T h e Magi’). However, it is also a ‘high’ 
Imagiste lyric, in which we are simply presented with images, which are 
left to stand on their own, with no extraneous ‘explanation’.
What then, was its meaning? This brings us back to what Pound meant 
by symbolism. As we have seen, Pound’s denial that Imagisme was 
Symbolism is disingenuous. However, his denial that this is the case is 
made clearer when we remember that in the ‘Vorticism’ essay, he made a 
distinction between ‘Symbolism’ and ‘Symbolism in its profounder 
sense’; and denied only that Imagisme the former. What, then, did he 
mean by ‘Symbolism in its profounder sense’? As we have seen, he stated 
that it was a belief in ‘permanent metaphor’, and that it was a move 
towards a belief in a ‘permanent world’. In a private letter of 1913, he 
could be more direct:
What do you mean by symbolism? Do you mean real symbolism, Cabala, genesis of
4 ‘Heather’ was published in March 1914. Apart from the S/asf poems (which will be discussed in 
the next chapter) Pound was to publish only seven more poems (in the August edition of Poetry) 
before the start of World War One.
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symbols, rise of picture language, etc. or the aesthetic (symbology) symbolism of 
Villiers de L’isle Adam, and that Arthur Symons wrote a book about-the 
literwary(sic) movement? [...] There’s a dictionary of symbols but I think it’s 
immoral [...] a symbol appearing in a vision has a certain richness and power of 
energising joy - whereas if the supposed meaning of a symbol is famihar it has no 
more force [...] than a synonym (Pound and Shakespeare 1985 : 302).
Here Pound makes a distinction between real sym bolism  (‘symbolism in
its profounder sense’) and the merely ‘literwary’ movement. (Just what
Pound means by ‘a dictionary of symbols’ may be explained by his
statement that ‘to use a symbol with an ascribed or in ten ded  meaning  is,
usually, to produce very bad art’ (Pound 1960: 86)). A symbol with an
easily elucidated meaning, using one word to mean another, ‘a synonym ’,
is, as we have seen, what Pound elsewhere called an ‘allegory’, and this is
what Yeats, too, railed against (although Pound, ironically, thought that
Yeats was occasionally guilty of just this crime (Yip 1969)). Just as Yeats
did. Pound thought that the Titerwary’ movement was ultimately of lesser
interest than ‘Symbolism in its profounder sense’ - symbols which are
perceived with ‘vision’ - symbols which lead to a belief in a ‘permanent
world’. ‘Fixed’ values (or merely ‘literwary’ values) for symbols were
immoral, because the image had to come straight from what Yeats called
‘Spiritus Mundi’, without any alteration by the conscious mind. Anything
less would be a betrayal o f the mystical poet’s art. Pound’s Imagisme was
not Symbolism in the literary sense, because in his Imagiste works Pound
was attempting to be a Yeatsian Symbolist; the Yeats who, as we have
seen, stated flatly that magic and poetry were the same thing. Pound’s 
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arguments for Imagisme (despite the different vocabulary) recapitulate 
Yeats’s arguments for mystical symbolism almost exactly.
And as Pound became a ‘Vorticist’ his belief in the mystical power of 
symbols became stronger, not weaker. ‘Vorticism’ is a more mystical 
essay than the Imagiste manifesto (Longenbach, 1988). In the same year, 
Pound, writing to a Christian, defended his own polytheistic mysticism ‘1 
have some religion [...] I count m yself much more priest than I do some 
sceptic [...] I can not find any trace of Christ’s having spoken against the 
Greek gods’ (Pound and Shakespeare, 1985 : 307).
To see how Pound’s visionary symbolism worked in practice, we should 
return to ‘Heather’, and we should look for the occult realities which the 
images presented represent. Oderman (1986), for example, is on the 
right path when he speculates that the black panther and the white 
leopard symbolise the male and female principles, and that this is an 
erotic/m ystical poem describing the visionary possibilities o f the sexual 
act. This is quite possibly true, or part of the truth, but it underestimates 
the extent to which Pound viewed himself as being, literally, a visionary. 
What is fascinating, reading the letters to Dorothy Shakespeare, is seeing 
how precisely Pound transferred his visions into poetry. When Pound 
stayed in Stone Cottage, Shakespeare occasionally wrote to him as 
‘Beloved o f the Black Panther’, and the context shows that both of them  
believed in the existence of both the panther and the leopard as real 
beings, with their own spiritual existence. For example, on the 6th of  
December 1913, Dorothy wrote: ‘Perhaps the panther was away from me
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for a minute this afternoon? Tell me more about the snow leopard [...] 
have either of them names?’ (Pound and Shakespeare, 1985 : 286) to 
which Pound replies: ‘No. They have not names. From careful perusal of 
my works you might learn that the snow leopard sits on his tale and 
observe’s one’s departure. The panther has been awa’. I daresay you had 
him’ (Pound and Shakespeare, 1985 : 287). In her next letter, 
Shakespeare wrote: ‘I saw the Bl. Panther lying on my hearth rug one 
night when 1 was wakeful with the most alarming distinctiveness. He was 
stretched out on his side with his long tail round his hind ankles. I was 
quite alarmed! And another night I felt him sitting stiff up by the fire. 
Fortunately I am not in the room I usually have (which is undoubtedly 
haunted) or else 1 should have had to ask if I might borrow Him every 
night’ (Pound and Shakespeare, 1985 : 288).
The poem, ‘Heather’, then, is a Symbolist poem in Pound’s ‘profounder’ 
sense. The figures in it do not correspond to ideas and emotions in the 
‘real’ world, because they are mystical, occult beings in their own right, 
with no need o f justification, or explanation. The ‘purpose’ o f this poem, 
is, purely and simply, to be a record of real, lived, visionary experience, 
presented as clearly as possible.
Yeats left for New York in January 1914, and left Pound hardened in 
his occult beliefs and aristocratic outlook. This was an attitude in which 
he would have been encouraged in holding by the concurrent 
speculations o f T.E. Hulme, who was formulating his doctrine of ‘Neo- 
Classicism’. This is not to say that Pound was directly influenced by Neo-
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Classical thought (though he was influenced by Hulme’s Anti-Humanistic 
theorising as we shall see), but it is symptomatic for two reasons, firstly 
because it shows the anti-democratic thinking that was becoming 
increasingly fashionable at this time, and secondly because it paves the 
way for the introduction of Wyndham Lewis (and therefore Vorticism) to 
the story, who definitely was influenced by Hulme’s speculations.
Firstly, however, we must backtrack to 1912, when Hulme was still an 
orthodox Bergsonian. While Hulme was still spreading the gospel o f  
Bergson in The New Age, he was began to write a series of political 
articles for The Commentator, a Tory periodical, under the pseudonym  
of Thomas Gratton. These articles first started to be published in 
February the 22nd, though it was not until the next year that Hulme 
published ‘A Tory Philosophy’ which contains his famous polemics 
against Romanticism.
In these early articles Hulme used the thought of Bergson and 
Nietzsche to formulate his own political position. As we have seen,
Hulme saw Bergson as an anti-intellectualist and this is the aspect o f his 
thought he stresses. Hulme emphasises that man has ‘generally irrational 
vital instincts’ (Hulme, 1994 : 208) and that therefore the view that 
politics consists of the discussion o f rational arguments must be 
erroneous (Hulme, 1994). This applies to the ‘intellectual’ as much as 
the ‘masses’; we may be under the delusion that we are deciding a 
question from purely rational motives, but this is a fallacy. Even the 
detached analyst of the phenomena is himself subject to the law.
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Conversion is always emotional and non-rationaF (Hulme, 1994 : 209). 
This is important because, according to Hulme, society is hierarchical, 
whether we admit it or not. The intellectual’s views eventually trickle 
down and influence those o f the masses. Therefore, the best way to 
influence the political debate in the long run is to capture the minds of 
the intellectual élite. This will not be easy, and involves a willingness to 
rely on nonrational means of persuasion; ‘we are not concerned with 
truth, but with success [...] They (i.e. the intellectuals) must be 
converted exactly as everyone else is- by hitching on your propaganda to 
one of their centres of prejudice and emotion’ (Hulme, 1994 ; 210).
Hulme adapted his irrationalism from Bergsonian thought, but by the 
time he wrote this document, he had found a new intellectual ally; Sorel 
(Hulme’s first reference to Sorel is in an article dated 9 November 1911. 
It is not clear when he wrote ‘Romanticism and Classicism’, but a date of 
late 1911, early 1912, seems the best guess: cf. Csengeri’s Introduction 
to Hulme’s Collected Works (1994)). Sorel was a French Marxist writer, 
who had begun to argue (from about 1900 onwards) that Marxism was 
not so much a ‘scientific’ or ‘rational’ statement about Capitalism, but 
instead a ‘myth’. This was not, however, intended as a derogatory 
statement. Instead, Sorel went on to argue that it was only myths, which 
appealed to man’s irrational side, that drove history, and that rational 
thought was, therefore, o f less consequence. Sorel went on to attack 
Bourgeois society, which, he claimed, lacked ‘mythic values’. Society 
could only be rejuvenated by rejecting Bourgeois values, and, o f course,
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Bourgeois democracy, in favour o f the myth of the ‘General Strike’ 
(Hulme would have found Sorel’s theories easy to assimilate, not least 
because o f their common intellectual background; for Sorel, too, was 
strongly influenced by both Bergson and Nietzsche (Gregor, 1969 : 61)).
Having proved, to his own satisfaction at least, that political thought is 
necessarily irrational, Hulme then reintroduces the perspectivism which 
we first saw formulated in the ‘Cinders’ document, influenced by 
Nietzsche; ‘Truths don’t exist until we invent them’ (Hulme, 1994 : 20). 
Since what we bring to phenomena is largely influenced by nonrational 
criteria, this obviously calls into question the notion of ‘objective truth’. 
This is particularly true for political questions. For example ‘All national 
histories are partisan, and designed to give us a good conceit of 
ourselves’ (Hulme, 1994 : 212) for ‘No history can be a faithful mirror 
[...] It must be a selection and, being a selection, must inevitably be 
biased’ (Hulme, 1994 : 213). Hulme is not mentioning this to deplore it. 
On the contrary he goes out of his way to state how much he likes it (In 
other words he stresses that history is not, and can never be, science. 
Again, there are parallels with Pound and Yeats, cf. Longenbach, 1987 ; 
22-25).
However the upshot of this view is that most of what we take as 
political discourse is simply meaningless. Since Man is not rational, 
rational argument is futile, and since there is no such thing as a value 
free view of reality, appeal to ‘the facts’ is futile as well. To influence 
one’s opponents one must appeal to their emotions and prejudices. The
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problem with the present day Conservative party, Hulme thought, was 
not that they had lost the argument (which was simply irrelevant) but 
that they no longer appealed to the emotions of the intellectuals. And 
this is for exactly the same reasons that Hulme thought that poetry had 
decayed; their discourse had degenerated into cliche; it no longer had 
any emotional force behind it. As he puts it himself ‘I am firmly 
convinced that just at the present moment Conservative thought has 
come to an important crisis. The old set o f catch words in which its 
philosophy embodied itself are now absolutely worn out’ (Hulme, 1994, 
215). Fascinatingly, Hulme uses the language of Bergson to explain why 
this is so: T he phrases feel dead in exactly the same way as cliches in bad 
poetry do. It is only by a certain unexpectedness of phrasing that a 
certain feeling of conviction is carried over, and you feel that the man 
was actually describing something real, that he had seen something at 
first hand [...] the point is, that any image or metaphor in time becomes 
conventionalised, and so ceases to convey any concrete meaning. The 
result o f this is that you must have freshness and unexpectedness in any 
art, not just because there is anything desirable in freshness p er  se, but 
because, owing to this law which I have just sketched out- that of the 
inevitable decay of metaphors-it is only be means of freshness that one 
can be convincing. This makes my position clear in regard to the dead 
phrases by which Conservatism expresses itself. I don’t object to them  
because they are old [...] but because 1 realise most intensely, both from 
my own experience and from conversation with the type of intellectual I
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have been discussing, that these phrases now carry no conviction. They 
must be restated in order to appear real at all’ (Hulme, 1994 : 217). 
Hulme saw his work in poetry and his political writings as both doing the 
same thing; rejuvenating the language by reattaching it to emotional 
reality. And the view of language he has is firmly Bergsonian.
This shows that Hulme’s earliest political philosophy has Bergsonian 
roots. What it doesn’t explain is why Hulme chose to become a Tory in 
the first place. This question has two answers.
The first is related to Hulme’s deepest emotional convictions. As we 
have seen, Hulme was always influenced by fin de siècle pessimism. He 
was terrified that the rise o f science and rationality would destroy the 
world of values. This led him to an extreme distrust of Modernity p er  se. 
As we have seen, he always counterpointed the uncertainty and flux of 
the modern world with the sense o f reassurance he got from  
contemplating the past, and the sense o f tradition. Liberalism and 
Socialism seemed to Hulme to proclaim that there was such a thing as 
‘progress’, which denied the validity o f this tradition. He turned to 
Bergson because this seemed like a way of finding a new language to 
express metaphysical (or at least quasi-metaphysical) truths, and a way 
of combating intellectualism (which had produced the scientific 
worldview). As his later articles make clear, it is precisely because 
Socialism and Liberalism appeared to be rational that he opposed them.
There is another reason that Hulme opposed these philosophies; what 
he saw as their egalitarianism. Again, to understand this, we must go
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back to his earliest thought. In the world o f modernity Hulme had argued 
that one must stress the concrete over the abstract, what could be 
sensuously experienced over intellectual constructions. Therefore words 
such as ‘society’ and ‘community’ were abstractions. And it was in 
response to this thinking that he was led to posit an egoistic philosophy, 
strongly indebted to Nietzsche. But there were, according to Hulme, 
always going to be those who realised this and had the ‘desire for strong 
arms, desire to kill, resolution to shake off social convention and to do 
it’ and those who did not. This distinction Hulme called ‘The knife order’ 
(Hulme, 1994 : 11). Therefore, he argued, egalitarianism was fallacious; 
society would always be stratified. The weak would always be dominated 
by the strong. And political theories that ignored these ‘facts’ could only  
lead to disaster.
But this still doesn’t answer the question of why Hulme became 
politically active a t this time. The answer lies in the current political 
situation. After twenty years o f Conservative rule, the world of politics 
had been shocked by the Liberal landslide of 1906. However for the next 
five years the Liberal reforms were blocked by the Tory dominated House 
of Lords.In 1907, four reformist Land bills were rejected or wrecked by 
the Lords. For the next two years the stalemate continued, until in 1909  
Lloyd George attempted to pass the reforming Finance Bill. It was passed 
by the Commons but rejected by the Lords, and Asquith immediately 
dissolved Parliament and called a new General Election. The Liberals won 
(in alliance with other parties they had a working majority) but the
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conflict continued. The Liberals introduced a Reform bill which would 
restrict the power of the House o f Lords; and of course it was blocked by 
the Lords. Another General Election was called. This time the major issue 
was Parliamentary reform; and the Liberals won again.The reform bill was 
reintroduced on 21st February 1911 (the day before Hulme’s first article 
for the Commentator), and, after bitter political infighting, was passed in 
August (Aikin, 1972).
For the previous four years, then, the Conservative party had faced 
nothing but defeat. Increasingly it looked as if the future might belong 
solely to the Liberals and the Labour party. As Hulme makes clear in his 
article ‘Progress and Democracy’ he was afraid of the increasing 
contempt that was being shown towards the House of Lords. He was 
afraid, moreover, that this was symptomatic of a general trend, that the 
move towards ‘pure’ democracy (or single chamber government) would 
result in a victory for simple minded egalitarianism, and would therefore 
run the risk of the ‘tyranny of the masses’.^  Moreover, abolishing 
institutions of the past would again implicitly acknowledge that political 
systems could progress, with all that that that implied. Looking for
5 Hulme’s political position here is closest, not to orthodox Conservatism, but to that group of 
‘radical aristocrats’ that Gregory Philips calls the ‘Diehards’. Certainly, his description of their beliefs 
recalls Hulme’s  own opinions ‘The Diehards did believe that they were living through a time of 
national and and international crisis there was a strong desire to preserve as much of the old 
order as possible’ (Philips, 1979 :111). They, too, became politically active when the House of 
Lords was threatened, which they believed would lead to disaster. And like Hulme, (and unlike 
democratic Conservatives), they had an instinctive dislike of democracy perse. However, as with 
Hulme, the Diehards were not just straightforward reactionaries: instead, they were prepared to be 
innovative, even radical in defence of what they saw as British traditions. It was the Diehards who 
were behind much of the Unionist agitation that Dangerfleld saw as being part of the death of 
English Liberalism, In The Strange Death of Liberal England. If this analysis is correct, It is not 
inconceivable that a hidden reason Hulme would have dislike the Left Is for their anti-imperialism ; 
given Yeats’s  Nationalist past, it may throw light on why he opposed Yeats’s aesthetic as well 
(Philips, 1979).314
evidence that pure democracy had always led to catastrophe Hulme was 
led to read such writers as Flinders Petrie, whose book Revolutions o f  
Civilisation contained the Spenglerian idea that all civilisations ‘pass from 
archaic simplicity through the perfection of the best period to their final 
decay’ (Hulme, 1994 : 224) (this book was also influential on Yeats). This 
decay is of course associated with democracy.
Hulme was by no means alone in holding these views. The editor o f The 
New Age himself, A. R. Orage, was writing articles at the same time that 
are strikingly similar to Hulme’s. These articles were written to examine 
the philosophies o f Liberalism and Socialism. He concluded that progress 
was a myth and that ‘man is a fixed species’ (Martin, 1967 : 215). Orage 
uses a touchstone that Hulme was to use, that of political ‘sanity’, to 
argue that the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity ‘have done more 
harm and less good than any trinity ever invented. The world will never 
be sane till it forgets them ’ (Martin, 1967 : 217). Against these secular, 
materialistic ideas, Orage asserts the religious. Like Hulme, Orage was 
terrified that morality and aesthetics would collapse if a materialist 
viewpoint was ever generally adopted; he therefore stresses that 
adoption of a ‘fixed’ religious set o f standards must be accepted before 
rational discussion of politics and morality could take place. Against all 
the ‘cross purposes’ of liberalism Orage counterpoints ‘the very oldest 
idea of all, the theory o f the Fall and Redemption’ (Martin, 1967 : 216).
He was not the first to do so. As early as 1908, G. K. Chesterton had 
written in praise of Original Sin in The New Age, and this aspect of his
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thought was shortly to be taken over by Hulme. All that remained was to 
diagnose where the illness that denied The Fall had originated. This 
Pound's friend Allen Upward achieved in 1910 (in The New Age), when he 
stated: “The Superstition set up by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the 
Eighteenth Century is generally known as the Religion of Humanity [...] t 
is simply a worship, with no more reason in it than the worship o f cats 
[...] The theory of Rousseau and Volney, of Paine and Shelley is that man 
was born without sin, and that he has been deliberately enslaved and 
degraded by kings and priests'” (Martin, 1967 : 217). Thus Upward made 
the first link between Rousseauism and Romanticism, linking them as 
symptoms of the same disease, the denial of Religion (especially the 
doctrine o f Original Sin).^
At the same time as these ideas were being formulated in England, 
Nietzsche became increasingly popular in the intellectual circles in which 
Hulme moved (Thatcher, 1970). Orage himself had gone through a 
Nietzschean phase (his first books had been adaptions of Nietzsche 
(Mairet, 1966)). Nietzsche was also particularly influential on J. M. 
Kennedy, A. M. Ludovici, Oscar Levy (colleagues of Hulme's on The New 
Age) and Edward Storer (who we have already met). These writers used 
their misunderstandings of Nietzsche to identify ‘Liberalism, materialism, 
Idealism, Romanticism, and atheism as a complex of ideas often 
associated with one another' (Martin, 1967 : 222) and oppose all of
6 Of course, it is debatable to what extent Rousseau was a Romantic at all, but it is only by 
understanding that for Orage, Hulme and others, Rousseau was the Romantic par excellence, 
that one can understand why they proclaimed their dislike of the movement so vociferously. 
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them J For example in works like Tory Democracy (1906)  Kennedy uses 
the hostility to Romanticism expressed in The Twilight o f  the Idols and 
Nietzsche's dislike of Democracy in order to support the House of Lords, 
and argue in favour of the retention o f the Christian aristocracy that 
Kennedy believed was being threatened by the rise of the middle and 
working classes (Martin, 1967)
All these writers used Nietzsche's anti-Romanticism and his anti­
democratic philosophy (such as his praise of aristocracy and the 
doctrine o f the superman) and ignored or distorted his materialism and 
fundamental optimism. A writer like Edward Storer simply used the 
German philosopher to provide support for his own support of the Tory 
party. It was Storer who probably introduced Hulme to the thought of 
Action Française.
‘Action Française' was a movement that was the brain child of the 
Frenchman Charles Maurras. Disillusioned by what he saw as a decadent 
and declining France (symbolised by the humiliating defeat o f 1870), 
Maurras was also appalled by the relativism and anarchy that ruled the 
literary scene. As Maurras saw it, these were two sides o f the same coin. 
Only be restoring sanity to society could literature be rejuvenated 
(Weber, 1962). Taking his cues from that aspect of Symbolist thought 
that opposed the excesses o f the worst sort of Romanticism by
7 It must be noted that Hulme despised these men, and went out of his way to deprecate them 
(Hulme, 1994). However, their work was symptomatic of the way the political philosophy of The 
New Age was developing, including the thought of men such as Orage, who Hulme definitely did 
admire. For example, Orage dropped the word Socialist from the magazine’s mast head in 1907, 
and the Socialist political commentators who had written for the paper were gradually replaced by 
more right wing Nietzscheans from about 1909 onwards (Carswell, 1977).317
emphasising hardness and precision, Maurras was led to espouse a new 
literature o f ‘Neo-Classicism' (this side o f Symbolism also, o f course, 
inspired Pound (Hughes 1960)).^ .Literature had gone wrong, Maurras 
thought, by taking too much notice of foreign influences, and by 
neglecting the great tradition of French literature in favour of a juvenile 
quest for novelty. A critic has summed up their ideas thus ‘There could 
be no beauty without order, no order without a hierarchy of values, no 
hierarchy without authority both to define and endorse it' (Weber, 1962 
: 9). Maurras therefore moved towards a political philosophy that 
emphasised religion. Royalism, authority and reaction, and that 
disapproved of materialism, democracy, and ‘progressive' ideas 
generally.
Hulme was first introduced to the ideas of Action Française by reading 
'Le Romantisme Français' (1907) by the literary editor of the Action 
Française newspaper, Pierre Lasserre. This book contained many ideas 
already current in The New Age circle. In it Lasserre, (strongly influenced 
by Nietzsche) argues that Romanticism had corrupted Europe by its 
gospel of the individual, and that only by accepting hierarchy could 
society be reformed. As opposed to the Romantic's deification of 
Humanity, Neo-Classicists accepted the reality of Original Sin. Given that 
this was the case, it followed that Utopian ideas were by definition  
unrealistic, and that progressive ideas could only lead to disaster 
(Robinson, 1985 : 109-111). The only hope for France was for a return
8 As well as its links with Symbolism, the school of French reactionary thought that gave birth to the 
Action Française was by no means unlmpllcated in Romanticism proper (Asher, 1995).
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to traditional values.
So far, we can see why Hulme would have found the movement 
attractive; these ideas strongly resembled his own. However, there is one 
aspect o f this line of thinking he found disturbing; Lasserre's attack on 
Bergson. For in his book, Lasserre had argued that Bergsonian philosophy 
was just the latest manifestation of Romanticism.
In this he was in the mainstream of French right wing thought. Until 
1907, Bergson was regarded mainly as a thinker of the right, for what 
were seen as his attacks on rationalism, materialism and determinism (in 
other words for exactly the reasons that Hulme had become a 
Bergsonian) (Schwartz, 1992). His right wing supporters had, however, 
begun to feel uneasy after the publication of Creative Evolution (1907). 
This book developed the concept of ‘inner duration' far beyond what had 
been posited in the earlier books. Moving from psychology to biology, 
Bergson now saw the ‘inner duration' as being the force behind life itself; 
‘life and consciousness are this very ascension [...] a simple flux, a 
continuity of flowing, a becoming' (Bergson, 1911 : 390). Moreover this 
‘becoming' might be the driving force behind evolution itself, forcing life 
into ever more complex forms (Bergson, 1911 : 192) This life force was 
continually pushing material life upwards in a ceaseless attempt for self 
realisation. The end result of this process could not be predicted except 
insofar as it would result in greater complexity (Bergson, 1911).
There were two problems this idea posed for the reactionary right. 
Firstly, if the élan vital was always moving forwards, this seemed to give
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support to the idea of progress. And secondly, if the actions of the life 
force could not be predicted, then the reactionary doctrine that ‘there is 
no new thing under the sun' would come under threat. One of the main 
arguments used by the anti-democratic right (frequently used by Hulme) 
was that since all previous democratic experiments had resulted in 
‘disaster', then it was by definition true that all democratic experiments 
in the future would meet the same fate. And this followed from the right- 
wing rejection of ‘novelty' and ‘progress'. According to the right, the 
future would always be like the past, and genuine novelty was impossible.
If, however, the future could n o t be predicted, if Bergson's ‘life force' 
was to be accepted, then perhaps novelty was possible. If it was true that 
Bergson believed this, then he could be seen to defend Progress, which, 
as we have already seen, Hulme now associated with Romanticism. The 
democrats could then argue that while it was true that democracy had 
failed in the past, that was no reason to argue that it could not succeed 
in the future.
Hulme was so disturbed by these ideas that he went to visit Lasserre in 
April 1911 to discuss the matter. Even after these discussions, he was not 
yet prepared to abandon his allegiance to Bergson. However, he admits 
that if it was demonstrated to him that Bergson was a Romantic this 
would call into question the validity of Bergsonian philosophy (Hulme, 
1994 : 164-165). For the period immediately after his encounter with the 
thought o f Action Française, he compromised by accepting that the élan 
vital was a valid concept for the individual, but not for the race (Hulme,
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1994 : 165). However, from now on, Hulme begins to adopt an 
increasingly ambiguous attitude to Bergson. He begins to write (as we 
have seen) under the pseudonym Thom as Gratton' and express anti- 
Bergsonian views using this nom d é  plume, whilst at the same time as 
writing pro-Bergson articles under his own name.
It is important to note that there is no point at which Hulme repudiates 
Bergson. As late as 1913 he published his translation of ‘Introduction to 
Metaphysics'. However, by October 1911 he can write that is beginning 
to come to the conclusion that Bergson was wrong (Hulme, 1994). And 
the articles that he writes in 1912, that state what he is now openly 
calling his ‘Neo-Classicism', make less and less reference to the 
Frenchman. These essays state for the first time that Hulme believed a 
change was coming in Western thought (this idea is strangely reminiscent 
o f Yeats).
It is as a result o f these ideas and experiences that Hulme wrote his two 
most famous essays; ‘A Tory Philosophy' (published early in 1912) and 
‘Romanticism and Classicism'. These are the first essays that state what 
would become known as the ‘Neo-Classical' position, which would be so 
influential on T.S. Eliot and Wyndham Lewis. I will concentrate here on 
showing the continuities between Hulme's previous positions and his 
‘Neo- Classicism'.
Hulme begins by restating that rationality is impossible and objective
321
truth does not exist (Hulme, 1994 : 233).^ He approvingly quotes 
Nietzsche's aphorism ‘Philosophy is Autobiography' and acknowledges 
that there is no chance that his essays will change anyone's mind, since 
people are not swayed by rational argument (Hulme, 1994 : 233). Instead 
he is simply going to define two ways o f looking at the world; ‘Romantic' 
and ‘Classical', and hope he can make people realise that the second is 
the more emotionally satisfying. The idea that there are two basic 
attitudes to life; Romantic and Classical was a staple o f the thought of 
Action Française, and, following Lasserre, Hulme goes on to claim that 
Romanticism was invented by Rousseau (since Hulme continues at times 
to speak approvingly o f Coleridge and Keats, he makes it clear that what 
he really objects to is not so much literary Romanticism as Rousseau's 
optimism).
Hulme then defines his two attitudes. He states that the essential 
difference between the two is that Romantics are optimists and 
Classicists are pessimists. For the Romantic (says Hulme) the increase of 
liberty is a good thing, because Man is naturally good and it is only laws 
that prevent him from acting on his good impulses. As we have seen, 
however, Hulme is immensely sceptical about ideas that posit the innate 
goodness of Man. The Classicist, for Hulme, is someone who believes that 
Man is, if anything, innately evil (or, as Hulme puts it, cursed with 
original sin) and that only traditional rules and values keep him from
9 We should notice in passing, not only that this is a belief that Hulme has held for some time, but 
that anti-rationalism is more normally associated with Romanticism than Neo-Classicism (see 
chapter one). Moreover, when Hulme comes to espouse Antihumanism some years later, his 
anti-rationalism remains In place.322
destroying himself (Hulme, 1994, 234-235).
Hulme then brings in tv/o concepts that we will remember from the 
‘Cinders' document. The first is his disbelief in progress, and the second 
is his intense distrust of Idealist metaphysics. Hulme restates his belief 
(first stated in ‘Cinders') that in the relativistic universe the only thing 
that stays constant is human nature. It follows, therefore, that progress is 
a myth, because regardless of the arrangements of society, human nature 
is static (Hulme, 1994 : 235).
Following from his empirical point o f view, Hulme disbelieved in 
Idealism (we must remember that Bergson had attempted to formulate a 
viewpoint that was neither Idealist nor materialist). It followed that what 
he saw as the Romantic ‘escapist' view point was ridiculous. The 
Romantic, Hulme thought, posited a world o f pure spirit, free of the 
confines of the material world. It was this world that they attempted to 
escape to. However, there was no such world. As he puts it. Romanticism 
gives you 'a kind of exhilaration you get from a sudden sense of release 
from weight, the sense o f lightness and exhilaration you would get from 
rarer air' (Hulme, 1994 : 237). Hulme tries to show that this emotional 
sense is an illusion. You cannot be ‘released' you cannot ‘escape’, 
because there is nowhere to go. (Hulme is caught here, because he wants 
a set o f values that are objective and religious, and yet not, in some 
mysterious way, metaphysical. At this time Hulme deals with this 
problem by being extremely cagey as to whether he is using his religious 
terms, such as ‘original sin' literally or just as metaphors. Later he
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thought he had found a way out of this dilemma when he discovered the 
philosophy of G.E. Moore and Husserl, which, he thought, affirmed 
objectivism within an anti-idealist philosophical framework (Levenson, 
1984)).
To sum up, Hulme writes, ‘The Tory side, I assert, depends on the 
conviction that the nature of man is absolutely fixed and unalterable, and 
that any scheme of social regeneration which presupposes that he can 
alter is doomed to bring about nothing but disaster' (Hulme, 1994 :
241).
In ‘Romanticism and Classicism' he attempts to apply his ‘Tory 
Philosophy' to literature. The remarkable thing about this essay is that it 
shows just how little his view of literature has really changed; in other 
words just how much continuity there is between his earlier, ‘materialist' 
and ‘relativist' position and his ‘Neo-Classicism'. Hulme restates that he 
dislikes rhetoric, and that poetry should use the language o f ordinary 
speech as much as possible. Poetry should avoid metaphysical 
abstractions and focus on the concrete; ‘The great aim is accurate, 
precise and definite description' (Hulme, 1994 : 68). Hulme repeats his 
belief that the ‘counter' language of poetry has run dry, and that what is 
necessary is to reconnect language to the emotions by the use of Images. 
The intellect cannot grasp these images; only the emotional side of man 
understands them (Hulme quotes Bergson to back up his point) (Hulme, 
1994 : 69-70).
Hulme’s case in summary is, therefore, much more limited than it 
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appears to be. What he is really arguing is that Rousseau's optimism will 
no longer do for the modern age. Whereas before, Man looked to the 
future with optimism and hope, now all he sees is the rise o f Godless 
materialism and the concomitant destruction o f aesthetic and moral 
values. In this nightmare (paradoxically) the only worthwhile activity is 
art. The rhetoric of Romanticism, however, has become worn out. 
Henceforth poets must stick much more strictly to the Image than they  
have done before.
Behind all these ideas (and we might say the same about Yeats's) lies a 
grinding pessimism; about Man, art and the future in general. And as we 
have seen, this pessimism was widely held by British intellectuals (and 
not just amongst writers for The New Age. We find an almost exact 
parallel of Hulme's ideas, in, for example Gissing's The Private Papers o f  
Henry Ryecroft (1961)). In some countries (Italy for example, as we will 
see) the rise of industrial capitalism and the new century generally was a 
cause for hope and celebration.
However, in Britain, the mood of the intellectuals, and the country in 
general, could be described thus; in  spite of the infusion of new ideas, 
there was little expressed optimism, and little sense of anticipation 
evident in the nation. The dominant mood was rather a mixed one; 
nostalgia in those who looked backward, apprehension in those who 
looked towards the future' (Hynes, 1968 : 348).
This, then, was the ‘New Classicism'.
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Chapter Nine rWvndham Lewis 
and Vorticism
It was in the beginning o f 1914 that Pound began to describe himself as 
a ‘Vorticisf. In order to explain what he meant by this, we must now turn 
to the early career of Wyndham Lewis.
Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957) was an Anglo-Canadian painter and 
writer, who was to become a decisive influence on the last pre-war phase 
of Anglo- American Modernism. Lewis had gone abroad early in the 
century, and had travelled throughout France and Spain. In France he had 
become acquainted with the philosophy of Bergson, and just as with 
Hulme, this was to be the dominant force on the early part of his writing 
career (up until about 1912. This is the period of the early short stories, 
the early paintings, and the very first drafts o f his novel Tarr). Lewis 
attended lectures by Bergson, and associated with Prince Kropotkin the 
Marxist/Anarchist, and Augustus John, as the older English painter 
produced his most Romantic paintings (Meyers, 1980: 12-25).
In Lewis, we find someone, who, at the beginning at least, had little 
concern with the problems we have discussed up until this point. As a 
painter, and prose writer, he had little concern with the lyric poet's quest 
to access eternity through the moment, nor (at the beginning, as I 
stress), did he have much concern with the problem of relativism. 
Instead, his primary motivation seemed to be dislike of bourgeois 
complacency, a self-conscious interest in outcasts from that Bourgeoisie 
and a fascination with Vitalist philosophy, especially, it need hardly be 
said, Nietzsche and Bergson (all this, of course, was par for the course 
for a young artist growing up in the first decade of the century).
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However, when he moved to England, he became aware of the aesthetic 
debates that were being carried on there, and by the Summer of 1914 his 
aesthetic concerns (if not his actual position) owed much to the interests 
of Pound, Yeats and Hulme.
And as with those three writers, it is important, in order to understand 
Lewis's development, to remember the chronology of his work and 
thought. The most important point to remember at this stage, is that, 
when he returned to Britain in early 1910, he was a self-proclaimed 
Bergsonian. Moreover, he manifested, at this stage, traits that, were he 
any other person, one would not hesitate to call Romantic. He was, that 
is to say, attracted to what he saw a outcasts of bourgeois society; 
tramps, outlaws and criminals. As he wrote himself: ‘During those days 
(i.e. of his European career) I began to get a philosophy [...] Like all 
philosophies, it was built up around the will-as primitive houses are built 
up against a hill, or propped up upon a bog. As a timely expression of 
personal impulses it took the form of a reaction against civilised values.
It was m ilitantly Vitalist (Lewis, 1984 : 125) (my italics). His early 
stories, most of which were published in The New Age, expressed the 
struggle o f Nietzschean Übermensch en to express their individuality 
against the constraining effect of ‘civilised values'. He explicitly 
counterpointed the vitality and ‘authenticity' of his protagonists with 
what he saw as the emotional deadness o f the Bourgeoisie. i In his essay 
of 1910, ‘Our Wild Body' he complains that in Britain, the vital forces of
1 Lewis wrote ‘ The snobbishness [...] of the English middle class, their cold Philistinism, perpetual 
silly sports, all violently repudiated by me, were the constant object of comparison with anything 
that stimulated and amused as did these scenes [i.e. of Breton life]’ (Lewis, 1984 :125).328
the body are tamed and controlled in the artificial cult of ‘the game'. As 
Bergson does in his book Laughter (1913) he argues that habit and 
stereotypical forms of behaviour conspire to repress the Vitalist sense of 
individuality possessed by us all. Moreover, he argues that the artist in 
particular should be in touch with these Vitalist ‘life forces' (Lewis, 1982 
: 254).2
As mentioned before, we must be careful not to read these early stories 
in the light of Lewis's later obsessions. Given Lewis's later reputation, it 
might well be thought that these early stories are in some sense ‘satirical’ 
but that is not the case. Instead, Lewis rewrote the stories after World 
War One (when he had become a ‘Neo-Classicist’ and had decided to 
write satire) to make them more satirical. This was part o f Lewis's 
project at the time; to rewrite almost all o f his pre-war writings, and 
therefore expunge all trace o f Bergsonism, which, partly (as I will show) 
under the influence of Hulme, had now become an embarrassment 
(Michel, 1994 : 15-16),
However, in their original forms these stories are not satirical but 
comic, and their sense o f the comic derives directly from Bergson; 
especially the Bergson o f Laughter. At this time, Lewis, was, as he said, a
2 To understand the dichotomy at the heart of Lewis’s earliest philosophy of art, one must 
remember that he was reading Nietzsche at the same time as he encountered the thought of 
Bergson, and that he accepted the early Nietzsche’s high valuation of the purpose of art (and, 
consequently, the artist). Moreover, (possibly influenced by his friend, the ultra-Romantic Augustus 
John), he seem s to have accepted the Romantic view of the artist as being a visionary, or a seer 
(the similiarities between this view and the early thought of Pound and Yeats do not need to be 
commented on). There is, therefore, a conflict between the Bergsonian strand of his thinking 
(which stresses mass action, and an identification with the crowd), and the more elitist, Nietzschean 
strand in his thought, which tended towards withdrawing from society, and standing aloof. Lewis’s  
early theorising is an attempt to see  if a synthesis of these two world views was possible 
(Normand, 1992 : 12-13).329
Vitalist, a Vitalist, moreover, under the influence of Rousseau (showing 
the differences between his own views and those of The New Age circle). 
T he human personality, I thought, should be left alone, just as it is, in its 
pristine freshness; something like a wild garden-full, naturally, of 
starlight and nightingales, or sunflowers and the sun' (Lewis, 1984 : 125). 
And so the people he wrote about; ‘primitives', were people who still 
possessed this ‘pristine freshness' whose energies had not yet been 
deadened by contact with civilisation. ‘The characters I chose to 
celebrate - Bestre, the Carnac and his wife, Brotcotnaz, le père François - 
were all primitive creatures immersed in life, as much as birds or big, 
obsessed, sun-drunk insects' (Lewis, 1984 : 251)) This can be seen by 
analysing the descriptions o f one of the characters of one of his earliest 
stories ‘Brobdingnag'. One might expect from the title that this might be 
a Swiftian attack on the eponymous character. But this is not the case, 
because Lewis, to repeat, was not at this stage a satirist. Instead 
Brobdingnag is admired for his vitality: ‘He is a glorious and unique 
creature [...] his eyes [...] are great, tender, wise, mocking eyes [...] (he) 
walks softly, with a supple giving of the knees at each step. This probably 
comes from his excessive fondness for the dance [...] in which he was so 
rapid, expert, and resourceful in his youth' (Lewis, 1982 : 292). 
Brobdingnag's one moral failing is that he beats his wife. But even this is 
seen as the flip side of his vitality; ‘the amenity and “sourire" of his 
nature' (Lewis, 1982 : 292) and his flaws are seen as the two sides of the 
same coin. He is a Nietzschean figure; beyond good and evil, yet always
330
exuberantly alive. This zest for life is implicitly contrasted with the living 
death, and sterile morality o f the Bourgeoisie. And as the critic Walter 
Michel (1994) shows, the rest of these early stories are marked by 
empathy with the characters; an empathy that has a Vitalist base.
Lewis spent the next three years o f his life working in London on his 
painting, and attempting to assimilate the new ideas he encountered  
there. He had already encountered Cubism in France, and his earliest 
work in England already shows Cubist influences. The work of the first 
period of his work (until about 1912) shows him attempting to portray 
his Bergsonian philosophy in Cubist terms. In early paintings, such as 
Man and Woman and Two Figures he portrays ‘animal life' held back and 
constrained by the corporeal facts of the body. ‘With their faces inclined 
upward, and their bewildered expressions, these figures show animal life 
struggling toward consciousness, aspiring out of the inertia of the plastic 
vessel' (Kush, 1981 : 46). However, in March 1912, the ‘Exhibition of 
Works by the Italian Futurist Painters' arrived in the Sackville Gallery in 
London, and Lewis’s work soon began to register Futurist influences.
To understand what Futurism was, and why Lewis was attracted to it, 
one must understand the position of the artist in Italy at this time. Italy 
had only been a united country since 1861, and in art, ‘provincialism' 
was the rule, as opposed to any idea o f a truly Italian art (Tisdall, 1977). 
Until recently this was how Italy had remained; provincial and backward. 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, however, Italy had begun to 
industrialise at an astonishing rate (Forgacs, 1990). To a young Italian
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intellectual, stuck in what he might well have seen as a European 
backwater that had produced little in literature and nothing in pictorial 
art for about four hundred years the industrial revolution he saw taking 
place before his very eyes seemed the best chance to shake Italy out of 
its torpor. ‘In the eyes of other countries, Italy is still a land of the dead, 
a vast Pompeii, white with sepulchres. But Italy is being reborn. Its 
political resurgence will be followed by a cultural resurgence. In the land 
inhabited by the illiterate peasant, schools will be set up; in the land 
where doing nothing in the sun was the only available profession millions 
of machines are already roaring,' as the ‘Manifesto of Futurist Painters' of 
1910 puts it (Boccioni et al., 1973 : 25). Thus the ‘triumphant progress 
of science' is to be welcomed because it destroys the ‘docile slaves of 
past tradition' and creates ‘free moderns, who are confident in the 
radiant splendour of our future' (Boccioni et al., 1973 : 24-25). All the 
new technologies were therefore to be embraced and all the new ideas 
that went with them. Futurism was to be a mass movement (as opposed  
to old fashioned patrician authoritarianism). It would attempt to reach 
out to as wide an audience as possible (as opposed to both Symbolist 
elitism, and the patrician attitudes of the (again, old fashioned) Catholic 
Church) and would use every technique; including shock, to shake 
Italians out of their torpor (Tisdall, 1977). The aggressiveness of some of 
these tactics should not obscure the fact that Futurism aspired to be a 
mass movement; it would turn its back on the elitism of the previous 
century (especially, of course, the ivory tower elitism o f the aesthetes)
3 3 2
(As Berghaus puts it ‘The Foundation and Manifesto o f  Futurism implied 
that an aesthetic revolution could only be realised in conjunction with a 
total overhaul of society. Hence, his (i.e. Marinetti's) exaltation of the 
masses and the world o f industrial labour' (Berghaus, 1996 : 47) and, 
later, ‘Marinetti believed that theatre as a form of “cultural combat" 
would lead the artists out o f their ivory towers and give them a chance 
“to participate, like the workers or soldiers, in the battle for world 
progress"' (Berghaus, 1996 : 73)).
The concomitant of this was that anything associated with the past 
would have to be destroyed. Futurists would ‘Destroy the cult of the past, 
the obsession with the ancients, pedantry and academic formalism', and 
‘elevate all attempts at originality, however daring, however violent' 
(Boccioni et al., 1973 : 26) (the reasons for this, in a country practically 
created o f the architecture and art o f the Renaissance and the Romans, 
hardly needs to be stated). And so all philosophers, especially modern 
philosophers, that emphasised dynamic sensation were to be embraced. 
These included Nietzsche, Sorel, Bakunin, and, above all, Bergson 
(Tisdall, 1977).3
In his ‘Futurist Dynamism and French Painting', Boccioni argues that 
attempts to show that Cubism was a Bergsonian art form were doomed to 
failure, because Cubism is ultimately the art of ‘the static, tradition 
française, pure objectivity etc.' (Boccioni, 1973 : 109) (a charge that was 
to be repeated by the Vorticists). Instead only Futurist art could truly
3 The Futurist’s  hatred of the past, was, in fact, the least Bergsonian part of their programme. 
However, like Lewis, they were almost as profoundly influenced by Nietzsche, and they could have 
discovered similar views in works such as Nietzsche’s The Use and Abuse of History (Kern, 1983]. 333
portray the fact that ‘all things move, all things run, all things are rapidly 
changing' (Boccioni et al., 1973 : 27). Boccioni explicitly distances 
himself from other arts, such as the cinema, that one might have thought 
were attempting to do the same thing. ‘Any accusations that we are 
merely being “cinematographic" make us laugh-they are just verbal 
idiocies. We are not trying to split each individual image-we are looking 
for a symbol, or better, a single form, to replace these old concepts of 
division with new concepts o f continuity' (Boccioni, 1973 : 89): and he 
quotes Bergson to back him up (one should compare these statements 
with similar, Vorticist, polemics against the cinema). What Futurist 
painters were trying to do therefore, was to find a dynamic symbol that 
would portray the inner 'élan vitaT of an object. And Boccioni makes it 
clear that it is this use of Bergsonian thought that differentiates Futurism 
from Impressionism (Boccioni, 1973 : 89(see also Dasenbrock, 1985 : 
49-50). These Bergsonian ideas show that ‘Our bodies penetrate the sofas 
upon which we sit, and the sofas penetrate our bodies. The motor bus 
rushes into the houses which it passes, and in their turn, the houses 
throw themselves upon the motor bus and are blended with it' (Boccioni 
et al., 1973 : 28). All categories o f thought which people have built up 
over the centuries are now useless. The distinction between the spectator 
who looks at the art and the artist who produces it no longer exists. ‘The 
construction of pictures has hitherto been foolishly traditional. Painters 
have shown us the objects and the people placed before us. We shall 
henceforth put the spectator in the centre of the picture,' And therefore
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the distinction between the work of art itself and the ‘reality' it is meant 
to portray has also broken down. ‘We would at any price reenter into 
life. Victorious science has nowadays disowned its past in order the 
better to serve the material needs o f our time; we would that art, 
disowning its past, were able to serve at last the intellectual needs which 
are within us' (Boccioni et al., 1973 : 28).
It is obvious why the Bergsonian Lewis would have found Bergsonian 
Futurism exciting. But Lewis was now living in London, and the 
intellectual scene was very different from that of Italy. As we have seen, 
the British intellectual avant-garde based around The New Age was 
dominated by men like Hulme and Orage; men who were terrified o f the 
very ‘flux' that the Futurists embraced. Lewis came under the influence of 
the Futurists in 1912, but shortly afterwards he became exposed to the 
anti-Bergsonian ideas o f Hulme, and the pre-Bergsonian ideas of Pound. 
His work over the next two years might be seen as being an attempt to 
merge all their philosophies. For example his paintings of ‘Timon of 
Athens' are amongst the first o f his paintings to be done in a Futurist 
influenced style. And yet, the subject matter is something no Futurist 
would have chosen. For the Futurist the past was dead; but Lewis was 
already detached and contemplative where the Futurists were not. Lewis 
used Futurism as a method to analyse what interested him; and he would 
not be held back if he became interested in the past (Wagner points out, 
that, while it is true Lewis did not become interested in Hulme's thought 
until slightly later, he would have had access to the same Neo-Classical
335
and anti-Bergsonian writers in Paris under whose influence Hulme 
created his own philosophy. This possibly explains why, right from the 
beginning of his exposure to the movement, Lewis kept a slight distance 
from the more messianic o f its statements (Wagner, 1957 : 7-12)).
To analyse further Lewis's reliance on Bergson in his early work, it is 
necessary to reiterate that he began as a comic writer. He was thus most 
interested in Bergson's theory of the comic, as stated in his book 
Laughter. This made him unusual amongst his contemporaries. Most of 
the artists interested in Bergson were not comic writers and artists, and 
were therefore more interested in the thinking of Creative Evolution, or 
indeed, the last chapter o f Laughter where Bergson describes his own 
theory of art, which he then compares to his theory o f the comic, which 
he views as a different kind of art. Lewis started off, of course, by 
counterpointing the spontaneity of outcasts (criminals, peasants, and, 
implicitly, the artist) with the rigidity of the Bourgeoisie (Norman, 1992 : 
20-23). This can be interpreted in Bergsonian terms, if one remembers 
that Bergson contrasting the spontaneous élan vital with the rigid world 
of the intellect. For Lewis, these people, who were in a sense outside 
society, represented the spontaneous flowing of the emotions, that is to 
say, people who were genuinely free from Bourgeois constrictions.The 
Bourgeoisie represent the ossified world of habit. Lewis at this point went 
out o f the way to identify himself as an artist who was himself outside 
(and, one might infer, superior to) society; he was at this point very  
much the Vitalist Romantic rebel, with leanings towards anarchistic
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egoism.4 And this attitude o f artistic superiority would make Bergson's 
theory o f the comic immediately attractive. Bergson, as we have seen, 
contrasted the inner, turbulent, unpredictable, élan vital (a metaphysical 
notion) with the outer static, dead, and therefore predictable world o f  
matter. The élan vital is the real inner life of an organism. It follows, 
then, that the matter of the body is ‘something mechanical encrusted on 
something living' (Bergson, 1913 : 57) ‘When did the comic come from 
in this case?' he asks. ‘It came from the fact that the [...] living body 
ought to be the perfection of suppleness, the ever-alert activity of a 
principle at work [...] When we see only gracefulness and suppleness in a 
living body, it is because we disregard in it the elements of weight, of 
resistance, and in a word, o f matter; we forget its materiality, and think 
only of its vitality, a vitality which we regard as derived from the very 
principle of intellectual and moral life. Let us suppose however, that our 
attention is drawn to this material side of the body' Then ‘the body is no 
more in our eyes than a heavy and cumbersome vesture, a kind of 
irksome ballast which holds down to earth a soul eager to rise aloft' 
(Bergson, 1913 : 49-50). One can therefore view a human being in two 
ways. We can focus on the inner spontaneous essence, or the soul. Or 
one can concentrate on the outer, hard, immobile material body. This 
last approach is the comic viewpoint. And it follows that ‘The attitudes, 
gestures and movements of the human body are laughable in exact
4 Brown writes They (I.e. Lewis’s  stories) depend on a lively narrative, filtered through the medium 
of a curious, generalising antagonist-raconteur, and the Vitalist self-expressiveness of the 
anti-heroic protagonists whose behavioural singularities are the centre of interest’
(Brown, 1990 : 34-35).
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proportion as that body reminds us o f a mere machine' (Bergson, 1913 : 
2); in other words a creature of mere matter, with no animating soul. As 
we have seen earlier, Bergson thought that only the élan vital could be 
genuinely unpredictable; matter was subject to deterministic physics. It 
follows then that the body is inclined towards habit or automatism; only 
the soul is free. Humans are therefore, permanently at war with 
themselves, between the part of them that wishes freedom (the soul) and 
the part that does not (the body). This is where the comic artist comes 
in. Bergson takes the example of a man who stumbles and falls. Why do 
we laugh? We laugh, says Bergson, because there is an ‘involuntary 
elem ent in this change- clumsiness in fact [...] Through lack of 
elasticity[...] .as a result, in fact, of rigidity' (Bergson, 1913 : 9). In other 
words, when his mind should have compensated for his changed 
circumstances ‘He did nothing of the sort, but continued like a machine 
in the same straight line' (Bergson, 1913 : 10). This, then is the essence 
o f the comic, when mechanistic determined behaviour overwhelms 
spontaneous spiritual behaviour. The role of the comic artist, says 
Bergson, is to notice this, and laugh at it. What we must fear is ‘that each 
one of us, content with paying attention to what affects the essentials of 
life, give way to the easy automatism of acquired habits' (Bergson, 1913 : 
19) [...] ‘This rigidity is the comic, and laughter is its corrective'
(Bergson, 1913 : 21). To be a true Bergsonian comic, one must, 
paradoxically, become less Bergsonian. The Bergsonian artist usually 
attempts to empathise with the inner Bergsonian flux o f a person. But
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this is precisely what the comic artist does n ot do. Instead he 
concentrates solely on the body, in order to laugh at its absurdities, its 
rigidity, its predictability; all so that the object of the laughter, 
chastened, will change his ways, and become more human. Thus there is 
a certain ‘absence of feeling which usually accompanies laughter [...] 
laughter has no greater foe than emotion' The comic artist's most 
characteristic emotion is to ‘look upon life as a disinterested spectator’ 
(Bergson, 1913 : 5) This, and not the empathetic aesthetic, is the side of 
Bergson's thought that Lewis seized upon.
At the same time as he was writing about the freedom o f Breton 
peasants, Lewis was also painting pictures like The Celibate. As the name 
suggests, this is a picture of som eone who has stifled their inner life. 
Their face has become a ‘geometric mask, cold and dehumanised' (Cork, 
1976 :12). Lewis uses his discovery of Cubism to use geometrical forms 
to suggest inner deadness. Throughout 1911 and 1912, this linear side of  
his painting became more pronounced. As we have seen, by this time, 
Lewis had been exposed to both Futurism and Cubism. Lewis was 
interested in the Cubist's technique, but only insofar as it helped him 
express his geometrical tendencies. He was far more interested in 
Futurism. Futurism was bold, iconoclastic, and violent; moreover it 
expressed itself in Bergsonian terms, which Lewis would have approved 
of at this time. However, Lewis of course, was a comic Bergsonian, as 
opposed the empathetic Bergsonism that inspired the Futurists. Lewis had 
no intention of identifying with the flux. Moreover, he had also been
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introduced to T.E.Huime. Hulme was influential on Lewis insofar as he 
introduced the ideas of ‘Neo-Classicism' to him, and also for his 
enthusiasm for modern art in general. What appealed to Lewis about Neo- 
Classicism was its pessimism and from 1912 until 1914 he was to 
increasingly emphasise the abstract and geometrical character of his 
painting (Lewis, 1937).
His acceptance of (some) o f Hulme's philosophy springs from an 
increasingly pessimistic conception of modernity. Lewis began to see the 
rational and organised nature of mass society as threatening the 
spontaneous inner being. This new organisation took the form of cities, 
science, and mankind's increasing enslavement to machines. However, 
whereas someone like D.H. Lawrence, in response to the same threat, 
emphasised the empathetic aspect of Bergsonism, and glorified the flux, 
Lewis's response was to grow increasingly sophisticated in portraying 
these new, static, dehumanising forms o f life, in order to make people 
realise that this was what they were becoming (For Lewis, as for Bergson, 
comedy was an essentially moral form of art; there is therefore a thin 
line between Bergsonian comedy and satire, one that Lewis himself was to 
blur after the war).
The other main reason that Lewis kept at least some distance from 
Futurism right from the beginning, is that the artistic avant garde  in 
England was strongly opposed to the movement. In 1913 A.R. Orage, the 
editor of the New Age had written: ‘I received an invitation to the dinner 
hastily scratched up in honour of Signor Marinetti the Futurist by a
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London committee, but I should as soon think of accepting it as 
accepting an invitation to dine with Barnum's freaks' (Orage, 1974 :
202). This was typical o f the reaction of the time. Pound himself was 
antipathetic to Futurism, as was Hulme. The English avant-garde was 
more pessimistic, less forward looking, more in love with tradition than 
the Italians. Certainly the Italian urgings to break with tradition and 
abolish the past found no converts in London. As Lewis became 
increasingly involved with the Hulme and Pound circle, he became more 
influenced by them.s 
But there is a deeper reason Lewis may have begun to feel increasingly 
wary of Futurism from about 1912 onwards. As we have seen the 
Futurists, following Bergson in their urge to break down barriers, wished 
to abolish the difference between 'art' and 'life'. This meant that the 
privileged Neo-Platonic metaphysical realm of art (posited by both Yeats 
and Pound) was to be abolished. Instead the task would become for the 
artist to aestheticise life. But if this was the case then a number of events 
would follow, and Futurists were beginning to follow the logic of their 
own arguments (Rainey, 1998 : 31-33). For if art was to integrate itself 
with life, then 'the concept o f art will have to be enormously widened  
[...] There is no reason why every activity must of necessity be confined  
to one or other o f those ridiculous limitations which we call music, 
literature, painting etc. [...] THEREFORE EVERY ARTIST WILL BE ABLE TO
5 See, for example, the statement Lewis made in 1915: ‘A point to insist on is that the latest 
movement in the arts is, as well, as a great attempt to find the necessary formulas for our time, 
directed to reverting to ancient standards of taste ' (my italics), a statement that he would certainly 
not have made five years earlier. This phrase can not but remind us of Pater’s  similar statements 
(Lewis, 1969 :97).
341
INVENT A NEW FORM OF ART' (Corradini and Settimelli, 1973 : 146) as a 
Futurist Manifesto of 1913 puts it. And so the fin de siècle idea of the 
artist as a 'social outcast’ would be abolished . Instead, the artist would 
have to become reintegrated with society, even if that society was still a 
capitalist marketplace: 'THE PRODUCER OF ARTISTIC CREATIVITY MUST 
JOIN THE COMMERCIAL ORGANISATION WHICH IS THE MUSCLE OF 
MODERN LIFE. MONEY IS ONE OF THE MOST FORMIDABLY AND BRUTALLY 
SOLID POINTS OF REALITY IN WHICH WE LIVE. IT IS ENOUGH TO TURN TO 
IT TO ELIMINATE ALL POSSIBILITIES OF ERROR AND UNPUNISHED 
JUSTICE' (Corradini and Settimelli, 1973 : 149).
And this, o f course, is where we came in. For it was in response to the 
capitalist valuation of the work of art that Romantic Neo-Platonic 
aesthetics were formulated. Now, however, under the influence of 
Bergson, the privileged metaphysical world of art and the artist were to 
be abolished. And this brought back the spectre of relativism with a 
vengeance, for, according to the Futurists: 'THE KIND OF WORK HAS IN 
ITSELF NO VALUE: IT MAY ACQUIRE A VALUE THROUGH THE CONDITIONS 
IN WHICH IT IS PRODUCED' (Corradini and Settimelli, 1973 : 149). This is 
fundamentally to treat the work of art as a commodity; the fear o f which, 
as we have seen, motivated the Romantics and all who followed them.
The Romantics, o f course (and Yeats and Pound), posited a metaphysical 
realm to give a foundationalist defence o f aesthetic and moral value.
This, however, is what the most advanced Futurists were attacking. The 
idea o f an 'objective' set o f metaphysical values becomes meaningless
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when you have destroyed the metaphysics from which it derives. Nor is 
the aestheticisation o f life as unambiguously positive as it might sound. 
For if everything is art then nothing is art, and who is to tell the 
difference? The spectre of relativism raises its head a g a in .6  Lewis would 
have become aware of these problems through his conversations with 
Pound and Hulme. Both of these men were o f course desperately worried 
that aesthetic and moral values were under attack from the new 
materialism, and from about 1912 onwards, Lewis began to think that 
unrestrained Bergsonism, such as the Futurist's, would help this state of 
affairs to come about. He consequently began to modify his adherence to 
Futurism's praise of the blurring of boundaries. Only by keeping life and 
art firmly separated (as they had been kept by the Symbolists, and of 
course, Pound and Yeats) could art be safeguarded. And so Lewis began 
to revert to a Platonistic approach to metaphysics. Instead of the flowing 
élan vital it was more coherent for an artist to posit a static metaphysical 
world (and therefore set o f values). Thus when Marinetti attempted to 
convert Lewis to Futurism in 1913 the following conversation ensued  
(Lewis claimed later):
’Why don’t you announce you are a Futurist!’ he (Marinetti) asked me squarely. 
'Because I am not one’, I answered, just as point blank and to the point.
6 Which would lead to the possibility of the redundancy of art. ‘What is the use of taking all the 
useful Gods and Goddesses away, and leaving the artist with no role in the social machine, 
except that of entertainer or businessman?’ (Cork, 1985 :245) he asked after the war. This, of course, is 
the theme of all the writers I have deal with in this thesis. In the new ‘social machine’ the artist would 
have no role except that of entertainer (what I have earlier called 'creator of playthings for the 
Bourgeoisie’) or businessman (the role the Futurists aped, but could never achieve). Compare 
Yeats earlier on the 'arts have failed’ and Pound: ‘The art of letters will come to an end before 
A.D. 2000’ (Carpenter, 1988 : 913).
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'Yes. But what’s it matter!’ said he with great impatience.
'It’s most important,’ I replied rather coldly.
'Not at all!’ said he. 'Futurism is good. It is all right’
’Not too bad,’ said I. 'It has its points. But you Wops insist too much on the machine. 
You’re always driving on about these driving-belts, you are always exploding about 
internal combustion. We’ve had machines here in England for donkey’s years. 
They’re no novelty to us.’
'You have never understood your machines! You have never known the ivresse  of 
travelling at a kilometre a minute. Have you ever travelled at a kilometre a minute?’ 
‘Never.’ I shook my head energetically. 'Never. I loathe anything that goes too 
quickly. If it goes too quickly, it is not there’
’It is not there!’ he thundered for this had touched him on the raw. 'It is only when 
it goes quickly that it is there!’
’That is nonsense’, I said. 'I cannot see a thing that is going too quickly.’
’See it - see it! Why should you want to see?’ he exclaimed. 'But you do see it. You see 
it multiplied a thousand times. You see a thousand things instead of one thing’ [...] 
’That’s just what I don’t want to see. I am not a futurist.’ I said. I prefer one thing.’ 
’There is no such thing as one thing.’
'There is if I wish to have it so. And I wish to have it so.’
'You are a monistl’ he said at this, with a contemptuous glance, curling his lip.
’All right. I am not a futurist anyway. Je hais le mouvement qui deplace les lignes.' 
At this quotation he broke into a hundred angry pieces. 'And you "never weep” - I 
know I know. Ah zut alorsl What a thing to be an Englishman!’ (Lewis, 1937 : 103)
This conversation illustrates that Lewis had two main objections to 
Futurism; firstly the worship o f the machine. He states, accurately, that 
Britain had had a century of industrialisation; the notion of the machine 
was not new, (and therefore not liberating) in the same way as it was for 
a comparatively 'backward' country like Italy. Secondly, by 1913, Lewis
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was (he said) falling out of love with Bergsonism. By quoting Baudelaire 
he admitted that he was moving backwards to a pre-Bergsonian Neo- 
Platonic position; even admitting that he was a Monist.
However, one must remember that these statements were uttered 
during an argument; moreover, an argument that Lewis was remembering 
in 1937; twenty five years after it happened, and at the height of his anti- 
Bergsonism. At the time it is doubtful that he would have expressed such 
openly anti-Bergsonian sentiments; certainly, as I will show, an analysis 
of Blast (written in 1914) shows that it was still steeped in Futurist and 
Bergsonian thought. But it does show that, by 1913, Lewis was beginning 
to become uneasy with the implications o f Marinetti's movement. This 
feeling intensified in the run up to the First World War.
Between 1910 and 1912, Lewis had concentrated on his stories and his 
early, Cubist influenced, paintings. However, in 1912 he was introduced 
to Roger Fry; at this point the leading Bloomsbury theorist of the avant- 
garde. It was as a result o f Fry's influence that Lewis's work was placed 
alongside paintings by Picasso, Matisse and Braque in the 'Second Post- 
Impressionist Exhibition' in the October of that year (Cork, 1976 : 48). 
Despite Lewis's later repudiation of Bloomsbury, he must have been 
flattered to have been specially chosen by England's leading artistic 
theorist (Hulme had not begun to write about art at this time) and the 
feeling was mutual. Fry went out o f his way to praise Lewis's efforts. 
Lewis's next task was a commission for a series of paintings to illustrate a 
special edition of Shakespeare's 'Timon of Athens'. As I have said,
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accepting such a commission shows that while Lewis was technically a 
Futurist at this point, he was far from slavishly adhering to Futurist 
dogma. No genuine Futurist would have contemplated illustrating a play 
that was not contemporary, or dealt with a contemporary theme. 
Moreover, it is possible to infer that Lewis was also moving away from  
the Futurist idea of the artist reinventing himself as simply a kind o f  
engineer, with as fixed a place in society. The theme o f Timon is of a 
'nobleman turned misanthrope who is driven into the wilderness by an 
alien and totally materialist society' (Cork, 1976 : 45), and this might 
well be taken as a symbol for Lewis's own position as an artist.
Early in 1913 Fry formed the Omega workshops; and attempt to bring 
together the cream o f British 'progressive' painters in order to create 
such 'practical' things as bedspreads, cushion covers etc. But by this time 
friction was showing between him and Lewis. The Omega project was a 
clear descendant of William Morris’s Arts and Crafts movement, whereas 
Lewis, given his knowledge of the Continental avant-garde, was already 
pushing towards something more revolutionary. Moreover there were 
personal differences between the two men, which manifested themselves 
in bickering about money. Underlying all these differences, however, was 
a more fundamental difference in temperament between Lewis and 
Bloomsbury. For example, the Bloomsbury circle remained implacably 
hostile to Futurism, whereas Lewis was impressed by the Marinetti's 
belligerence (though dubious about some parts o f his programme)
(Cork, 1976). Moreover, what Lewis saw as sentimental Bloomsbury
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optimism was beginning to grate; Lewis had, as we have seen, begun to 
read Hulme, and become influenced by the pessimism of his 'Neo- 
Classicism'. The simmering hostility finally exploded in July, when, after 
yet another fight about money, Lewis cut himself loose from the Omega. 
He took with him three other artists furious with Fry's tightfistedness; 
Etchells, Hamilton and Wadsworth; all artists he had met through the 
Omega (they were to become the backbone of English Vorticism). It was 
at this time, too that he began to think about writing an English Futurist 
Manifesto, to explain clearly the difference between his aesthetic and 
Bloomsbury's. Marinetti apparently heard of these disputes, and hurried 
back to England for another lecture tour; whereas before he had been 
greeted with derision, it now seemed that there was a group o f English 
painters who were working along Futurist lines. He therefore returned in 
November 1913. It is worth bearing in mind, (given his later repudiation 
of the movement) that Lewis was amongst those who organised a banquet 
in Marinetti's honour (Cork, 1976).
However, it was at this very same banquet that Marinetti fatally 
offended Lewis's pride by paying too much attention to the young English 
Futurist painter Nevinson. He compounded his error by addressing a 
letter written the next day to Nevinson, as though Nevinson was the 
leader o f the English Futurists. This was probably decisive in distancing 
Lewis from Futurism. In his notes to the 'Cubist Room' exhibition o f late 
1913, for the first time he began to criticise the movement (Cork, 1976) 
(this is assuming, as seems highly likely, that his conversation with
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Marinetti, reprinted earlier, did not take place in the way that Lewis 
chose to remember it). However, there was no question, as o f yet, o f  
breaking with the Futurist aesthetic. Instead, Lewis's next plan was simply 
to bring English artists together, to create a new 'establishment' to rival 
Bloomsbury. This new grouping was to become the London Group; a non­
partisan association of avant-garde English painters. Though technically 
under Bloomsbury dominion (Sickert) it was in fact far more radical than 
anything Bloomsbury was normally able to countenance. Though it had 
no ostensible aesthetic, it marked the increasing influence of the more 
aggressive theories of Hulme over those of Sickert and Fry. Hulme had by 
now formed his 'Anti-Humanist' philosophy (see below), and was now 
writing frequent reviews o f London Group painters. He also started to 
socialise with them, and it was at this point, in early 1914, that, under 
Hulme's influence, Lewis probably first began to have doubts about 
Bergsonism (it is very difficult to say, because Lewis published few 
articles between 1912 and Summer 1914).
In early 1914 yet another fight occurred; this time between Sickert 
and Lewis. Lewis broke with the London Group, and again he took the 
most uncompromising of his contemporaries with him. This time there 
was to
be no turning back. Lewis and his friends had broken completely with all 
the artistic establishments in London at this time, and, to press home the 
point, the first task he set himself was to set up an alternative and rival 
to the Omega Workshops, to be called the Rebel Art Centre. It should
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again be noted that one of the first things the centre did was to ask 
Marinetti to give yet another talk, which he did in the Spring o f 1914. A 
list of the people who associated with the Centre is a summary of the 
people who have been discussed so far; Pound, Ford Madox Ford, Hulme, 
Lewis, the English painters. Gaudier-Brzeska (a French sculptor and 
painter, who was first discovered by Pound), had also become associated 
with the group (Cork, 1976).
The Rebel Art Centre was on the very 'cutting edge' o f  British avant- 
garde  painting. Yet there was still no talk of a dissociating themselves 
from the broader movements of Continental Modernism, let alone 
forming a separate movement. Lewis sometimes asked people to make 
out cheques to 'The Cubist Art Centre', and as the talks o f Marinetti 
show, there was still no official distancing of themselves from Futurism. 
The name by which they were known was still considered irrelevant, and 
they seemed as happy to be called Cubists or Futurists as anything else 
(Cork, 1976). However, this does not mean that Lewis, Gaudier et al. (let 
alone Pound) were Futurists. For a start, a new influence was starting to 
make itself felt; Expressionism (which at this time mainly meant 
Kandinsky). The English found Kandinsky’s (essentially metaphysical) 
notion of ‘Pure Form' particularly attractive, in that it acted as a balance 
to the Bergsonism of Futurism (In 1913, Boccioni had said that "In 
sculpture, therefore, we are not necessarily looking for pure form, but 
for pure plastic rhythm ' i.e. a moving metaphysical object as opposed to 
a static metaphysical object which was, essentially,what Kandinsky's
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theories argued in favour of) (Boccioni, 1973 : 93). Moreover, by 1914 
Lewis (and many of the others) were beginning to have doubts about the 
Bergsonism that, as they saw it, underlay Futurism (see below).
Nevinson, (mentioned earlier), on the other hand, was far more 
unambiguously attracted to the Italian movement, and after Marinetti 
had failed to convince Lewis that he should openly state his allegiance to 
the movement (in the conversation quoted earlier) he approached 
Nevinson. And so, on June 7 1914, the 'VITAL ENGLISH ART FUTURIST 
MANIFESTO’ was published in The Observer, The Times and the Daily 
Mail. This followed the, by now, standard Futurist format (’HURRAH for 
motors! HURRAH for speed! HURRAH for lightning’ it went in part ) 
(Cork, 1976 : 228-229). However, the really controversial part of the 
manifesto was the last paragraph, when Marinetti and Nevinson claimed 
that 'ATKINSON, BOMBERG, EPSTEIN, ETCHELLS, HAMILTON, NEVINSON, 
ROBERTS, WADSWORTH, WYNDHAM LEWIS’ (Cork, 1976 : 230) were all 
Futurists. This was a list o f practically everyone who was associated with 
the Rebel Art Centre, and Marinetti had no right to make any such 
statement. The artists, who before had not really cared how they were 
referred to, were outraged that Marinetti had so arrogantly annexed 
them to his own movement. This, finally, was the chance Lewis had been 
looking for. He had been planning a Futurist Manifesto of his own since 
the Winter of 1913, and he had been writing it, on and off, since that 
point. Now however, Marinetti’s arrogance had polarised the English 
artists. It would no longer be enough to simply label themselves as
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Futurists. They had to distance themselves from the movement. A new  
name would have to be found. Pound came up with the word 'Vorticisf 
(Lewis, 1937), which he had been using, in his own sense, for the 
previous seven years; and the movement was born (naturally enough, the 
word had occult and mystical overtones (Carpenter, 1988 : 247)). Thus, 
Blast, which was published a month later, was no longer simply an English 
Futurist manifesto. Instead, it had now become the journal o f 'Vorticism'.
Thus, unlike Futurism, (but like Imagisme) Vorticism was not a 
movement with agreed upon goals and ideas. Instead, it was an ad hoc  
movement, created as a response and as a challenge to Cubism, 
Expressionism and (mainly) Futurism. As regards Blast, the original plan 
had been for the magazine to be co-written with Nevinson, the one 
confirmed Futurist, and it was Nevinson who had actually thought of 
naming the magazine Blast (Wees, 1972 : 159). The articles in the 
magazine itself had been written at various points over the previous six 
months. Some of them express allegiance to Futurist ideas, some of 
them, (written later) repudiate the movement. Moreover, its creation was 
essentially polemical, to distance the English from the overbearing 
arrogance of Marinetti. If Marinetti had not published his English Futurist 
Manifesto, there is no doubt that Blast would have been published, but as 
a Futurist, not a Vorticist, Manifesto.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Vorticism is a meaningless 
concept. For, as we have seen, despite the fact that Lewis was basically a 
Futurist, he had major differences with the Italian movement,
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differences, which were, moreover, getting wider. And so. Blast is 
significant not just in itself, but as a harbinger of the changes that were 
going to take place in Lewis’s own aesthetic after the war (In this chapter 
I will be discussing mainly the manifestos published in Blast I should add 
that there was also a Vorticist play T he Enemy of the Stars’ which was, 
again, clearly influenced by German Expressionism. As it does not deal 
specifically with the themes I am dealing with here, however, discussion 
of it is outwith the scope of this dissertation. See Materer, 1976 and 
Dasenbrock, 1985).
Vorticism is, therefore, Lewis’s attempt to take what he views as 
important out of Futurism and balance it with the new discovery of 
Expressionism (which, to repeat, at this point meant Kandinsky). 
Surprisingly, Lewis (even though Vorticism ostensibly consisted of a wide 
variety o f artists, only Lewis, Pound and Gaudier-Brzeska actually wrote 
manifestos. Pound’s section will be deal with later, but Lewis wrote by far 
the majority of Blast : it is therefore reasonable to view the movement in 
his terms) rarely mentions Cubism. Cubism was a movement he had not 
really been interested in since 1912, and it was moreover, not a 
metaphysical movement (as Expressionism and Futurism certainly were). 
Cubism therefore had little interest for Lewis, and is little discussed in 
Blast's flrst issue (In Blasts  second, and final, issue, he wrote ‘the whole 
of the modern movement, is, we maintain, under a cloud. That cloud is 
the exquisite, and accomplished, but discouraged and sentimental, and 
inactive, personality of Picasso. We must disinculpate ourselves of Picasso
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at once’ and continues 'We applaud the vivacity and high-spirits of the 
Italian Futurists’ (Lewis, 1967 : 4 1 ))7  
However, despite all this, Lewis still had a number of objections to 
Futurism. Firstly there was its machine worship (or its 'Automobilism’ as 
he calls it (Lewis, 1989 : 33-34)). Lewis echoes Pound in accusing 
Futurism of being mainly 'Impressionism up to date’ i.e. a basically realist 
movement (Lewis, 1967 : 143), one which, moreover, is guilty of 
sentimentally worshipping 'progress’. 'Futurism [...] is in its narrow sense 
and in the history of modern painting, is a picturesque, superficial, and 
romantic rebellion o f young Milanese painters against the Academicism  
that surrounded them’ (Lewis, 1967 : 143). He therefore sees that 
Futurism is a reaction to Italy’s backwardness, and the speed o f its 
industrialisation. But note this is in its narrower sense; Lewis is aware 
that there is more to it than this. His deeper objection is to their 
optimism. Lewis himself, in 'The New Egos’ portrays a bleaker view of 
the future than the fundamentally naive vision of the Italians. Because of 
the new mass culture that is arising, Lewis argued, humanity begins to 
lose its respect for the individual, and, instead, value the idea of the 
group; 'We are all today (possibly with a coldness reminiscent of the 
insect world) in each other’s vitals-overlap, intersect, and are Siamese to 
any extent’. This does not mean that modern men are less egotistical 
than men of the past, merely that their 'egoism takes a different form’. 
Moreover, because of the exigencies o f organising people in a mass
7 And see Lewis’s vigorous defence of Futurism in July 1914, after the publication of Blast Issue 
One, in an essay entitled (significantly) ‘A Futurist’s Reply to Mr G.K. Chesterton’ (Lewis, 1989). 353
society, society becomes rationalised (Lewis’s thought seems to have 
affinities with Weber here) 'such separating things as love, friendship, 
hatred, are superseded by a more realistic and logical passion’. Thus in 
the modern world, rationality takes the place of emotion, the mass takes 
the place of the individual, and therefore, 'Dehumanisation is the 
diagnostic o f the modern world’ (Lewis, 1967 : 141). Looking into the 
future, Lewis foresees a state in which individuality will be extinguished 
by a rationalised (and omnipresent) state apparatus: 'We all foresee [...] 
in a century or so men and women being put to be at 7 o’clock by a state 
nurse (separate beds, o f course!)’ (Lewis, 1967 : 144).
Now the language of this passage is strongly reminiscent o f Bergson’s 
language in Laughter {Cf, Bergson, 1913 : 20-21).s The difference is that 
Bergson optimistically portrayed society as attempting to encourage 
individuality; in other words the comedian (who does the same thing) 
was, in Bergson’s view, incorporated into society and working for  
society. Lewis is, however, more pessimistic. For him it is modern society 
itse if that is the problem. Instead of encouraging individuality, but being 
held back by the the persistent few who insist on acting in the 
stereotyped attitudes of the slave, Lewis, instead, sees modern society as 
a whole as being intent on exterminating individuality. The comic artist is 
therefore outside of society laughing not at individuals, (or not just at 
individuals) but at society en masse. The Futurists had welcomed the new  
and looked forward to a brighter future. Lewis, however, anticipated a 
future in which genuine individuality would be exterminated, because the
8 As well as Bergson, there are clear echoes of Nietzsche in Blast (Bridgewater, 1972).
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élan vital that created an individual’s freedom would have become 
completely suppressed by the oppressive forces o f the new machine 
civilisation, (there is of course no precedent for this belief in Bergson’s 
own theories.) ’Human insanity has never flowered so colossally’ as he 
puts it (Lewis, 1967 : 145).
Whether Lewis had moved away from Bergson in other respects is not 
clear. Since, as a comic artist, Lewis was less interested in the interior of 
a person and more interested in the exterior, he rarely discusses the 
empathetic aesthetic which is the basis o f conventional Bergsonism. 
Nevertheless, at times his language is strongly Bergsonian^ and it is clear 
that he views art as a metaphysical and internal capability and one that is 
under threat by the increasing materialism of the modern age. As we 
have seen, Lewis had begun to see (no matter that he remained a 
Bergsonian in other ways) that the Bergsonian emphasis on blurring 
boundaries might lead to relativism. Much o f Blast is therefore an 
attempt to argue against this part of the Futurist programme. When he 
writes ‘Our vortex insists on water tight compartments’ (Lewis, 1967 : 
147) he is stating the most profound difference between Futurism and 
Vorticism. Futurism o f course, wanted to blur every distinction, 
especially the distinction between art and life. However, if there is one 
thing Lewis insists on over and over again, it is that art and life must be 
kept firmly separated. On a deeper level than merely that they were 
realists, this is his major objection to the Impressionists and the
9 For example, compare ‘Comedy lies midway between art and life' (Bergson, 1913 :170) and 
‘It is all a matter of the most delicate adjustment between the voracity of Art and digestive quality of 
Life’ (Lewis, 1967 :134). There are numerous other examples.355
Futurists. His essay ‘“Life is the Important thing!”’ (the title is of course 
ironic) is an attempt to show that Impressionism posited Life and Nature 
as being the same thing. Therefore, by concentrating on painting Nature, 
they were inadvertently promoting the myth that only Nature (and 
therefore Life) is o f any consequence, and that art is parasitic upon it. 
Lewis is uncompromising. ‘For those men who look to Nature for 
support, she does not care. “Life” is a hospital for the weak and 
incompetent. “Life” is a retreat for the defeated [...] There is only one 
thing better than life [...] and that is something very abstruse and 
splendid, in no way directly dependent on “Life”. It is no EQUIVALENT for 
life, but ANOTHER life, as necessary to existence as the former’ (Lewis, 
1967 : 136). This other ‘thing’ is, of course, the metaphysical world of  
art. And so, in the same way, the Futurists do the same thing. The 
difference is that the Impressionists inadvertent/y blurred the distinction 
between art and life, whereas the Futurists did it explicitly; on the 
contrary, they proclaimed it. In his long essay ‘Futurism, Magic and Life’, 
Lewis argues that the main problem with Futurism is that ‘Everywhere 
LIFE is said instead of ART’ and that ‘In Northern Europe, for the last half 
century the intellectual world has developed savagely in one direction- 
that o f Life’ (Lewis, 1967 : 132).
But why did Lewis oppose this trend so vehemently? One reason is that 
he identified the increasing dehumanising effect of mass culture as part 
of a trend of blurring distinctions between life and art, the individuals 
and the mass. And the result o f this was that the artist, who previousiy
356
had a specified role in society, finds himself in a more and more 
ambiguous situation. And this lets in the spectre of relativism; the ghost 
that had terrified Yeats, Pound and Hulme. In ‘Relativism and Picasso’s 
Latest Work’, Lewis discusses Picasso’s sculpture, and it is obvious that 
what worries him about it is that it blurs the distinction between 
sculpture and engineering. ‘They (i.e. the sculptures) imitate like 
children the large, unconscious, serious machines and contrivances of 
modern life [...] Most of Picasso’s work (on canvas as well) is a kind of 
machinery. Yet these machines neither propel nor make any known 
thing; they are machines without a purpose’ (Lewis, 1967 ; 140). What 
Lewis is saying here, is that in an advanced capitalist industrial society, 
the people with the real power are businessmen and the men who build 
the machines which enable capital to function; engineers. It is therefore, 
natural for the artist, whose position is jeopardised by the industrial 
process which businessmen control (and the cultural effects o f this 
process; the title of the essay is significant here), to don, as it were, the 
robes of the powerful in an attempt to justify their own existence. And 
so, (says Lewis), artists increasingly pretend to be businessmen or 
e n g i n e e r s .  10 What Lewis points out is that this approach is doomed to 
failure. Picasso’s sculptures pretend to be machines; i.e. to be useful in a
utilitarian way; but o f course it is a bluff; they are not really useful in this
10 Lewis would have become aware of this new attitude simply by studying the Futurists. ‘One 
notes, for example, that the Futurists’ image of themselves as artists, their attitudes towards society 
and their methods differed markedly from those who preceded them [...] Rather than accepting and 
propagating the comfortable clichés about the artist as a dishevelled but proud escapist loner, they 
were fashionably dressed and appeared easy-going: their projected image was that of energetic 
and powerful world leaders or industrialists [...] the Futurists faced the fact that in order to put their 
creative views across they had to employ the methods (and some of the attitudes) of the controlling 
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sense at all. ‘A work o f art could not start from such a purpose as the 
manufacture of nibs or nails’. Picasso’s sculptures, says Lewis, are caught 
between two stools; they are of no use as machines, yet because o f their 
faux utilitarian uses, they cannot be art either. And so Picasso’s art 
merely makes us ask Tn the experiments of modern art we come face to 
face with the question of the raison d'etre  o f Art more acutely than 
before, and the answer comes more clearly and unexpectedly’ (Lewis, 
1967 : 140). As the title of the essay implies Lewis’s worry was that in the 
modern world art would be shown to have no raison d ’etre; that the 
system of values that had upheld Western art since the dawn of the 
Christian era would be destroyed by relativistic philosophy and the 
repressive trend of twentieth century culture (his reasons for the rise of 
relativism are, therefore, slightly different from Yeats’s, but the end 
result is the same). Picasso’s sculpture, by blurring the distinction 
between art (sculpture) and life (machinery) could help create a state of 
affairs where this could become possible.
In affirming (in defiance o f Bergson) that boundaries must not be 
blurred, Lewis was led to question the deepest assumption of Bergsonism; 
that the real metaphysical world behind the world o f appearances was 
one o f flux. It was because o f this assumption that the Futurists had 
ended up along a course, that, Lewis thought, might end up in a world of 
(as he put it later) Men W ithout A r t  Now, Lewis had become influenced 
by Hulme’s theories of original sin and by his concern for the future of 
value, and it might well be thought that he might have gone along the
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route of Hulme; that is, attempting to find an objectivist, but non­
metaphysical basis for moral and aesthetic standards (as Hulme was to 
find, around 1915, in the work o f Husserl and Moore). But he did not do 
this. Instead, he began to reconsider his support for the metaphysical 
‘flux’, which, Bergson had claimed underlay reality. Given that, when  
taken to its logical conclusion, it seemed to lead to undesirable 
consequences, might it not be better to revert to the older view (which 
his close friend Pound already held) that metaphysical reality consisted  
of stasis and not Hux? He would have been helped along this road by his 
discovery, early in 1914, of the Expressionists; specifically Kandinsky. 
Edward Wadsworth, a fellow painter, had written an essay, ‘Inner 
Necessity’ for Blast, that quoted extensively from Kandinsky’s ‘On the 
Spiritual In Art’ and Pound especially found Kandinsky’s theories to be 
congenial (In his ‘Vortex’, he wrote ‘Picasso and Kandinsky, father and 
mother of the movement (i.e. Vorticism) (Pound, 1967 : 154)).
Kandinsky had written, in a manifesto published in Blast, that the basic 
force of art was Inner Necessity, which he defined as: ‘The inevitable 
desire to express the objective [...] which extracts ONE universal form 
from the subjective’ and that the development of art is ‘a progressive 
expression of the eternally objective within the temporarily subjective’ 
(Wadsworth, 1967 : 120). This concentration on the metaphysically 
objective and eternal fitted in well with Pound’s Neo-Platonism, as did his 
emphasis on mystical form (this seems to have been the inspiration for
11 Because he was a metaphysical thinker; moreover, an Idealist (to the point of praising Bishop 
Berkeley, in which he was preceded, of course, by Yeats) (Materer, 1979).359
Lewis’s essay on ‘Feng-Shui and Contemporary Form’). It seemed to act as 
a counter to Futurist subjectivism, flux, and formlessness (The Futurists 
themselves seemed to recognise this, with Carra attacking ‘Contemplative 
Idealism’ which he claimed was ‘contaminating the pictorial 
constructions of the Expressionists’ (Carra, 1973 : 111)). And when Lewis 
claims that ‘The Vorticist is at his maximum point of energy when stillest’ 
(in an essay which was one o f the last to be written), he is positing a 
metaphysical position that is closer to Kandinsky’s (and Pound’s) than 
the Futurists (Lewis, 1967 : 1 4 5 ). 12
But this does not mean that Lewis was simply distancing himself from 
Futurism in order to proclaim himself a convert to Expressionism. Lewis’s 
objection to Kandinsky were twofold. Firstly, Kandinsky used his theory 
o f Pure Form to justify abstraction. But Lewis was not an abstractionist. 
He writes ‘The finest Art is not pure Abstraction, nor is it unorganised 
life’ (Lewis, 1967 : 134). As Cork (1976) makes clear, most o f Vorticist 
paintings that look abstract, are, in actual fact, fundamentally 
representational; in fact it is doubtful if an y of the Vorticists ever 
produced genuinely abstract paintings. To deal solely with the 
metaphysical world of pure form would be to go too far, as Lewis implies; 
the Vorticist was to stay outside life, but still in contact with it (cf. 
Dasenbrock (1985) for a discussion of the extent to which the Vorticists 
wished to stay apart from, but in contact with life). Secondly Kandinsky 
was, like the Futurists, too optimistic; ‘there are fields of discord 
untouched’ (Lewis, 1967 : 142) as Lewis writes.
12 For further links between Vorticism and Expressionism, see Weisstein, 1973.360
In conclusion, then, Lewis began as a convinced Bergsonian Futurist, 
but, under the influence o f Hulme and Pound, began to worry that 
abolishing the metaphysical distinction between Art and Life would let in 
relativism, and endanger the position of the artist (the dilemma that 
faced Pater at the beginning of this thesis). To ask whether Blast is 
fundamentally a Futurist magazine or not, is therefore, futile; the 
magazine (written over quite a long period of time) shows Lewis in the 
process o f moving away from Bergson, a process that would not be 
complete until after the war. His Vorticism, as he sums it up at the end, 
is edging towards Neo-Platonism: ‘Life is the Past and the Future; the 
Present is Art’ he concludes ‘the Past and the Future are the Prostitutes 
Nature has provided. Art is periodic escapes from this Brothel’ (Lewis, 
1967 : 148). Art is therefore posited as being a timeless metaphysical 
world; an escape from ‘reality’. And this is where Lewis’s views agree with 
those of Pound.
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Chapter Ten: Ezra Pound and
Vorticism.
We have seen, then, that Lewis saw Vorticism as a way to take on board 
the innovations of Futurism, whilst at the same time avoiding their 
‘Romantic’ exaltation of the machine, and safeguarding the position of art. 
However, Pound was also associated with the movement, and yet he came 
from a very different background from Lewis. What, then, did Pound mean 
by the word Vorticism?
Before we can discuss this, we must return to the thought o f T.E.Hulme.
As we have seen, by 1912, Hulme had evolved a theory of ‘Neo-Classicism’. 
However, in 1913 he discovered Byzantine art, and the theories of Wilhelm 
Worringer and it was under the influence of these two that Hulme’s Neo- 
Classicism became ‘Anti-Humanism’. In his book Abstraction and Empathy, 
Worringer had argued that there were two basic artistic urges. Empathy (or 
which manifested itself in terms of Realism) and Abstraction. Worringer 
argued that the initial artistic impulse in humanity had been towards 
abstraction, not representation. This was because ‘the urge to abstraction is 
the outcome o f a great inner unrest inspired in man by the phenomena of 
the outside world; in a religious sense it corresponds to a strongly 
transcendental tinge to all notions’ (Worringer, 1953 : 15). Primitive people 
were terrified of relativism and the flux o f reality, and thus had ‘an 
immense need for tranquillity’ (Worringer, 1953 : 16). Therefore: ‘The 
primitive artistic impulse has nothing to do with the rendering of nature. It 
seeks after pure abstraction as the only possibility of repose within the 
confusion and obscurity of the world-picture, and creates out of itself, with 
instinctive necessity, geometric abstraction. It is the consummate
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expression, and the only expression o f which man can conceive, of 
emancipation from all the contingency and temporality of the world- 
picture [...] he wishes to purify it (i.e. the artistic object) of life and 
temporality’. The best form of art to do this, for Worringer is the 
‘crystalline-geometric’ (Worringer, 1953 : 44). Primitive man, for 
Worringer, was terrified of the flux o f reality, and hankered after 
metaphysical certainties. Worringer can therefore argue that ancient 
peoples were, in a sense, primitive Kantians, desperate to perceive the 
‘thing in itse lf (Worringer, 1953 : 18). The timelessness of this 'Ding an 
SiclŸ would be represented by regularity and its ‘antihuman’ metaphysical 
nature, by the use of geometrical, ‘inorganic’ forms (Worringer, 1953 : 42). 
The religious form this will tend to take will be of monotheistic objectivism  
(or Neo-Platonism).
As Man develops, however, he ‘masters’ nature, by means of technology. 
He will begin to feel that he is ‘at home in the world’ (Worringer, 1953 :
45) and that life is good. He will no longer have the need for redemption 
from the world of appearances. Instead, he will start to trust his senses. He 
will cease to believe in the ‘real’ metaphysical world that lies behind the 
world o f the senses. ‘It is men o f this earthly world who find satisfaction in 
[...] naturalism’ (Worringer, 1953 : 48). He will anthropomorphise the 
world, and see his own vitality reflected in it; his ‘artistic volition inclines 
towards the truth of organic life, that is, towards naturalism’ (Worringer, 
1953 : 14). Worringer uses the language of Bergson here to make it clear 
that he views this attitude, which he calls the ‘Classical’ attitude (by which
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he means Classicism as understood by the artists o f the Renaissance) as 
being Vitalist. Thus, realist artists support temporality as opposed to 
timelessness, the world of the senses as opposed to metaphysics, optimism  
as opposed to the desire for redemption, life as opposed to death. 
Worringer therefore views the history of Humanity as being one of  
Bergsonian vitalism versus Kantian (or Platonic) metaphysics. This was a 
view of the world that appealed to Hulme, and it is obvious that following 
Worringer, Hulme now began to think that realist art itself was associated 
with the ‘progressive’ ‘relativist’ world view he despised and feared. At the 
same time as he was reading Worringer, he saw Byzantine abstract art for 
the first time, as was obviously impressed by what he saw as their 
superiority to the tradition o f ‘Western’ Renaissance realism (Hulme, 
1994).
And so, as he had done with Bergson, Hulme cannibalised Worringer’s 
philosophy to get what he wanted out of it. He stopped using the phrase 
Neo-Classical (mainly because Worringer had used that phrase to mean the 
Renaissance; cf. Levenson) and substituted the new phrase ‘Anti-Humanist’ 
(Humanism, o f course, being associated with the Renaissance). The major 
change he makes in his appropriation is that while Worringer’s theories 
were purely descriptive, Hulme’s were prescriptive. Hulme states openly  
that he prefers the ‘Abstract’ worldview, which Worringer never does 
(although one might infer it from his general presentation). As we have 
seen, Hulme had already decided what he calls the ‘Renaissance attitude’ 
(secularism, relativism, rationality) was breaking up, and that it would be
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replaced by its opposite; a new sociopolitical arrangement that would be 
objectivist in ethics and aesthetics. And so, when Hulme saw Cubist and 
Futurist paintings for the first time, he immediately decided that this was a 
sign that Western Art was returning to abstraction. He then made the even  
bigger assumption that because this was the case, the metaphysical outlook  
that inspired older abstract art (such as the Byzantine) would also return. 
As he says himself: 'I recognised this geometrical character reemerging in 
modern a rf (Hulme, 1994 : 271). This seemed to confirm that a 'Neo- 
Classical' or 'Anti-Humanist' worldview would soon envelop the world. 
Hulme's philosophy o f art therefore develops out of his 'Neo-Classical' 
dislike o f 'the Renaissance attitude' (cf. Levenson, (1984) for a discussion  
of this. Levenson emphasises the difference between Hulme's Neo- 
Classicism and his Anti-Humanism more than I do, but the basic points we 
make are the same).
When he begins to discuss his 'new' philosophy we will therefore not be 
surprised to discover that the continuity o f his position is much more 
striking than any changes. He is keen, as before, to state that just because 
he is championing modern art, this does not mean that he in any way 
approves o f 'novelty' (Hulme, 1994 : 263). On the contrary, just as with 
Neo-Classicism, this new kind of art is in actual fact a return to the values 
of the past; specifically the non-representational art of ancient Egypt and 
Byzantium. Hulme has created a theory and then argues back to look at 
the actual art that he believes exemplifies it. He is not, therefore, interested  
in all modern art; merely the art that confirms his own beliefs. He therefore
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divides Modern Art into three main groups; Tost Impressionism, analytical 
Cubism and a new constructive geometrical art’ (Hulme, 1994 : 264) and 
makes it clear he will only talk about the third kind. As he writes: 'You get 
at the present moment in Europe a most extraordinary confusion in art [...] 
So confusing is it that most people lump it altogether as one movement and 
are unaware that it is in fact composed of a great many distinct and even 
contradictory elements [...] When I speak of a new complex geometrical art 
then, I am not thinking of the whole movement. I am speaking of one 
element which seems to be gradually hardening out, and separating itself 
from the others. I don’t want anyone to suppose, for example, that I am  
speaking of Futurism which is, in its logical form, the exact opposite o f the 
art I am describing, being the deification of the flux, the last efflorescence 
of impressionism [...] I also exclude [...] post-impressionism’ (Hulme, 1994  
: 277). (These are of course, almost exactly the words with which Pound 
condemned Futurism in Gaudier-Brzeska and Lewis condemned it in Blast). 
Hulme’s criticism is more searching, however. As well as describing 
Futurism as 'impressionist’ (i.e. a sort of kinetic realism) Hulme also, 
correctly, perceives that the Futurist vision owes a great deal to Bergson, 
and vitalist thought generally. And given his Action Française inspired 
dislike of Bergson, by the logic of his own position, once Hulme saw that 
Bergson inspired the Futurists, he then had to oppose Futurism. Hulme also 
goes out of his way to express his dislike of Cubism, except insofar as it 
inspires 'the new geometric art’ (Hulme, 1994 : 281). Hulme views Cubism 
as a beginning, not an end, as an art form that presages 'geometrical art’
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but that has failed to achieve this end. Hulme saw the school that most 
closely approximated his own ideas as being what we now call Vorticism, 
and this is the only branch of Modern Art he writes of with approval.
In his only major essay on what he believes is happening to art, 'Modern 
art and Its Philosophy’, Hulme gives what is basically a précis  o f Worringer’s 
ideas. Primitive people, he writes, 'Live in a world whose lack 
of order and seeming arbitrariness must inspire them with a certain fear 
[...] In art this state o f mind results in a desire to create certain abstract 
geometrical shapes, which, being durable and permanent shall be a refuge 
from the flux and impermanence o f outside nature’ (Hulme, 1994 : 274). 
This 'fear o f the flux’ Hulme identified with the religious impulse, and of 
course it is paralleled by Hulme’s own fear o f relativism. This attitude came 
to be menaced by ‘rationalism’ (Hulme 1994 : 274) and 'relativism’
(Hulme, 1994 : 275), which eventually led to the Renaissance, and the rise 
of realism. When Hulme talks about the Renaissance he makes clear that 
what he objects to in the Renaissance outlook is what he once objected to 
in Romanticism. 'In the Renaissance [...] you get the hint o f an idea [...] 
which is the opposite of the idea of original sin; the belief that man as a 
part of nature was after all something satisfactory’ (Hulme 1994 : 270).
And so Hulme, in his writing on art, has merely expanded his 'Neo-Classical’ 
ideas. The main difference is that, under the influence o f Worringer, Hulme 
now sees realism itself as being part of the relativism-secularism- 
romanticism-democracy etc. complex of undesirable ideas. Worringer had 
shown (thought Hulme) that not only is the Neo-Classical idea the
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preferable approach to life, it actually predates the Renaissance ideas that 
it was supposed to be a reaction to. Therefore, when the Renaissance 
attitude breaks up, it will not mean that any thing new has happened. On 
the contrary, it will merely mean that Man has returned to his oldest 
beliefs. The 'Anti-human’ is a return to the most primitive view point o f  
humanity, in which 'geometrical regularity’ (Hulme 1994 : 274) is 
counterpointed to the ‘optimistic rationalism’ (Hulme 1994 : 275), which 
Hulme had spent his whole life arguing against. The stasis o f 'dead 
crystalline forms’ is the antithesis o f the cult of 'progress’ (Hulme 1994 : 
274). The art of the future, which would be the art o f the new 'Religious’ 
attitude, would, therefore, be abstract, geometrical, and inorganic. It 
would, in other words, be much like the art of the distant past.
There would be one difference. Instead of patterns, the new art would 
probably model itself on machinery, because, according to Hulme, we now 
live in a world surrounded by machinery, and it is likely that contemporary 
artists will use them for aesthetic ends (Hulme, 1994). These arguments 
are important, because they were obviously a profound influence on 
Wyndham Lewis, and, to a lesser extent, Pound. As we have seen, when 
Lewis came to London he he was a convinced Romantic vitalist. However, by 
the time he came to write B last he was echoing Hulme in his emphasis on 
stasis, 'deadness’ and geometry, and in opposing Bergson (the case is 
different with Pound: Pound was never a Bergsonian). And Pound himself, in 
his own idiosyncratic fashion, was soon to follow Hulme’s move towards 
'Anti- H umanism’.
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On February the Sixteenth 1914 Pound attended the lecture where Hulme 
unveiled his new doctrine of ‘Anti-Humanism’. Pound had little intellectual 
understanding o f what was said, (he called the lecture ‘unintelligible’ 
(Pound, 1980 : 179), but he eagerly jumped on Hulme’s ideas. Pound had 
just left Yeats at Stone Cottage, where, as we have seen, Yeats encouraged 
him in his elitist ideas. Now he returned to England and was pleased to see, 
as he saw it, an even more uncompromising elitism developing. Hulme 
meant Anti-Humanism to mean an anti-metaphysical defence of 
‘objectivism’ in ethics and aesthetics, but for Pound the word meant exactly 
what it said; to be opposed to the majority of humanity. Moreover he 
immediately gave the word an occult and religious twist wholly alien to 
Hulme’s ideas. ‘The artist has for so long been a humanist!’ he wrote 
immediately afterwards. ‘He has had sense enough to know that humanity 
was unbearably stupid and that he must try to disagree with it. But he has 
also tried to lead and persuade it; to save it from itself [...] (but) [...] The 
introduction of djinn, tribal gods, fetishes, etc. into the arts is a happy 
presage [...] The artist has at last been aroused to the fact that the war 
between him and the world is a war without truce. That his only remedy is 
slaughter[...] He knows he is born to rule but he has no intention of trying 
to rule by general franchise [...] Modern civilisation has bred a race with 
brains like those of rabbits and we who are the heirs of the witch-doctor 
and the voodoo, we artists who have been so long the despised are about to 
take over control’ (Pound, 1980 : 180-182).
This last phrase gives the game away, o f course. Modern society had cast
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aside the artist, destroyed the patronage system and made the artist hawk 
his wares in the marketplace to the despised masses. Now however, a 
change was coming. A new tyranny would be established, and artists (such 
as, for example, Ezra Pound), would become the tyrants. Then the masses 
would be made to suffer as Pound and his friends had suffered. The artists 
would have their revenge.
As we will see. Pound disliked Futurism and had little good to say about 
the movement, but he was influenced by at least one aspect of Futurist 
rhetoric; Marinetti’s tone. From now on Pound’s statements will become 
increasingly belligerent, aggressive and contemptuous. The reasons behind  
his adoption of this tone, however, were very different from those o f the 
Futurist. Futurism we will remember, was a mass movement, that attempted 
to use shock tactics to wake the populace out of their apathy. Pound 
however, explicitly dissociates himself from this approach. T he old 
fashioned artist was like a gardener who should wish to turn all his garden 
into trees. The modern artist wishes dung to stay dung’ (Pound, 1980, 180). 
For Pound, hatred and contempt did not lead to to the reform of society. 
They were an end in themselves.
This new ‘Anti-Humanism’ is one aspect of Pound’s Vorticism, and 
accounts for the tone of poems such as ‘Salutation the Third’, first 
published in Blast One.
Let us deride the smugness of The Times':
GUFFAW!
So much the gagged reviewers,
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It will pay them when the worms are wriggling in
their vitals;
These are they who objected to newness,
HERE are their tomb-stones.
They supported the gag and the ring:
A little BLACK BOX contains them.
So shah you be.
You slut-behied obstructionist,
You sworn foe to free speech and good letters.
You fungus, you continuous gangrene' etc. (Pound, 1967 : 45).
But Vorticism was also, for Pound, a development of Imagiste aesthetics.
Pound still wished for his Renaissance, and now he wished to have a
vocabulary with which he could discuss all the arts. In ‘Vortex Pound’ he
writes that the artist relies on the ‘primary pigment of his art; nothing else’
(Pound, 1980 : 151) and that ‘Vorticism is the use of, or the belief in the
use of, THE PRIMARY PIGMENT, straight through all of the arts’ (Pound,
1980 : 6); and he makes it clear that whereas the poet may talk of the
image (‘the primary pigment of poetry is the IMAGE’ (Pound, 1980 : 152))
and the painter something else, the same idea runs through all the arts.
Thus when Pound met the composer George Antheil six years later, he
decided that he was to become a Vorticist composer. Vorticism was a way
of unifying the arts; boiling them down to their basic content (Carpenter,
1988 : 431-436). Pound makes ciear in Blast that behind all these ‘primary
pigments’ lies the ‘Vortex’. It was Pound who named the movement
‘Vorticism’ and as we have seen, he had been using the word almost from
the beginning of his career. What did he mean by it?
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In a negative sense, he meant it to oppose himself to Futurism and 
Impressionism. Wyndham Lewis was deeply influenced by Futurism, and as 
we have seen, for him, Vorticism was, when all was said and done, a variety 
of Futurism (though he may have changed his mind about this in the very 
last months before the war). However, this was not the case for Pound. 
There are few things he hammers home more strongly than that Futurism is 
not Vorticism. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, Pound believed, 
(wrongly) that Futurism was basically a mimetic art ‘a sort o f accelerated 
impressionism’ (Pound, 1980 : 199) whereas Vorticism was not going to be 
mimetic, or at least not mimetic in this simplistic way (of course, the 
Futurists themselves had specifically denied that their art was mimetic in 
this way, in their polemics against the cinema). A Vorticist ‘selects what 
actuality he wishes and excludes the rest ‘(Pound, 1980 : 156). But there 
was a more profound reason as well. Futurism insisted on a break with the 
past; and insisted that the artist must ignore tradition if he wished to truly 
represent modernity. Pound however, insisted that the artist must be a part 
of the tradition if he wished to create at all. ‘All experience rushes into the 
vortex. All the energised past, all the past that is living and is worthy to live. 
All MOMENTUM, which is the past bearing upon us, RACE, RACE MEMORY, 
instinct charging the PLACID NON-ENERGISED PRESENT’ (Pound, 1980 : 151). 
This is a restatement o f Pound’s belief that the true art work embodies the 
past of the race, or tradition. The present without this consciousness of the 
past is dead, ‘non-energised’. In ignoring the past, therefore, the Futurist 
ignores everything that is really important. ‘Impressionism, Futurism [...]
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DENY the Vortex’ (Pound : 1980: 152) (Pound writes T h e Vorticist has not 
this curious tic for destroying past glories. I have no doubt that Italy 
needed Mister Marinetti, but he did not sit on the egg that hatched me, and 
as I am w holly opposed to his aesthetic principles, I see no reason why I, 
and various men who agree with me, should be expected to call ourselves 
Futurists. We do not desire to evade comparison with the past. We prefer 
that the comparison be made by some intelligent person whose idea o f “the 
tradition” is not limited by the conventional taste of four or five centuries 
and one continent’ (Pound, 1980 : 206) (my italics).
So what is the Vortex, then? In his First Vorticist Manifesto, published in 
Blast One, Pound makes clear that the idea of the Vortex developed out of 
the idea o f the the Image, and in fact that the Image is the Poet’s vortex. 
Vorticism is yet another attempt then to clarify Pound’s own poetic. It 
concentrates specifically on the problem of form.^ As we have seen, 
Imagisme had abandoned all outward metrical form, to describe the inner 
mystical form of the object. Pound was clearly worried that this would lead 
to slack technique and formlessness (and it was these concerns that 
eventually led him to abandon vers libre). Pound was also worried that his 
mystical philosophy might lead people to believe that he thought that the 
poet was merely a receiver for mystical impulses from beyond; and might 
therefore forget that the poet must always have conscious control over 
these states. This control manifests itself in the strict form that the poet 
will use to express his vision. And so he posits two types of mystical poet.
1 ‘Vorticism [...] was an attempt to revive the sense of form’ Pound stated in an interview later 
(Writers at Work, 1963 : 41).374
He explains that ‘if you clap a strong magnet beneath a plateful of iron 
filings, the energies of the magnet will proceed the organise form’. In the 
same way, some poets organise form by expressing mystical forces ‘The 
love of God, the “life force” [...] what you will’ (Pound, 1980 : 7). This kind 
of poet expresses mystical forms in the same way the iron filings express 
the force o f magnetism. And yet ‘this is not Vorticism’ And the reason is 
that the Vorticist (i.e. Pound) is not passive in receiving these mystical 
forces. He actively takes them and forces them into form. As Pound puts it 
‘The Vorticist is expressing his complex consciousness’ (Pound, 1980 : 8). 
To see the difference we should examine one of Pound’s ‘Vorticist’ poems, 
which he published in issue one of Blast.
Before Sleep.
The lateral vibrations caress me,
They leap and caress me,
They work pathetically in my favour,
They seek my financial good.
She of the spear stands present.
The gods of the underworld attend my, O Annubis. 
These are they of my company.
With a pathetic solicitude they attend me; 
Undulant,
Their realm is the lateral courses.
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Light! I am up to follow thee, Pallas.
Up and out of their caresses.
You were gone up as a rocket,
Bending your passages from right to left and from 
left to right 
In the flat projection of a spiral.
The gods of drugged sleep attend me,
Wishing me well.
I am up to follow thee, Pallas (Pound, 1967 : 47).
This poem deals with the narrator drifting into sleep, when he becomes 
aware that he is surrounded by the gods o f the dead (Annuis is the Egyptian 
God of the dead). These gods of the underworld are the gods that express 
themselves in an ‘iron filing’ way; i.e. passively. If he was to express their 
wisdom he would be financially rewarded (presumably because this is what 
people want to hear). But their realms are the ‘lateral’ realms; they are 
unable to break free of this world, and therefore they are ‘pathetic’. 
Counterpointed against these gods is Pallas, the god of wisdom. That she is 
the Vorticist god is shown by her movement, she moves up (’as a rocket’) 
‘from right to left and from left to right’ i.e. in a gyre or vortex. Her realm, 
is in other words, vertical, as opposed to the horizontal realm o f the ‘gods 
of drugged sleep’. She enables the poet, in other words to be active rather 
than passive. The other gods wish him well, but they cannot follow; only the 
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Vorticist route can lead to real wisdom. Vorticism is, therefore, a 
redefinition o f Imagiste poetics, stressing the concepts o f form and activity 
that Pound believed he had neglected in his initial formulations.
But that is not quite all, because by the second edition of Blast in 1915, 
Pound had altered his meaning yet again. To see why, we must return to the 
problem of form. As we have seen. Pound wished to construct a giant epic 
of the modern world, and yet he was hamstrung by the problem of process, 
which Imagiste poetics had great difficulty dealing with. This was because 
of the ‘pointillist’ nature of Imagiste poetics. Imagism could only deal with 
the moment, and Pound had to work out a way to string these moments 
together in order to create form; without, however, using the obvious 
chronological links. Moreover, he would have to deal with this problem to 
write his poem which would include history. As Pound became more 
interested in Vorticism he began to think that it might hold the key to this 
problem of ‘process’. Since Vorticism dealt with activity but in a, as it were, 
static fashion (given its concern with the spinning vortex which was, 
however, always viewed from a ‘still point’) possibly it might give Pound 
what he wanted; a way o f dealing with change without compromising his 
Neo-Platonic philosophy. And so, by 1915, the definition of a vortex has 
subtly altered. It is now ‘a radiant node or cluster, it is what I can and must 
perforce call a VORTEX, from which, and through which, and into which, 
ideas are constantly rushing’ (Pound, 1980 : 207). Previously it was the past 
which was rushing into the vortex. The difference is now that Pound having 
set up his static vortex or image, now wishes to set it moving. He wishes to
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adapt his Imagiste aesthetic to deal with the problem of movement. 
(Levenson catches this point (1984 : 127-128)). To illustrate this, we must 
again analyse one of the poems Pound wrote for Blast Two.
DOGMATIC STATEMENT ON THE GAME AND PLAY OF CHESS
Red knights, brown bishops, bright queens,
Strikiug the board, falling in strong ‘L”s of colour,
Reaching and striking in angles,
Holding lines of one colour;
This board is alive with light 
These pieces are living in form,
Their moves break and reform the pattern;
Luminous green from the rooks,
Clashing with 'x"s of queens,
Looped with the knight-leaps “Y” pawns, cleaving, embanking,
Whirl, centripetal, mate,
King down in the vortex;
Clash, leaping of bands, straight strips of hard colour,
Blocked lights working in, escapes, renewing of contest 
(Pound, 1967: 18).
As the present participle used throughout shows, this is an attempt to
present a chess game as it  is actually happening, in other words, as a
process. Pound is not so much interested in the pieces themselves, because
the ‘board is alive with light, These pieces are living in form’. The light
shows us that Pound is more interested in the Platonic reality, or the
Platonic processes that lie behind the game, than in the game itself. The 
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phrase ‘living in form’ shows what he is trying to do; these pieces are 
represented by ‘form’ (i.e. pure form, which, as we know, Pound took from  
Kandinsky) and yet, unlike timeless (and therefore dead) Platonic realities 
they are ‘living’. He is attempting, therefore, to set up a timeless Platonic 
realm and make it  move. What he is trying to avoid  is Bergsonian flux.
And so when Harriet Monroe claimed that this was a ‘Futurist’ poem, 
Pound rightly denied it: ‘The pictures proposed in the verse are pure 
Vorticism [.,.] the two movements are not synonymous. Admitted there is a 
shade of dynamism in the proposition, to treat the pieces as light 
potentialities, still the concept arrangement is Vorticist’ (Ruthven, 1969 : 
75). Pound admits that there is a ‘shade’ of dynamism (i.e. Futurism), 
because like the Bergsonian he is more interested in the dynamic ‘light 
potentialities’ (i.e. the metaphysical reality of the pieces) than in the pieces 
themselves. Nevertheless, this interest in dynamism is balanced by the 
emphasis on static form in the poem. Phrases like ‘holding lines in one 
colour’, ‘straight strips of hard colour’ and ‘reform the pattern’, balance 
the inherent dynamism of the concept; in the same way as the literal ‘strips 
of hard colour’ balance the Bergsonianism in a painting by Lewis. With this 
poem, then, Pound believed he had found a solution to his two problems; 
the problem of form and the problem of process. This is not to say that the 
Cantos were to be a ‘Vorticist’ poem. Pound was, as he realised himself, 
still in the grip of fin de siécîe aesthetics; albeit greatly modified. It was not 
until Hugh Selwyn Mauberiy that he waved a regretful goodbye to that view 
point. Mauberiy, who was ‘out of key with his time’ is not of course Pound;
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but he is an element of Pound that Pound felt had to die; the aesthete. And 
the way that this would be achieved was to turn away from the mystical- 
aesthetic viewpoint he had held up until this point, and instead deal with 
the twentieth century on its own terms, and learn the new social sciences 




It has been argued in this thesis that there are two main strands of 
Anglo-American Modernist poetry. Firstly, there is the school 
associated with T.E.Hulme. This has its roots in French Associationist 
psychology, and Bergson. In English literature, perhaps the closest 
analogue is the the early works o f Pater. Like Pater, Hulme began as a 
relativist, a materialist, and a sceptic, who nevertheless desperately 
wanted to affirm aesthetic and moral values and proclaim the existence 
of free will. Moreover, (again like Pater), Hulme was eclectic in the 
extreme, and was able to adapt thought from a huge variety of sources 
to bolster up his own theorising. Thus, whereas on the surface his 
thinking seemed to go through at least three distinct phases, on closer 
inspection there were far closer links between these philosophies than 
Hulme would, perhaps, been prepared to admit. As far as his links with 
Romanticism are concerned, one may note that at least some of his 
sources (Nietzsche, Bergson) have Romantic roots, and that his 
theories are, on the whole, amenable to a Romantic interpretation 
(especially in terms o f his anti-rationalism).
Associated with Hulme are the poets o f the Forgotten School of 
Imagism, especially F.S. Flint, Storer, and Campbell. Unlike Hulme, 
these men took little interest in metaphysical speculations, but instead 
concentrated on the practicalities o f artistic creation and (when in a 
philosophical mood) political philosophy.
The other main school of British Modernist poetry is that of Yeatsian 
mystical Symbolism, the most famous practitioner of which, apart from
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Yeats himself, is Ezra Pound. It is only by considering the metaphysic 
behind this mystical or occult Symbolism that one can fully explain the 
problems of form and content that have exercised literary historians 
since the publication of these writer's canonical literary works.
There are two points that are extremely important to grasp here: first 
that Yeats and Pound predicated their work around an institutionalised 
elitism. That is to say, they aimed their works only towards the 
spiritual aristocracy who had rejected the vulgarities o f materialism  
and bourgeois democracy. Secondly that their metaphysic was Neo- 
Platonic.
Only by remembering these facts can the questions of the purpose of 
the classic Modernist literary techniques be fully explained. For 
example, I have demonstrated that the 'allusive method' has two 
purposes in Pound's poetry. Firstly, it helps to create and preserve and 
extend the literary 'tradition', a tradition of literary élites, a tradition 
of which Pound believed himself and Yeats to be a part. By quoting 
from works o f the past, one put them in different contexts, and made 
them live for new generations, at the same time as stressing the 
analogies between the writer's aesthetic problems and achievements 
and one's own.
Secondly, one uses the knowledge of these artist's work as a test, a 
way of eliminating those not in the tradition from the ranks of 
knowledgeable readers o f the work in question. The allusions therefore 
exclude as much as they include; and this is a direct result of the
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elitism cited above.
The question of Neo-Platonism is, possibly, even more important, 
given that it is the Neo-Platonic assumption o f metaphysical reality as 
being a spatial, and not a temporal phenomenon that leads, I have 
shown, to the very mechanics o f form used in many canonical 
Modernist texts.
These then, are the conclusions of the thesis. However, in this 
afterword we may wish to continue and see whether this new paradigm 
of Anglo-American Modernism can illuminate other problems that, 
strictly speaking lie outside its scope (which is, to reiterate, up until 
the beginning of the First World War). For example it has frequently 
been noted that Ezra Pound began as a Neo-Romantic, and only later 
'modernised’ himself. When did this 'break’ from Romantic aesthetics 
occur? There has been no shortage of answers. Dasenbrock in The 
Literary Vorticism o f  Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound (1985) suggests 
the Homage to Sextius Propertius sequence o f 1916 (begun 1917). Noel 
Stock (in his book Poet in Exile, 1964 puts forward the Ripostes volume 
of 1912. Robinson suggest the Canzoni volume is the first hint of 
Pound’s 'later’ manner, in Poetry, Painting and Ideas 1885-1914  (1985).
There are, I would suggest, three answers to this question. The first is 
that the question is facile, in that two of the key elements of Pound’s 
Modernism (the allusive method, and the disjunctive, non-logical link 
between elements within the poem) can be clearly seen in various 
poems in his first volume A Lume Spento, written when he was still
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unequivocally a Neo-RomanticT
There are, however, two more key elements that did not yet exist, 
and we must keep in mind that Pound’s Modernism was not a 
disinterested attempt to formulate a modern aesthetic, but was, 
instead, practical. The reason why he altered his aesthetic was that he 
wished to write a modern epic, and all his efforts were undertaken with 
this ultimate goal in mind. He had two main obstacles to overcome: 
firstly to discover a language with which he could deal with twentieth 
century realities, and secondly to find a form. We can see, as I have 
shown, the first efforts towards modern diction in the last section of 
Canzoni, and a move towards a firmer sense of form, but, at that point. 
Pound had not abandoned the idea of chronological progression as 
structure. It was only when, increasingly under the sway of Neo- 
Platonism, he saw more fully the implications of this for his view of 
temporality, that Pound finally abandoned chronology (and, indeed, a 
temporal aesthetic), in the "Xenia’ sequence of 1913, and we see 
further developments in this direction in Pound’s discussions of 
Vorticism.
However, this does not mean that Pound’s development was over by 
the outbreak of World War One. As we have seen, one o f the main 
distinctions between the fin de s ièd e  aesthetic outlook, and the avant- 
garde approach (which meant, at this period. Futurism), was that 
whereas the Decadent writer was out of the world (in his 'ivory 
tower’), the Futurist was determined to be in the world. This was what
1 See chapter four, footnotes five and six.
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Wyndham Lewis objected to when he claimed that Art was becoming 
confused with Life. He wished not only to keep these realms separate, 
but to ensure that the artist stayed in the realm of art.
And so, if one wished to see when Pound ended the process of 
'modernisation' one would look for signs that he was moving away 
from Art for Art’s sake Aestheticism and towards, instead, a way of 
making art useful, a way o f bringing art into the world, a way of 
helping the artist to influence real events. Is it, therefore, a coincidence 
that after 1918 Pound turns away from mysticism and towards 
economics (Carpenter, 1988)? I think not, and I see Pound’s increasing 
interest in politics from this point onwards as being part o f this 
attempt to make art useful, to merge art and life, to make his epic not 
just an aesthetic artifact, but, instead, something that helped to make 
real events happen in the real world. By the end of World War One, 
therefore. Pound’s apprenticeship was over, and it is, again, no 
coincidence that it is now that he begins to write The Cantos. (To what 
extent Pound ever really divested himself of his mystical beliefs is of 
course a moot point: Pound, 1973 : 70-71 might be illuminating in this 
respect.)^
In the case of Wyndham Lewis we have a slightly different problem. 
Between 1910 and 1 9 1 4 ,1 have argued, we find Lewis moving slowly
2 But even this landmark, the beginning of the Cantos, Is more ambiguous than it seems. Pound 
actually began to write this ‘poem of some length’ in 1915 with the three {eventually scrapped) 
‘ur-Cantos’, and made two further attempts in 1917 and 1918. Cantos IV,V,VI,VII, and ,VIII, were 
actually written before Pound rewrote the first three Cantos (in 1923), to give the beginning of 
the poem as we have it now. The first publication of this first section of the poem, of course, was 
in January 1925, with the publication of A DRAFT OF XVI CANTOS of EZRA POUND for the 
Beginning of a Poem of Some Length (Bush, 1976).
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away from an aesthetic based on Bergsonian Becoming towards one 
predicated upon Neo-Platonic Being. By the outbreak of World War 
One, however, this process was by no means complete. Even at the end  
of the war in The Caliph's Design (1919), Lewis can espouse a view that 
still seems avant-garde. It is only by the mid nineteen-twenties that we 
find Lewis espousing his mature worldview, which opposes what he 
calls the 'tim e-culf (Bergsonian relativism, which constitutes much of 
what we call European Modernism) with an undoubtedly Neo-Platonic 
objectivism, which even has, as Lewis freely admits, a connection with 
Thomism (see the chapter 'God as Reality’ in Time and Western Man, 
first published 1927 (Lewis, 1993)).^ It is only be examining the 
metaphysical beliefs o f Lewis in this period (a task which lies outside 
the scope of this thesis) that one can fully understand Lewis’s fiction 
and art of the time.
Like Pound and Yeats, therefore, Lewis was, fundamentally, a 
metaphysical, even a religious, writer and thinker (See Tomlin, 1980 : 
40-43).
3 In other words, whereas Pound began as an Aesthete and moved in the direction of the 
avant-garde, Lewis began as an avant-gardeist, and moved back to an older Neo-Romantic 
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